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Abstract:
This thesis studies the expansion of workers’ collective action and collective bargaining 
over working conditions in the context of the Spanish Restauracion (1875-1923), in an 
institutional setting characterised by the absence or little enforcement of legislation 
concerning industrial conflict and the regulation of working conditions. The thesis 
addresses two of the main issues in the contemporary and historical debate. The first 
one addresses the causes of labour unrest and the existence of a weak and politically 
radical labour movement. A second related issue argues that, had Spanish unions 
adopted the outlook of more conservative British or German unions, they would have 
been able to advance the interests of workers more effectively.
In the first part of the thesis, I offer a narrative of union development based in 
coalition-formation. My main argument is that state policy was crucial in shaping the 
outlook of Spanish unions. I argue that in strike waves, workers in large cities had some 
degree of political power and were able to obtain the (often only temporary) protection 
of state officials from employers’ counterattacks. Since the state was able to monopolise 
the repression of the labour movement up to 1919, ‘public’ lobbying to attract the 
support of the state radicalised the positions of employers and unions. Severely 
contested union rights brought about a system of industrial relations that was 
fragmented and organisationally weak, dependent on state policy to be shaped 
effectively. Up to 1920, the state, however, hesitated to expand its authority to regulate 
more thoroughly the relations between workers and their employers.
The second part of the thesis asks if the Spanish system of industrial relations 
hindered the reaching of co-operative solutions to social problems. In other words, was 
the prevailing system of collective bargaining efficient in the fulfilment of the rapidly 
changing preferences of workers in the period? To answer this question, the thesis offers 
three case studies of collective bargaining over workplace public goods. The main 
conclusion of these exercises is that the supply of public goods was more neutral than 
expected with respect to the institutional setting. Weak unions and the absence of local 
or regional collective bargaining did not prevent workers to modify working conditions 
according to their changing preferences for a shorter workday, a safer workplace, stable 
wages and income smoothing during economic downturns.
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction.
Labour market performance in Spain in the political context of the Restoration (1874- 
1923) offers the opportunity to study the operation of a labour market in absence of 
formally constituted collective bargaining institutions, minimum wage legislation or 
unemployment insurance, and other common regulations of post-Second World War 
labour markets in Europe and North-America. Therefore, a relatively unregulated labour 
market generates the possibility of measuring the effect of forces other than well 
enforced labour market regulation and binding employment contracts on the evolution 
of labour market institutions and workers’ welfare. The underdevelopment of labour 
market regulation in Spain in the late 19th and early 20th centuries did not imply labour 
markets worked exclusively as spot markets in which “exit” was the main determinant 
of the terms of employment. “Voice”, taking the multiple forms of strikes, boycotts, 
sabotage or collective bargaining, played an important role as well. In fact, the period 
witnessed a highly cyclical, but rising, trend in workers’ collective mobilisation in the 
form of growing union membership and strike activity.
This thesis takes into account that institutions of collective action matter and 
differ substantially among countries. The labour movement in Spain has often been 
characterised by its radicalism, instability, widespread violent tactics and quasi­
revolutionary general strikes. For example, comparing the Italian and Spanish labour 
movements before 1917, Edward Malefakis stressed:
( ...)  the Spanish and Italian working classes and their movements remained far less 
integrated with the rest o f society than was true in Western and Central Europe, 
particularly in the pre-communist era. ( ...)  There was no decrease in collective violence 
as worker organization spread, no reasonably secure hegemony o f reformist leaders, (...),
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no abandonment o f revolutionary goals in revolutionary situations for the defense of  
democratic capitalist regimes.1
Revolutionary syndicalism offers an interesting case-study of the development 
of labour institutions and labour market outcomes in the presence of class antagonism, 
which erodes social capital and hinders co-operative solutions to social problems. 
Comparing the Spanish experience with the more mature British and German labour 
movements, the central tenet of the academic and reformist view of labour unions 
(developed in chapter 3) affirmed that unions had to become moderate to make peaceful 
collective bargaining possible. This line of argumentation appeared, for example, in the 
following paragraph written by a commission of Catalan cotton textile workers after 
they visited Lancashire in 1889:
The docility o f English workers is the result o f the assurances they receive from the 
employers’ union, which maintains the collective agreements reached without any 
variation. It thereby offers confidence to the worker, who, in return, offers peace to the 
employer.2
When addressing class antagonism, contemporary reformers stressed several 
institutional characteristics related to economic and political underdevelopment bearing 
on the evolution of the labour movement. Following this lead, accounts of labour history 
up to the Civil War have incorporated the metaphor of “failure” which has been used to 
explain the arduous transition of Spain to economic and politic modernity. “Failure” 
looms large in narratives of Spain’s slow and incomplete industrialisation. The 
comparison with England’s industrial revolution was for instance used in the classic 
work on Spanish economic history, Jordi Nadal’s, El fracaso de la revolucion industrial 
en Espana (the failure of the Industrial Revolution in Spain). Similarly, the inability of 
the Spanish parliamentary system to allow for greater presence of Republican and 
Socialist representatives also accounts for the Restoration system’s failure to co-opt new
1 Malefakis, Edward, “A comparative analysis o f workers’ movements in Spain and Italy,” p. 59. In 
Richard Gunther, ed., Politics, society, and democracy: the case o f  Spain (New York, 1993).
2 Comision Obrera Catalana, Memoria descriptiva redactada por la Comision Obrera Catalana para 
estudiar las fabricas de hilados y  tejidos de algodon de Inglaterra (Barcelona, 1889), quoted in Smith, 
Angel, “Social conflict and trade union organisation in the Catalan textile industry, 1890-1914,” 
International Review o f  Social History, XXXVI (1991), p. 374.
3 Nadal, Jordi, El fracaso de la Revolucion Industrial en Espana, 1814-1913 (Barcelona, 15 th edition, 
1997).
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political forces.4 In this context, political and economic backwardness explained the 
expansion and persistence of radical ideologies among Spanish working class 
institutions. As American labour historian Benjamin Martin put it:
In Western Europe sustained economic growth and the improving status o f wage 
earners made trade unions a more integral part o f the institutional, social, and 
economic fabric and had a moderating effect in their outlooks and policies. Such was 
not the case in Spain, where capitalistic development had been only partial and highly 
uneven. Labor organizations continued to draw their force as vehicles for popular 
protest amid frustration over the vestiges o f preindustrialism that condemned the 
country to an excruciatingly slow economic expansion.5
Pere Gabriel points to capitalistic underdevelopment as explaining the reasons for 
the growing radicalisation and ultimate ‘failure’ of the labour movement (in this case 
referring exclusively to the Catalan labour movement):
Strikes usually ended badly because o f the intransigence o f some employers, because 
o f government repression for more general political reasons, or sooner or later 
because o f terrorist provocations. The trade union movement consequently became 
disorganised while the conditions previously agreed to were gradually rejected by the 
employers. When reorganization appeared to be more or less established another 
strike movement would develop and the cycle repeated. (...)
This created a situation in which co-operative solutions to social problems could not be 
reached, reinforcing the antagonism between workers and employers:
This cycle had many implications. Essentially, it underscored the incapacity of 
Catalan, and more generally Spanish, society (ultimately the incapacity o f Spanish 
capitalism) to permit the “orderly” development o f the trade union movement and of 
labor improvement which were the great hope o f many reformism intellectuals and, 
lest we forget, o f many trade unionists as well. A high degree o f continuous trade 
union effort took place in Catalonia but not the organizational stability of the labour 
movement. The situation did not tend to strengthen the resolve o f labor leaders to
4 Ringrose, David M., Spain, Europe, and the “Spanish miracle, ” 1700-1900 (Cambridge, 1996), p. 7.
5 Martin, Benjamin, The agony o f  modernization. Labor and industrialization in Spain (Ithaca, NY, 
1990), p. XV.
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avoid direct confrontations and avert disorganization (...)  but rather to reinforce the 
most intransigent outlooks.6
1.1. The strike threat and rising workers’ militancy.
In the first part of the thesis, I describe how workers’ collective protest took an ever 
increasing role and labour unrest became one of the most salient political issues of 
Restoration Spain. Contemporary observers linked the spread of labour militancy to the 
liberal and industrial revolutions of the first half of the 19 century. The Liberal 
Revolution, starting in 1808 with the independence war against Napoleon, forbade 
urban guilds first in 1813 and finally in 1835. The French sociologist and member of the 
Paris Musee Social, Angel Marvaud, argued in a classic book on the Spanish cuestion 
social (the social problem) that:
The consequences o f the banning o f guilds (gremios) -final as I said in 1835- had severe 
consequences on the urban workers: they opposed the (previous) co-operative regime 
because it limited their freedom, but it (the previous situation) was preferable to the state 
o f complete isolation that was to threaten them from then onwards.7
The Industrial Revolution and the advance of mechanisation was the second cause 
of workers’ discontent. According to contemporary theories of wage and labour supply 
determination, mechanisation caused unemployment and falling product prices and 
drove wages and hours to levels barely avoiding the starvation of the worker. As a 
consequence of falling wages, children and women were driven into the labour market, 
further depressing wages. Defenceless in front of the employer, the worker was forced 
to accept intolerable working conditions or otherwise unemployment and destitution. 
This shifting of rights in favour of increasingly powerful employers explained the rising 
trend in workers’ discontent.
This relative deprivation hypothesis has also been incorporated into recent 
contributions to Spanish labour history. These narratives of the rise of labour militancy 
in Spain stress the role of technological factors and market forces triggering stagnant or
6 Gabriel, Pere, “Classe obrera i sindicats a Catalunya, 1903-1920,” pp. 825-826. Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, Universitat de Barcelona, 1981.
7 Marvaud, Angel, La question sociale en Espangne (Paris, 1910), pp. 22-23.
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even declining living standards and the disruption of traditional social relations. In turn, 
these discontinuities generated frustration-aggression responses explaining the
o
organisation of workers’ collective action. The inability of Spanish capitalism to satisfy 
the demands of workers caused the radicalisation of the labour movement. For example, 
Benjamin Martin has claimed that:
The socioeconomic lag greatly enhanced the inflow o f the new political credos -  
socialism, anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism- that were part and parcel o f the Industrial 
Revolution but shaped and attenuated by Iberian underdevelopment. Spanish socialists 
sought to emulate the socialdemocratic practices o f its Western European counterparts 
but found it necessary to periodically resort to quasi-insurrectionary actions. The 
inherent instabilities o f the Catalonian textile economy ruled out any durable labor 
peace in Barcelona, thus contributing to the most insurrection-prone anarchist 
movement in Western Europe and to the pervasive spread of anarcho-syndicalism.9
Because radical politics and mass strikes antagonised employers, an 
insurrectionary labour movement prevented the orderly development of collective 
bargaining institutions and the supply of socially useful institutions like savings banks, 
co-operative stores or mutual benefit societies. In what was the traditional interpretation 
of Spanish reformers, the problem of social unrest was to be solved by the maturation of 
the labour movement through the provision of collective bargaining in exchange of 
social peace, while reformers sought to correct market failures or unsatisfactory market 
outcomes through a far-reaching regulatory programme. In this regard, reformers 
compared the experience of the more mature German and British unions with 
revolutionary syndicalism in France, Italy and Spain.
In part I of the thesis, I argue that this comparison with more mature labour 
movements is misleading and that processes of growth and maturation in working class 
militancy had fundamentally different dynamics. Since formal bargaining mechanisms 
and institutions did not exist and the rights to belong to a union and to strike were 
contested, workers turned to the public arena to express their grievances. In this context,
I consider state policy was crucial in diminishing or increasing the size of the costs of
8 On frustration-aggression models o f workers’ behaviour: Shorter, Edward and Charles Tilly, Strikes in 
France, 1830-1968 (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 6-7.
9 Martin, Benjamin, The agony, p. XV.
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collective action, shielding unions from employers’ repression in particular 
circumstances or further repressing workers in others. In this case, state policy shaped 
the evolution and the types of institutions of the labour movement. A ‘political’ model 
will consider thus:
1. Union demands.
2. Strikes.
3. Political opportunities / strike outcomes.
4. Union strategy (and back to 2).
It is easy to see why workers turned to the political or public arena to express 
their grievances. This is for instance commonly contemplated in the literature on 
institutional change. In some contexts, institutional change cannot be achieved between 
the main private actors because high transaction costs make such voluntary agreements 
difficult.10 For example, we could imagine arbitration institutions in strikes in the form 
of joint boards of workers and employers which could diminish the costs of frequent 
strike action. In this sense, they might be efficiency-enhancing institutions. As I show 
in chapter 2, however, union recognition clauses were seldom accepted by employers. 
The agents with an interest in institutional reform see the political solution as the most 
cost-effective means of overcoming the transaction costs that hamper the private 
solution. Institutional reform is not necessarily income or efficiency enhancing, it might 
only be redistributive. What is important is that the agents involved in institutional 
reform show some public display of their grievances and that some ‘political’ solution 
is given leading to institutional reform. A political solution generates a new distribution 
of rents and opens another round of “public” lobbying, producing further institutional 
reforms. Different rounds of this exchange lead to a circular process of institutional 
change.
Focusing on political solutions and public lobbying, my model of union growth 
depends on strike waves, which in turn depend on political opportunities opened by 
events such as colonial wars, election years or government crises. In this context,
10 Libecap, Gary, Contracting fo r property rights (Cambdrige, 1989), chapter 1; Knight, Jack, Institutions 
and social conflict (Cambridge, 1992), “The primary importance o f distributional conflict;” Majone, 
Giandomenico, Evidence, argument, and persuasion in the policy process (New Haven, 1989), chapter 5 
“Changing institutional constraints.”
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unions did not grow through ordered dues collection and the gradual supply of 
collective and non-collective goods. Rather, as Spanish anarcho-syndicalists 
maintained, it was the strike that made the union in a sudden process of union growth. 
Paradoxically, this model of union expansion is akin to the hypotheses put forward by 
critics of the labour movement linking trade unions with fundamental political change 
(developed in chapter 3). Critical in this ‘political’ explanation is the fact that 
authorities decided to arbitrate or repress strikes, which in turn shaped the institutions of 
the labour movement. This is explained in chapter 4 of the thesis, in which it is argued 
that the political power enjoyed by workers in big cities and an economic and its 
interaction with political elite divided along the way of handling labour unrest allowed 
for the expansion of a strike-prone labour movement which included the unskilled. By 
maximising the probability of a favourable political intervention in the strike, radical 
union strategies in big cities running larger than average strikes became, with some 
important exceptions, a winning strategy up to 1920. Nevertheless, the same forces that 
made union growth possible -an inclusive strategy of strike and union participation- 
also unleashed the forces of government and employer repression which ended the 
strike wave, as in 1903, 1911 or 1920.
By looking at strike conflict, the narrative of union growth proposed here moves 
away from traditional explanations based on the internal dynamics of the labour 
movement studied in isolation of the political and ideological environment (studied in 
chapter 3). In absence of clearly defined and enforced union and strike rights, strikers 
needed outside allies to defeat powerful employers.
1.2. Workplace public goods.
The second part of the thesis examines the effects of workers’ collective action and 
state intervention on the operation of labour markets. Between 1874 and 1923, the 
workday was subject of substantial regulatory decisions. In 1900, maximum hours 
ceilings for women and children were passed and in February 1919 the state satisfied 
the fundamental demand of the 8-hour day. The right to rest on Sundays was subject of 
legislation in 1904 and hours ceilings were established for mining, textiles and sales 
and retail workers in the 1910s. Workplace safety and sanitation was regulated since 
1900, with a labour inspection service starting to work in 1906. Workplace accident 
compensation was obtained in 1900 and substantially improved in 1922. After these
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initial efforts, minimum wage laws, unemployment insurance and an old-age pension 
system were adopted in the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s.
Moreover, unions and strikers also pushed for higher wages, a shortening of the 
working day and the banning of payment by the piece. For example, workers’ demands 
in 1890 are outlined in Temma Kaplan’s vivid depiction of the first 1st of May 
celebrated in Barcelona:
May Day 1890 became a revolutionary international holiday, complete with anthems, 
globes enveloped with palms o f peace, red carnations, red flags, and, in Barcelona, 
yellow triangular ribbons emblazoned with slogans calling for the eight-hour day. The 
demonstration in Barcelona started with a mass meeting at the Tivoli theater in Gracia 
Pass, close to the Plaza de Catalunya. The audience heard the speakers call for the eight 
hour day, and end to child labor altogether for children under fourteen, and a six-hour 
day for those between the ages o f fourteen and eighteen. They demanded the abolition 
of most night work and prohibition o f female employment in mines. They called for 
consecutive thirty-six hour rest periods every weekend or for a half-day on Saturday.
And they demanded that the Government regulate jobs dangerous to the health of  
workers.11
In 1903, the detailed accounts of Miguel Sastre Sanna on Barcelona’ strikes
fFi 1 9enables us to identify workers’ demands in the early 20 century. I have collected the 
number of times each issue was mentioned in the strikes reported by Sastre in 1903 and
1 Xpresent them in the following table.
11 Kaplan, Temma, Red city, blue period. Social movements in Picasso’s Barcelona (Berkeley, 1992)..
12 Miguel Sastre Sanna, Las huelgas de Barcelona y  sus resultados durante el aho 1903. Acompahados de 
numerosos e importantes datos estadisticos sobre asuntos relacionados con la cuestion social obrera en 
Barcelona (Barcelona, 1904). There are yearly issues of information on Barcelona’s strikes until 1914.
13 Workers’ demands were presented as a written collective contract (bases de trabajo) organised in 
articles, each article referring to one issue at each time: wages for all categories, hours, time schedule, etc.
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Table 1.1. Strikers’ demands in Barcelona, 1903.
Issue: Times:
Shorter Hours 17
Higher Wages 15
Restrictions on freedom of dismissal 6
Solidarity with other strikers* 5
Sunday rest 4
Adoption o f time rates instead o f piece rates 3
Work organisation 2
Re-admission o f sent off union workers 2
Right to associate 2
Lay off o f non-union workers (union-shop)* 2
Seniority rules in recessions 2
Housing 1
Sickness insurance 1
Source: Own elaboration from Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona en el 
aho 1903 (Barcelona, 1904).
* not presented in bases de trabajo but motivation o f strike._________
As in 1890, the main demand of workers on strike in Barcelona in 1903 was the 
shortening of the working week, followed by higher wages, exercising some control 
over company’s hiring and lay off policies and the management of piece rates.
Making a final leap over time, the programme presented by the anarcho- 
syndicalist National Confederation of Labour (Confederacion Nacional del Trabajo, 
CNT) at the General Strike of 191714 presented a mixture of “old” and “new” elements. 
The programme presented the following objectives of the organisation:
14 General Strike declared all over Spain. For reference see Meaker, Gerald H., The Revolutionary Left; 
Lacomba, Juan Antonio, La crisis espanola de 1917 (Madrid, 1970).
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Table 1.2. CNT programme for the 1917 General Strike._________________________
1. A Republic
2. Recognition o f working-class syndicates and their power to veto laws passed by the bourgeois 
Cortes}5
3. A seven-hour day and an English Week.
4. A minimum wage o f 4 pesetas a day and no piece-work.
5. Pensions for disabled workmen and for those over 50.
6. Children under 14 not to work
7. The dissolution of the Army and its substitution by a militia.
8. A declaration o f war to come only after a plebiscite, and those who vote for it to be enlisted first.16
9. Separation o f Church and State, dissolution of convents and the closure of the churches for a certain 
period.
10. Divorce laws.
11. Nationalisation o f land.
12. Reforms o f the prison system to make it more humane.
13. Prohibition o f all festivals (e.g. bullfights and indecent cabarets) which can brutalise the people.
Source: Quoted from Brenan, Gerald, The Spanish Labyrinth (Cambridge, 1943), p. 198-199. Original 
source is Manuel de Burgos y Mazo, Paginas histdricas de 1917 (Madrid, 1919), p. 79-83.17__________
Among the “old” elements that could perfectly join the 1903 list are the familiar 
regulation of the working week and hours of work, the antagonism against piece rates, 
the necessity of setting a network of social insurance for sick and old workers, or the 
minimum wage. Efforts to improve working conditions were now backed by a 
movement committed to the violent overthrow of the monarchy, to the dissolution of the 
army and to stop the involvement of Spain in World War 1. The labour movement was 
now organised along class lines and used the revolutionary general strike to have an
1 Rimpact on government policies.
In spite of the changing nature of working class institutions, in part 2 of the 
thesis, I study the collective bargaining (formal and informal) of the main demands of 
Spanish unions related to working conditions. In order to do that, I consider observable 
characteristics of labour markets like wages, hours of work, effort rules, forms of 
contract, layoff policies, and industrial safety can be treated as collective or public
15 Cortes is the Spanish Parliament.
16 The debate on the participation o f Spain in the 1st World War is treated with great detail in Meaker, 
G.H., The revolutionary Left., ch.2, “The Ordeal o f Neutrality.”
17 Burgos y Mazo was Minister of Interior in 1917.
18 The same can be said o f the General Workers’ Union (Union General de Trabaj adores, UGT) which 
originally organised the general strike o f 1917.
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goods: “attributes of work that by their very nature must be experienced jointly, such as 
the speed of the assembly line, cotton lint in the air, or the risk of catastrophic 
accidents.”19 Those collective goods are bargained by agents’ means to exert collective 
action such as unions and employers’ associations, with the implication of a third agent
90with regulatory and coercive power such as the state.
The argument on the impact of unions on workplace public goods is put forward 
by Richard Freeman and James Medoff in the following paragraph, where it is argued 
that union take into account the preferences of older, less marketable workers, with 
firm-specific human capital acquired during their careers:
The collective nature of the trade unionism fundamentally alters the operation of the 
labour market and hence the nature of the labor contract. In a non-union setting, where 
exit and entry is the predominant form o f adjustment, the signals and incentives to firms 
depend on the preferences o f the “marginal” worker, the one who might leave because of 
(or be attracted by) small changes in the conditions o f employment. The firm responds 
primarily to the needs o f this marginal worker, who is young and marketable; the firm 
can to a considerable extent ignore the preferences o f typically older, less marketable 
workers, who -  for reasons o f skill, knowledge, rights that cannot be readily transferred 
to other enterprises, as well as because o f other costs associated with changing firms -  
are effectively immobilised. In a unionized setting, by contrast, the union takes account 
. o f all workers in determining its demands at the bargaining table, so that desires of 
workers who are highly unlikely to leave the enterprise are also represented. With 
respect to public goods at the workplace, the union can add up members’ preferences in 
much the same manner in which a government can add up voters’ preferences for 
defense, police protection, and the like to determine social demand for them. In sum, 
because unions are political institutions with elected leaders, they are likely to respond 
to a different set o f preferences from those that prevail in a competitive labour market.21
The literature on unions and the supply of public goods, however, has been 
developed under the assumption that strikers and unions have well defined and
19 Wright, Gavin, “Labor history and labor economics” (Boston, 1987), in Field, Alexander (ed.), The 
future o f  economic history (Boston, 1987).
20 On unions as fundamentally bargaining over workplace public goods: Olson, Mancur, The logic o f  
collective action. Public goods and the theory o f  groups (Cambridge, MA, 1995), chapter 3 “The labor 
union and economic freedom,” p.67. As well in Duncan, Greg J. and Frank P. Stafford, “Do union 
members receive compensating differentials?,” The American Economic Review, 70, 3 (June 1980), p. 
355.
21 Freeman Medoff, What do unions do? (New York, 1984), p.9-10.
Chapter 1. Introduction. 21
relatively uncontested rights, which accords well with the system of industrial relations 
in post-war labour markets in Western Europe and the US but not with labour markets 
in the 19th century. It is not all too clear how the bargaining power of unions is affected 
by the institutional environment and if the “voice” mechanism of unions is less efficient 
when union rights are contested. Does the absence of formal collective bargaining 
hamper the fulfilment of rapidly changing preferences as industrial labour markets 
evolved in the period? Were workers’ demands for workplace public goods met as 
workers gained experience on the new risks faced in industrial establishments? As their 
demands for shorter hours intensified with rising wages? Or, as the expectation of a 
longer attachment to industrial work and the concern for future productivity and old age 
eroded the preference to work by the piece?
To address the impact of workers’ collective action and state policy on 
workplace public goods in the particular institutional context of the Spanish 
Restauracion, I have chosen to study the collective negotiation of the length of the work 
day, of piece rate lists, and of the levels of workplace safety and health. In the case of 
piece rates, given the level of detail needed to understand the lists and the terms of 
contract and the general scarcity of evidence on many sectors, I have focused on the 
negotiation of lists in the Catalan cotton textile industry, where this issue was especially 
important. In the next three sections, I outline approaches used to analyse the historical 
evolution of these workplace public goods with examples drawn from the international 
historical literature.
Hours.
In the international economic history literature the shortening of the working week has 
attracted a great deal of attention. First, it has implications for workers’ welfare as 
leisure has been increasing over time. Moreover, it also offers an interesting case study 
of the effects of unions and collective bargaining on labour market outcomes. In the 
following paragraphs I discuss two models of the decline in hours of work, one by 
Martha Ellen Shiells on hours of work in the British and American iron and steel 
industries and the other, by Robert Whaples on the decline of hours of work in the 
United States between 1914 and 1919.
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The argument putting emphasis on skilled, long-term workers’ preference for 
short-hours is at the base of Martha Ellen Shiells’ comparative analysis of collective 
bargaining of hours in US and British Iron and Steel.22 In the late 19th century, 
American iron and steel firms worked two twelve-hour shifts per day whereas after the 
First World War they started working three shifts of eight hours each. According to 
Shiells, the choice of shift systems depends on the skill mix and hourly wages that must 
be paid to attract eight- and twelve-hour skilled and unskilled workers. Being paid 
higher wages and thus more ready to substitute income by leisure, skilled workers 
demand a premium to work long hours. On the other hand, unskilled workers, with a 
relative greater preference for long hours, would demand a premium to work short 
hours. The argument follows: a firm works 12-hours shifts if the premium paid to 
skilled workers for long hours is lower than the premium paid to unskilled workers for 
short hours. Apparently, Shiells argues, this was to be the equilibrium reached in US 
and British iron and steel in the late 19th century.
However, some changes must have appeared in the early 20th century since 
hours fell considerably. The first candidate is wage increases with backward bending 
labour supply curves. Another is a change in the equilibrium due to declines in hours in 
other industries and sectors shifting the wage functions for unskilled and skilled 
workers and the premiums demanded. Unless these changes were symmetrical for 
unskilled and skilled workers, the transition towards eight-hour days would have 
created a public good problem for workers with heterogeneous preferences.
In Britain, according to Shiells, there existed an efficient collective choice 
mechanism -in  the form of joint boards of conciliation and arbitration- that guaranteed 
that changes in hours reflected changes in the average workers’ preferences. As a 
consequence of this, in March 1919 the eight-hour day was introduced in British Iron 
and Steel. An inspection of wages of unskilled and skilled workers before and after the 
decline in hours allows Shiells to conclude that skilled workers subsidised the change. 
On the other hand, in the US, with a poor collective bargaining mechanism, changes in 
working conditions reflected poorly the preferences of the average worker with twelve
22 Shiells, Martha Ellen (1990), “Collective choice o f working conditions: hours in British and US iron 
and steel, 1890-1923,” Journal o f  Economic History, L, 2 (June 1990), pp.379-392.
23 Ibid., p.386.
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hour shifts remaining for longer. As the collective bargaining mechanism failed, there 
was an increasing pressure on public opinion for government intervention and eight 
hours shifts were finally obtained in 1923.
Shiells article illuminates the decision-making process and offers an institutional 
analysis of the reduction of the working week. Robert Whaples on the other hand 
explicitly tests quantitatively a series of theories concerning the reduction of the 
working week using two different data sets at sector- and city-level.24 The main 
explanatory variables and their contribution in the reduction of the working week in the 
US from 1914 to 1919 are:
Table 1.3. Factors explaining the reduction of the working
_______week in the US. 1914-1919. Whaples (1990)_______
Explanatory variable___________ Contribution_______
Union strength 
Real wages in a backward 
bending labour supply
4.2 % (14 %) 
30.9 %
Tight labour market 16.2%
Immigration 19.4%
Female employment 4.3 %
State Law 1.2%
“Personnel” boom 3.8 %
(Electrification) (30.1%)**
Source: Whaples, “Winning the eight-hour day.”
*when union effect on wages is taken into account.
**electrification on city-level regressions. The table uses 
sectoral data regressions.__________________________
According to Whaples the transition towards short hours is best understood with 
a model of labour supply and demand in which firms offer discrete hour-eamings 
packages. The model also assumes that each worker maximises utility subject to
24 Whaples, Robert, “Winning the eight-hour day 1909-1919,” Journal o f  Economic History, L, 2 (June 
1990), pp.393-406.
25 The model is taken from Bemanke, Ben E., “Employment, hours, and earnings in the Depression,” 
American Economic Review, 76 (March 1986).
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opportunities available within and outside of the manufacturing sector. Important as 
well, workers only consider wages and hours when accepting or refusing a job. Hence 
there is an earnings curve, which is the indifference curve in the eamings-hours space 
for which workers’ utility equals the reservation’s utility that they are able to obtain 
outside the manufacturing sector. Along the same indifference curve workers trade off 
earnings for hours, keeping utility constant. On the demand side, firms convert worked 
hours into output, but there are diminishing returns due to worker fatigue. Firms 
maximise profit by offering an hour-eamings package at the point where the marginal 
cost of labour equals marginal product.
Whaples’ argument goes as follows: as there was a 30 per cent increase in 
manufacturing employment, firms were forced to hire workers whose reservation utility 
was above the eamings-hour package previously offered by firms. The new workers’ 
earnings curves were higher and steeper than those of the initial employees. In order to 
make manufacturing employment attractive, firms had to offer higher earnings and 
shorter hours. Whaples concludes “wartime growth of manufacturing sector should 
therefore be one of the reasons that hours fell.”26 As his regressions show, a tight labour 
market -proxied through rising wages and rising manufacturing employment- not only 
was the main reason why hours fell. Other important causes include the more obvious 
growing union strength and increasing government intervention. Finally, two usually 
neglected factors pushing the working week down are the ‘personnel’ boom described
97by Sanford Jacoby and electrification of the industry. A genuine labour-demand side 
factor, the personnel boom is a set policies implemented in firms that can be thought as 
an investment by employers in the future productivity of their workers. Since employers 
were increasingly aware that worker fatigue reduced future productivity, managers 
sought to minimise this danger by shortening the working day.
Electrification also changes the demand for labour. As Whaples puts forward:
By shifting the ownership of power-generating machine outside the firm, electrification 
might have helped reduce the length o f the work week. This shift reduced the 
manufacturer’s benefits from running machines (including power-generating machines)
26 Whaples, “Winning,” p.387.
27 Jacoby, Sanford (1986), Employing bureaucracy: employers, managers, unions, and the transformation 
of work in the American industiy, 1900-1945 (New York, 1986).
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long hours in an attempt to reduce the fixed costs per unit o f output. Since most firms 
worked only one shift, shortening machine hours meant shortening hours o f labor.28
The variable is not a negligible factor, in spite of the fact that it might be proxying 
some unmeasured characteristics of industries, like the adoption of scientific 
management and new production techniques. In his sector-level regressions, the 
adoption of electricity accounts for a 30 per cent of the measured reduction in hours.
Shiells and Whaples arguments enlighten different parts of a same problem with 
backward bending labour supply curves (i.e. an income effect) underlying the reduction 
of the working day. Shiells shows how changing preferences through a collective 
bargain mechanism are transformed into a shortening of hours, whereas Whaples 
weighted empirically the importance of each of the factors. His main conclusion seems 
to be that the transition to higher wages and lesser hours was mainly a demand-side 
factor, as firms improved the work package to attract rural workers to urban factories.
Piece rates.
There is also a wide literature on the problems of managing piece rates which have also 
been applied to historical problems like the origins and persistence of price lists in the
iL
Lancashire cotton textile industry in the first half of the 19 century. The economics 
literature is unanimous in signalling the cause of workers’ discontent with piece rates: 
wage cuts. According to this view, workers have a notion of what is ‘a fair day’s wage 
for a fair day’s work.’ Notions of fairness are relative, based on a comparison of one’s 
wages with that of similar individuals in the community or firm. But probably the most 
usual comparison is wages earned at present with wages earned in past. Thus if firms 
cut wages, they face strong workers’ opposition in the form of strikes or output 
restriction.
The economics literature on incentive payment schemes focuses on the difficulty 
for firms to implement piece rates, with output restriction at the heart of the problem.
28 Whaples, “Winning,” p. 389.
29 On notions of fairness see Solow, Robert M., The labor market as a social institution (Oxford, 1990) 
and Akerlof, George A. and Janet Yellen (1988), “Fairness and unemployment,” American Economic 
Review, vol. 78, number 1 (1988) and Akerlof and Yellen, “The fair wage-effort hypothesis and 
unemployment,” Quarterly Journal o f  Economics, vol. 105, number 2 (1990).
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Because workers are paid by the output they actually produce, piece rates apparently
solve problems associated with hidden information (adverse selection) and hidden
action (moral hazard). However, in spite of individual output being observable, it is 
precisely the fact that information asymmetries exist that prevents piece rates to be 
implemented successfully. Most authors argue that the problem seems to be the fact that 
workers know a lot more about the production process than managers do. Probably the 
most popular formulation of this argument was put forward by Richard Edwards:
Managers’ ability to control soldiering resulted from their inadequate knowledge of the 
actual techniques o f production. Most o f the specific expertise -for example, the 
knowledge o f how quickly production tasks could be done -resided in workers .. .Piece 
rates always carried the allure o f payment for actual labor done (rather than labor 
power), thus promising an automatic solution to the problem o f translating labor power 
into labor...but as long as management depended on its workers on information for
how fast the job could be done.. .there was no way to make the piece-rate method
deliver its promise.31
Information about the production process is especially needed when new 
techniques are introduced. With stable technologies, the knowledge gap between 
workers and employers can be reduced over time, but the introduction of new 
machinery requires the cooperation of workers and employers. Workers paid by the 
piece should in principle favour the introduction of new techniques that would increase 
their earnings. But “firms never seem to allow their workers to start earning more 
money.” Wage cuts follow every innovation introduced in the firm. The result is 
output restriction and low levels of innovation. For Carmichael and MacLeod the reason 
behind firms' inability to keep fixed piece rates is the competitive environment in which 
these firms operate. The argument assumes that a firm that has successfully enforced an 
explicit contract containing a fixed piece rate. As its workers start to introduce 
innovations, wages and profits grow. However, this knowledge-base can be acquired by 
other employers parasiting the innovating firm. What originally was knowledge
30 See Gibbons, Robert, “Piece-rate incentive schemes,” Journal o f  Labor Economics, vol.5, number 4 
(1987).
31 Edwards, Richard, Contested Terrain (New York, 1979), p.98-99. Quoted in Huberman, Michael, 
Escape from the market. Negotiating Work in Lancashire (Cambridge, 1996), p.66 and in Gibbons, 
Robert, “Piece-Rate Incentive Schemes,” p .414.
32 Carmichael, Lome H. and W. Bentley MacLeod (2000), “Worker cooperation and the Ratchet Effect,” 
Journal o f  Labor Economics, vol. 18, number 1 (2000), p .l.
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produced by workers becomes managers’ property in other firms. If competing firms are 
able to exploit the new knowledge, the ‘innovating’ firm will be driven out of business 
because workers in ‘parasite’ firms are paid a lower piece rate.
Thus the situation above described becomes a classic prisoner’s dilemma. As 
firms cannot commit to keep piece rates stable, workers restrict output and firms are 
kept in an equilibrium in which technical change is costly, workers’ effort and labour 
productivity are low, and piece rates are low. If firms were able to commit themselves 
to not to cut piece rates, they would be in a “high effort-high piece rates” equilibrium.
Given the detail required to understand all contingencies in a piece rate contract, 
the optimal strategy is focusing in a sector rather than on the whole of the industry. 
Authors like Michael Huberman and William Lazonick have made models of 
informational asymmetry operational by analysing the organisation of work in cotton 
spinning, or more precisely on the self-acting mule.34
Gary Miller in his study of work organisation presented a model of piece rate 
bargaining, later used by Michael Huberman to analyse the piece rate problem in cotton 
spinning in Lancashire. The model allows for the creation of endogenous effort norms 
and strategic behaviour and points to community-enforced standards for reference 
wages. The basic prisoner’s dilemma acknowledged in all models of piece rate 
bargaining is here as well analysed. Workers can trust their employers will not cut piece 
rates and give full effort and promote innovations, or to distrust them expecting wage 
cuts and restrict output. Employers can honour the trust of workers and keep piece-rates 
fixed or renege on their commitment and cut wages. For employers, no matter what
33 Ibid.,p.3.
34 See analysis o f the effort problem in the Lancashire firm McConnell and Kennedy in the 1820s in 
Huberman, Michael, Escape from the market, chapter 3. Great detail is as well provided in Lazonick, 
William H. (1981), “Production relations, labor productivity, and choice o f technique: British and US 
cotton spinning,” Journal o f  Economic History, vol. XLI, 3 (September 1981) and especially Lazonick, 
William H., “Industrial relations and technical change: the case o f the self-acting mule,” Cambridge 
Journal o f  Economics, 3 (1979).
35 Miller, Gary, Managerial dilemmas, the political economy o f  hierarchy (Cambridge, 1992); Kreps, 
David M., “Corporate culture and economic theory,” in James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle (eds.), 
Perspectives on positive political economy (Cambridge, 1990); for a test o f the model on mule cotton 
spinning Huberman, Michael, “Piece rates reconsidered: the case of cotton,” Journal o f  Interdisciplinary 
History, XXXVI, 3 (Winter 1996), pp.393-417.
36 Huberman, Escape from the market, p.72.
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workers do, the optimal strategy is renege and cut wages. Since workers are rational, 
they will accordingly restrict output. Both parts are better off if workers do not restrict 
output and employers keep piece rates fixed, but as employers cannot commit not to cut 
wages, a lower utility equilibrium ensues.
In one shot piece rate games the final outcome will inevitably be the one just 
described. Things change when repeated interaction is allowed in the model. As both 
parts can punish each other in future negotiations, a tit-for-tat strategy can lead to a co­
operative settlement if the game is repeated to infinity or players do not know when 
repeated interaction is going to finish. Players start co-operating and only do not co­
operate if the other does not co-operate. In long enough games the stream of future 
benefits from co-operation can be greater than the present gain of not co-operating. 
Accordingly, the dominant strategy becomes to co-operate. As Gary Miller notes, a co-
'X 'loperative settlement is more likely to arise in long-run organisations. Co-operation is 
not the dominant strategy, it is only rational to co-operate if each of the players knows 
for sure the other is willing to co-operate and knows she herself is willing to co-operate, 
and so on. In a more technical language, reputations for firms not to bust the piece rate 
and for workers not to withdraw effort need to be developed.
Workplace safety and health.
The level of safety in the workplace constitutes a clear example of public good in the 
workplace. Unions can have two effects on the issue of workplace safety. First, they can 
increase wages, keeping the accident rate constant. Second, they can reduce the accident 
rate through the collective bargaining of safety regulations. So far, the historical
t l ievidence is mixed about the role of 19 century and early 20 century union in 
enforcing safety standards in the workplace. For example, David Fairris has shown how 
in US manufacturing workers’ voice did have an impact on factory fatalities. Even in
-ip
the case of company unions, the existence of unions has a negative effect on fatalities. 
However, the analysis of workplace safety in coal mining in the US between 1912 and
37 Miller, Managerial dilemmas, p. 186-187.
38 See Fairris, David, Shopfloor matters: labor-management relations in 20th century American 
manufacturing (New York, 1997), pp.38-39.
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1923 performed by Price Fishback failed to find any significant impact of miners’ 
collective action on the accident rate in the industry.
Moreover, the historical literature has also addressed the impact of state 
sponsored factory acts and safety regulations on workplace risks. For a law on factory 
safety to have an impact, workers have to take more care to avoid accidents and 
employers have to invest on safety, generally agreeing to follow the rules imposed by 
the state. In order to fully understand the problem, models take into account the 
incentives faced by both sides. For employers to invest in safety the expected fine for 
non compliance with state rules is the relevant variable (the average fine times the 
probability of being fined) when making decisions on investing in safety. Workers, on 
the other hand, will take into account the post-accident compensation. Hence the 
regulation of workers’ compensation and the conditions upon which is received must be 
considered. In the absence of liability acts, workers or their relatives have to prove 
negligence on the part of their employer in order to receive the compensation.40 A 
second view stressed the contractual responsibility of the employer, who was 
responsible for the health of the worker during the whole of the contractual relationship. 
Both theories were difficult to implement because it was complicated to apportion 
responsibilities in the event of workplace fatalities.41 The final view considered factory 
risk to be inherent to industrial work and established that employers were responsible 
for workplace risk; this is the view that predominated in the Employers’ Liability Act of 
1900.42 This view had important consequences on incentives of workers and employers 
because compensation had always to be paid to the worker in the event of a work- 
related accident.43 Its effects on the accident trend in a particular industry are 
correspondingly ambiguous.
39 Fischback, Price V., “Workplace safety during the Progressive Era: fatal accidents in bituminous coal 
mining, 1912-1923 ” Explorations in Economic History, 23 (1986), pp.269-298.
40 In the Spanish debate the doctrine emplacing workers to prove employers’ negligence required quasi- 
delictive responsabilities from the employer. Ossorio y Gallardo, Angel, Accidentes de trabajo (Madrid, 
1902).
41 Soto Carmona, Alvaro, El trabajo industrial en la Espaha contemporanea (1874-1936) (Barcelona 
1989), p. 679.
42 Doctrina del riesgo profesional. Employers liability acts significantly reduce the probability for 
employers to escape compensation to workers or relatives by giving rights to compensation to cases in 
which for instance workers’ neglicence intervened in the accident, workers had assumed the risk inherent 
in the job, or the accident was provoked by a fellow worker.
43 Fichback, Price V., “Operations o f unfettered labor markets: exit and voice in American labor markets 
at the turn of the century,” p.48, NBER working paper series on Historical Factors in Long run growth, 
number 105.
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1.3. Limits of this inveslfeation.
A note on wages.
One of the many difficulties encountered in the study of labour markets in Restoration 
Spain is the absence of adequate wage data. The literature on compensating differentials 
finds the labour market totally or partially compensates for workplace disamenities like 
higher accident risks, longer hours of work, or temporary unemployment.44 
Furthermore, there is also a huge literature calculating the effect of unions on wages 
rates, to the point that higher wages are considered to be the most clear-cut impact of 
unionisation in a sector or an industry.
aI_ i t .
In the case of Spain in late 19 and early 20 centuries, because historians only 
have access to provincial or sector averages in different benchmark years, available 
wage data make it very difficult to estimate the relevant compensating differentials or 
union effects.45 Examples of this type of data are 1896/1897 wage data for factory 
workers in provincial capitals published by the Institute* Geografico y  Estadistico in 
1903 or the Estadistica de salariosy jornadas de trabajo, 1914-1930 published in 1931 
by the Ministry of Labour including data on daily wages for occupations in different 
cities in 1914, 1920, 1925 and 1930.46 In addition, estimates of workers’ collective
44 Among other historical studies: Hatton, Timothy J. and Jeffrey Williamson, “Unemployment, 
employment contracts, and compensating wage differentials: Michigan in the 1890s,” Journal o f  
Economic History, 51, 3 (September 1991), pp. 605-632; Kim, Seung-Wook and Price V. Fishback, 
“Institutional change, compensating differentials, and accident risk in American railroading, 1892-1945,” 
Journal o f  Economic History, 53, 4 (December 1993), pp. 796-823. An example where wages do not 
adjust perfectly to levels o f various disamenities: Fishback, Price V. and Shawn Everett Kantor, “Square 
deal or raw deal? Market compensation for workplace disamenities, 1884-1903,” Journal o f Economic 
History, 52 ,4  (December 1992), pp. 826-848..
45 Silvestre, Javier, “Factores competitivos y no competitivos en la determination salarial durante la 
industrialization: el caso de Espana (1900-1936),” unpublished paper, Facultad de Ciencias Economicas, 
Universidad de Zaragoza. Cited with the permission of the author.
46 Instituto Geografico Estadistico, Estadistica de la emigracion y  inmigracion de Espana en el 
quinquenio 1896-1900 (Madrid, 1903); Ministerio de Trabajo y Prevision, Direction General de Trabajo, 
Estadistica de salarios y  jornadas de trabajo, 1914-1930 (Madrid, 1931). Another source, in this case for 
1884, is US Bureau o f Foreign Commerce, Labor in Europe. Reports from the Consuls o f  the United 
States in the several countries o f  Europe on the rates o f  wages, cost o f  living to the laboring classes, past 
and present wages, &c., in their several districts, in response to a circular from the Department o f  State 
requesting infoimation on the subjects. Spain (Washington, 1885). A list o f sources is given in Simpson, 
James, “Real wages and labour mobility in Spain, 1860-1936,” p. 199 in Scholliers, Peter and Vera 
Zamagni, Labour’s reward. Real wages and economic change in 19th and 20th century Europe (Aldershot, 
1995).
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mobilisation like union densities or the cumulative number of strikers do not exist or are 
limited to certain years or regions.
In the case of compensating differentials, econometric estimation with aggregate 
data often finds difficulties in isolating wage differentials for any given workplace 
disamenity like risks to life or limb, long hours, or temporary unemployment spells. For 
instance in the case of job risks, W. K. Viscusi argued:
estimation using industry-wide data sets often encountered difficulty in distinguishing 
the positive wage premium for job risks. The reliance on aggregative industry data pools 
workers with heterogeneous preferences and firms with perhaps quite different offer 
curves, so that the estimated tradeoffs at any particular risk level cannot be linked to any 
worker’s preferences or any firm’s offer curve.47
Because job risks and other disamenities are normal goods, one important source 
of variation is individual differences in wealth. Affluent workers will demand a higher 
wage for any given level of risk, while employers have greater incentives to protect 
their skilled workers to secure their investments in their employees’ training. This 
makes it difficult to isolate the wage-risk trade-off. In aggregate terms, what we will 
observe is that workers in high pay sectors or establishments also enjoy lower levels of 
workplace risk or lower hours. However, this does not rule out that compensating
A O
differentials exist for any particular position.
This argument also shows how successful historical exercises to estimate 
compensating wage differentials have proceeded. First, through the use of individual 
level data comparable to modem micro data, which allow to control for differences in 
education, experience, and other variables related to individual productivity. This makes 
it possible to estimate what is the additional compensation that workers of a given 
productivity level will receive for coping with greater workplace risk. Second, some 
econometric exercises adopt a case-study approach and use the wage rate of given jobs 
or occupations in a particular sector for different locations or establishments with 
different levels of workplace risk and calculate the compensating differential after
47 Viscusi, W. K., “The value of risks to life and health,” Journal o f  Economic Literature, XXXI, 3
(1993), pp. 1916-1917.
48 Ibid., p. 1917.
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controlling for a set of alternative independent variables from a standard labour supply 
and demand model. Occupation- or position-based analyses have been conducted 
leading to robust results for mining and railway workers in the US in which a positive, 
statistically significant wage premium compensated workers for bearing higher levels of 
risk.49
In addition, the estimation of union wage effects also has used micro data of 
individuals modelling labour-supply decisions at the individual level. In this case, the 
union wage effect is measured by the increase in earnings experienced by a worker of 
constant characteristics of passing from non-unionised to a unionised status. A series of 
variables are added to the analysis to control for differences in skill, industry or region 
which might affect final earnings. Examples of this procedure are Barry Eichengreen’s 
study of union wage effects using a sample of 3,334 individuals from Iowa (US) in 
1894 or the use by Hatton, Boyer and Bailey of a sample of 956 workers from the 
United States Commissioner of Labor survey on British workers in 1889-1890. In both 
cases, additional information allows to estimate a two-stage labour supply regression in 
which the decision to join a union is modelled along an earnings equation.50 In the 
above mentioned cases, the union wage effect is on the range of 15 to 20 per cent.
One problem with the use of a static cross-section of individuals is that the size 
of the union effect varies substantially depending on the evolution of unions. For 
instance, the 15-20 per cent observed by Hatton, Boyer and Bailey for 1889-1890 
coincides with the expansion of new unionism in Britain. Wage equations measuring the 
union wage effect over time show much smaller effects in the long run and a decline of 
the union wage effect once the process of fast union growth has ended.51 One example 
of this is Boyer and Hatton’s 1994 article on the effect of agricultural unions on 
agricultural wages in late 19th century Britain. Union density had a positive effect on
49 In the case o f railworkers: Kim and Fishback, “Institutional change, compensating differentials, and 
accident risk.” The case of mining workers: Fischback, Price V., “Workplace safety during the 
Progressive Era: fatal accidents in bituminous coal mining, 1912-1923.” Explorations in Economic 
History, 23 (1986), pp.269-298.
50 Eichengreen, B.J., “The impact o f late nineteenth century unions on labor earnings and hours: Iowa in 
1894,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 49, pp. 501-515; Hatton, T.J., G.R. Boyer and R.E. Bailey, 
“The union wage effect in late 19th century Britain,” Economica, new series, 61, 244 (November 1994), 
pp. 435-456.
51 Wage gains obtained by the union are later translated into wage gains for non-union workers.
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wages between 1872 and 1876, but not thereafter. Simulation shows how the union 
effect peaked in 1876 at 6 per cent, but declined thereafter to two per cent in the 1890s 
and was near zero from 1900 to 1903. This contrasts with Price Fishback’s study of the 
bituminous coal industry in the US from 1912 to 1923. In regressions based on a rich 
panel of state-level observations, it was estimated that, after controlling for a variety of 
factors, the move from non-unionisation to unionisation raised the wage rate by about 6 
to 12 per cent. Union effects, however, varied over time, Fishback estimated the 
“relative contribution of exit and voice to the substantial rise in coal earnings that 
occurred between 1892 and 1929.”54 Exit, as measured by alternative employment and 
wages, accounted for a 66 per cent of the raise in wages from 1892 to 1929. After 
controlling for coal prices, unionisation in turn accounted for about 36 per cent. During 
the 1920s unions were progressively weakened, the decline in the strength of unions 
between 1923 and 1929 contributed to 60 per cent of the observed fall in wages.
In Spain, time series evidence of real wages broken down by sectors show 
substantial increases in real wages for sectors like the Asturian coal industry, Biscay 
steel or the Catalan cotton textile industry, which at the same time went through an 
export boom during World War l.55 This also translated into a process of increasing 
wage differentials between cities and regions. In Biscay, the average industrial real 
wage grew 22 per cent between 1914 and 1920, 32 per cent in Oviedo, 24 per cent in 
Santander, 11 per cent in Barcelona, and 28 per cent in Valencia.56 Some of these 
provinces experienced frequent strike activity from the late 1918 to 1920. Roses and 
Alonso (2002) however note that this process of labour market disintegration from 1914 
to 1920 was caused by price shocks caused by World War 1. In a period of 
extraordinary profits in some sectors, strike activity might be an endogenous variable if
52 Boyer, George R. and Timothy J. Hatton, “Did Joseph Arch raise agricultural wages?: rural trade 
unions and the labour market in late nineteenth century England,” Economic History Review, 41, 2 (May 
1994), pp. 310-334.
53 Fishback, Price V., Soft coal, hard choices: the economic welfare o f  bituminous coal miners, 1890 to 
1930 (Oxford, 1992), chapter 6.
54 Fishback, “Operations,” p. 18.
55 Sudria, Carles, “Los beneficios de Espana durante la gran guerra. Una aproximacion a la balanza de 
pagos espanola, 1914-1920f  Revista de Historia Economica, 8, 2 (1990), pp. 363-396.
56 Calculated from Roses, Joan J. and Blanca Sanchez-Alonso, “Regional wage convergence in Spain 
1850-1930,” unpublished paper, Universidad Carlos III Madrid and Universidad San Pablo-CEU Madrid 
(2002), table A.4., p. 34.
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unions want to appropriate part of the existing rents in the form of higher wages. In 
any case, this only makes inter-industry comparisons of wages all the more difficult.
Table 1.4. Real wage indexes for selected sectors. 1913-1920 0913=100).
Catalan cotton 
textile
Asturian coal 
industry
Biscay steel 
industrv
Agricultural
labourers
1913 100 100 100 100
1914 101 106.9 99 97.2
1915 98.2 114.4 95.3 102.4
1916 89.4 124.3 93.6 91.8
1917 92.1 129.6 97 90.2
1918 91.8 177.1 100.6 91.6
1919 84.8 170.7 103.8 90.3
1920 124.1 166 123.5 104.5
Source: Maluquer de Motes, Jordi, “Salarios,” pp. 506-507.
The regulation of children and women work.
Another important stream of labour market reform considered the work of children and 
women. In the period, this issue generated a substantial literature by labour market
co
reformers. No one denied children and women were important inputs in the early 
factories. For example, in surveys conducted in the 1840s it was shown that children 
represented 21 per cent of total employed in the Catalan cotton industry. By 1861, 
however, this proportion had fallen to 7.18 per cent. In contrast, the paper industry 
witnessed a relative increase in the share of children between 1840 and 1861.59
57 This for instance assumed in bargaining models in which agents want to capture the available rents. For 
example, in Card, David and Craig Olson, “Bargaining power, strike duration and wage outcomes: an 
analysis o f strikes in the 1880s "Journal o f  Labor Economics, vol. 13, 1 (January 1995), pp. 32-61.
58 Among other examples: Elias de Molins, Jose, La mujer obrera en las ciudades y  en el campo. 
Orientaciones sociales (Barcelona, 1913), Gascon y Marin, Jose, Not as legislativas sobre la 
reglamentacion de la jornada de trabajo de las mujeres y  adolescentes de Espana (Madrid, 1907), 
Villota, J. y A. Revenga, El trabajo industrial de los menores de 18 ahos en Espana (Madrid, 1909), 
Gonzalez Castro, J., El trabajo de la infancia en Espana (Madrid, 1917). A critic view is provided in 
Alsina, Fernando, Observaciones sobre la reglamentacion del trabajo de los ninos en talleres y  fabricas 
(Barcelona, 1892).
59 Roses, Joan Ramon, “The early phase o f Catalan industrialisation, 1830-1860,” p. 103. Unpublished 
PhD dissertation, European University Institute, 1998.
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In 1873 and in 1900, laws were passed limiting the employment of children to 
those older than 10, the reduction of the working day to six hours and the prohibition of 
night work for those between 10 and 14 years old.60 One line of research would thus 
consider the impact protective legislation on the share of children employed in factories 
and workshops. This would make use of census data or other sources to measure the 
effects derived from labour demand and supply shifts and from legislation on the share 
of children employed in each sector before and after the passing of the law (the relevant 
one is the 1900 law). In addition to problems traditionally associated with the use of 
census categories and problems of measurement, one of the main limitations of this type 
of exercise might be the difficulties in finding values for children earnings and for 
variables related to supply and demand factors -as technological change and changes in 
factor prices.
On the other hand, protective legislation also established hours ceilings for 
women through the 1900 law and through the royal decree of June 1902. Several 
interpretations have been given for the origins of state intervention in the case of 
women. Gloria Nielfa, for instance, considers that it was the product of state support to 
the idea of male breadwinner families and the “family wage”.61 In the case of the US, 
Elisabeth Landes argued that maximum hours laws reduced the employment share of 
women, especially of foreign-born women, and that the maximum-hours ceilings were 
more readily adopted in states where male adults faced stronger competition from
fs')young foreign-born women. As I discuss in chapter 5, the law mandated a maximum 
working week of 66 hours and a working day of 11 hours. Even in manufacturing, this 
limit was above or was roughly similar to scheduled hours. Probably the effects must
60 Martin Valverde, Antonio, La legislacion laboral historica (Madrid, 1987), pp. 65-72.
61 Nielfa, Gloria, “Trabajo, legislacion y genero en la Espana contemporanea: los origenes de la 
legislacion laboral,” paper presented at 7th congress of the Asociacion de Historia Economica, Zaragoza, 
2001. As well, Balcells, Albert, Trabajo industrial y  organizacion obrera en la Cataluha contemporanea 
(1900-1936) (Barcelona, 1974), “La mujer obrera en la industria catalana durante el primer cuarto del 
siglo XX,” pp. 41-45, and Rey Reguillo, Fernando, “Condiciones laborales de las mujeres trabajadoras: 
legislacion y actitudes patronales. El caso Catalan (1917-1923),” pp. 234-236, in Garcia Nieto Paris, M. C. 
(ed.), Ordenamiento juridico y  realidad social de las mujeres. Actas de las IV  jornadas de investigacion 
interdisciplinaria (Madrid, 1986).
62 Landes, Elisabeth M., “The effect o f state maximum-laws on the employment o f women in 1920,” 
Journal o f  Political Economy, 88, 3 (June 1980), pp. 476-494. An skeptical view is provided in Goldin, 
Claudia, “Maximum hours legislation and female employment: a reassessment,” Journal o f  Political 
Economy, 96, 1 (1988), pp. 189-205 and Goldin, Claudia, Understanding the gender gap. An economic 
histoiy o f  American women (New York, 1990), chapter 7, pp. 189-199.
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have been too small to observe any impact on the general trend in female labour force 
participation.63
1.4. Summary.
This thesis evaluates the operation of a labour market with an undeveloped and partially 
enforced legislation regulating industrial conflict, union rights, and the terms of 
employment. In part I of the thesis, I study union growth and strike activity during the 
period using insights from the literature on collective action and institutional change. 
To explain the existence of a rising, but cyclical, trend in workers’ collective action, my 
account stresses the political power of the labour movement and the divisions of the 
economic and politic elite on the issue of labour unrest and public order. I also argue 
this generated a very weak framework for collective bargaining in which employers and 
the labour movement adopted extreme positions to ‘lobby’ a hesitant government into 
favouring one of the two parts in conflict. In this sense, my accounts moves away from 
traditional explanations based on the “failure” of Spanish capitalism and the Spanish 
political system {La Restauracion) to explain the characteristics of the system of labour 
relations and considers a coalition-formation approach that is more neutral to 
judgements about the failure or backwardness of the Spanish economy and its political 
regime.
In the second part of the thesis, I present case-studies of the effect of this 
particular system of industrial relations on the evolution of crucial workplace public 
goods like the length of the workday, piece rate lists and the levels of workplace safety 
and help. Following the historical and economic literature described in section 1.2., the
63 There are disagreements on the trend o f female labour force participation namely because o f the bad 
quality of 19th century population censuses (Borderias, Cristina, “La evolucion de la actividad femenina 
en la formation del mercado de trabajo barcelones 1856-1930,” paper presented at the 7th congress of the 
Asociacion de Historia Economica (Zaragoza, 2001)). The relative wealth o f municipal censuses of 
workers has generated a series of local studies: Ferrer, Lloren9, “Notas sobre la familia y el trabajo de la 
mujer en Cataluna, siglos XVIII-XX,” Boletin de la Asociacion de Demografia Historica, XII, 2-3
(1994); Arbaiza, Mercedes, “La construction social del empleo femenino en la sociedad vasca (1850- 
1936),” paper presented at the 7th congress of the Asociacion de Historia Economica (Zaragoza, 2001); 
Llonch, Montserrat, “Insertion laboral de la inmigracion y sistema de reclutamiento de la fabrica textil: 
Vilassar de Dalt, 1910-1945,” Boletin de la Asociacion de Demografia Historica, 2-3 (1995), pp. 149- 
161; Camps, Enriqueta, “Transitions in women’s and children’s work patterns: implications for the study 
of the family income and household structure.” The History o f the Family. An international Quarterly, 3, 
2 (1998), pp.137-157; Camps, Enriqueta, “Las transformaciones del mercado de trabajo en Cataluna 
(1850-1925): migraciones, ciclos de vida y economias familiares.” Revista de Historia Industrial, 11 
(1997), pp.45-70.
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approach adopted here considers workers with different characteristics had different 
preferences over workplace public goods, which had to be reconciled through collective 
bargaining. In the latter, I distinguish various levels of collective bargaining 
institutions, from the simple strike threat to formal institutions like joint boards of 
employers and delegates of a recognised union.
Part I. Institutions.
Chapter 2.
The rise of syndicalism in Spain, 1869-1923.
2.0. Introduction.
The central question in labour history explores why workers join movements of protest 
and why only some of the competing social movements became mass organizations. 
Restoration Spain witnessed the consolidation of two mass labour movements -  the 
National Confederation of Labour (Confederation Nacional del Trabajo, CNT) and the 
General Workers’ Union {Union General de Trabajadores, UGT) - with a distinct 
Anarchist and Socialist outlook, uniting all workers in different regions and different 
industries, committed to the violent overthrow of the monarchy and the change in social 
relations through the mass, general strike. In the years 1919 and 1920, the number of 
strikers multiplied by a factor seven with respect to the average number of strikers in the 
period 1905-1918, in formidable wave of strikes led by the CNT and UGT (graph 2.1). 
In a fast process of union consolidation, the CNT emerged as a powerful mass 
organization capable of winning a one-week long general strike in Barcelona and 
gathering most of the union movement in Catalonia into one single organization. In 
Catalonia, the syndicate jumped from 34,000 members in early 1918 to 345,000 in 
December 1918 and 427,000 in 1919. In the Madrid congress of 1919 at the Comedia 
Theater, the union boasted about joining 800,000 members.1 Additionally, the UGT 
more than doubled membership in two years, from 89,601 members in 1918 to 211,342 
in 1920.
1 Gabriel, Pere, “Classe obrera i sindicats a Catalunya, 1903-1920,” p. 685, unpublished PhD dissertation, 
University o f Barcelona, 1981; the figure quoted in Brenan, Gerald, The Spanish labyrinth: an account o f  
the social and political background o f  the Civil War (Cambridge, 1943), p. 199. The classic accounts of  
the period 1918-1920 in Catalonia and especially in Barcelona: Balcells, Albert, El sindicalisme a 
Barcelona (1916-1923) (Barcelona, 1974); Solano, E. G., Elsindicalismo en la teoriay en lapractica  
(Barcelona, 1922).
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However, this considerable success was the culmination of almost fifty years of 
efforts aimed at creating national working class organisations. This series of attempts 
started with the order given by Bakunin to Giuseppe Fanelli to organise the Spanish 
section of the International in May 1869 and culminated in the success of CNT in 1918- 
1919. In this chapter I discuss the main patterns of the evolution of the labour 
movement in Spain between 1869 and 1923. In spite of the absence of adequate union 
membership data, I underline the relationship between union growth and strike waves in 
highly discontinuous processes of growth and decline. Additionally, I concentrate on the 
institutional characteristics of unions in the period. My explanation here emphasizes the 
inability of unions to enforce union recognition and the closed shop (the restriction to 
employ union workers only). Absence of compulsory membership clauses in collective 
contracts led to “olsonian” low membership equilibriums in sectors o f the Spanish 
economy characterised by employing large numbers of workers -like mining, railways 
or the cotton textile industry-, while it amplified the role of state policy in shaping 
collective bargaining institutions.
700
600
500
x  400
u) 300
a>js
£ 200
100
1905 1907 1909 1911 19231913 1915 1917 1919 1921
Graph 2.1. Strike activity in Spain, strikers (thousands) 1905-1923.
Source: Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Estadistica de huelgas, 1905-1923.
Note: the graph includes a fitted exponential trend to show the increasing trend in strike activity and the 
years in which strike activity is below or above trend. Recorded strikes do not include “political” or 
general strikes (for example, the general strike of 1917 or the Tragic week of 1909 are not included).
2 Termes, Josep, Anarquismoy sindicalismo en Espana (1864-1881) (Barcelona, 4th edition, 2000), p. 43.
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2.1. Theories of collective mobilisation.
Theories of social movements consider a series of steps are required before an organised 
social movement exists. A strong sense of group identity needs to be created and 
common grievances requiring collective solutions must be identified. A co-ordination 
problem among participants has to be solved because the decision to participate in 
movements of protest depends on other participants doing so. This is especially 
important in the case of unions and strikes because, with contested strike and union 
rights, the labour movement found powerful enemies in employers and, in some cases, 
in the state. Political repression and employers’ retaliation in the form of the hiring of 
strike-breakers and black lists were important costs for those deciding to join unions, 
but these costs declined with the aggregate level of participation.
For unions, an additional limitation exists because the costs of belonging to the 
union -dues, foregone earnings in strikes, employer repression- are individual, while the 
benefits derived from union action -shorter hours, higher wages, or a safer workplace- 
are collective, that is enjoyed by all workers irrespective of their participation.4 In small 
groups, like for example groups of skilled artisans in the cities of modem Europe, in 
which defection could be easily monitored, participation in the collective project could 
be guaranteed. However, 19th century unionism developed in rapidly growing urban 
centres and ever-increasing industrial establishments, relaxing the social controls over 
defectors that were characteristic of small communities and intensifying the free-rider 
problem inherent in collective action.
Traditional models of collective mobilisation stress large changes in political or 
economic exogenous variables when explaining changes in participation. One tradition 
in the academic debate over cycles of strikes and collective protest considers that 
workers go on strike when their bargaining power is stronger, for example with tight 
labour markets.5 Alternatively, it is argued that protest emerges in communities
3 Calhoun, Craig, “The problem o f identity in collective action,” in Huber, Joan (ed.), Micro-macro 
linkages in sociology (Newbury Park, CA, 1991).
4 Olson, Mancur, The logic o f  collective action. Public goods and the theory o f  groups (Cambridge, MA, 
16th edition, 1995), p. 67.
5 Bargaining models in which bargaining power depends on the available rents discussed in Kennan,
John, “The economics o f strikes,” in Ashenfelter, Orley and Richard Layard, Handbook o f  labor 
economics (New York, 1986).
Chapter 2. The rise o f  syndicalism. 42
experiencing an identifiable decline in their material well-being. Deprivation arguments 
focus on the rigours imposed by industrialisation, which were especially felt by 
unskilled workers and immigrants from rural areas.6 As these groups joined unions, the 
argument goes, the labour movement became more strike-prone and politically radical.7 
Among this base of more impetuous workers, a key role is given to the “unassimilated 
peasant”, who having lost his traditional social networks of mutual help experienced 
relatively more hardship. As Gerald Meaker put it:
Indeed much o f the history of Spanish labor in the early 20th century must center 
around what Adam Ulam has termed the “unassimilated peasant”. Large numbers of 
peasants-proletarians set the tone of the urban labor movement, both retarding it and 
radicalizing it by their presence -  by their willingness to act as strikebreakers and 
their susceptibility to extremist appeals.8
Or as Gerald Brenan wrote in 1943:
From the very beginning [...] the peculiarity o f Spanish anarchism has consisted in 
its having two distinct roots -the industrial workers o f Catalonia and the agricultural 
workers o f Andalusia. At first sight this might seem to be a rather unnatural 
partnership. For the Catalan workers were [...] the most highly paid workmen in 
Spain outside the Basque country. They had not better reason than any other body of 
workers in Europe to aim at revolution. But they were recruited to a great extent 
from the half-starving and embittered agricultural labourers o f the south and east and 
penned up in the most unruly and excitable city in Europe.9
Breakdown arguments focus on the “dissolution of social bonds and controls by 
industrialisation,” on fundamental discontinuities in the lives of the people: 
“discontinuities produce strain, disorientation and anomie, people respond to those 
unpleasant conditions by producing or joining movements of protest.”10 Discontinuities, 
for example, are produced by mechanisation and technological change bringing about 
the inevitable de-skilling of artisans and other skilled workers. The student of labour
6 Shorter, Edward and Charles Tilly, Strikes in France, J830-1968 (Cambidge, 1974), pp. 6-7.
7 One example of this line of reasoning is the debate on “new unionism” in Britain. For example, in 
Hobsbawm, E. J., “New unionism in retrospect,” in Worlds o f  labour. Further studies in the history o f  
labour (London, 1984).
8 Meaker, G. H., The Revolutionary Left in Spain, 1914-1923 (Palo Alto, CA, 1974), p. 2.
9 Brenan, The Spanish labyrinth, p. 185.
10 Shorter and Tilly, Strikes, p. 6.
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tVistrife in early 20 century Barcelona, Angel Smith, argues that skilled workers rather 
than unskilled labourers were at the forefront of radical politics and revolutionary 
unionism in Barcelona:
We argue that in order to understand the situation it is necessary to bear in mind that 
many workshops were being penetrated by capitalistic modes o f production and that 
the relationships among employers and employees were becoming increasingly 
conflictive. The major proportion o f strikes {in Barcelona) did not originate in large 
factories employing unskilled labour but in the so-called oficios (crafts). Skilled 
workers had a most important role in the growing unionisation among the unskilled. 
Furthermore, they did often take the lead in constituting industrial federations or 
general confederations, and, thus, in the expansion o f class consciousness.11
Other explanations focus on key changes in labour law easing the constraints on 
workers’ collective mobilisation. One of the great intuitions of Mancur Olson’s logic o f  
collective action is the importance of union recognition and closed shop clauses in the 
growth of unions to overcome the free rider problem in collective action. In his view, 
large unions grow and stabilise themselves because membership is compulsory and/or 
because a particular union is granted a period of peaceful collective bargaining after it is 
recognised by employers. In Olson’s explanation, since unions won recognition or the 
closed shop only exceptionally, the growth of unions resulted from what Richard 
Freeman labels “top-down” political changes like, for example, the Wagner Act of 1935 
in the United States. In this case, by making collective bargaining “a goal of public 
policy” and enforcing union recognition, the Act brought about what “was undoubtedly
the most phenomenal increase in membership in the history of modem American
™  ”12 umomsm.
Rather than focusing on large exogenous shocks, a series of narratives of the 
evolution of collective protest emphasize endogenous forces. The main assumption of 
these explanations is that the individual decision to join depends on the expectation that 
others are doing so. When certain conditions are met, increasing participation brings 
further participants, mainly because the individual costs of collective action decrease
11 Smith, Angel, “Trabajadores ‘dignos’ en profesiones ‘honradas’: los oficios y la formation de la clase 
obrera barcelonesa (1899-1914),” Hispania, LVI/2, 193 (1996), p. 655.
12 Quote from Olson, The logic, p. 79. “Top-down” argument from Freeman, Richard, “ ‘Spurts’ in union 
growth: defining moments and social processes,” National Bureau o f Economic Research working paper 
number 6012 (April 1997).
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with (and expected benefits increase with) participation. For example, in large strikes, 
employers find it more difficult to employ strike-breakers, or symbolic strike successes 
spread the expectation that other strikes can be won. Under these assumptions, non­
linear growth processes are generated by tipping or contagion effects.13 Alternatively, in 
Richard Freeman’s model of union spurts, union density depends on the organisational 
resources used by union to expand and on the resources used by employers to oppose 
unions. However, both unions’ and employers’ organisational resources depend on 
union density, being modest at very low and very high union densities but high in the 
middle. Non-linear resource functions create a union membership function in which the 
union grows very fast at medium union densities (in the model, what is growing is the 
ratio of new union members to employed workers in a given year).14
Using these models of the evolution of collective protest, I focus on the following 
features of movements of workers’ protest in Spain between 1870 and 1923 that stress 
the importance of endogenous processes sparking strike waves and fast union 
implementation and the importance of union recognition for union stability:
1. Unions emphasized strikes rather than ordered collective bargaining and the 
supply of non-collective goods. Radical working organisations focused on the 
common as opposed to the individual benefits of strikes, while deploying a 
strategy to extend conflicts to other trades and localities.
2. Strikes were clustered in few years.
3. Important strikes pretended to re-shape the employee-employer relationship. 
This took the form of the drawing up of collective contracts regulating 
employment terms of a sector in a locality or region.
4. Employers’ opposition to unions guaranteed union recognition was seldom 
obtained. As Olson noted, the potential for conflict was highest at low union 
densities when conflict was about the institution of the union. The absence of 
formal bargaining institutions amplified the role o f the state in shaping collective 
bargaining institutions, first by mediating in important strikes and after 1919 by 
making collective bargaining an objective of public policy.
13 Schelling, Thomas C., Micromotives and macrobehavior (New York, 1974), pp. 15-17.
14 Freeman, “Spurts,” p. 11.
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2.2. Unions and strikes.
According to the theory of collective action, it is natural for unions to remain small and 
local because large organisations suffer from the problem of free-riding. But the rhetoric 
of working class organisations was radically opposed to this type of utilitarian analysis. 
Working class organisations, especially those of internationalist inspiration, believed in 
the gains of enlarging membership and building a powerful country wide movement 
organising all wage earners on the basis of industry, region and locality. This implied 
the existence of a theory of working class activism based on the potential benefits of 
federations of trade unions organised at the local level, which in the internationalist 
imagery mirrored the organisation of the Paris Commune of 1871, with local and 
industrial federations being co-ordinated by delegated representatives. For example, one 
leader of the Federacion Regional Espanola (FRE, Spanish Federation of the (1st) 
International), Anselmo Lorenzo, stressed the need of pooling resources creating a large 
strike fund to be shared in solidarity among all FRE local federations to defeat capital. 
Another leader of the FRE, Jaime Balasch, noted the benefits of unity, large numbers 
and the existence of a delegated body co-ordinating strikes to fight against an enemy, 
the capitalistic class, with greater resources.15
Appeals to solidarity and unity did not immediately reach a community of 
interest that only existed in the minds of a handful of activists. In spite of that, the 
rhetoric of labour organisations highlighted the abolition of distinctions based on skill, 
geography or gender to organise a working class national movement with well defined 
collective objectives. In a congress held in 1900, the anarchist-led Federacion de 
Sociedades Obreras de la Region Espanola (Federation of Workers’ unions of the 
Spanish region) put emphasis in unity and solidarity above ideological, economic and 
religious divisions, extending membership to the unskilled: “no workers’ union is 
anarchist. Unions encompass workers with different political opinions, religious beliefs 
and economic means. They include everyone pursuing the improvement of working 
conditions and the emancipation of the working class.”16 When Solidaridad Obrera 
(Workers’ Solidarity) was created in Barcelona in 1907, one of its main proponents, the
15 Termes, Anarquismo y  sindicalismo, pp. 76-77; Abad de Santillan, Diego, Contribucion a la historia 
del movimiento obrero espahol (Puebla, Mexico, 1962-65), chapter 4.
16 Alvarez Junco, Jose, Ideologiapolitica del anarquismo espahol (1868-1910) (Madrid, 1976), p. 559.
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socialist Antonia Badia i Matamala, remarked the “convenience of joining together all 
workers’ unions in close workers’ solidarity, which will unite all workers around what
1 7is common to them all without taking into account their individual ideals.”
Strikes were the testing ground for the practice of class solidarity. Unions, in this 
regard, did not stress the individual benefits of joining in. The main emphasis of 
working class organisations was neither the collection of dues nor the supply of non­
collective services for members like mutual benefit or burial funds or insurance against 
disease, death or workplace accident. Rather, working class leaders underscored the role 
of the mass strike as the means to satiate collective grievances. Even a moderate in 
matters of strike tactics like Pablo Iglesias, leader of the Spanish Socialist Party, 
considered strikes to be the only “weapon available to the working class to put an end to
• i oits state of slavery.” Influenced by the contemporary rise of anarcho-syndicalism in 
France, early 20th century activists encouraged frequent strike action to increase 
workers’ awareness of their own power and of the unsolvable conflict between workers 
and employers.19 It was argued that “the federated society believing to be ready for the 
struggle must do it immediately, (...) doing its best to extend the conflict as much as 
possible, because experience has taught us that what helps us to win strikes is a lot of 
agitation and not money, because workers’ funds are always depleted before the
70capitalists’.” What were needed were short and spontaneous strikes to train workers
71“in the collective experience of solidarity.” Syndicalism had to become “a fighting 
technique for winning more and more advantages for the workers -such is (was) its
77daily reivindicative task.”
In these conflicts, union activists shaped a community of interests in which local 
struggles were related to wider grievances. In Manresa, a textile town in Catalonia, a 
strike of textile workers protesting a pay cut was backed by solidarity strikes organised 
in Barcelona and the most important textile towns. In a pamphlet published by the main
17 Gabriel, “Classe obrera,” p. 398.
18 Perez Ledesma, Manuel, “La Union General de Trabajadores: socialismo y reformismo,” Estudios de 
Historia Social, 8-9 (1979), p. 222.
19 Prat, Jose, “Ser o no ser,” public speech delivered to the Building workers’ union of Gracia in 1904 
(Barcelona, 1905); p. 11; Prat, Jose, Orientaciones (Barcelona, 1916), p. 6.
20 Perez Ledesma, “La Union General de Trabajadores,” p. 222.
21 Alvarez Junco, La ideologia, p. 432.
22 Brenan, The Spanish labyrinth, p. 170.
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textile union, the Tres Classes de Vapor (Three Steam Classes), union leaders 
addressed “all Catalan workers” stating:
We must honour the memory o f our parents and we do not forget that the grievances
o f the workers o f Manresa are common to all wage-eamers. Let’s make sure the
words solidarity, union and co-operation are not only abstract words, let’s make
them alive by our actions and transformed into facts so that all the world sees clearly
24that we are worthy of bearing the name o f workers.
The rhetorical power of working class’ activists was especially felt in large 
strikes. Fuelled by radical appeals to change status quo, large strikes suspended the 
logic collective action implicating large numbers of workers in public demonstrations of 
working class solidarity and resoluteness. Large strikes encompassed public meetings 
and walk outs, the public collection of extraordinary dues, the public ostracism of 
strike-breakers and clashes with troops and the police. In Barcelona, a general strike in 
February 1902 originated from a long conflict of the metallurgical workers calling for 
the 9 hour day which had started in late 1901. In early 1902, other trades followed suit 
presenting their demands to employers. The strike reached momentum when the textile 
workers walked out of their factories. At this stage, strikers paraded the streets of the 
city, inviting other workers to join in the protest, and breaking the windows of open
tfishops. On the 16 of February, a public meeting took place open to all workers in which 
activists rallied workers toward the general strike. A massive one-week general strike 
ensued. The local federation of unions blocked newspapers prints and obstructed the 
distribution of food in the city. Tramways did not circulate. When bakeries opened their 
doors, workers assaulted these establishments to distribute bread to the families of 
strikers.25
To put another example, the strikes of the mining workers of Biscay in 1890, 
1903, 1906 and 1910 also left a profound imprint on public opinion because miners 
extended conflicts to the neighbouring city of Bilbao and the metallurgical towns of 
Sestao and Baracaldo. Following the success of the 1st of May of 1890, a strike of only
23 Three Steam Sections refers to the three processes involved in cotton textiles: preparing and spinning, 
weaving and finishing.
24 Ferrer, Joaquim, El primer “Primer de M aig” a Catalunya (Barcelona, 1972), pp. 64-65.
25 Romero-Maura, Joaquin, La “Rosa de Fuego El obrerismo barcelones de 1899 a 1909 (Madrid, 
1989), pp. 207-212.
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200 workers started in the Orconera Company (in the town of La Arboleda) on the 13th 
of May to protest the dismissal of 5 socialist workers.26 However, by the 14th, the 
number of strikers had increased to 3,000 to 5,000 because daily pickets and patrols 
persuaded (or forced) other workers to follow suit. Groups of strikers paraded in other 
mining towns like Gallarta or Ortuella. In Ortuella, a public meeting of 4,000 striking
tViworkers decided workers would demonstrate in Bilbao the following day. On the 15 , a 
group of workers walked from Gallarta to Ortuella carrying red flags, cheering workers’ 
unity and shouting against the Guardia Civil stations financed by the employers’ of the 
Circulo Minero (employers’ association). In spite of the presence Of troops and armed 
policemen, 7,000 to 9,000 strikers were concentrated in Ortuella and it was decided to 
march towards Sestao, Baracaldo and finally towards Bilbao. Miners were dispersed by 
two infantry troops when they were abandoning the town. However, some strikers 
reached Sestao and encouraged (or coerced) metallurgical workers to join the strike. 
Another group of 6,000 to 8,000 workers was formed, which also clashed with the 
troops causing one dead and two seriously wounded. In spite of the failure to march 
over Bilbao, by the 15th, the strike was general in the mining towns and among the 
metallurgical workers of Biscay, encompassing 30,000 workers.27
2.3. Strike waves.
Enlarged by participatory appeals to extend labour conflicts and extending membership 
towards the unskilled, mass strikes tied workers in different trades and different 
localities into one single movement. Symbolic strike successes like the Barcelona 
building workers 13,000 strong strike of 1901, or the Biscay mining strike of 1910, or 
the textile general strike of 1913 set a chain of events in which optimistic expectations 
passed from one group of workers to the rest. In other cases, it was the focusing of 
activities in working class action days, like for example the first 1st of May celebrated in 
1890, or exogenous factors like the protests against the colonial wars in 1911 or against 
the rise of prices in 1916.
26 Fusi, Juan Pablo, Politica obrera en el Pais Vasco (1890-1923) (Madrid, 1974), p. 88.
27 Ibid., p. 93.
28 A discussion o f the literature for example in Biggs, Michael, “Positive feedback in collective 
mobilization: the American strike wave o f 1886,” pp. 7-11, University o f Oxford, Discussion Papers in 
Economic and Social History number 40 (April 2001).
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Symbolic victories, or national action days for that matter, solved co-ordination 
failures and set in motion a series of strikes loosely related to economic conditions. 
During the Democratic Six Years (Sexenio Democratico) (1868-1873), the Paris 
Commune of 1871 became a catalyst for union action. Later on, when the First Republic 
was proclaimed in February 1873, the local Federation of Barcelona rallied workers to 
join the urban militias by professing: “Arms to the workers! Autonomous municipality!
90A shorter workday and higher wages!” In Valencia, Alcoy and the Andalusian towns, 
the local leaders of the 1st International called for the general strike in which workers 
presented their demands to employers. The socialist Francisco Mora remarked of the 
strike wave of 1873:
Instead o f consolidating immediately the Regional Federation ( ...)  and of 
constituting trade federations consciously practicing solidarity resistance, (...)  
workers responded with a chaotic wave of strikes that transformed the Region 
(Spain) into a battlefield between bourgeois and proletarians.31
Some changes were not that drastic. At the turn of the century, the Restoration 
state eased the repression on anarchist circles after the campaign against the Montjuich 
trials and the legitimacy crisis brought about by the defeat with the United States in the 
Cuba war of 1898. In this context, a strike wave unfolded between 1899 and 1903 led 
by the Federacion Regional de Sociedades Obreras de Resistencia (FRSOR, Regional 
Federation of Unions). During the Restoration, two strike waves were associated with 
more progressive Liberal governments. A period of tolerance toward labour 
organisations in 1881-1883 allowed for the expansion of the Federacion de los 
Trabajadores de la Region Espanola (FTRE, Workers’ Federation of the Spanish 
Region), which was especially active in the South of Spain. In 1910 and 1911, the 
forming of a government headed by Liberal-reformist Jose Canalejas also sparked 
important metal workers strikes in Barcelona and Sabadell or a miners’ strike in 1910 
and a general strike in 1911 in Bilbao.
29 Termes, Anarquismo, p. 170.
30 Engels, Frederick, “The Bakuninists at work. An account of the Spanish revolt in the summer of 1873,” 
p. 7, English translation of the series of articles published in Der Volksstaat, October 31, November 2 and 
November 5 1873 available at the Marx-Engels internet library: www.marxists.org/archive/engels/ 
works/1873.htm
31 Mora, Francisco, Historia del socialismo espahol (Madrid, 1902), quoted in Elorza, Antonio and 
Michael Ralle, La formacion delPSOE  (Barcelona, 1981), p. 50.
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Using the strike data published since 1905 by the Instituto de Reformas Sociales 
(Institute of Social Reforms, IRS), 1910, 1911, 1913, 1916, and 1918-1920 correspond 
to years in which aggregate strike activity was above an exponential trend for the period 
1905-1923 (graph 2 .1).32 In order to observe the size of strike waves before 1905, in 
graph 2.2. I show the number of strikers between 1899 and 1923 in the city of 
Barcelona -the most strike-prone city in the country- excluding general and political 
strikes. The graph shows three periods of exceptional strike activity in 1903, 1913, 1916 
and 1918-1920.
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Graph 2.2. Strikers (thousands) in Barcelona, 1899-1923.
Source: Smith, “Trabajadores dignos,” and Martin Ramos, “Analisi del moviment vagmstic.”
Note: strikers’ figures do not include general strikes.
The mechanics of strike waves made possible strikes clustered in short periods of 
time in which optimistic expectations passed from one group of workers to the other 
making union growth possible. But strike waves also brought about hostile reaction 
from the state and employers. As I explain in more detail in the next chapter, rather than 
collective bargaining or the profit squeeze caused by a shortening of the workday or an 
increase in wages, employers and state officials feared mass strikes and social upheaval. 
This led to periods of political repression and employers’ retaliation, as in the early 
years of the Restoration, from 1874 to 1881, when the 1st International was banned, or
32 Strike activity is measured by the yearly number of strikers. The exponential trend captures the fact that 
strike activity was increasing very fast during the period.
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in 1903, or 1911 when the government crushed the rising strike movement. In 
Barcelona, during the strike wave of 1903, 371 workers were arrested out of 52,015 
strikers. In this sense, some authors have argued that the policy of the government was 
the strategic arrest of the main strike leaders to stop the strike very early on. Hostile 
reaction led to a period of demoralisation and collective de-mobilisation, like between 
1905 and 1909.
In the strike wave of 1918-1920, a mixture of domestic and international events 
. seems to have taken place. The roles of the Soviet and German Revolutions of 1917 and 
1918 were as important as the political crisis of the Restoration state, the legitimacy 
crisis of the monarchy and the initial victories of the National Confederation of Labour 
(CNT) in late 1918 and early 1919. Domestic political instability was no doubt a critical 
factor, but the timing of the strike wave in Spain was roughly similar to other 
experiences of cycles of strikes in most European countries and in the United States, 
suggesting that forces other than purely domestic were at play.34 Moreover, as in other 
European countries, labour markets were characteristically tight, giving additional 
bargaining power to strikers. Between 1910 and 1920 the annual rate of growth of the 
gainfully occupied in industry grew 3.12 per cent, with most gains concentrated in the 
period 1915-1919. In the textile industry, employment increased from 134,000 workers 
in 1910 to abot 243,500 in 1920, while in mining, empoloyment rose from 99,000 
workers in 1910 to 173,000 in 1920.35
33 This is for instance the interpretation in Bengoechea, Soledad, “Conflictividad social en Barcelona 
durante 1903 (un estudio realizado en base a la correspondencia cruzada entre el ministro de la 
Gobemacion, Antonio Maura, con los gobemadores civiles de Barcelona y ciertos sectores de la 
patronal),” in Arenas Posadas, Carlos, Antonio Florencio Puntas and Jeronia Pons Pons, Trabajo y  
relaciones laborales en la Espaha contemporanea, pp. 341-355 (Sevilla, 2001). Of the 371 arrests, 264 
strikers ended up in prison. 181 spent less than one week in prison while the longest stay in prison was 3 
months. Of the 264 jailed workers, 127 were prosecuted but only one was finally judged and there were 
12 dismissals. On the remaining 115 cases, the Ministry o f Interior Garcia Aliz issued a collective pardon 
through a Royal Decree passed on the 14th August 1903. Sastre, Miguel, Las huelgas de Barcelona y  sus 
resultados en el aho 1903 (Barcelona, 1904), pp. 72-74. In the following years, In 1904, 160 strikers 
were arrested out o f 11,047. Of those Sastre noted “some o f them went to prison, but they were freed 
almost immediately.” Quoted in Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona, year 1904, p. 85. In 1905, 58 workers 
were arrested out o f 1676 strikers. Again, Sastre remarked that “most o f the arrested strikers did not go to 
prison and were freed almost immediately by either the Civil governor or the Judge.” Sastre, Las 
huelgas, year 1906, p. 67.
34 Different national experiences ares treated in the collective volume: Haimson, Leopold H. and Charles 
Tilly (eds.), Strikes, wars, and revolutions n an international perspective. Strike waves in the late 19th and 
20th centuries (Cambridge and Paris, 1989).
35 Maluquer de Motes, Jordi, “De la crisis colonial a la Guerra Europea,” La economia espahola en el 
siglo X X (Barcelona, 1987), pp. 64.
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The strike wave of 1918-1920 shows again the limits of labour collective 
mobilisation in the context of the Restoration, with employers’ and state repression 
intensifying in 1919-1920. In Barcelona, after the success of the Canadiense strike, 
employers staged a bitter 84-day long lock-out in Barcelona from the 3rd November 
1919 to the 26th January 1920. Open class warfare gave way to the years of 
pistolerismo, when unionists and gangs paid by employers were routinely involved in 
gun battles in the streets of Barcelona. In the years 1920 to 1923, union leaders like 
Salvador Segui, or Valerio Boal were shot to death, while at the same time union 
membership and strike activity of the CNT diminished considerably. In January 1920, 
the civil governor of Barcelona ordered the closing of the offices of the CNT. A 
similar course was taken with the strike wave of the rural towns of Cordoba organised as 
well by the CNT, when the government outlawed the unions and the army crushed the 
strike movement. In the case of the socialist UGT unions, repression was milder. 
Union membership reached a maximum plateau in 1920 with over 200,000 dues paying 
members (more than doubling the 1918 membership figure), but membership losses 
after 1920 were minimal.
2.4. Union recognition.
In strike waves, optimistic expectations were crucial because workers expected to re­
define the employee-employer relationship and obtain the recognition of the union. 
When prospects appeared to be good, the traditional organisational drive included a 
public meeting in which a set of demands were drawn up and presented to employers in 
the form of a written collective contract. For example in the first union drive in the 
Biscay iron mines, workers presented a contract which included shorter hours, the end 
of piece rate work and the abolition of barrack housing. The demands put forward by 
the Catalan textile union of La Constancia (Constancy) in the strike of 1913 considered 
higher wages, a workday of 10 hours and the end of night shifts in the industry. An
36 The classic reference o f this episode is Solano, E. G., El ocaso del sindicalismo. Segunda parte 
(Barcelona, 1933).
37 Lamberet, Renee, Mouvements ouvriers et socialistes (chronologie et bibliographie) (Paris, 1953).
38 Diaz del Moral, Historia de las agitaciones campesinas andaluzas (antecedentes para una refoima 
agraria) (Madrid, 1973), p. 335.
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unusual unionisation drive among the chambermaids of Barcelona promoted by the 
CNT in 1918 shows how the collective contract was drawn up:
Maids and servants were convoked to a meeting at "El Globo”, a popular dance hall in 
front of the Ciutadella Park. [...]
The spacious room of “e/ Globo’'’ was not large enough to let everybody in, three other 
“Globos” would have been necessary. Almost everybody joined the union. A union 
committee was elected and a collective contract was drawn up and presented promptly 
to the “masters” (Jos sehores). The contract included an increase in wages, a shortening 
of the workday and one and a half free days in the week.39
The final aim of most of these efforts was fundamentally employers’ recognition 
of the union’s bargaining power and the start of collective bargaining. For example, in 
the strike wave of 1903-1904 in Barcelona, 30 per cent of strikes were inititated by 
unions presenting written collective contracts to employers.40 Between 1899 and 1902, 
building construction workers, coachmen or quarry workers had agreed upon the 
collective conditions of employment with their employers. For example, textile workers 
in the finishing trades (cilindradores y  aprestadores) called for a 9-hour day, an 
increase in wages, a minimum age of 14 for apprentices, the end of work by young girls, 
union recognition and the union shop.41 Shoe-makers went on strike to obtain the eight- 
hour day and the end of piece rate work.42 Building construction workers demanded the 
eight hour day, an increase in wages, and the constitution of a joint board of workers 
and employers to solve eventual conflicts and avoid strikes 43 In all these cases, union 
recognition was fundamental because most unions had been created only after 1898. A 
60 per cent of the existing in Barcelona in 1904 had been organised or rather re­
organised in the years 1899-1904 (graph 2.3) and were trying to re-shape their 
relationship with employers in the form of union recognition.
39 Manent, Joan, Records d ’un sindicalista llibertari catala, 1916-1943 (Paris, 1976), pp. 30-33.
40 In fact this is underestimating the extent o f “union recognition strikes” since many o f these strikes did 
not entail a written collective contract, but sometimes a crucial demand (for example, Sunday rest for 
bakers). Sastre y Sanna, Miguel, Las huelgas de Barcelona y  sus resultados en el aho 1903 (Barcelona, 
1904), Las huelgas de Barcelona y  sus resultados en el aho 1904 (Barcelona, 1905). 14 of 47 registered 
strikes included written collective contracts.
41 Sastre, Las huelgas 1903, “cilindradores y aprestadores.”
42 Ibid., “zapateros.”
43 Ibid., “obreros de la construction.”
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Graph 2.3. Unions existing in 1904 by year of creation (Barcelona).
Source: Institute de Reformas Sociales, Estadistica de asociacion ohrera 1904 (Madrid, 1907).
Note: this graph shows most unions operating in Barcelona in 1904 had been created between 1898 and 
1904, and especially in 1899, 1900, 1902 and 1903.
In these strikes, membership typically increased during the strike and fell 
thereafter. Generally, strong employers’ resistance to recognise unions undermined 
most efforts to stabilise the position in a particular trade. For example the members of 
the Barcelona Shoemakers’ union joined 1,100 members before the strike called on June 
1903 in a trade of approximately 10,000. After the strike in which the union failed to 
obtain union recognition, membership fell to 700. After the 1,200 strong dockers’ strike, 
only 300 could come back to work, the rest saw their jobs taken by strike-breakers. In 
the tram workers strike of 1901, the union was banned and strikers were crushed by the 
military. A gas workers’ strike in 1903 also ended with an order from the government 
banning the union. Lost strikes implied sharp decreases in membership and a period of 
demoralisation. Miguel Sastre estimated that there were more than 45,000 union 
workers in Barcelona at the peak of the strike wave in 1903, of an estimated working 
population of 88,000. By 1908, he reckoned this figure had gone down to less than 
10,000 44
44 Marvaud, Angel, La question sociale en Espagne (Paris, 1910), p. 135, figures based on : Sastre y 
Sanna, Miguel, “Las sociedades de resistencia de Barcelona,” La Paz Social, 1909, pp. 238-240.
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Union stability was not that problematic in small, local craft unions which had 
been able to lead a more continuous life. In Barcelona, a barrel-makers’ union existed 
since 1870 with almost foil unionisation and the printing trades’ union had organised 
the trade since the early 1880s. In both cases, collective agreements between workers 
and employers had regulated the terms of employment for decades. Unions in large 
urban sectors like shoe-making, building construction or the metal trades experienced 
more discontinuous processes of union implementation. Table 2.1. shows union density 
values (union workers/ employment in the sector) for some trades between 1903 and 
1906 in Barcelona taken at peak membership shortly before or during the strike and at 
the end of the year. Dockers, gas workers, the metal trades or textile workers had low 
union densities below 10 per cent. Building construction workers enjoyed almost foil 
unionisation in 1903, but by 1906 union density had fallen to 25 per cent.
Table 2.1. Union densities in Barcelona. 1903-1906.
Trades Peak union Density at the Year
density end o f year
Quarry workers 1 0.18 1903
Barrel-makers 1 1 1906
Hat makers 0.96 0.96 1906
Carpenters 0.89 0.89 1903
Building construction 0.86 0.86 1903
Lithographers 0.84 0.84 1903
Tanners 0.84 0.83 1906
Gas workers 0.69 0 1903
Typographers 0.64 0.64 1903
Agricultural labourers 0.39 0.04 1904
Lathe operators 0.36 0.76 1903
Carpenters 0.33 0.33 1906
Coachmen 0.3 0.3 1904
Building construction workers 0.26 0.26 1906
Typesetters 0.25 0.25 1903
Glass workers 0.21 0.09 1906
Cotton textiles (weaving and spinning) 0.16 0.16 1905
Cotton textiles (finishing) 0.09 0.07 1905
Locksmiths 0.05 0.06 1904
Dyers 0.04 0.04 1905
Shoemakers 0.1 0.06 1903
Foundry workers 0 0 1905
Shoemakers 0 0 1906
Source: Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona, years 1903-1906.
Numerically important sectors of the Spanish economy like the metal trades, the 
cotton textile industry or mining were characterised by having close to zero union 
densities in the late 1.9th and early 20th century. In all these cases, employers did not
Chapter 2. The rise o f syndicalism. 56
recognise unions or union rights were severely contested. Below I discuss 5 case-studies 
in which I stress employers’ opposition to union recognition, the consequent instability 
of unions and the organisation of strikes associated with union recognition.
Cotton textile workers.
Unions had existed since the 1840s in the cotton textile industry.45 In 1869, the Tres 
Classes de Vapor (Three Steam Classes) was created and presented their demands to 
employers. The union was especially active in 1870 and 1871 leading a series of 
successful strikes in Barcelona and Manresa.46 In 1871, it joined the 1st International and 
in 1872 a wider federation called Union Manufacturera was created joining local unions 
of 105 towns in late 1872. By early 1873, the union obtained a shortening of the 
workday to 11 hours and an increase in wages of 7.5 per cent. This led to an apparently 
uncontrolled wave of union recognition strikes in 1873, with union membership peaking 
at 30,000 members.47
The Tres Clases, like most unions, was extremely weak during the period going 
from the fall of the 1st Republic to 1881. In 1881, when the union started operating 
again, a textile worker remarked textile workers had gone “through a seven year
■d Q
eclipse.’ A series of union recognition strikes took place in 1881, which met strong 
employers’ resistance. In Mataro, employers staged a lock-out lasting 13 weeks. In 
1882, a section of the textile union joined the Union Manufacturera, which operated 
within the FTRE, while the Tres Classes remained outside the anarchist organisation. 
The period 1882-1883 saw further strikes and union gains. In 1883, there were more 
employers’ lock-outs in Mataro and Igualada, but between 1883 and 1890 the union 
enjoyed a period of collective bargaining in the large establishments of Barcelona and its 
province, while being substantially weaker in the rest of the Catalan textile sector.49 In
45 The classic work on early Catalan unionism is Maluquer de Motes, Jordi, “La crisis del modelo liberal 
en Espana: el nacimiento del movimiento obrero y las primeras formulaciones socialistas: 1835-1868,” 
unpublished PhD disseration Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, 1975; a recent contribution is 
Bamosell, Genis, Origens del sindicalisme catala (Vic, 1999).
46 Izard, Revolucio industrial, pp. 68-69.
47 For example, the Federal Commission of the International wrote to the Union asking for greater control 
of strikes to avoid losing resources. The letter remarked most strikes did not follow the rules set up by the 
International. In Izard, Revolucio industrial, p. 72.
48 Ibid., p. 75.
49 Ibid., p. 115.
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1890, a conflict in Manresa sparked a general strike in the sector in which the union was 
defeated. With a weak union, there is very little evidence of union activity in the 1890s.
The years from 1899 to 1901 saw a rapid rise of unionisation in the so-called 
montana (mountain) region, located in inner Catalonia.50 In February 1899 there was a 
series of strikes in the main towns of this area: Roda de Ter, Torello, Vic, Ripoll, or 
Camprodon. In this area, they constituted the Federacio del Textil de la Comarca del 
Ter i Fresser (Textile Federation of the Ter and Fresser Valleys), which 3 Clases de 
Vapor and Unio Fabril Cotonera (Cotton Union) joined in September 1899,51 when the 
Spanish Federation of the Textile industry was created {Federacion de la Industria 
Textil Espanola). The initial membership was exceptional high at about 40,000 
members, most of them from outside Barcelona. A representation of the Federation 
established itself in Madrid in order to negotiate with the Liberal party in power a law 
establishing a workday of 11 hours and a night shift of 8.
Yet any attempt to stabilise the union proved to be short-lived. In October 1900, 
employers in the Ter Valley staged a lock-out, to which workers responded with a 
general strike in November. The strike lasted seven weeks and was lost, with 800 union 
workers losing their jobs. By late 1901, the Textile Federation had disappeared and the 
sector had rates of affiliation below 5%.
From 1913 to 1916 there was another important strike movement in the Catalan 
textile sector. In March 1912, a Sindicato del Arte Fabril y  similares (Textile Syndicate) 
had been legalised with 2,000 members in Barcelona. In April 1913, the syndicate 
adopted the name of La Constancia (Constancy). On the 14th June 1913, the Catalan 
federation of the Textile Syndicate presented to their employers a set of demands: higher 
wages, shorter hours and union recognition. As employers refused to deal with the
tVi +Uunion, a strike started on the 13 July with a participation peak of 85,000 on the 9 of
50 The ‘Mountain’ was characterised by its use o f hydraulic power to run the mills. It contained traditional 
textile towns like Manresa or Manlleu but also the town mills located along the rivers Ter, Fresser, 
Llobregat, and Cardener. Discussed in more detail in chapter 6.
51 See Gabriel, “Classe obrera,” p. 488. Unio Fabril Cotonera was a socialist oriented textile union with a 
strong hold in Mataro, north o f Barcelona. In a conference held on the 29th June o f 1900 they were to 
propose joining the socialist General Workers Union (UGT).
52 Federacion Tres Clases de Vapor had only 250 members in the city o f Barcelona. See Gabriel, “Classe 
obrera,” p.491. According to Miguel Sastre, about a 10 per cent o f 10,000 textile workers in Barcelona 
were unionised. Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1904.
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August.53 On the 16th August a conciliatory formula was proposed by the Civil Governor 
of Barcelona contemplating higher wages, a ten-hour workday, and the effective 
enforcement of the 1900 law on the night work of children and women. These promises 
were later transformed into a government decree.
By late August 1913, La Constancia had gathered 18,000 workers (about one 
fifth of the Catalan textile workers). However, a series of strikes in 1914, 1915 and 1916 
undermined again the position of the union. In Reus, an industrial city in the south of 
Catalonia, the employers’ association locked-out workers for ten days. The employers’ 
association of the Mountain area also adopted a strong anti-union stance laying off union 
workers. In 1916, La Constancia lost a 17,000 strong strike in the province of Barcelona 
that finally brought about the dissolution of the union.
Metal workers.
A similar case in Catalonia was that of the metal trades, encompassing about 13,000 
workers in early 20th century Barcelona, with about a third being unionised at the time. 
In late 1901 and early 1902, foundry workers, locksmiths, tinsmiths and iron tinkers - 
organised under the umbrella organisation Federacio Metal, lurgica (Federation of metal 
workers)- went on strike calling for a 9-hour day, pay by the hour and overtime, the end 
of piece rate work and the restriction to employ boys over 14.54 After two months on 
strike, on mid February 1902, a one week solidarity general strike was staged in 
Barcelona with between 80,000 and 100,000 striking workers at its peak.55 But on late 
February, metallurgical workers finally gave up and resumed work with their traditional 
10-hour day. As a consequence of the strike, 1500 metal workers were fired as their jobs 
had been taken by strike-breakers. In May-June 1903, after the 1903 Madrid conference 
of the FRSOR, a Federacion de Sociedades Metalurgicas de Espana (Spanish 
Federation of Metallurgical societies) held a conference in Barcelona with 
representatives mainly from Catalonia and Andalusia.56 However, as the Federacion 
failed to organise Barcelona, the most important concentration of metal workers, the
53 The strike was general in the sector. A detailed follow-up o f the strike is given in IRS, “Noticias 
relativas a la huelga en la industria textil,” inLa jom ada de trabajo en la industia textil
54 Cuadrat, Socialismo y  anarquismo, pp.76-77; Romero Maura, La Rosa de Fuego, p.207.
55 Ibid., p.211.
56 There was another Metal workers union organised in 1903 belonging to the UGT with about 2800 
members in 1903 mainly from Madrid, cities in Castilla-Leon and some from the Basque country and 
Asturias.
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union disappeared in May 1905.57 By 1910, only 300 of between 12,000 to 13,000 
metal workers in Barcelona were unionised. The Catalan socialist leader, Josep 
Comaposada, claimed in 1909 that as a consequence of the failed 1901-1902 strike, most
co
metal workers in Barcelona were “extremely reluctant to join unions.”
However, in the summer of 1910, another important metal workers strike took 
place in Barcelona, followed by a three-months general strike in the trade from mid 
September to mid December.59 The strike had sparked from a conflict in a factory 
(Rablons) in which a group of workers had demanded, but failed to enforce, the union
t j .
shop. On the 9 September 1910, the local metal workers’ union called for the general 
strike in the trade and drew up a collective contract that included union recognition, the 
nine-hour day, work on holy days and an increase in pay for overtime hours. Workers 
were quite slow to mobilise but the tolerance of the civil governor towards picket lines 
made possible that the conflict extended to most of the metal workers of the city. 
Employers refused to meet the strike committee and the situation was blocked. Finally, 
workers surrendered and decided to go back to work, but 1,000 strikers saw their jobs 
taken by strike breakers.60 In April 1914, when the first Catalan conference of metal 
workers’ unions met in Barcelona, it was decided to open a debate on the means needed 
to engage employers into collective bargaining and obtain the recognition of the union.61
Building construction workers.
Another interesting case was that of the building construction workers. In October 1901, 
a federation of the existing building construction workers’ unions in Barcelona had won 
a strike calling for the 8-hour day and obtained a formal collective bargaining board in 
the form of a joint commission of workers and employers (Comision Mixta). In 
Barcelona by 1903, the union had become extremely successful with about 13,000 
workers of the 15,000 employed, with some of its branches supplying schools and adult
f \  9education to their members. In Madrid, the union El Trabajo (Work) enjoyed a similar
57 Gabriel, “Classe obrera i sindicats,” p. 532.
58 Comaposada, Josep, La organizacion obrera en Cataluha (Reus, 1910), p. 24.
59 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona, year 1910, “Obreros metalurgicos.”
60 Ibid.
61 Gabriel, “Classe obrera i sindicats,” p. 552.
62 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona, year 1903, “obreros de la construction.”
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success up to 1911. Nevertheless, most of this unionisation drive was supported by 
extraordinary labour market conditions in the sector, with an extremely tight market for 
building construction workers. In Barcelona, a second strike was attempted in the 
summer of 1903 to win a pay rise of 0,50 pesetas, but it ended in failure.64 By 1906, 
employment in the building trades in Barcelona had fallen to 3,500 workers only, of 
which some 900 unionised.65 It is not surprising that union activity in the sector was 
almost non existent until 1913, when in Barcelona a local federation of building 
construction workers was formed, and only effective after 1916.66 In Madrid, a two- 
month employers’ lock-out in 1911, undermined both the implementation of the union 
and its ability to advance the interests of its members as individual contracting 
substituted for collective agreements between employers and El Trabajo.
Miners.
The attempts of the Biscay iron mining workers to organise collectively date back to the 
celebration of the 1st May in 1890. A general strike in the area of about 30,000 
participants was organised calling for the eight-hour day. In addition to a 10-hour day, 
the mining workers also demanded the suppression of the system of barrack housing, 
which was compulsory for all miners, and the abrogation of the so-called tareas (the 
payment according to individual or group output). As a consequence of the general 
strike, martial law was declared but the captain general of the province, general Loma, 
invited workers to present their demands to the employers. With Loma and the Prefect 
threatening to withdraw the military and police protection from the establishments on 
strike, employers had to bargain with workers and accept some of their demands, leading 
to the so-called Loma Agreement.67
In spite of this early success, most mining workers in the area remained outside 
unions. There were important strikes in 1903, 1906 and 1910, extended to the whole area 
of Bilbao and triggering a favourable intervention of the authorities, both by the prefect 
and the military. The miners’ union, the Federacion de Obreros Mineros (Mining
63 Byme, Justin, “Trabajo y conflictividad en el sector de la construccion en Madrid, 1900-1914,” 
Sociologia del Trabajo, 15 (Spring 1992), pp. 125-127.
64 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona, year 1903, “obreros de la construccion”.
65 Sastre,' Las huelgas de Barcelona 1906, “obreros de la construccion;” Gabriel, “Classe obrera i 
sindicats,” p. 525.
66 Ibid., p. p. 576.
67 Fusi, Juan Pablo, Politico obrera en el Pals Vasco, 1880-1923 (Madrid, 1974), pp.92-93.
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workers Federation), constituted in 1899, only had 723 members in 1904 of a trade of 
about 11,000 and was not recognised by employers. For instance, when in 1903 the 
Federacion demanded the payment of weekly instead of monthly wages, employers 
refused to recognise the union as the collective voice of their employees. Despite the 
favourable intervention of the government, unionisation stood below 10 per cent (968 
members in 1907) and their union had not obtained formal recognition from the mining 
firms.
In March 1910, another miners’ conference agreed to call for a reduction of the 
workday, an issue that had been untouched since the Loma Pact of 1890. A miners’ 
strike ensued in the summer. The strike was a considerable success, obtaining favourable 
state intervention and a decree establishing a workday of nine hours in the summer. 
Despite state support, the Biscay miners’ union did not stabilise its position in the 
following years. Looking at membership figures, from 6,885 members in 1911 and 
union density over 50 per cent, this figure fell to 1,954 in 1912. Further, the onset of 
World War 1 did not favour the union, and membership fell further to 1,250 in 1914, 
1,134 in 1915 and 870 in 1916.68
This contrasted sharply with the successful unionisation of Asturias coal miners 
before 1914, where there had been a first attempt to organise a union in 1899. The 
mining union suffered to important defeats in 1903 and 1906. After the 1906 strike, 
Manuel Llaneza, leader of the Asturias miners, spent three years exiled in the mines of 
the North of France, where he devised a union modelled on the French socialist mining 
unions. This implied a strict central authorisation of strikes and control over strike- 
funds. As Benjamin Martin notes: “centralised leadership and control and the pooling of 
resources to create a large strike fund gave it (the union) a formidable cohesion and 
force.”69 In 1910, the Asturias Miners’ Union (Sindicato Minero Asturiano, SMA) was 
created under the leadership of Llaneza. After some initial victories, by 1912 the SMA 
had unionised more than half of the mining workers in Asturias and had reached about
7010,000 members. In 1913, when the big mining concerns joined forces under a 
common employers’ association, the union was formally recognised as the legitimate
68 Ibid., p. 360.
69 Martin, Benjamin, The agony o f  modernization, p. 110.
70 Shubert, Adrian, Hacia la Revolucion. Origenes sociales del movimiento obrero en Asturias (1860- 
1934) (Barcelona, 1984), p. 142.
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71“voice” of mining workers (except in Hullera Espanola). In 1914, a minimum wage 
agreed by the SMA and the employers’ association. In the World War 1 years, union 
densities fluctuated between 60 and 80 per cent. In 1919, a mining strike in Asturias in 
which 30,000 workers participated obtained the 7-hour day and portal-to-portal pay.
Railway workers.
Railways companies employed 60,000 workers in 1905. The first evidence available on 
the association of workers had to do with the creation of funds to cover accident
79compensation. Proper unions seem to have been created in 1892 in the workshops of 
Ferrocarriles Andaluces (Andalusian Railway Company) in Malaga, which reached 
about 1000 members in 1894.73 In 1893, in Sant Marti de Prover^als (next to 
Barcelona), drivers and stokers of the Compania del Norte organised their union, La 
Esperanza (Hope).74 From very early on, La Esperanza tried to unionise drivers and 
stokers in other railways companies with the aim of creating a national federation. But 
the company was to act diligently against the union by laying-off Luis Zurdo, the main 
leader of the union, and other eleven workers.
In spite of strong employers’ resistance, a national General Railway Workers 
Union (Sindicato General de los Ferrocarriles de Espana) was organised in 1896, with
7AZurdo as secretary. Proving the weakness of the union, the collective contract 
approved in the 1896 conference was presented to employers six years later, in 1902. 
After employers refused to come to terms with the Sindicato, the union threatened with a 
general strike in the sector, which never took place because it was not supported by the 
rank-and-file.
71 The SMA stroke again against Hullera Espanola in 1916, and ending up in the temporary recognition 
of the union. When in 1917, Hullera refused to accept the collective agreement o f that year between SMA 
and the employers’ association, another strike ensued. After 19 days, the IRS intervened, and a 
referendum was made among the workers o f whether they wanted to be represented by the SMA or the 
catholic company union. The referendum was won by the SMA but still it was the government who had to 
force the company to recognise the union.
72 The most notable case is the Asociacion General de Empleados y  Obreros de los Ferrocairiles de 
Espana (General Association o f Spanish railways’ workers), created in 1903. Juez Gonzalo, 
Emerenciana, “El mundo social de los ferrocarriles espanoles de 1857 a 1917,” unpublished PhD 
dissertation Universidad Complutense de Madrid 1997, p. 363.
73 Castillo, Santiago, “El asociacionismo ferroviario y su genesis,” Estudios de Historia Social, 26-27 
(July-December 1983).
74 Juez Gonzalo, “El mundo social,” p. 372.
75 Ibid., p.839.
76 Ibid., p.840.
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In 1909, a new attempt to create a national railways workers’ union stemmed 
from the employees of the MZA Company (Madrid-Zaragoza-Alicante) in Madrid. This 
initiative was organised through the Casa del Pueblo (People’s Home) of UGT. In order 
to avoid black listing and lay-offs of union organisers, it was decided that the leadership 
of the new union (Union Ferroviaria, Railways union) was to be given to people
associated with the Socialist Party (PSOE) and its union, UGT. Further, the register of
77
members was encoded to avoid retaliation by the companies on union supporters. In 
the second half of 1910, Vicente Barrio, leader of the Union, gave a series of meetings 
and conferences in the main cities of the country. In a series of unionisation drives, local 
offices of the union were being opened across the Spanish geography. This was followed 
by conflicts and attempts by employers to curtail union activity. In December 1910, the 
PSOE, which had won a deputy in the election that had taken place in the same year, 
denounced in parliament the activities of companies and defended the activity of the 
union. By late 1910, the union had an estimated membership of 20,000. During the 
following year, membership more than doubled, reaching 45,000 in early 1912, and
60,000 at the end of the first conference of June 1912, in a sector of about 85,000 
employees.
In the first conference of the Union Ferroviaria, it was decided that the union 
was to be called Federacion Nacional de los Ferroviarios Espanoles and new statutes of 
the union were drawn up. Among the main regulations, the union was now open to all 
railway workers and was not limited to drivers and stokers. Furthermore, the union was 
divided into sections corresponding to each of the companies operating in Spain. Finally, 
a centralised mechanism to regulate strikes was instituted with control over strike
70
funds. This, however, as in 1912, did not prevent regional sections -namely the 
Catalan branch- to strike unilaterally, in spite of the opposition of the central office of 
the Union Ferroviaria. A vote deciding whether to support the 1912 Catalan strike came 
out in favour of the strike. Moreover, the conference also passed a set of demands being
70presented to employers in the form of a collective contract (bases de trabajo).
77 Boletin del Institute) de Reformas Sociales, “Information sobre los origenes de la Union Ferroviaria,” 
December 1912, p. 482.
78 Juez Gonzalo, “El mundo social,” pp. 390-391
79 Ibid., pp. 854-857.
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In this sector, the regulation of the state is a key factor to understand the further 
evolution of the union. The royal decree passed in October 1912 -during the preparation 
of a general strike in the sector- recognised the right of the railway workers to go on 
strike and also the right of railway managers to hire labour (in fact, strike-breakers) to 
guarantee the service.80 More importantly, the enactment of two additional royal decrees 
authorised the minister of Defence to call on duty all railway workers having served in 
the Army between 1901 and 1911 to guarantee the service, severely limiting the right to
o 1
strike. The bill presented by the Liberal government to the approval of the Cortes had
%
two salient characteristics. First, it required all railway companies to submit written 
collective contracts containing issues like wages, promotion policies, seniority rules, 
pensions, accident compensation, etc., to the Ministry of Public Works (Ministerio de 
Fomento) for approval. Second, it severely curtailed the right of workers to strike, 
through the creation of compulsory joint commissions arbitraging in conflicts between 
labour and management, through which all workers’ demands had to be negotiated. 
Arbitration and conciliation was to be secured in two steps. There was a joint 
commission of labour and management (junta de conciliacion). If the junta failed to
reach an agreement, arbitration committees (tribunales arbitrates) were to be drawn
~\
82up.
In this sense, the right to strike was banned for railway workers as they were
0*1
considered civil servants, which at the time had not the right to strike. The curtailment 
of the right to strike for railway workers made it an easy target for opponents to the 
reform and the project never became a law, being blocked in parliament not only by 
Republicans and Pablo Iglesias (the only Socialist deputy), but also by Conservatives.84 
On the other hand, railway companies also opposed the law and accused the government 
in trying to intervene in the “private” dealings of each company with their employees.
80 The issue is discussed in IRS, Conflictos de obreros y  empleados en las compahias de ferrocarriles.
81 The same solution had been given in France by the Briand government to crush the railway workers 
strike. Suarez, “La huelga de ferrocarriles de 1912,” p. 528. Since reservists had to wear an armband, the 
strike was popularly known as the “armband strike” (huelga del brazalete).
82 The tribunal was formed by the chief engineer of the company in which the conflict had taken place, a 
deputy from parliament and a member from the senate, two members o f the Instituto de Reformas 
Sociales, one representing labour and the other management, one o f the presidents o f the Supreme Court, 
and the Dean o f the Madrid College o f Lawyers.
83 Ibid., pp. 530-532.
84 IRS report quoted in Juez Gonzalo, “El mundo social,” pp. 500-501.
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In July 1916, another strike in the sector brought about a determined reaction 
from the government. On the 13 , the executive suspended constitutional guarantees, 
closed the Cortes and declared martial law. The leaders of the Federacion Nacional de 
Ferroviarios, those presiding the strike commission, and Socialist and UGT leaders like 
Largo Caballero and Julian Besteiro were arrested. Yet, the government commissioned a 
report on the strike to the Instituto de Reformas Sociales. In it, the experts of the 
Instituto remarked that strikes ensued because unions were not recognised by the railway 
companies. It also added “although our general legislation guarantees and gives room to 
the adequate constitution of unions (sociedades), the regulation is flawed with respect to 
the legitimate and efficient participation of those organisations in the conflicts and
or
deliberations with employers (entidades patronales).” Following this argument, the 
Instituto proposed making union recognition compulsory and the institution of 
mechanisms for prompt government intervention, when the negotiations between labour 
and employers were broken. In August 1916, a royal decree was sanctioned making 
union recognition compulsory for all industrial companies providing public services.
The General Workers’ Union (UGT).
Union membership figures for the General Workers’ Union (UGT) allow us to analyse 
the impact of the 1910-1913 unionisation drives in mining and railways on union 
membership. Before 1911, UGT’s most solid footholds had been the building 
construction workers of Madrid and groups of agricultural workers in Andalusia. But 
between 1910 and 1913, UGT grew mainly in mining, both in Biscay and Asturias, and 
in railways. Graph 2.4. shows two membership bursts in 1911-1912 and in 1919-1920 
(membership measured at the end of the year), with year-to-year increases of more than 
50 per cent concentrated in 1911 and 1912 and an increase of 135 per cent in 1919-1920 
with respect to 1918. The membership burst of 1911-1912 is associated with the 
unionisation drives in coal mining and railways. However, after peaking in 1913, union 
membership fell continuously until 1916, only to recover in 1919.
85 Ibid., p.555.
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Graph 2.4. Union members (thousands). General Workers’ Union (UGT), 1896-1923.
Source: Anuario Estadistico de Espana, various years.
Note: the graph includes an exponential trend to underline periods of union decline and periods of fast
union growth.
The strike wave of 1918-1920.
The link between strike waves, union creation and union recognition appears clearly in 
the strike wave of 1918-20, with the consolidation of the National Confederation of 
Labour (CNT) in Catalonia. Created in 1910, the CNT stemmed from the Barcelona 
federation of unions Solidaridad Obrera (Workers’ Solidarity). In 1911, the 
Confederacion led a series of general strikes in September 1911 in protest of the war in 
Morocco, which prompted the government of Jose Canalejas to outlaw the syndicate. 
After a two year period of clandestine activity, the CNT was made legal in the summer 
of 1914. In the autumn of 1914, the CNT participated in the important movement 
against the rise of consumer prices caused by the onset of World War 1, concentrating 
most of the activity of the organisation up to 1916. In 1917, an ultimately failed national 
general strike was orchestrated by the UGT and CNT. From then onwards, the CNT
86 The syndicate was legalised in July 1913, but as the legalisation took place at the same time of the 
important textile strike in the summer of 1913, most of its leaders were arrested accused of participating 
in the conflict.
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agenda considered the creation, growth and consolidation of a new institution called the
87  i-*sindicato unico, or “one big union.” Instead of joining workers under trade federations 
(federaciones de oficio), the CNT wanted unions to organise into broader industrial 
federations devised to be massive organisations encompassing the workers of a 
particular industry, like transport, mining, textile or metals.
Most of these institutional innovations appeared in 1916 and 1917 in Barcelona 
and were developed initially by the carpenters’ and building construction workers’ 
unions. In June 1916, a conference of the Federacion del Ramo de la Construccion 
(national federation of building construction workers) took place in Barcelona under the 
leadership of Salvador Segui, the Sugar Boy, head of the Catalan branch of the CNT 
from 1918 until he was shot dead in 1923. The doctrine of the “one big union” was to 
become dominant in the Regional Confederation of Labour conference (CRT, the 
Catalan branch of the CNT) held in Sants (Barcelona) in late June of 1918.88 Following 
more anarcho-syndicalist practices, the various craft, local or neighbourhood branches of 
the syndicate had relative autonomy, but strikes still had to be authorised by the unico 
board. Once the approval had been given, the entire unico was forced to provide support 
either in the form of solidarity strikes or through financial assistance.
If one looks at the evidence, there is no doubt this simple and persuasive idea had 
an extraordinary success. Taking figures from Catalonia only, membership stood at
34,000 in early 1918 and 73,860 during the Sants conference, but by late 1918 CNT 
there were 345,000 members, reaching 427,086 in 1919, with the movement peaking in 
the general strikes of March and April in Barcelona and in parts of Catalonia.
CNT membership figures, namely the figures of federated members provided in 
their conferences, have been subject to criticism. It has been noted that the syndicate 
overestimated its members, especially in the case of the Madrid conference of 1919. It is 
argued as well that even those who went to the conferences were not truly federated 
members, since most of them did not pay dues or did not attend the congress and hence 
did not belong formally to the organisation. Gerald Brenan, writing shortly after the
87 Martin, Benjamin, The agony o f modernization. Labor and industrialization in Spain (Ithaca, NY, 
1990), p. 198.
88 The classic reference on the Conference is Lladonosa, Manel, El Congres de Sants (Barcelona, 1975). 
As well, Lorenzo, Cesar M., Les anarchistes espagnols et lepouvoir, 1869-1969 (Paris, 1969), pp. 49-51.
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Spanish Civil War, claimed that CNT’s “core of persistent adherents did not exceed
200,000,” which would have put UGT at the forefront of the labour movement.89 
However, with a policy of deliberately low dues and lacking any type of bureaucracy, 
membership in the CNT was not linked to the payment of dues. Furthermore, in the 
political and economic context of the time, no union could avoid having strong 
fluctuations of membership. In this sense, the use of persistent dues-paying members as 
unit of analysis does not capture periods of fast union growth.90
Seen under this light, CNT figures look plausible, especially for Catalonia, 
where the unicos were being created throughout 1918. The first unico appeared among 
carpenters, cabinetmakers, etc. (ramo de la madera) even before the Sants conference. 
The printing trades organised their syndicate in July 1918. A building construction 
unico appeared in October 1918 (ramo de la construccion). The metal workers’ big 
union joined in November.91 Additionally, the local federations of unions of most of the 
important Catalan industrial towns like Sabadell, Terrassa, Badalona, Manresa, or 
Igualada also accepted to belong to the CNT in late 1918. By early 1919, the CNT had 
enforced the presence of their “workshop delegates” (delegados de taller) in most firms 
in the series of strikes of late 1918.92 In February-March 1919, there were 3,500 CNT 
workshop delegates in Barcelona alone co-ordinating the strike in La Canadiense, the 
company supplying electricity to the city, a 44-day long strike coupled with a one-week 
long general strike.
The symbolic victory of La Canadiense generated a process of explosive union 
growth in 1919 in which the CNT claimed to organise 800,000 workers across Spain. 
However, the benefits of this period of collective effervescence did not accrue 
exclusively to the anarcho-syndicalist union. As I have noted in the previous section, the
89 Brenan, The Spanish labyrinth, p. 199.
90 Using ‘broad’ membership figures is common in the literature on union growth. In his study o f the US 
union spurt of the 1930s, Richard Freeman notes the differences between union membership figures based 
on dues payers and ‘broad’ membership figures given by unions and argues he has “a mild preference for 
measures that reflect the broadest possible membership in unions to those limited to annual dues-paying 
members, as the former may give a better indication of changes in periods o f rapid growth.” Freeman, 
“Spurts in union growth,” appendix A, p. 53. A similar argument in the case o f France, Friedman, Gerald, 
State-making and labor movements. France and the United States, 1876-1914 (Ithaca, NY, 1998), 
pp.248-251, especially footnote 10.
91 Gabriel, “Classe obrera i sindicats,” pp. 706-707.
92 Ibid., p. 710. An account o f the importance of workshop delegates in Pestana, Angel, “El sindicalismo 
en Cataluna” in Trayectoria sindicalista (Barcelona, 1974).
93 Gabriel, “Classe obrera i sindicats,” p. 728.
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General Workers’ Union doubled membership between 1918 and 1920, from less than
100,000 members to over 200,000. More importantly, union creation was also intense in 
sectors that were characterised by having low levels of unionisation. In graph 2.5. and
2.6., I use the date of creation of local union offices applying to participate in the 
elections of representatives to the local boards of employers and unions in two sectors 
like the garment industry -employing in most cases women on a putting out basis- and 
agriculture. In both cases, a sharp process of union creation were concentrated in 1918 
and 1919, suggesting optimistic expectations had been spread motivating workers to 
invest in the organisation of unions, even in sectors that had been traditionally hostile to 
union development.
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Graphs 2.5. and 2.6. Year of creation of unions applying to participate in IRS elections 
in garment industry and agriculture, 1919.
Source: Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Censo electoral social (Madrid, 1920). 
Note: the IRS census of unions of 1919 was based on the information voluntarily sent by unions willing
to participate in the election process.
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2.5. Conclusions.
This chapter has analysed the evolution of the labour movement in Spain since 1869 to 
the onset of the Primo de Rivera’s Dictatorship in 1923. Emphasis is put on the inability 
of unions to enforce union recognition clauses not allowing unions to stabilise their 
position. Lost strikes caused large membership declines and employers’ hostility 
checked the stabilisation unions. With conflicts over the institution of the union, strikes 
calling for union recognition were clustered in years in which exogenous (political 
opportunities, foreign events or tight labour markets) and endogenous factors (like early 
union successes) spread optimistic expectations among workers. ‘Positive feedback’ 
generated self-reinforcing processes of collective mobilisation in 1871-1873, 1881- 
1883, 1899-1903, 1910-1913 and especially in 1918-1920.
Chapter 3
A coalition for reform? Political responses to labour 
militancy, 1875-1923.
3.0. Introduction.
The first attempts of the Spanish state at intervening in the labour market and the first 
legislative effort to regulate the expansion of both unions and strikes took place in the 
early twentieth century. Previously, there had only been the first enquiries on working 
class’ living standards and the causes of labour unrest -the projects of the Comision de 
Reformas Sociales (Social Reforms Commission) - during the 1880s. The turn of the 
century witnessed the abandonment of the “abstentionist” (<abstencionista) stance on 
labour matters and a decisive move towards overcoming the principle of “free 
contracting” in the Napoleonic Civil law code, probably one of the most significant by­
products of the liberal revolution. From 1900 to 1910, the state sanctioned 531 by-laws 
and regulations on labour matters: the first workmen accidents’ compensation law in 
1900, the regulation of children’ and women’s work, the creation of an agency devoted 
to studying and collecting data on labour issues and proposing legislation (the Instituto 
de Reformas Sociales, Institute of Social Reforms, IRS) in 1903, the law of industrial 
tribunals in 1908, and the first bills and laws on arbitration and conciliation mechanisms 
in strikes in 1909.
The purpose of this chapter is to offer a description of the contours of this 
reform from a perspective which takes into account coalition building, elite ideology, 
and policy implementation. In order to pursue this task, I shall discuss the collective 
decision-making process, describe as precisely as possible the character of the reform, 
and address some of the existing hypotheses on the expansion of state intervention in 
labour issues and over the character of this reform.
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Labour and political historians have generally conceived the state as having both 
a sometimes passive and generally arbitrary role on labour matters. For instance, Gerald 
H. Meaker noted:
Like most weak governments, Restoration ministers aggravated proletarian unrest by 
constantly alternating between severity and laxity, so that periods o f repression were 
often followed by intervals o f conciliation and almost indiscriminate amnesty.1
In this setting, the evolution of the labour movement depended on political 
events and coalitions. As Mauro F. Guillen put it:
The history o f the Spanish labor movement until 1939 is one o f recurrent cycles of  
mobilization, unionization, strikes (often linked to political goals), repression and 
recovery o f unions. The labor cycle appears to follow political events and to be 
constrained by economic downturns, although at some points it also affected the 
evolution o f national politics and the economy. The right o f association was initially 
acknowledged in 1869, although ambiguous legislation allowed for the discretionary 
repression o f labor organizations.2
Contrary to these claims, I argue that the Restoration state’s stance towards 
labour evolved over time and that a ‘Conservatives-dominated’ coalition for reform was 
created in the Conservative Party governments between 1899 and 1909 following the 
political crisis of 1898. Because Conservatives were less reluctant than Liberals to 
intervene in the labour market and had more cohesive government majorities, their 
governments introduced a series of reforms in 1900 and 1903 which included workers’ 
accident compensation or the creation of the Instituto de Reformas Sociales (Institute of 
Social Reforms, IRS), which was to have a lasting influence as the main forum for 
discussion on labour-management relations and through the supply of its fair share of 
‘experts’ on the labour problem. With respect to the most contended piece of legislation, 
the regulation of strikes and unions and the introduction of arbitration and conciliation 
mechanisms, Conservatives also had the lead and introduced a series of reforms like the 
Labour courts in 1908 or the Strikes law of 1909. The Liberals, on the other hand, also 
presented important bills, especially during the brief stint in which Jose Canalejas was
1 Meaker, Gerald H., The revolutionary Left in Spain, 1914-1923 (Palo Alto, 1974).
2 Guillen, Mauro F., Models o f  management. Work, authority, and organization in a comparative 
Perpective (Chicago, 1994), p. 154.
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at the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, Trade, and Public Works. But as I will show, 
they were more divided along the intervention issue and most of these reforms were not 
passed.
My contention that a series of reforms were introduced is a controversial one, 
namely because most of these reforms were only partially or not at all enforced. Thus, 
one could argue that having non-enforced legislation and not having legislation were in 
fact analogous. This argument misses the point. As I will show, it ignores the political 
debate around the passing of legislation and the particular history of each of the laws 
being sanctioned at the time, with different political groups favouring or blocking the 
passing of legislation. Non-enforcement was endogenous to institutional change and 
was a consequence of some groups -notably employers and workers- blocking the 
implementation of reform. Had employers been able to veto reform in parliament, they 
would have done it, but in fact they lacked the political power to do so.
3.1. Responses to lahour militancy.
The growth of unions and the levels of social unrest shocked contemporaries in late 19th
tliand early 20 century Spain. Probably no political or social issue generated more 
controversy than the so-called cuestion social (the social issue). The role of authorities 
in particular bursts of strike activity in large cities was discussed in parliament for 
weeks. A whole new academic field expanding in Spain, sociology, was mainly devoted 
to the study of social unrest. Newspapers, like the republican daily La Publicidad, 
dedicated specific sections exclusively to strikes and unions. After the massive general 
strike in Barcelona in 1902, a Conservative Catalan deputy claimed in Parliament: “I 
have known Barcelona for many years, I have seen her in the most tragic moments, in 
political revolts, I have witnessed mutinies etc; but I declare that (...) I had never 
witnessed the spectacle of nowadays.” He then went on to note that the general strike 
of 1902 had been an attempt to “stage what was staged (sic) years ago in the Paris 
Commune.”4 What had happened in Barcelona was “more serious than mutiny, more 
serious than sedition, more serious than revolution,” according to a leader of the 
Conservative Party.5 La Veu de Catalunya, a conservative Catalan newspaper, woke up
3 Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados (DSC), 20th February 1902, number 124, p.3597. 
Speech by Bartomeu Robert.
4 Ibid., p. 3773.
5 Romero Robledo, DSC 15th March 1902, p. 3926.
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the spectres of Jacobin terror: “We warn workers. Our middle class is not as tame as the 
one that got herself killed in 1793.”6
Employers.
Opponents of the labour movement identified strikes and union expansion with social 
instability and, even further, with social revolution. They had grounds to do so. The 
progressive political experiment of the First Republic had collapsed in a spiral of strikes 
and social turmoil fuelled in some important cities by the alliance of the members of the 
Ist International (not particularly supported by more moderate unions) and the 
intransigentes, the left wing of the Republican movement, pushing for a replication of
• 7 •the Paris Commune. At the beginning of the Liberal revolution of 1868, employers had 
but reluctantly supported a compromise between order and the liberal revolution, “the
Q
monarchy with republican institutions.” However, after having experienced profound 
disagreements with the 1868 revolutionaries over crucial issues such as the freedom of 
conscience, and colonial or trade policy, by 1872-73, they ended up sponsoring Antonio 
Canovas del Castillo and the return of the Borbon king, Alfonso XII, as the only means 
of re-establishing social order.
By identifying unions with revolution, employers and critics of the labour 
movement claimed labour strife was caused by outside agitators, “sectarian mobs” 
pursuing political rather than economic goals.9 In 1902, the Catalan conservative press 
for instance asserted that “professional agitators paid by the government had come to 
Barcelona to wake up revolutionary passions” blaming the Republican Alejandro 
Lerroux and the anarchists for the sudden burst of labour strife.10 In Parliament, Catalan 
conservative deputies accused foreign-born anarchists settled in Barcelona of being the
6 Quoted in DSC, 18th March 1902, p. 4015 (Lerroux).
7 Termes, Josep, Anarquismo y  sindicalismo en Espaha (1864-1881) (Barcelona, 2000, 3rd Edition), pp. 
207-231.
8 Riquer, Borja de, “Canovas y los conservadores catalanes,” p. 156 in Escolta, Espanya. La cuestion 
catalana en la epoca liberal (Madrid, 2001).
9 Cu-Cut!, 21st April 1904, quoted in Romero-Maura, La Rosa de fuego, p. 433.
10 Quote from La Veu de Catalunya, 24th February 1902, in Nadal, Jordi and Carles Sudria, Historia de la 
Caja de Pensiones (Barcelona, 1983), p. 42. In fact they also blamed the Liberal government, but 
especially Segismundo Moret, for paying Lerroux to stir social conflict leading to the 1902 general strike. 
The literature has discredited this view: Culla, Joan B., El Republicanisme lerrouxista a Catalunya (1901- 
1923) (Barcelona, 1986), pp. 80-85; a similar but contemporary view is given in the authobiography o f  
the Catalan republican Hurtado, Amadeu, Quaranta anys d ’advocat. Historia del meu temps, 1894-1940 
(Barcelona, 1969), tome 1, pp. 73-74.
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“hidden hand” behind the general strike.11 During the mining strike of 1910 in Biscay, 
the conservative press manifested not knowing if it was truly a workers’ strike or “a
1 9revolutionary plot” by Socialists and Republicans.
Because unions only pursued political goals, it was argued, they also presented
demands to their employers which were impossible to concede, truly exceptional with
respect to normal relations between capital and labour. In the Parliamentary debate of
1910 over the strikes in Barcelona, Bertran y Musitu, having close ties with the
11employers’ association of the building construction trade, noted “the anarchist 
influence over the unions of Barcelona, and Catalonia in general.” According to him, 
the bitterness of conflicts between labour and management was due to the carelessness 
and arbitrariness of unions influenced by anarchists when staging strikes, since “this 
(anarchist) influence, which is also due to international agreements, sparks labour 
conflicts at the worst of times when the special conditions of the industries do not allow 
for a prompt resolution of the conflict.”14
In their view, however, radical politics did not attract workers. The inability of 
unions to build up a persistent core of dues-paying members was evidence enough to 
support their claim that workers were truly conservative and did not approve of strikes 
and revolutionary politics. In the 1903 mining strike in Biscay, employers of the Circulo 
Minero refused to deal with the union on the grounds that it only represented a tenth of 
the labour force.15 A similar argument was used in the large metal workers strike of 
1910 in Barcelona. In spite of the fact that their conclusions might have been wrong, 
their evidence was accurate. By 1910, the miners’ union of Biscay joined less than one 
thousand members in a trade of about 14,000. In Barcelona, during the 1910 strike in 
the metal trades, union density stood below 10 per cent. In the textile or in the building 
construction trade in the province of Barcelona, membership also stood at levels below
10 per cent.16
11 DSC, 27th February 1902, p. 3773.
12 Quote from El Pueblo Vasco, 17 July 1910, in Fusi, J.P., Politico obrera en el Pais Vasco (1880-1923) 
(Madrid, 1975), p.300.
13 Bengoechea, Soledad, Organitzacio patronal i conflictivitat social a Catalunya. Tradicid i 
corporativisme entre finals del segle i la dictadura de Primo de Rivera (Barcelona, 1994), p. 45.
14 DSC, 4th November 1910, p. 1629..
15 Marvaud, Angel, La cuestion social en Espaha (Madrid, 1975), p. 140, originally published in French in 
1910.
16 See chapter 2.
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Since unions and strikes were not truly supported by naturally conservative 
workers, demanded impossible concessions from employers, and pursued radical 
political goals imposed by foreigners or anti-system political parties, employers 
routinely called for the cancelling of public meetings during strikes, the crushing of 
strikes by the authorities, and the banning of revolutionary unions. Resenting what they 
considered an excessively tolerant policy from the authorities towards labour, their 
appeals for the crushing of strikes went hand in hand with the implementation of a 
programme aimed at re-establishing their authority in the workplace. Their first move 
was to demand their complete sovereignty when ‘dealing’ with their workers, claiming 
they “could only trust our (their) own effort and initiative” to solve conflicts with
1 7labour. Bartomeu Robert, formerly mayor of Barcelona and president of the Catalan
Regional League (Lliga Regionalista) noted in Parliament that he understood that “the
conciliation formula between capital and labour must be pursued in that individualistic
sense. The masters, the patrons, who we have to assume motivated by truly Christian
1 8feelings, have to show their love for their fellow men.”
This appeal to Christian values was quite common. A long tradition of Catholic 
thinkers claimed that modem societies were drifting towards dissolution and disorder. 
According to them, there was an inevitable straight link between Luther, the French 
Revolution, liberalism and anti-clericalism, anarchist terrorism, and the rise of the 
labour movement. This historical process inevitably led in their view to lawlessness and 
the inability to govern modem societies.19 What was needed was a restoration of 
venerable Christian Catholic values and the bringing together of workers and
tViemployers, estranged by the industrial revolution and machinism. In the mid-19 
century, Jaime Balmes, the leading Catholic conservative thinker, had already warned 
about the need to build up institutions for the poor, “to do them good and to make them
90good,” as a moral responsibility of the rich. In Europe, especially in France and 
Germany, Catholic thinkers stressed the need of moral reform to restore the natural
17 La Veu de Catalunya, 8th March 1902, “Ensenyances”, quoted in Riquer, Boija deJLa Lliga 
Regionalista: la burgesia catalana i el nacionalisme (1898-1904) (Barcelona, 1977), p. 236.
18 DSC, 27th February 1902, number 130, p. 3777.
19 Intellectual origins of this tradition: Fradera, Josep Maria, Jaume Balmes. Els fonaments racionals 
d ’una politica catolica (Vic, 1996), chapter 1, “L’intel.lectual catolic.” An example o f this type of 
historical argument in the late 19th century is, for instance, Dalleres, Pere, La Iglesia a favor de la clase 
obrera (Vic, 1896).
20 Quoted in Fradera, Jaume Balmes, p. 191.
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harmony between masters and workers. In France, authors like Charles Perin or Leon 
Harmel, professed the role of the master as “head of the workers’ family” and 
emphasized employers’ moral obligations towards workers, through the payment of 
wages above the market and the provision of stable employment. Harmel also 
introduced work councils in his model Christian factory of Val des Rheims, an idea 
further developed by Count Albert de Mun and Colonel Tour de la Pin’s Cercles 
catholiques d ’ouvriers (Catholic Workingmen’s Clubs) or in the appeals to restore 
catholic medieval guilds by Cardinal Manning in England or the German
91Gesellenverein. In Spain, these ideas were pursued by the Jesuit Father Antonio 
Vicent, who, in a book dedicated to the powerful industrialist Marques de Comillas, 
proclaimed the need to create workers’ circles, namely mixed employer-employee 
organisations, which according to the leading scholar on Catholic unions were “rigidly 
controlled by the Church and restricted to practicing catholics.”22
Influenced by Catholic conservative thought, employers advocated their moral 
authority over workers and the natural harmony of interests between capital and labour. 
In this regard, they devised institutions that conflicted with modem unionism and its 
appeals to working class participation. Camps y Fabres, a catholic employer writing in 
1880, acknowledged nostalgically that the dissolution of medieval guilds during the 
liberal revolution “had divided the industrial class in two factions, the factory owners 
heading towards bankruptcy and workers towards socialism.”23 Writing after the first 1st 
of May celebrated in Spain in 1890, Juan Sallares y Pla, president of the employers’ 
association of Sabadell (an industrial town near Barcelona), elaborated upon the need of 
reviving the medieval “guilds” (gremios) as mixed employers-employees institutions.24 
In other cases, as in the case of the Guell company town near Barcelona, the benefits of 
a healthy rural life were stressed as opposed to the dangers, both moral and physical, of 
urban concentrations, believing building factories in urban areas was a “powerful means
21 Williams, Melvin J., Catholic social thought. Its approach to contemporary problems (New York, 
1950), pp. 18-25.
22 Vicent, S.I. Antonio, Socialismo y  anarquismo. La Enclclica de nuestro santlsimo Padre Leon XIII ‘De 
conditione opificum’ y  los circulos obreros catolicos (Valencia, 1893). Quote from Winston, Colin M., 
Workers and the Right in Spain 1900-1936 (Princeton, NJ, 1985), p. 25.
23 Camps i Fabres, Antonio, Apuntes sobre la cuestion industrial (Manresa, 1894), quoted in Jutglar, 
Antoni, Ideologias y  closes en la Espaha contemporanea. Aproximacion a la historia social de las ideas, 
volume 2 (Madrid, 1971), p. 129.
24 Sallares, Juan, Las ocho horas. Algo sobre la cuestion obrera (Barcelona, 1890).
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• 9^of solving labour unrest {la cuestion obrera) in many industries.” This implied control 
over the habits of workers, the closing of taverns “where the craziest and most absurd 
ideas about the social order are learnt,” and the banning of the working class press. In 
its 1895-1896 session, the Academy of Legislation and Jurisprudence of Barcelona 
awarded a PhD thesis entitled Industrial Law {La Ley jurldica de la industria) written 
by Enric Prat de la Riba, a young lawyer who was going to lead the Catalan regionalists. 
In the book published in 1898 and dedicated to Eusebi Giiell, Prat de la Riba wrote 
about the need to restore guilds and opposed the formation of independent unions and
97employers’ associations. Later on, he went on to denounce the perils of life in the 
great cities and advocated the construction of company towns isolated from urban 
concentrations, where thanks to the “vigorous will of the owner” the economic and
9 0
moral well being of workers was cared for.
In this sense, employers developed an ambitious plan to create islands of 
authority outside the intervention of the state. The most famous case was that of the 
Marquis of Comillas, whose holding embraced mining concerns in Asturias, shipyards 
in Cadiz, a shipping company, and railways companies. For instance, the premises of 
Hullera Espanola in Aller (Asturias) contained schools, co-operative stores, dwellings, 
catholic circles, and institutions such as mutual aid and retirement funds. The premises 
of the Trasatlantica shipping company in Barcelona included dwellings for its workers.
9Q
A whole neighbourhood had been erected next to the shipyards in Cadiz in 1893. In 
these institutions, the virtuous employer only deserved “gratitude, respect and
in
resignation.” As Comillas once put it, “it is in the interest of workers that their
25 Colonia Giiell y  fabrica de panas y  veludillos de Giiell y  Cla., Sociedad en Comandita. Breve resena 
historica escrita con motivo de la visita hecha a dicha colonia po r los senores Congresistas de la Semana 
Social, pp.43-45, quoted in Padro, Josep, “Fundacio i inicis de la Colonia Giiell,” p. 556, in Calvo, Angel 
(ed.), El pas de la societat agraria a industrial al Baix Llobregat (Barcelona, 1995).
26 Ibid., p. 565.
27 Prat de la Riba, Enric, Ley jurldica de la industria. Estudio de filosofia jurldica seguido de bases para  
la formacion de un codigo industrial (Barcelona, 1898), p.247. As well in Appendix E o f the book.
28 Ibid., chapter 6, pp. 266-267. Another example is for instance, Masdival i Puig, Narciso, Cuestiones 
sociales (Barcelona: Imprenta de Francisco S. Altes, 1901).
29 Rodrigo Alharilla, Los marqueses de Comillas, 1817-1925. Antonio y  Claudio Lopez (Madrid, 2001), 
p.262; Shubert, Adrian, Hacia la Revolucion. Origenes sociales del movimiento obrero en Asturias, 1860- 
1934 (Barcelona, 1984), chapter 4. As well, Sierra Alvarez, Jose, El obrero sohado. Ensayo sobre el 
paternalismo industrial (Asturias, 1860-1917) (Madrid, 1990).
30 Rodrigo Alharilla, Los marqueses de Comillas, p.270.
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associations are participated by patrons. Workers are truly convinced of that and that is
11
why they want patrons to have a say in their associations.”
Some of the most famous and well studied of these initiatives were run by 
devout catholics. Comillas, for instance, channelled a huge amount of resources towards 
supplying workers with catholic press and forbid not only anarchist or socialist press but 
also liberal newspapers. His most ambitious initiative, the General Association for the 
Study and Protection of the Interests of the Working Class, included the Catholic 
reactionary Juan Manuel Orti y Lara and several members of the clergy (along with 
aristocrats and powerful members of the military).32 In the Giiell company town, near 
Barcelona, there were 6 different religious institutions in a mill town of about 330 
inhabitants. It is also known that some well-studied Catalan company towns contained 
schools run by priests or nuns and sponsored catholic centres.
Despite these examples, the association of employers with catholic paternalism 
has probably been taken too much for granted in the literature. Catalan employers, for 
instance, also used appeals to modem science and liberal values to protect their 
authority in the workplace. When arguing against laws forbidding the employment of 
children, Juan Sallares struggled to adopt the language of contemporary sociologists by 
using arguments from household economics, studies of infant mortality, or the 
sociology of work (for example, the effect of machinery on the organisation of work). 
He used household budgets when pointing to the required children’s earnings in 
working class families to make ends meet. He argued as well about the beneficial effect 
of machinery in reducing physical exertion at work.34 Employers exposed their 
opposition to unions by claiming the negative effect on growth and the competitive 
advantage of the industry. In 1891, the employers’ association of the Biscay mining 
sector, the Clrculo Minero, rallied against the celebration of the second 1st of May to 
“start an honest but firm opposition campaign against all the unruly and rebellious
31 Ibid., p.275.
32 Asociacion para el Estudio y Defensa de los Intereses de la Clase Obrera, Proyectos de reformas 
sociales (Madrid, 1899), pp.5-6.
33 See for instance, Rey Reguillo, Fernando, Propietarios y  patronos. La politico de las organizaciones 
economicas en la Espana de la Restauracion (1914-1923) (Madrid, 1992), p. 334-338; and his “Actitudes 
politicas y economicas de la patronal catalana (1917-1923),” Estudios de Historia Social, number 24-25 
(January-February 1983), pp. 23-148.
34 Sallares y Pla, Juan, El trabajo de las mujeres y  de los nihos. Estudio sobre sus condiciones actuales 
(Sabadell, 1892). See as well, Borras Llop. J. M., “Actitudes patronales ante la regularization del trabajo 
infantil,” Hispania, volume LV/2, number 190 (1995), pp.629-44.
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workers (...) who avail themselves of every opportunity to obstruct and slow down the
r
development of the mining and metallurgical industry (...).” In Parliament, a Catalan 
deputy told of the project of a Catalan employer travelling abroad to buy “all the 
machinery necessary to establish a factory among the best in Europe” being brought
‘Xfsdown by a long and bitter strike. In January 1902, the Barcelona employers’ 
association of the metal industries justified their position resisting a strike calling for the 
9-hour day on the grounds that conceding the short workday would have been “the 
suicide of the Spanish metal industry.” Other arguments resorted to the need of 
technical expertise accusing the government of not knowing enough about the ‘true’ 
economic conditions of the trade. This also protected employers from state intervention, 
since it was needed “to look for case-specific rather than general solutions,” for which 
“the action of those (directly) involved rather than the state” was more advantageous.38
Defending their right and ability to provide for their workers, employers rallied 
against state intervention in labour matters. Accordingly, they deployed an ambitious 
welfare programme for workers which, they believed, made state intervention not only 
unnecessary but harmful. Shortly after the 1902 general strike, the first issue of Revista 
Social devised a whole programme based on the “precepts of the Gospel and modem 
Science” that included funds to provide for old age, disability and other risks, 
unemployment agencies, profit-sharing plans, popular gyms, hospitals, elementary and 
technical schools, and so on. The supply of those welfare goods was provided by big 
firms or employers’ associations. For instance, the 1901 general strike in the cotton 
textile town of Manlleu (in the north of Catalonia) had brought about an industrial 
tribunal (jurado mixto) and a friendly society (montepio), whose membership was 
restricted to those not belonging to the local independent union.40 Distrustful “that the 
government, believing to oppose the social problem (la cuestion social% with its 
lugubrious procession of strikes and mutinies, might sanction a law on permanent 
industrial tribunals,” the Employers’ Association of the Ter and Fresser Valleys 
published a pamphlet to publicise “the principles backing (their) deeply rooted views
35 Torres, Eugenio, Ramon de la Sota, 1857-1936. Un empresario vasco (Madrid, 1998), p. 74.
36 DSC, 15th March 1902, number 135, p. 3921.
37 Quoted in Riquer, Borja de, La Lliga Regionalista, p. 230.
38 DSC, 27th February 1902, number 130, p.3777.
39 Francesc Moragas, “Seamos practicos,” in the the first number o f Revista Social published in March 
1902. Quoted in Nadal and Sudria, Historia de la Caja, pp. 45-46.
40 Smith, Angel, “Social conflict and trade-union organisation in the Catalan cotton textile industry, 1890- 
1914,” International Review o f  Social Histoiy, XXXVI (1991), p. 359.
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against the passing by the state of arbitrage and conciliation tribunals.”41 Interestingly 
enough, they acknowledged the right of workers to associate and strike “with no other 
limitation than public interest and the freedom of others.” However, in their view, 
strikes collided with the common good since they were “a ruinous weapon” for both 
workers and employers, whose “natural and necessary consequence” was bankruptcy 
for employers and poverty for workers. Further, since the natural tendency of strikes 
was to “degenerate” into violence, this coerced the liberties of workers not willing to 
support the strikes, a coercion that the authorities necessarily needed to repress 42
To be sure, some of the institutions devised by employers provided benefits 
above those supplied by the state. Rusinol, for instance, claimed that the Manlleu’s 
friendly society paid workplace accident compensations twice as high as those 
stipulated by the Accidents law of 1900.43 But the truth was that those institutions were 
the exception rather than the rule. After his visit to Spain, Angel Marvaud, from the 
Paris Musee Sociale, wrote in 1910 that “one should not exaggerate the importance of 
employers’ sponsored institutions. They are few and most of them have had an 
ephemeral life.”44 This did not depend on employers not being generous enough. Most 
of these institutions appeared in the big mining concerns of the North (Asturias and 
Biscay) and in some of the metallurgical plants of Bilbao, having some of the largest 
industrial concerns in Spain 45 In Catalonia, the atomistic nature of the textile sector and 
cyclical demand shocks hampered their development and restricted the supply of 
housing, retirement funds and friendly societies to big companies such as Giiell, Sert or 
Rusinol.46 Profit sharing plans also faced very reticent employers. An attempt was made 
in the 1880s in the Duro coal mining company of La Felguera (Asturias) but the plan
41 Asociacion de Fabricantes de la cuencas del Ter y del Fresser, Los jurados mixtos en Espana. D atosy  
consideraciones acerca de la conciliacion y  el arbitraje entre patronos y  obreros (Barcelona, 1902). As 
well, Rusinol, Alberto, Bases para la creacion y  funcionamiento de los jurados mixtos en Manlleu -  
proyecto de monteplo redactado por D. Federico Rahola por encargo de la Junta de Conciliacion 
(Barcelona, 1902).
42 Ibid., p. 6.
43 For temporary disability the 1900 accident compensation law paid 50 per cent o f the salary while 
unable to work. Most employers’ sponsored accident compensation schemes claimed to pay the full 
salary. DSC, 28 February 1902, number 131, pp. 3818-3819.
44 Marvaud, La cuestion social, p. 211.
45 Ibid., p. 213; Fusi, Polltica obrera, pp. 76-77.
46 Marvaud, La cuestion social, p. 211. On the role o f demand and the development of employers’ 
sponsored welfare institutions, see the introductory chapter in Jacoby, Sanford M., Modern manors: 
welfare capitalism since the New Deal (Princeton, NJ, 1997).
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was finally abandoned;47 there were some some individual exceptions like the cases 
found in the 1910s in Barcelona and Sabadell. Most of the experiences appeared after 
1919 in some of the largest Spanish companies: the Bilbao shipyards, Papelera 
Espanola, Bank of Bilbao, Transmediterranea, Duro-Felguera, Fundicion Vulcano, 
Madrid-Penot, or Electricidad del Norte de Madrid 49
At the peak of the strike wave of 1902-1903, the Chamber of Commerce of 
Barcelona devised a plan to solve strikes following the experiences of employers in the 
textile town of Manlleu.50 Some friendly societies, industrial tribunals (jurados mixtos) 
were created, and mixed unions of employers and workers, especially in the summer of 
1903, with strike activity at its peak. For instance in July 1903, a bakers strike gave way 
to the oxymoron Patronal Obrera de panaderos de Barcelona “La Concordia” 
(harmony, concord).51 Section 5 of article 11 of the union’s rules stated that 
membership would be withdrawn from those “promoting (...) ideas hostile to the 
harmony between workers and employers.” A strike by stone cutting workers was also 
arbitrated by the Chamber of Commerce in 1903 and brought about the constitution of a 
mixed employee-employer union, which signed a collective contract in 1906,52 and a 
mixed tribunal formed by 3 workers, 3 employers and the president of the Chamber (the 
traditional formula). Other similar cases include foundry workers or lathe operators.
But these cases were rare, representing only 5 out of 74 recorded strikes in
c “l
1903. In most cases, the striking workers or employers refused to accept the 
intervention of the Chamber.54 “The Dispossessed” {Los Desheredados), the union of 
card box makers in the area of Barcelona, refused on the grounds that it was “absurd” to
47 Marvaud, La cuestion social, p.211.
48 Prats, Antonio, “La participation en los beneficios. La voz de un patrono.” Revista Social, IX, number 
123 (December 1910), pp. 1035-1042.
49 Rey Reguillo, Fernando del, “La polemica sobre el control obrero. Los ongenes en Espana,” Sociologia 
del Trabajo, number 8 (Winter 1989-1990), p. 137.
50 The material on this initiative is located at the Archive o f the Chamber o f Commerce of Barcelona: 
ACCB, 18 K8 1902-1903, vagues a Barcelona, 88-10.
51 The noun patronal means ‘employers’ association’, and the adjective obrera ‘workers” . Reglamento de 
la Patronal Obrera de Panaderos de Barcelona "La Concordia ” (Barcelona: Tipografia la Artista de P. 
Patau (1903).
52 Bases de las Sociedades de Patronos y  Oficiales Picapedreros de Barcelona y  su radio (Barcelona: 
Tipografia “El Arte” de Vicente Martinez, 1906).
53 Sastre, Miguel, Las huelgas de Barcelona y  sus resultados en el aho 1903 (Barcelona, 1904); Smith, 
Angel, “Trabajadores ‘dignos’ en profesiones ‘honradas’: los oficios y la formation de la clase obrera 
barcelonesa (1899-1914),” Hispania, LVI/2, number 193 (1996), p. 672.
54 Romero Maura, La Rosa de Fuego, p.226 sustains it was the employers who turned the mediation o f the 
Chamber down.
Chapter 3. A coalition fo r  reform? 84
accept an intervention when they had not been recognised by their employers. In 
another case, the employers’ association of the building construction sector refused by 
claiming that the arrangement ending the strike in 1901 did not allow them to do so. The 
shoemakers union, La Igualdad (Equality), also turned down the arbitration from the 
Chamber expressing doubts about the true aims of the Chamber and calling for the 
abolition of private property.55
More ambitious programmes and institutions requiring co-operation from other 
groups -engineers, human resources specialists, etc. - were not developed. Employers 
were slow to adopt scientific management or other experiments like vocational guidance
thor human relations, being introduced in the early 20 century in more developed 
economies like Germany or the United States. As Mauro Guillen, who has studied the 
diffusion of scientific management in the US, Britain, Germany, and Spain, has noted, 
there were only few isolated cases of implementation of scientific management 
techniques in “a handful of small firms in Barcelona and the experiments at the Ciudad 
Lineal in Madrid during the late 1910s (...).”56 Guillen stressed his argument up to the 
point of defending the thesis of a “theoretical failure of scientific management” in Spain 
before 1939. For instance, the leading engineering journal in Spain -the Revista Minera, 
Metalurgica y  de Ingenieria- published only 8 brief notes on scientific management in 
the 1,300 weekly issues from 1910 to 1936, the first one in 1918, 4 in 1919, and 3 in 
1920.57
Unable to build up stable welfare institutions, employers could only associate 
themselves in powerful associations protecting the freedom to work and rallying against 
the passing of pro-labour legislation. However, no matter how powerful their 
associations were after 1919, employers were slow to mobilise and the decisive move 
was not done before 1914. They had reasons to do so. The onset of the Restoration had 
witnessed a severe curtailment of civil liberties and the harassment of the labour 
movement by the authorities. In spite of the success of the 1890 May Day, during most 
of the 1890s the labour movement was still weak and routinely harassed as a side-effect
55 All cases in ACCB 18 K8 1902-3 vagues a Barcelona 88-10: letter from “Sociedad de constmctores de 
cajas de embalajes y sus contomos, Los Desheredados” to the Chamber; letter from the “Centro de 
Contratistas generales de obras y maestros albaniles de Barcelona”; letter from “Sociedad de Zapateros 
La Igualdad.”
56 Guillen, Models o f  management, p. 173.
57 Ibid., p. 167.
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of the excesses of the anarchists. A law allowing unions to exist (Ley de Jurisdicciones) 
was passed in 1887, Created in 1888, the UGT had only about 6,000 members by 1896. 
Particular episodes such as the ‘Mano Negra’ (Black Hand) events of the early 1880s, 
the riots in Jerez in January 1892 or anarchist terrorism in Barcelona in the mid 1890s 
also provided opportunities to the authorities to close union offices and jail labour 
leaders. In most of these cases, authorities resorted to the military and more severe 
martial tribunals.58 Furthermore, political demonstrations by the working class, where 
union leaders rallied workers to join unions, were banned up to the early 1900s. For 
instance, in spite of the organisational success of the 1st of May of 1890, its celebration 
was prohibited by authorities up to 1902.59
With public order guaranteed by the government and the activities of unions 
severely curtailed, employers needed not to worry about organising against the labour 
movement up to the very late 1890s or early 1900s. An exception to the rule was the 
mining employers’ association, the Circulo Minero, which was not concerned with 
labour issues at its inception. In 1887, the circulo (circle) was on the verge of 
disappearing when its leaders urged owners to join in but failed to increase membership. 
In the same year, it was decided to lobby against the tax imposed by the municipality of 
Bilbao on each tone of iron exported abroad.60 With little activity in the next two years, 
the circle only met once. A general strike in the area after the 1st May of 1890, in which 
employers were forced by the military to concede some of the workers’ demands, 
radically altered the focus of the circulo, whose main purpose became the protection of 
the mining concerns from strikes. In 1891, for instance, the circulo agreed upon 
building barracks to shelter units of the Guardia Civil in the mining towns. Other means 
to counter the spread of unions and the Socialist Party included calling for the crushing 
of strikes and workers’ meetings by the authorities, the laying off of Socialist workers, 
and the drawing up of ‘black’ lists of militant workers to force them to migrate.61 Later 
on, in 1890s, a federation of employers’ association, the Centro Industrial de Vizcaya, 
united diverse employers’ associations under a powerful umbrella group.
58 Ballbe, Manuel, Orden publico y  militarismo en la Espana constitucional (1812-1923) (Madrid, 1985), 
p. 254, p.257..
59 Rivas, Lucia, “El Primero de Mayo, jomada obrera, 1890-1930,” Estudios de Historia Social, number 
38-39 (1986), p. 288.
60 Diaz Morlan, Pablo, Horacio Echevairieta, 1870-1963. El capitalista republicano (Madrid, 1999), 
p.48.
61 Torres Villanueva, Eugenio, Ramon de la Sota, pp. 12-1 A.
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In Catalonia, employers organised their associations later on and, as we shall 
see, quite ineffectively. Their main association, Fomento del Trabajo Nacional (created 
in 1889), was a powerful lobby against free trade, but was not initially concerned with 
labour unrest. In fact, some of its most influential members, like Guillermo Graell and 
later Eduardo Calvet maintained a more conciliatory position towards strikes and 
unions, which led to the creation of an alternative, harsher Federacion de Fabricantes 
de hilos y  tejidos de Cataluna in 1913 (Catalan Federation of Textile patrons). 
However, after the huge general strike in the summer 1913, Fomento also adopted a 
more anti-union stance. Local initiatives explicitly conceived to oppose workers’ 
militancy appeared generally around the turn of the century. In the textile town of 
Sabadell (Barcelona), the local employers’ association Gremio de Fabricantes de 
Sabadell created in the late 1890s a Union Industrial (Industrial union), exclusively 
aimed at solving of conflicts between capital and labour. Another example was Manresa 
(in the province of Barcelona), where some employers’ associations were created in the 
late 1890s: the Asociacion de Fabricantes de Manresa y  su comarca, the Asociacion de 
Patronos de Artes y  Oficios and Union de Patronos de Artes y  Oficids. In the textile 
towns along the rivers Ter and Fresser, after the strike of 1891 in Manlleu, the 
Asociacion de Fabricantes de Manlleu (factory owners association) was founded. 
However, a more decisive and cohesive move was the Asociacion de Fabricantes del 
Ter y  del Freser created in 1899. In Barcelona, the Centro Algodonero appeared in 
1903. 64 In building construction, a Centro de Contratistas de Obras was created in 
1892, which in 1900 incorporated a Gremio de Maestros Albaniles. An employers’ 
association in the metal trades -Sociedad de Industrials Metalicos y  Metalarios- only 
appeared after a strike in 1901.
Nevertheless, most of these institutions only gained momentum after 1910 and 
especially in 1919. Using data from the register of employers’ association located at the 
archive of the Gobierno Civil of Barcelona, the leading historian on Catalan employers’
62 For instance in the pamphlet Graell, Guillem, ‘L’accio economica’ (Barcelona: Viuda D. Casanovas 
Societat d’Estudis Economics, 1907), speech delivered on the 26th October 1907.
63 Romero-Maura, La Rosa de Fuego, p. 429-431; Rey Reguillo, Propietarios y  patronos, p. 159-160; 
Bengoechea, Soledad, Organitzacio patronal i conflictivitat social a Catalunya. Tradicio i corporativisme 
entre finals de segle i la dictadura de Primo de Rivera (Barcelona, 1994), pp. 126-141. As well, Selles, 
Magda, El Foment del Treball Nacional 1914-1923 (Barcelona, 2000).
64 Bengoechea, Organitzacio patronal, pp. 127-130.
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associations, Soledad Bengoechea, noted two sharp rises in the number of employers’ 
associations in the province of Barcelona, namely 1910-1914 and 1919, with strike 
activity at its highest.65 In Barcelona, the metal industries and construction employers’ 
associations gave way to the creation of the Federation Patronal after the strikes of 
1910. In the textile industry, the Fomento del Trabajo National became a powerful 
organisation integrating an array of local employers’ associations after its failure to 
solve the strike of 1913. In many textile towns like Reus or Igualada, or in the textile 
neighbourhoods of Barcelona like Sant Marti de Provencals and Hostaffancs, several 
associations appeared in 1914 and in 1915. Next to Barcelona, in Gracia, an employers’ 
association of textile factory owners was founded in 1917.66 The first conference of 
Spanish federation of employers’ associations, the Confederation Patronal, was 
celebrated in 1914, but this organisation was to have an important role only from 1919 
onwards.
Several indicators concur with the idea that the activity of employers 
associations was apparently quite ineffective up to 1919. For instance, one of the most 
important associations after 1914, the Federation de las Industrias de la Construction 
(of the Barcelona building construction sector), had problems in attracting membership 
and resorted to occasional coercion to force reluctant employers to join. By 1915, after 
a period of continuous dues collection, the strike fund of the Federation amounted to 
merely 1215,50 pesetas, a much smaller figure than what an ordinary workers’ union 
counted upon when staging strikes. In 1918, the Federation acknowledged of the free 
rider problem by announcing the decision to “bestow the necessary authority on the 
directors of our Federation to inflict serious penalties to federated members not 
complying with their duties (.. .).”69
With little internal cohesion up to 1919, employers could do little to confront 
workers and strikers. Taking data from Catalan strikes from 1912 to 1915, the only 
period and region in which there are data on employers’ associations, in 46 per cent of 
the cases striking workers had to deal with an employers’ union. However, the effect of
65 Bengoeachea, Soledad, “Los sindicatos patronales en Catalunya: dispersion y unidad (1887-1919),” 
Historia Social, number 32 (1998), p. 41 and table 1 in page 40.
66 Bengoechea, Organitzacio patronal, p. 151.
67 Bengoechea, “Los sindicatos patronales,” p. 44.
68 On strike funds collected by unions see chapter 2.
69 Bengoechea, “Los sindicatos patronales,” p. 47.
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the existence of an employers’ association on the probability that the strike was won 
could not be distinguished from 0, with a negative but not significant sign (results 
presented in table 3.1., discussion in chapter 4), showing employers’unions were 
inefficient or simply irrelevant. Furthermore, employers’ associations neither had any 
effect on the number of days on strike -in  spite of strikes with an employers’ 
association being on average longer than strikes without- nor were they able to force the 
authorities to intervene in the conflict. These results contrast sharply with the 
advantages for striking workers belonging to a union. With respect to non-union 
workers, union workers conducted on average much longer strikes (more than doubling 
strike duration), were substantially more successful (a 50 per cent higher probability of 
winning a concession from their employers), and generally brought about the favourable 
arbitration of the prefect (the probability was 5 times higher).
Table 3.1. Effects of unions and employers’ associations on strikes. 1912-1915.
Union workers vs 
Non-union workers
Employers’ association
Strike success [1] 53.46 per cent Negative, small, not significant.
Prefect intervention [2] 440 per cent Positive, small, not significant.
Strike duration [3] 2.36 1.3
Notes and sources: data on 315 strikes from: Museu Social, Estadistica social de Catalunya, various issues (1912-1915).
Full results presented in appendix to chapter 4, table 4A.1. Reported figures are marginal effects for [1] and [2] when the relevant 
variable changes from 0 to 1 measuring the percentage change in the baseline probability. Reported figures from coefficients 
significant at 5 and 1 per cent levels.
[1]: logit regression with the dependent variable taking value 1 if  strikers won or obtained a compromise against a set of strike 
characteristics (days, strikers, strike participation rate), and dummy variables for the existence of a union, an employers’ 
association, the type of settlement (arbitration by the prefect, the mayor, the junta local de reformas sociales, or none of these), 
strike issues, struck trade and year of the strike, the province (Barcelona, Tarragona, Gerona, Lerida), and if the strike occurred in 
the city o f Barcelona.
[2] logit regression taking value 1 if  the prefect arbitrated the strike and 0 otherwise against same set of variables as [1] except 
type of settlement.
[3] Average strike duration union/ average non-union workers and average employers’ association/ average non 
employers’ association.
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Reformers.
In Spain, advocates of reform in labour matters were not precisely original. Much has 
been written about krausism, the intellectual tradition of Spain’s progressive liberals,
70being the main driving force bringing about reform in Spain. Put this way, it is true 
that an important group of reformers belonged or were disciples of the krausists circles 
at the Institution Libre de Ensenanza (Free Institute of Education, created in 1876), the 
so-called institucionistas (institutionists). A founding father of the Institution, 
Gumersindo de Azcarate, former professor of Law at the University of Madrid, became 
one of the leading advocates of reform in Parliament and headed the reformist Instituto
71de Reformas Sociales from 1903 to his death in 1917. People like Adolfo Posada or 
Rafael Altamira, later at the University of Oviedo (Asturias), or Constancio Bemaldo de 
Quiros, having a leading role in reformist circles and institutions, also had been
77disciples of Giner de los Rios at the Institution. But krausism was a complex 
philosophical system connected to German idealism with little use for the kind of 
policy-oriented arguments put forward by reformers, which used contemporary 
sociology and jurisprudence and were influenced by developments taking place in more 
advanced nations in Europe, notably France and Germany, and sometimes Britain. 
Mainly, their thought depended on French reformism (Charles Gide, Paul Bureau, or 
Joseph Paul Boncour), German and Austrian progressive social Catholicism (Ketteler, 
Vogelsgang) and their interpretation of Pope XIII’s encyclic Rerum Novarum (1891), 
and Bismarck’s state ‘socialism’ (which in the Spanish debate meant
77‘interventionism’) most often blending an eclectic mix of the three.
70 De la Calle Velasco, M. Dolores, “Sobre los origenes del Estado social en Espana,” Ayer, number 25 
(1997), pp. 127-150; De la Calle Velasco, M. Dolores, “Comision de Reformas Sociales, de la represion 
al analisis de la conflictividad social,” Studia Historica, vol. II, number 4 (1984). A definitively more 
plural view is offered in Gil Cremades, Juan Jose, El reformismo espanol. Krausismo, escuela historica, 
tomismo (Barcelona, 1969); Guillen, Ana M., “The emergence o f the Spanish welfare state (1876-1923): 
the role o f ideas in the policy process,” International Journal o f  Political Economy, (summer 1990), pp. 
82-96; Montero, Feliciano , “La polemica sobre el intervencionismo y la primera legislacion obrera en 
Espana, 1890-1900. Primera parte: el debate academico,” Revista de Trabajo, number 59-60 (1980). On 
the “accidental” but pervasive influence o f K.C.F. Krause, an obscure disciple o f Fichte and Schelling, on 
Spanish social thought see Carr, Raymond, Spain, 1808-1939 (Oxford, 1982), pp. 303-304.
71 The classic approach to Azcarate is his son’s account, Azcarate, Pablo de, Gumersindo de Azcarate. 
Semblanza, epistolario, escritos (Madrid, 1969).
72 Diaz, Elias, La fdosofia social del Krausismo espanol (Valencia, Fernando Torres, ed., 1983), p. 159.
73 “Socialist” was used in the debate as “interventionist”. Definition o f “State socialism” in Zancada, 
Praxedes, El obrero espanol. Notas para una historia politica y  social (Madrid, 1902), p.236; Buylla, 
Adolfo, Economia (Barcelona, 1901), pp. 153-154. See as well, Montero, Feliciano, El primer catolicismo 
social y  la Remm Novarum en Espana (1889-1902) (Madrid, 1983), p.78; Montero, “La polemica sobre 
el intervencionismo.”
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In addition, there were other intellectual, more conservative traditions joining in 
the fray for reform having little to do with krausist circles, especially ‘socialist’ social 
Catholicism, connected to the Conservative Party, which favoured a ‘state 
interventionist’ interpretation of the encyclic Rerum Novarum™ and, in some cases, the
n c
Catalan conservative “historical school” of law, also close to social Catholicism. Even 
among institucionistas there was a mix of influences, being republicans or progressive 
liberals they nonetheless frequently resorted to the social catholic literature. For 
instance, an important influence on the institutionists was Nitti’s II Socialismo Cattolico 
(Social Catholicism), translated by Dorado Montero (a Law professor at the University 
of Salamanca) and with a foreword by Buylla, which favoured a progressive 
interpretation of the encyclic based on Henry George’s, The condition o f  labour, an
n/r
open letter to Pope Leo XIII.
In spite of fundamental differences in the interpretation of Spanish recent history 
and their belonging to diverse political traditions, when analysing their contemporary 
social and political situation, reformers and critics of the labour movement did not 
disagree about facts. The symptoms of the social illness were the expansion radical, 
politically oriented unions, an increasing trend in violent strikes, and the pervasive 
threat to political order. A supporter of reform -Miguel Fernandez Jimenez- noted 
“revolutionary agitation is not receding, all the contrary, it is gaining strength, 
predominating in our country, among the working classes, the influence of the anarchist 
element, which has caused the violence and social indiscipline which characterise the 
most recent strikes staged in Spain.”77 Another, Jose Gascon y Marin, a professor of 
Administrative Law at the University of Seville, a member of the IRS, wrote that “in
74 On different interpretations o f the encyclic: Botella, Cristobal, El socialismo y  los anarquistas (Madrid, 
1895).
75 An example of Catalan conservative-reformist thought is Duran y Bas, Manuel, Estudios morales, 
sociales y  economicos (Barcelona, 1895), with a foreword by Federico Rahola who had a leading role in 
the creation o f popular savings banks and the Instituto Nacional de Prevision and was president o f the 
Barcelona Academy o f Jurisprudence and Legislation. In 1898, the president of this institution gave the 
inaugural lecture adopting a reformist view: Soldeyila y Boixader, Carlos M., Consideracions historico- 
filosoficas sobre el contrato de trabajo (Barcelona, 1898). Other examples are Rahola, Federico, El trust 
del capital y  el sindicato obrero (Barcelona, 1910) and Gay de Montella, Rafael, Reformas del codigo 
civil espanol en orden alproletariado  (Barcelona, 1910); Gay de Montella was secretary o f the Barcelona 
Academy o f Jurisprudence and Legislation.
76 Nitti, F. El socialismo catolico (Salamanca, 1901).
77 Fernandez Jimenez, Miguel, El problema obrero y  los partidos espaholes (Estudio de politica  
contemporanea) (Granada, 1904).
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78Spain, unions have a distinct socialist or libertarian character.” The Spanish working 
class was dominated by “anti-social anarchism” as the conservative sociologist Sanz y
7 0  rEscartin (also a member of the IRS) put it. An alarmed Melquiades Alvarez, one of the 
venerable leaders of the Republican movement, noted that because of the “too frequent 
disorders” and the “violence of the popular masses,” he feared “despotism and 
dictatorship” might be embraced for the sake of social stability.
However, in spite of a fundamental agreement on the available evidence,
reformers’ theory of union growth was opposite to the one defended by critics of the
labour movement. Violence and radicalism were not a consequence of the strength of
unions but rather the proof of their weakness. Establishing a clear divide between
unions and politics, unions were “not only resistance societies” {sociedad.es de
resistencia) but legitimate participants of the polity supplying socially useful
institutions to their members. It was only necessary “to take a look at the rules
governing many workers’ unions” to appreciate “their articles containing the supply of
vocational training, the election of conciliation committees, unemployment agencies,
mutual benefit and old age funds, (...)” Their main aim was not political but rather “the
elevation of wages, the shortening of the working day, and the improvement of working 
81conditions.” Even in more conservative quarters, it was accepted that “the activities of 
unions not only bring about material results but also contribute powerfully to create the
87habits of order and morality.” According to their theory of union maturation, naturally 
conservative unions had become radical and politically oriented because of employers’
87“blindness” and “selfishness”, their “greed” and “survival instinct”, an “obstinate 
resistance” to unions which hampered the latter’s stabilisation and the peaceful pursuit
a a
of economic interests. They recognised unions broke the principle of the freedom to 
work by organising picket lines, boycotts, labels, or the closed shop, but that it was also 
“necessary to remember the coercion stemming from employers, both political and
78 Gascon y Marin, Jose, Los sindicatos y  la libertad de contratacion (Barcelona, Second edition, 1907), 
tome I, p. 49.
79 Quoted in ibid., p. 132.
80 Melquiades Alvarez, DSC 10th March 1902, number 139, page 4048. On Melquiades Alvarez: Garcia 
Venero, Maximiniano, Melquiades Alvarez. Historia de un liberal (Madrid: Tebas, 1974).
81 Gascon Marin, Los sindicatos, tome I, p. 120.
82 Sanz y Escartin, Eduardo, El individuoy la refoinna social (Madrid, 1896), p. 243.
83 Jose Canalejas’ foreword, p. XIII, in Buylla, Adolfo, Adolfo Posada and Luis Morote, El Instituto de 
Trabajo. Datos para la historia de la reforma social en Espana (Madrid, 1902).
84 Quote from the liberal newspaper El Imparcial on the Barcelona general strike of 1902 in Alejandro 
Lerroux, DSC, 8th March 1902, number 136, p. 4014.
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religious, their refusal to employ union workers, their imposing of company stores or 
company dwellings.”85
Using an international comparison, reformers opposed to radical Italian or 
Spanish unions, the example of moderate British, American and German unions, a line 
of reasoning they adopted from French and Italian reformers. In Britain or Germany, 
unions “so powerful that employers do not dare to refuse to negotiate with” had brought 
about social peace and a decline in strike activity. Where unions were weak, like in 
Italy, Russia or Spain, and in some cases France, political radicalism, strikes, and
o/r
revolutionary hopes were the norm. Taking for granted that “the bitterness of strikes is
o n
inversely related to the progress, the strength, and the discipline of unions,” the 
process of union implementation led inevitably to bread-and-butter unionism, the 
respect for property rights, and the abandonment of political radicalism. In their view, 
the control of strike-funds by a central bureaucracy, and the supply of institutions like 
friendly societies or unemployment insurance, tamed workers’ revolutionary hopes and
oo
led them to a more gradualist agenda. Employers, Gumersindo de Azcarate remarked, 
should not fight unions but rather “wish all their workers belonged to the union,” 
because a union “allows to substitute reflection for impulse.”89 Reformers admired the 
“self-control”, the “virility” and the “instruction” of the British trade unionist, as 
opposed to the ignorant and hot-headed Spanish worker.90
Identifying recalcitrant employers as the main cause of unions’ weakness, 
reformers did not hesitate to use state coercion to compel employers to negotiate and 
recognise unions. The conservative sociologist Sanz Escartin asserted “the future 
civilization, (...), if it is not going to be subjected to revolution or Caesar’s type of
85 Jose Canalejas’ foreword, p.CXLV, in Buylla, Posada, Morote, El Instituto de Trabajo; a similar 
argument in Fernandez Jimenez, Elproblema obrero, pp.221-222.
86 Examples of this argument: Jose Canalejas’ foreword, p. XVII, in Buylla, Posada and Morote, El 
Instituto de Trabajo’, Gascon Marin, Los sindicatos, tome I, p.26; Fernandez Jimenez, El problema 
obrero, p. 131; Zancada, Praxedes, El obrero en Espana (Notas para una historia politica y  social) 
(Madrid, 1902), p.225; Sanz Escartin, El individuo, p.243; Buylla, Adolfo A. and G. Alegre, La 
proteccion del obrero (Accion social y  accionpolitica) (Madrid, 1910), p. 105 and p.l 15; Roig y Bergada, 
6th March 1902, number 136, p.3949; Eduardo Dato, 28th February 1902, number 131, pp.3809-10, 
quoting Fernandez Villaverde’s speech to the Madrid Academy o f Jurisprudence in the 1901 session.
87 Jose Canalejas’ foreword, p. CXL, in Buylla, Posada, Morote, El Instituto del Trabajo.
88 See for instance Alvarez Junco, J., La ideologia politica del anarquismo espanol (1868-1910) (Madrid, 
1976), p. 567.
89 Gumersindo de Azcarate, DSC, 19th October 1910, number 45, p. 1227.
90 Sanz Escartin, El individuo, p.28.
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oppression, must rest on freely constituted associations (...) able to harmonise all social 
interests by means of a higher coordinating body.”91 The institucionista Azcarate went 
further and argued that “the moral duties of property are nowadays trusted to private 
initiative, (but) there is no social guarantee of their indispensable compliance, 
(therefore) it is absolutely necessary to pass laws to make sure they are effective.” 
Following this line of reasoning, Jose Canalejas, the liberal Minister of Agriculture, 
Trade, and Industry argued: “where the State does not intervene to regulate or soften the 
battle of the classes, where governments are reluctant to address the social problem,
07everything is burned down by the anarchist fire.” In Parliament during the debate over 
the creation of the Instituto de Trabajo (Institute of Work) in 1902, after an intervention 
by the Catalan textile manufacturer Ferrer Vidal, who was alarmed by the possibility 
that the government might sanction compulsory arbitration, Canalejas replied: “the fact 
that employers do not respect the law (mainly thinking about the non-recognition of 
legal unions) is what drives thinkers ( “hombres pensadores”) toward the option of 
compulsory arbitration and the coercion of the State.” He then went on to say: “we 
require (...) the worker to respect the law and to keep away from the streets, (...) to 
make life in freedom viable, making social progress possible, but let’s ask employers as 
well(...) to respect legal precepts.” And he concluded: “modem times are costly, 
modem times demand sacrifice (...), it is natural that social legislation wakes up in 
capitalists’ minds the impression and the belief that, to some extent, it is a tax, and a 
serious one.”94 In other cases, social conflict was simply a misunderstanding, caused by 
“the distance existing between those demanding work and those supplying it” triggering 
“indifference towards the worker” and “hatred towards the capitalist.”95 But the action 
of the state was still needed to bring both groups together.
Based on these ideas, and in spite of employers’ demands to crush union 
meetings and strikes, reformers insisted on arbitration and conciliation procedures 
resting on powerful independent unions for a quick and less acrimonious settlement of
91 Ibid., p.237.
92 A slightly more conservative view was put forward in Azcarate, Gumersindo de, “Estudios sobre los 
deberes de la riqueza,” (speech delivered in November 1892) (Barcelona, 1904); quote from Fernandez 
Jimenez, El problema obrero, p. 111.
93 Canalejas’ foreword, p.XXIX, in Buylla, Posada, Morote, El Instituto del Trabajo.
94 Jose Canalejas, DSC, 8th April 1902, number 5, p.53.
95 Maura Gamazo, Gabriel, Jurados mixtos para dirimir las diferencias entre patronos y  obreros y  para  
prevenir o remediar las huelgas (Madrid, 1901), p.202.
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disputes.96 In their opinion, the “most effective (state) intervention is to sponsor large 
unions, with strong funds making them powerful and conservative at the same time; the 
mixed commissions, elected by the unions and the employers’ associations, will follow
07to protect the common good” an argument they supported by resorting to the examples 
of France, Belgium, Germany, the United States or even New Zealand, the country with 
no strikes about which Eduardo Dato and Jose Canalejas were equally enthusiastic (the
QO
former Conservative and the latter Liberal, both reformers and future Presidents). For 
instance, considering the work councils of Belgium, Roig i Bergada, a Catalan deputy 
who had advocated compulsory arbitration in Parliament, claimed that “those councils 
include workers and employers, (...) creating among them the habit of friendship, 
fraternity, and affection, that in the future will probably become a buffer against solvent 
theories and to the dreadful ideas that anarchists try to instil in our working classes.”99 
Minister Canalejas summarised the optimistic view of reformers on conciliation 
mechanisms by claiming that when “workers’ associations finally reach their full 
development, there will be no more strikes.”100
According to critics of the labour movement, reformers’ insistence on protecting 
the right of workers to associate violated the principle of “freedom of contract”, which 
was at the heart of the liberal (Napoleonic) Civil Law Code. Forcing workers to join 
unions and strikes, and combining to change employment conditions and bringing 
employers to ruin, critics argued, curtailed the right to work and the right of employers 
to adequate wages, hours, and working conditions to exogenously determined economic 
conditions. To confront those arguments, reformers made a theoretical effort to 
demolish the principle of freedom of contract, “this sarcastic fiction,”101 struggling to 
find a middle way between “the individualistic status quo and supporters of the 
collectivist or anarchist revolution.” In an interpretation that has become canonical in 
all textbooks of Spanish labour law, reformers considered the worker the weak 
contractual party and doubted accordingly that he was ‘free’ when accepting a contract
96 For instance, Sanz Escartin, El individuo, p. 351.
97 Maura Gamazo, Jurados mixtos, p. 217.
98 Zancada, El obrero en Espana, pp. 19-20. In the case o f Asutralia and New Zeland, reformers cited 
Metin’s Le socialisme sans doctrines. Australie et Nouvelle Zelande (Paris, 1901).
99 Roig y Bergada, DSC, 6th March 1902, p. 3950.
100 Quoted in Fernandez Jimenez, El problema obrero, p.365.
101 Maura Gamazo, Jurados mixtos, p.212.
102 Canalejas’ foreword, p.XLIII, in Buylla, Posada, Morote, El Instituto del Trabajo. This argument awas 
also put forward in Dorado, F., El problema obrero (Salamanca, 1901).
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and its implicit working conditions. For instance it was argued “in order to have free 
contracting, the first condition is being free, and a worker who accepts any job that is 
being offered to him is not economically free,”104 an idea they associated with Pope 
Leo XIII encyclic Graves de Communi.105 Using Turgot’s iron or Lassalle’s bronze law 
of wages, and influenced by mounting evidence on working class destitution, reformers 
affirmed that, under conditions of competition, workers’ wages inevitably fell below 
subsistence levels, restricting their ability to choose among different job offers, and 
forcing other members of the family, namely children and women, to enter the labour 
market, which further depressed wages.
For instance, quoting Ketteler, the social catholic propagandist, bishop of 
Mannheim, the professor at the University of Oviedo, Adolfo Buylla, argued about how 
in Kettelers’ book Die Arbeitfrage and das Kristenthum (The labour question and 
Christianity) “labour nowadays is treated as another commodity, (...), subject to the 
terrible effects of competition, a fact aggravated after the abolition of the old 
organisation of work (guilds) and the use of machinery as well as the development of 
the big industry.”106 It was also claimed that after the abolition of medieval guilds “the 
worker found himself face to face with the employer, isolated and defenceless, 
accepting a labour contract which, according to orthodox principles, is purely economic 
and determined by the law of supply and demand.” He also remarked that “machinery 
saves labour; women and children compete with adult men; and the excess labour 
supply (la sobra de brazos) determines an absurd fall in wages or an exorbitant increase
107in the hours of work.” Arguing wages did not catch up with the rising cost of living, 
Jose Canalejas quoted Gaspar Decurtins, the Swiss socialist catholic: “the excess of 
production (...) is the cause that wages have been falling to intolerable levels, since they
1 OKgenerally only allow the worker barely to avoid starvation.” Thus, in their view, the 
principle of free contracting lost its fundament because “the wage regime (...) has
103 Posada, Adolfo, Tratado de derecho (Madrid, 1895), p.237; Gallart Folch, Alejandro, Derecho 
espanol del trabajo (Barcelona, 1936), pp.18-20; Palomeque, Carlos M., Medio siglo de derecho del 
trabajo espanol, 1873-1923 (Madrid, 1980).
104 Luis Canalejas (member o f the Parliamentary Commission on the Instituto de Trabajo), DSC 5 May 
1902, number 27, p.677.
105 Gascon Marin, Los sindicatos, p.l 16.
106 Buylla, Economia, p. 151.
107 Maura Gamazo, Jurados mixtos, p.9.
108 Jose Canalejas’ foreword, p.XLVI, in Buylla, Posada, Morote, El Instituto del Trabajo.
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become an exploitation regime”109 and “the wage system has substituted the chains of 
the slave.”110
The criticism to the idea of freedom of contract was associated with a far- 
reaching project to overcome the liberal Civil law Code (passed in 1889). In this regard, 
most of the political debate on labour unrest concentrated on overcoming liberal 
jurisprudence rather than opposing conservative reaction. In 1885, Gumersindo de 
Azcarate wrote about the need to pass “a new code adapted to the needs of today’s 
society,” because “he was beginning to feel uncomfortable in the mould of the 
Napoleonic code.”111 In 1902, Canalejas affirmed that “the individualistic (emphasis in 
the original) period in which the Napoleon Civil law code and others similar to ours, has 
finished, and the new period of sociability (‘sociabilidad’) for the Civil law code has
119started.” In this sense, the 5 articles applied to labour matters from the 1889 Civil law 
Code (from article 1583 to 1587, regulating lease or rent agreements ‘arrendamiento de 
servicios') needed to be overcome by new labour contract law including clauses “on the 
number of hours of work, requiring a written contract, the compensation scheme,” or 
treating accident compensation and so on.113 Therefore it was necessary to draw up a 
new set of regulations containing maximum hours laws, minimum wages, abolishing or 
reducing the work of children and women, and regulating workplace safety. For 
instance, using Decurtins again, wages needed to be kept above the level necessary to 
“cover the needs of the worker, compensate him for the risks of death or mutilation, and 
(...) the wear of his strength.”114 The shortening of the working week was essential for 
the worker to “restore her strength”, avoid her “falling prey to anaemia or tuberculosis,” 
the reduction of the accident rate, and the increase of average labour productivity.115 In 
their opinion, state action on hours or wages was premature given the poor state of
109 Fernandez Jimenez, Elproblema obrero, p. 15.
110 Canalejas quoting the Austrian social catholic Meyer in his foreword, p.XLV, in Buylla, Posada, 
Morote, El Instituto del Trabajo.
111 Azcarate, Gumersindo de, El regimen parlamentario en la practica (Madrid, 1978 [1885]), p. 189. As 
well, excerpts from his 1893 conference “El problema social y las leyes obreras,” in Azcarate, 
Gumersindo de Azcarate, pp.82-83.
112 Canalejas’ foreword, p.CXVI, in Buylla, Posada, Morote, El Instituto de Trabajo.
113 Ibid., p.CXVII. This became the IRS, Bases para un proyecto de ley acerca del contrato de trabajo, 
presentadas al Instituto de Reformas de Sociales made public in 1904. Palomeque, Carlos M., “La 
intervencion normativa del Estado en la ‘cuestion social’ en la Espana del siglo XIX,” Ayer, number 25 
(1997), p.122.
114 Fernandez Jimenez, El problema obrero, p.234.
115 Ibid., p.307. On hours of work the most important reference is Revenga, Ricardo, La jom ada de ocho 
horns (Madrid, 1903), with a foreword written by Jose Canalejas.
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statistics in Spain. Accordingly, reformers pressed initially for the creation of an 
Institute of Work {Instituto de Trabajo) (in 1902), based on the experiences of the US 
Commissionate of Labor or the French Office du Travail, which had, among others, the 
objective of collecting and publishing data on the conditions of work, strikes and union 
membership. Furthermore, the new legislation required new institutions to solve 
conflicts, since “some conflicts (...) can only be solved in ordinary tribunals,”116 
something that would reduce the number of strikes. For instance, article 1584 of the 
Civil Code put the burden of the proof on the worker so that, in the Tribunal, it was 
“always the owner who was believed.” Article 1590 did observe compensations for
117contractors but not for workers.
In pursuing this task, progressive reformers considered they were bringing 
further democracy and “restoring the social content of democratic ideas” through social
n o
legislation, belonging to “a new individualistic school (...), which separates itself 
from the unyielding view of 18 century individualists and recognises that the French 
revolution has not finished the task: political freedom has been achieved, but economic 
freedom does not exist.”119 This was probably too optimistic. Rampant electoral fraud 
and a restrictive electoral system severely curtailed the electoral possibilities of 
progressive coalitions, bringing about too small republican minorities and leaving the 
Socialist party (created in 1879) outside Parliament. In this sense, most reformers saw a 
moderately powerful workers’ party pressing for further reform as a committed ally in 
the coalition for reform and a guarantee of social pacification. Gumersindo de Azcarate, 
who in 1885 had opposed the creation of a working class party, later changed his views 
to say “in most of the English colonies of Australia (sic) there is a workers ’ party (his 
emphasis) with an important role in public affairs, but none of them is collectivist.” 
For instance, Fernandez Jimenez, who defended the reformist action of the Conservative 
party, remarked that in France, “next to Vaillans, Zevaes, and other enemies of 
participating in the legalist battle of political parties, (...) Millerand triumphs in the 
peaceful conquest of power, having a decisive influence in French policy, with the
116 Maura Gamazo, Los jurados mixtos, p. 14.
117 Canalejas’ foreword p.CXVII, in Buylla, Posada, Morote, El Instituto del Trabajo.
118 Zancada, El obrero en Espaha, p.223.
119 Luis Canalejas (member o f the parliamentary commission on the Instituto de Trabajo), DSC 5th May 
1902, number 27, p.677.
120 Azcarate, El regimen parlamentario, chapter XV, “El partido obrero y el regimen parlamentario.” 
Quoted in Buylla, Posada, Morote, El Instituto del Trabajo, p.CLIV.
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support of Waldeck-Rousseau and other notable politicians, being responsible with their
191 •constancy of an important series of reforms.” “As in France, Germany, Belgium, even 
in Austria,” the author went on, “working class parties need to be legalised and start
1 99working (...) for government solutions to advance their interests.” Quoting the 
Conservative politician Eduardo Dato, he added: “with this tactic, not only a duty of 
strict justice but also a wise political strategy, the angry protest of the working class has
1 91been disarmed in most European nations.”
3.2. A coalition for reform?
It took a while for a ‘coalition for reform’ to take shape. During the 19th century, 
episodes related to the liberals revolutions had brought about the alliance between the 
progressive politic groups and the working class in the main cities to defeat absolutism. 
In Barcelona, joint commissions of workers and employers had been tried for some time 
to solve strikes. This was the case of the ultimately failed experience of the joint 
commission of textile workers and employers in Barcelona at the onset of the Espartero 
regency (1840).124 Similar experiments appeared during the Progressive Biennium 
(1854-55). During the First Republic (1873), there were mixed commissions in 
Barcelona, Valencia, and Alcoy (Alicante). In a brief stint in government, lasting less 
than two months, the republican federalist Pi y Margall brought about a reformist 
agenda based on industrial tribunals to arbitrate on labour conflicts, and even projects to 
reduce the workday to nine hours, to establish a minimum wage of 6 reales, and laws
19 ^
prohibiting child labour and regulating women work in industry. But this experience
was aborted by the collapse of the First Republic in July 1873.
The Restoration of the monarchy in 1874 severely curtailed the political power 
enjoyed by Republicans. Their offices were closed, and authorities forbade republican 
meetings and the singing of La Marselleise. Repressed or silenced up to 1881, 
republicans were also internally divided among the ‘possibilist’ faction of Castelar, and 
the different groups of Pi i Margall, Salmeron, Figueras and Ruiz Zorrilla (the 5 having
121 Fernandez Jimenez, El problema obrero, p. 163.
122 Ibid., p. 191.
123 Ibid., p. 191.
124 Bamosell, Genis, Origens del sindicalisme catala (Vic, 1999), pp. 169-186.
125 Hennessy, C.A.M., The Federal Republic in Spain. Pi y  Margall and the Federal Republican 
movement, 1868-1874 (Oxford, 1962), pp.200-201. The ‘social’ ideas o f Pi y Margall collected in Molas, 
Isidre (ed.), Ideario de P iy  Margall (Barcelona, 1966), pp.68-75.
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been presidents during the revolutionary period). Furthermore, their electoral 
possibilities were severely limited by a restrictive electoral system based on single-
1 OAmember districts. The introduction of universal male suffrage in 1890 and the 
reduction of electoral fraud in the great cities made way for the participation of 
republicans in parliament but they never attained more than 10 per cent of the seats in 
the chamber.
Nevertheless, except in the case of Pi y Margall’s Federales and Catalan unions,
1
the links between the Republican and labour movements were not particularly strong. 
The first republican programme, signed by Ruiz Zorrilla and Salmeron, contained a 
programme of social reform including free compulsory elementary schooling, popular 
housing, rural credit co-operatives, or a shortening of the workday. But it was
i ?o
considered “internationalist, socialist, and demagogue” by other republican factions. 
With an incomplete liberal revolution, most of the republican agenda in the late 19th 
century focused on classic liberal objectives such as demanding the curtailment of the 
power of the church, a popular and compulsory army, trial by jury, and universal 
suffrage. Ruiz Zorrilla, exiled in Paris, was still committed to revolution and used his 
connections with the military to plan the overthrowing of the crown. In 1880, a second 
republican programme drawn up by Ruiz Zorrilla openly expressed its opposition to the 
International and stressed the commitment to social order and to property.
However, at the turn century, there was a generational change in leadership of 
the republican movement. Estanislao Figueras had died in 1883, Ruiz Zorrilla in June 
1895, and Pi y Margall in 1901, and Castelar retired from politics and then died in 1901. 
By the early 20 century, only Nicolas Salmeron remained active among the “men of 
1873”. In spite of the fact that the leadership of Salmeron was uncontested, the more 
open electoral politics of the big cities like Valencia, Madrid and Barcelona gave way to 
a new generation of young republicans with closer ties with working class voters and, 
occasionally, with revolutionary circles. With leaders such as Alejandro Lerroux, a
126 The 1878 electoral law established a system of election based maily on single-member districts and 
about 20 multi-member districts in the big cities. A restrictive electoral system assured that Conservatives 
and Liberals remained the two dominant parties and reduced pluralism in Parliament. Universal male 
suffrage was granted in 1890.
127 Duarte, Angel, El republicanisme catala a l a f i  del segle XIX  (Vic, 1987), chapter “Republicanisme i 
obrerisme,” pp. 69-98.
128 Darde, Carlos, “Los partidos republicanos de la primera etapa de la Restauracion (1875-1890),” p. 
445-447, in Jover, J.M. (ed.), El siglo XIXen Espana. Doce estudios (Barcelona, 1974).
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journalist settled in Madrid who became famous during the campaign against the
1 7QMontjuich trials in the mid-1890s, or the writer Blasco Ibanez in Valencia, the
1 70emphasis now shifted towards radicalism rather than reform. In the mid 1890s, 
Francesc Ferrer Guardia, secretary of Ruiz Zorrilla in Paris in the mid 1890s and later a 
martyr of the Tragic Week in 1909, had already proposed a vague political programme 
resting on “a popular republic” reaching out to working class voters.131 Writing at the 
height of the anarchist terrorist campaign in the 1890s, Ferrer argued that “the Spanish 
Republic would not generate such atrocities” and proposed following the “firm and 
prudent” French strategy of “doing as much as possible for workers” while repressing as
1 77severely as possible the “loathsome criminal monotony” of anarchists. Later on, in 
1898, Alejandro Lerroux also claimed “that only the Republic can sanction the
1 77necessary reforms that will satiate the legitimate aspirations of the working class.” 
The ties with the labour movement were tightened in 1900 when Lerroux’s newspaper, 
Progreso, became the official periodical of the bakuninist Federacion de Sociedades 
Obreras.134 Political influence over the civil governor of the city was used to solve 
strikes or to free union and strike leaders.135 Some republican lawyers, probably the best 
known was Emiliano Iglesias, offered legal protection to union leaders and strikers.136 
After the electoral success of 1901 in Barcelona, Lerroux shocked the Parliament 
during the debate over the 1902 general strike by stating that the “general strike was the 
only weapon” against a well organised and armed bourgeois society “which could be 
used by the working class to win economic wars.” According to his view, strikes were 
bitter because of exploitative employers, not because of disorderly and intractable 
workers. He then went on to praise the “moderate” and “generous” metal workers and
1 77their “noble spirit of transaction.” In the period 1901 to 1906, there were at least 50 
parliamentary interventions by Lerroux, or his group (Emilio Junoy and Jaume Angles -
129 The Montjuich trials was a campaign developed in Barcelona by the government in reaction to the a 
series o f terroris attacks in the mid 1890s which included the arrest o f many union leaders, torture, and 
death penalty sentences. This led to a wide outcry in the Spanish and foreign press. Finally, a 
conservative government gave amnesty to most prisoners.
130 On Valencia: Reig, Ramiro, Obrers i ciutadans. Blasquisme i moviment obrer: Valencia, 1898-1906 
(Valencia, 1982).
131 Alvarez Junco, Jose, El emperador del Paralelo. Lerroux y  la demagogia populista (Madrid, 1990), 
pp. 144-145, p. 212.
132 Quote from El Progreso, 27th April 1892, in ibid., pp.146-147, footnote 32.
133 Ibid., p. 195.
134 On the Federacion see next chapter.
135 See one case in Culla, Joan B., El republicanisme lerrouxista a Catalunya (1901-1923) (Barcelona: 
Curial, 1986), p. 87.
136 Ibid., p.88.
137 DSC, 22nd February 1902, number 122, pp.3536-7.
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the first blue-collar worker to enter the Restoration Parliament) related to the labour 
movement, denouncing the treatment to strikers, protesting for the closing of union
1 - lO
offices, defending the right of association or the improvement of working conditions.
Radicalism however did not have enough political power to build up reform 
coalitions. In spite of electoral success in some important urban cities, the electoral 
system generated one-winner election outcomes and favoured the two dominant parties 
at the expense of smaller political groups. Within these constraints, the Republican 
parliamentary group remained small and unable to reach other political groups to 
promote labour-friendly laws. Furthermore, with radicals still committed to a violent 
overthrowing of the monarchy at least up to 1909, and their well known links with the 
anarchists, there was little room for the development of a gradualist reform agenda in 
the context of the monarchy.
The limited political power of Republicans contrasts sharply with the wide 
majorities obtained by the dominant parties. The restrictive electoral system was 
coupled with the practice of encasillado, through which liberals and conservatives 
agreed the deputies to be elected in most electoral districts. This made sure large 
government majorities were obtained, while a pact between Liberals and Conservatives 
also guaranteed both parties took turns in power. Therefore, the problem for 
governments was not building majorities with the minor parties, but rather 
disciplinating their own large majority. Divided among different political factions and 
lacking internal discipline, the government had substantially less control over the 
members of its majority than what is common nowadays.
In this context, parliamentary or senate initiatives necessarily fell on the
1 70government and depended on internal developments within the dominant parties. The 
first important and finally aborted step in the direction of reform was taken in the early 
1880s by the government headed by Posada Herrera, belonging to the left of the 
Liberals (Dynastic Left). It lasted less than 4 months after it was unable to pass a law on 
universal suffrage. In 1883, its Interior minister, Segismundo Moret, a man of the 1869
138 Culla, El republicanisme, p. 87.
139 By this I mean “the action” putting the process of legislating in motion. For instance, Aragon, Manuel, 
“La iniciativa legislativa,” Revista de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Complutense (1986-87), 
pp.75-98.
Chapter 3. A coalition fo r reform? 102
Revolution and an institucionista, passed a Royal Decree creating the Comision de 
Reformas Sociales (Social Reforms Commission). This body was devoted to the study, 
as it was defined at the time, “of all issues related to the welfare and advance of the 
working classes in agriculture and industry and affecting the relationship between 
capital and labour.”140 In spite of the symbolic importance of the Commission, the truth 
was that it obtained very little political support. Azcarate, a member of the Comision, 
blamed “the apathy of the government” and “the lack of means,” a “budget without a 
single peseta to start collecting statistics on labour,”141 as the main causes making the 
project fail. The Commission could not gather the funds to publish the famous enquiry 
of 1884-1885 until 1889.142 Even after the agency was re-organised in May 1890 
(shortly after the 1st of May), its bills were turned down in parliament, for instance the 
1893 bill on joint committees of capital and labour to solve strikes or the one on Sunday 
rest.143 Others, like the bill on labour contracts, never reached the political debate.
It is necessary to wait until the political crisis brought about by the Cuba war in 
1898 to see further movements in the direction of reform. This first legislative effort 
corresponded to the Conservative party in which some internal currents favoured a shift 
towards reform. In 1890 after the successful first May Day, Canovas del Castillo, leader 
of the Conservative party, had delivered a speech in the Ateneo de Madrid entitled “The 
labour question and its new character.” In the same year, another Conservative notable, 
Salvador Bermudez Castro (Marquis of Lema) gave a speech with the title “The social 
question and political traditions” in front of the same audience. Adolfo Buylla 
considered the first speech, by Canovas del Castillo, an example of what he defined as 
state socialism or conservative socialism, a tradition he also identified with the
140 Palacio Morena, Juan Ignacio, La institucionalizacion de la reforma social en Espana (1883-1924). La 
Comision y  el Instituto de Reformas Sociales (Madrid, 1988), p.25. The most frequently cited 
contributions to lhe literature on the Comision are: Castillo, Santiago, “El reformismo en la Restauracion: 
del Congreso Sociologico de Valencia a la Comision de Reformas Sociales,” Estudios de Historia Social, 
number 30 (July-September 1984), pp.21-78; Castillo, “Introduccion,” in Reformas Sociales. Informacion 
o ra ly  escrita (Madrid, 1985 [1889-1893]); Calle Velasco, M. Dolores, “Comision de Reformas Sociales, 
de la represion al analisis de la conflictividad social,” Studia Historica, volume 2, number 4 (1984); 
Elorza, A. and M. C. Iglesias, Burgueses y  proletarios. Close obrera y  reforma social en la Restauracion 
(1884-1889) (Barcelona, 1973).
141 Quoted in Buylla, Posada, Morote, El Instituto del Trabajo, p. 183.
142 The petitions for funds from the members o f the Comision to the Minister o f Interior in Palacio 
Morena, La institucionalizacion, pp.42-44.
143 Zancada, El obrero en Espana, p.215. The project was ordered through a Royal decree in 1883 and 
finalised in 1884.
Chapter 3. A coalition fo r  reform? 103
academic Eduardo Sanz y Escartin.144 Acknowledging the multiple meanings that 
socialism {socialismo) had in the Spanish debate, Buylla identified state socialism with 
Bismarck, and defined it as “the economic school that, aware that the distribution of 
wealth is unfair and sympathetic towards the state of the labouring classes, opposes 
firmly all violent and revolutionary solutions.” Harsh opposition to radical politics, he 
went on, was also coupled with “the belief that the state is able to introduce reforms 
advancing the welfare of the working classes, gradually and not threatening the present 
order.”145
In addition to the authoritarian connection with Bismarck, social Catholicism 
and the encyclic Rerum Novarum were essential ingredient of the first Conservative 
reforms.146 Characteristically, the first bill proposed by Canovas was the Sunday rest 
law in the early 1890s, which attracted obvious support from the Catholics. In the 
Senate, the debate brought the law closer to the reactionary Catholics and away from the 
original contents devised by the Comision de Reformas Sociales, which in turn caused 
uproar in the laic, liberal minorities.147 Evidence of the lack of political will and support 
for the project, the law was not passed, while instead two laws drawn up to repress 
anarchism were made effective in 1894 and 1896.148
A series of profound political developments suddenly changed the political 
context in the late 1890s. Most important of all was the so-called “regenerationist” 
movement, which gained momentum during the Cuba war with the United States in
1898. Headed by another institucionista, Joaquin Costa, “regenerationism” in fact 
included a myriad of sometimes contradictory perspectives on the economic and 
political state of Spain. Classic themes of the regenerationist literature were the 
backwardness of the Spanish economy (especially in agriculture), and the need to 
moralise and modernise a passive, illegitimate, and fraudulent liberal state unable to
144 Buylla, Economia, p. 153. As well in Botella, El socialismo, pp.346-347. Another definition (“legal 
socialism”) is given Pereira, Luis, “Socialismo juridico,” in Galan Eguizabal, Felix and Francisco Nunez 
Tomas, Anuario obrero. 1915. (Madrid, 1916), pp.9-13.
145 Buylla, Economia, pp. 153-154.
146 Montero, El primer catolicismo social, pp.82-83
147 Montero, Feliciano, “La polemica sobre el intervencionismo y la primera legislation obrera en Espana. 
1890-1900. 2a parte: el debate politico-parlamentario,” Revista de Trabajo, number 61-62 (1981), pp.59- 
65.
148 Zancada, El obrero en Espana, p. 215.
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address the most pressing problems of the country.149 Moreover, it affirmed the need for 
the state to overcome the liberal revolution, which had ended with the liberal reforms of 
the 1880s (universal male suffrage, the associations’ law of 1887, homogenisation of the 
administrative and taxation system), and led to a more active role of the state in the 
economy.150 Characteristic as well were the appeals to increase the supply of state- 
funded, free secular schools, which for instance contradicted with their appeals to reign 
in public expenditure and government deficits. A book by Macias Cavea advocated it 
was necessary that the state improve its administration and bureaucracy, decentralise 
administration towards the province and the municipality, and introduce social reforms 
to solve labour unrest. In the latter case, regenerationists approached social Catholicism, 
for instance affirming that “in order to avert destructive socialism (his emphasis) (...) 
there is no other way, in the moulds of the current public law in Europe, but to adopt 
what the great archbishop of Westminster called constructive socialism, or Christian 
socialism (,..).”151 However, regenerationism did not push for a democratic agenda and, 
instead, fantasised about a ‘benevolent’ dictator or authoritarian president, to the point 
of affirming, like Macias Picavea did, that “in government we need Bismarcks, with 
grafts from (injertos de) Saint Francis of Assisi.”152 In fact, the ideas put forward in the 
period have the flavour of a “revolution from above,” as politicians associated with the
\C'\
movement like Antonio Maura put it, and were an effort to implement the 
movement’s idea of “making the monarchy national” and solving the crisis of 
legitimacy of the state.154
Regenerationism gained momentum in the midst of political crisis and gained 
influence across the political spectrum. Nevertheless, it was from conservative ranks 
that this programme was pushed forward. In August 1897, the Conservative leader 
Antonio Canovas del Castillo was shot to death by an Italian anarchist paid by Cuban
149 Maurice, Jacques and Carlos Serrano, Joaquin Costa: crisis de la Restauracion y  populismo (1875- 
1911) (Madrid, 1977), pp.27-30. Examples o f regenerationist literature are: Mallada, Lucas, Los males de 
la patria  (Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1969); Macias Picavea, R., El problema nacional. Hechos, causas 
remedios (Madrid: Seminarios y Ediciones, 1972).
150 This went hand in hand with developments in political economy, Pan-Montojo, Juan “El atraso 
economico y la regeneration,” in Pan-Montojo (ed.), Mas se perdio en Cuba. Espana, 1898 y  la crisis de 
fin desiglo  (Madrid, 1998), pp.261-335.
151 Quote is from Joaquin Costa in Maurice and Serrano, Joaquin Costa, p.84.
152 Ibid., p.31.
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exiles,155 paving the way for the arrival of a new generation of Conservative politicians, 
some of them with typically regenerationist objectives. This was especially the case of 
Antonio Maura, who probably entered in contact with the regenerationist literature 
when, earlier in his political career, he was associated with German Gamazo, an 
important political figure of the Liberal party.156 First as Minister of Interior 
(Gobernacion) and later on as president, Maura sponsored three typical regenerationist 
projects such as a new electoral law, the law on the merchant navy, and the finally
1 Cl
aborted law on administrative decentralisation. Another regenerationist project, the 
reduction of government deficit and the first efforts to rationalise the tax system were 
also tried by Fernandez Villaverde, finance minister during the Silvela-Polavieja 
government, who favoured intervention in labour matters. Member of the Comision de 
Reformas Sociales, in 1900 Fernandez Villaverde delivered a moderately reformist 
speech at the Academy of Jurisprudence of Madrid entitled “Industrial combinations
1 CO
and workers’ strikes from the point of view of the law.” Fernandez Villaverde also 
became one of the leading voices in the elaboration by the Comision of the 1901 bill on 
strikes.
In this context, the Silvela- General Polavieja government, with Eduardo Dato as 
Interior minister, introduced the first reforms in 1900: the accidents law, which 
established employers’ liability for workplace accidents, and the law regulating children 
and women’s work. This legislation perfectly defined conservative interventionism. In 
the case of the accidents’ law, Eduardo Dato later related the passing of the workplace 
accidents’ law to the 1884 law passed in Germany by Bismarck,159 but also there had 
been an original proposal by the Comision de Reformas Sociales. The project had a 
clear social catholic leaning as a priest was allowed to sit in the boards of social reforms 
(juntas de reformas sociales), which were to supervise the implementation of workplace 
safety regulations. Regenerationism was an important influence as well. When asked by 
Dato to intervene in the elaboration of the bill, the leadership of the cotton textile union
155 Eisdale, Charles J., Spain in the Liberal Age. From Constitution to Civil War, 1808-1939 (Oxford, 
2000), p. 192.
156 Tusell, Javier, Antonio Maura. Una biografia politico  (Madrid, 1994), pp.49-50.
157 On the latter, Tusell, Javier, La reforma de la administracion local en Espana (1900-1936) (Madrid: 
Instituto de Estudios Administrativos, 1973), pp.89-128.
158 Gascon Marin, Los sindicatos, tome 1, p. 100.
159 Eduardo Dato, DSC 28th February 1902, number 131, p.3809.
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Tres Classes de Vapor answered affirmatevely on the grounds that “it is (was) a true 
task of regeneration, wich every citizen is obliged to.”160
There is no evidence that the accidents law found much opposition in 
Parliament, with its discussion taking place in the midst of the debate on the budget in 
late 1899 and early 1900. This led the liberal notable Count Romanones to remark that 
Dato was trying to pass “a fundamental law” as if it was a minor vote approving the 
building of a provincial road.161 The law was discussed on the 17 January with an 
amendment by Gumersindo de Azcarate, which was accepted by the parliamentary 
commission. This in turn led to the creation of a mixed commission of parliament 
deputies and senators adopting a final text to be passed in the Senate. Praxedes Zancada, 
writing in 1902, perceived that “based on generous motives, (the law) did not find 
opposition in the chambers (and) (...) was enthusiastically welcomed by public 
opinion.”162
Because the textile industry employed mainly women and children, the law 
regulating female and child work found more opposition. Employers responded late to 
the passing of the law in the Senate, which was sent to congress on the 19 December
1899. Through its deputies (Sallares, Ferrer i Vidal, Sala i Argemi, Sedo), the Fomento 
del Trabajo Nacional (the main Catalan employers’ association) managed the 
suspension of the debate for two weeks until employers could write their reports and 
send them to the parliamentary commission.163 There was also an amendment to the bill 
put forward by Sedo, one of the largest cotton textile employers, accepted by the 
commission but voted out later on.164
Opposition from Catalan employers to the government had not only been caused 
by the laws of Dato. The Silvela government of 1899-1900, a purely regenerationist 
government combining both authoritarianism (general Polavieja) and reform (notably 
administrative de-centralisation and tax reform), had initially won the support of
160 Quoted in Seco Serrano, Carlos, “Regeneracionismo y tensiones sociales (en tomo al Gobiemo Silvela 
de 1899-1900), p.37, in Alfonso XIIIy la crisis de la Restauracion (Madrid, 1992).
161 Conde Romanones, DSC 17th January 1900, numer 107, p.3568.
162 Zancada, El obrero, p.218.
163 Borras Llop, “Actitudes patronales,” pp.636-637. Excerpts o f the report were published in La Veu de 
Catalunya during January 1900.
164 DSC 22nd January, number 111, appendix 8.
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Catalan employers. However, the new taxes levied by Fernandez Villaverde to reduce 
the government deficit brought about a three months tax strike by the storekeepers of 
Barcelona, which in turn triggered a vigorous reaction by the Minister of Interior 
Eduardo Dato, who did not lift the state of war in the city in the following seventeen 
months.165 It was clear then that in early 1900, there was little room for accommodation.
In 1901, a new liberal government (headed by Sagasta) submitted a new bill on 
strikes, with Alfonso Gonzalez at the Minister of Interior. Based on a restrictive 
versions of the strike bill elaborated by the Comision by the likes of Sanz Escartin, 
Fernandez Villaverde, the institucionista economist Piemas Hurtado, and Moreno 
Rodriguez, the law defended the right to strike in the preamble but limited it by 
stipulating the cases of illegal strikes in the following articles (based on article 556 of 
the Criminal Law code).166 Among the most polemic points of the law was its treatment 
of the coercion of strikers to non-union workers or the right of employers to lay off 
union workers and employ only non union workers. The labour movement’s opposition 
to the law was warranted by the restrictive interpretation of all these issues.167 A 
parliamentary commission presided by Gumersindo de Azcarate changed the bill 
substantially by easing most of the restrictions, especially the ones referring to the 
distinction between legal and illegal strikes.
The constitution of these parliamentary commissions helps understand the 
internal workings of legislative work in the Restoration parliament. Generally, 
commissions reflected the political composition of parliament but reformers, and most 
notably the republican Azcarate, were able to sit and even preside the parliamentary 
commissions on labour issues. This guaranteed that the commission presented a bill 
equally or more progressive than the original purposes of the government or the
1 ARsenate. In turn, it diminished the chances of the bill being passed in a notably more
165 Riquer, Boija de, “La crisis del 98 y la irrupcion del catalanismo en la politica espanola,” in Escolta, 
Espanya. La cuestion catalana en la epoca liberal (Madrid, 2001), p. 195. The details o f the fiscal reform 
in Martorell Linares, Miguel, El santo temor al deficit. Politica y  hacienda en la Restauracion (Madrid, 
2000), pp.68-87.
166 Article 556 penalising combinations of workers aimed at altering the ‘normal’ levels o f wages and 
hours had been not used since 1882 (Pablo Iglesias, DSC 19th October 1910, number 45, p .1226), and as 
such was recognised by the Supreme Court in early 20th century. Probably, the reason for this were the 
difficulties in gathering evidence to judge strikers rather than judiciary’s progressivism.
167 Canalejas’ foreword, p.CLVI, in Buylla, Posada, Morote, El Instituto del Trabajo.
168 On the election o f commissions Pons y Umbert, Adolfo, Organizacion y  funcionamiento de las Cortes 
segun las Constituciones espaholas (Madrid, 1992 [1906]), pp.712-714. It says little about the selection
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conservative parliament, divided among the issue reform/abstention in labour matters, 
with little room for middle ground solutions.169 This is what happened in the case of the 
1901 strike law, which by late 1902 had not been discussed in parliament and had few 
chances of being passed.
Lacking parliamentary support, the first Sagasta government fell but, in early 
1902, the government obtained the support of Jose Canalejas. An erstwhile republican, 
Canalejas had entered the left of the Liberal party (the so-called Dynastic Left) and 
served in important ministries in the Sagasta governments. During the 1890s he 
developed his reformist programme. In 1895 he had published Aspecto juridico del 
problema social (Legal aspects of the social question) in which he proposed overcoming
1 70the legal principle of “freedom of contract” in the spirit of the reformist literature. In 
the late 1890s, he also made a much criticised move towards the regenerationist project 
of the General Polavieja, understanding regenerationism as a “true revolution” in the 
administrative and legal system.171 In early 1902, he conditioned his entry into the 
Sagasta government to an ambitious programme of reforms which included laws 
restricting the power of the church, social reforms, and an agrarian reform, which was 
embodied in a pact signed by the liberal notables Sagasta, Vega de Armijo, Moret and 
Weyler.172
In 1902, the cuestion social was at the centre of the political debate. In early 
1902 another bill creating conciliation boards of employers and workers entered the
process of members from the different parties. One author has argued that generally representation from 
all political groups was warranted by an ‘implicit’ rule guaranteeing the representation of all parties: 
Martorell Linares, Miguel, “Gobiemo y  parlamento: las reglas del juego,” pp.215-221, in Cabrera, 
Mercedes (ed.), Con luz y  taquigrafos. El Parlamento en la Restauracion (1913-1923) (Madrid, 1998). 
Even if  the selection rule more or less maintains the composition o f the Parliament, self-selection assures 
members of the commission are preference outliers. However the direction o f the effect in the case o f  
social reforms is in principle ambiguous. In practice however commissions’ preferences were biased 
towards more reform with respect to a notably more ‘conservative’ parliament. On committee 
(commissions) power, see for instance Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast, “The institutional 
foundations of committee power,” American Political Science Review, 81 (March 1987), pp.85-104; a 
survey o f the literature in Peter C. Ordeshook, “The spatial analysis o f elections and committees: four 
decades of research,” in Mueller, Dennis C. (ed.), Perspectives on public choice. A handbook 
(Cambridge, 1997), chapter 12.
169 The only contrary case was the coalition between conservative’s reformism and social Catholicism, 
that could even incorporate reactionary Catholics (like in the case o f the Sunday rest law or votes on laws 
like the one limiting the workday for women).
170 Discussed in Fomer Munoz, Salvador, Canalejas y  el partido liberal democratico (1900-1910) 
(Madrid, 1993), pp.56-57.
171 Ibid., p.100.
172 Buylla, Posada, Morote, El Instituto del Trabajo, pp.8-12.
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process of parliamentary discussion. The parliamentary commission again contained 
representatives of all political parties. Among them there were republican reformers 
such as Melquiades Alvarez, conservatives like Isasa or an anti-reform liberal such as
11 'XLopez Puigcerver. Shortly after the general strike of Barcelona, Canalejas, from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and Trade, tried to pass his project, for which he had 
been advised by the University of Oviedo professors Buylla and Posada, to create an 
institute devoted to the study of the state of the working classes and the elaboration of 
legislation {Instituto de Trabajo).114 Canalejas tried to obtain the maximum political 
support by contacting the conservative Dato, the republican Azcarate and the socialist 
Iglesias, to whom he even proposed the directorship of the Institute. In this case, the 
parliamentary commission, headed by the liberal Alvarado and including Gumersindo 
de Azcarate, did not change the original bill much and was submitted for vote with the 
only opposition of the conservative member of the commission, Eugenio Silvela, who 
opposed some of the articles of the law.
In the midst of the political debate after the general strike and of the crisis of the 
second Sagasta government, a crisis Canalejas’ entry did not solve, the bill did not raise 
much interest in the chamber, but was mentioned frequently and discussed ardently in 
other ongoing debates. During the debate, it was the Conservative Romero Robledo who 
proposed amendment and led much of the discussion, along with Maura and Silvela. 
However, later on, in a strategic move not even understood by his contemporaries, 
Romero Robledo finally withdrew all his amendments and the law was passed thanks to 
the votes of his parliamentary group on the 7th May 1902.175 This helped overcoming 
the opposition from inside the liberals’ ranks, who were profoundly divided by the law. 
Liberals like Moret and Lopez Puigcerver had expressed their opposition to the project 
in the parliamentary debate. A speech by the radical republican Alejandro Lerroux in 
February 1902 reflected the confusion by remarking there was “a Liberal Party which 
should lead the enactment of social reforms (...) but still has not passed any.” Adding as 
well that “in spite of its reactionary and clerical background, the Conservative Party has
173 DSC 22nd February 1902, number 126, p.3661. Profiles o f parlamentarians and senators in Dodero 
Vazquez, J.F., Las ultimas cortes de la Regencia (Madrid, 1902)
174 The Instituto was to depend from the Ministry o f Agriculture, with a budget 170,000 pesetas, in order 
to increase the efficiency of the institution Canalejas warranted the permanence o f elected officials 
(traditionally, government officials were aligned to political parties and lost their post when their party 
lost the election).
175 Buylla, Posada, Morote, El Instituto del Trabajo, pp. 177-183.
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1 7 f \taken the initiative and has passed social reforms.” As Lerroux evidenced, the truth 
was that the Liberal party sided with the principle of “freedom of contact” as expressed 
in the 1889 Civil Law code. The law was finally blocked in the Senate, but by that time 
Canalejas, the “Spanish Millerand” as he was called, had abandoned the government
1 77and had distanced himself from the Liberal Party.
In 1903 a new general election organised by Antonio Maura as Minister of 
Interior led to a new conservative majority in Parliament with Silvela as president. In 
April 1903 a royal decree created the Instituto de Reformas Sociales (IRS), which, being 
based on the Canalejas’ project, was transferred to the Ministry of Interior (but Maura 
was not behind the project). Furthermore, compared to the original project, the 
government now limited the number of representatives elected by employers and 
workers and instead increased the number of members appointed by the government (12 
for workers, 12 for employers, 30 for government). In spite of the unilateral decision by 
the government to push forward a ‘conservative’ and loyal institute, the government 
through a royal decree elected a rather pluralistic list of members.178 In a concession to 
reformists, Gumersindo de Azcarate was called to be the president of the Institute. Other 
elected members had previously been at the Comision de Reformas Sociales -the most 
notable figures being Moret and Fernandez Villaverde. The list also included the 
republican and reformist Melquiades Alvarez, the economist Jose Maria Piemas 
Hurtado, linked to the reformist Institucion de Libre Ensenanza, and Jose Maluquer y
1 *7Q
Salvador, from social catholic circles. It was clear that the royal decree creating the 
IRS had been a move to control the original Canalejas bill (still in the Senate for 
approval).
The fall of the Silvela-Maura government in July 1903 triggered a more purely 
reformist, if weaker, government with Fernandez Villaverde as president and Garcia 
Alix as minister of Interior. The summer of 1903 had witnessed an increase in strikes 
and industrial conflict. With the prisons full of trade unionists, one of the first decisions 
of the new minister was to give amnesty to arrested workers. Later on, Garcia Alix
176 Lerroux, DSC 19th February 1902, number 122, p.3539.
177 The identification o f Canalejas with the Socialist French minister Millerand in Buylla, Posada, Morote, 
El Instituto del Trabajo, p. 140.
178 Royal Decree 13 May 1903.
179 Palacio Morena, La institucionalizacion, p.66.
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agreed with Azcarate to submit, along with the bill on strikes, bills on conciliation
1 80boards and industrial tribunals, plus another one regulating apprenticeship. However, 
none of these gathered enough political support. In the case of strikes, the law was first 
submitted to the Senate, which after approving it, passed it on to the Parliament much 
later on the 14th of October 1904. The Villaverde government, however, unable to pass 
the budget for 1904, had fallen in late 1903.
The next parliamentary attempts to pass legislation corresponded to the period of
Count Romanones as Minister of Interior in the liberal government of 1906, which on
the 27 January of 1906 presented the bills on strikes and boards of conciliation.
However, by that time the political debate on the ley de jurisdicciones (law of
jurisdictions, a severe limitation of the freedom of press and reunion) was about the
start, with a famous campaign led by republicans and other minor groups to obstruct the
181normal functioning of the parliament to delay the final vote of the chamber.
It was another conservative government which finally passed the laws on strikes, 
on boards of conciliation and arbitration, and on industrial tribunals. Paradoxically, this 
happened during the Tong government’ of Maura with the hard-liner Juan de la Cierva 
at the Interior Ministry. Maura himself had favoured a notably more repressive tactic 
during his time in the Interior ministry at the height of the strike wave of the summer of 
1903; but De la Cierva saw himself as an even more authoritarian Interior minister. For 
instance, defending one of his first polemical decisions, he noted “it is another act of 
government which can be used as an example of firm and serene resolution, which 
impresses adversaries and compels them to give in before an implacable Power. When
1 89one doubts at every step, one encourages subversion and lawlessness.”
In spite of de la Cierva and Maura’s sheer lack of reformist credentials, it was 
their government which was pushing more decisively for reform, backed by a cohesive 
majority in Parliament. It was de la Cierva who allowed the IRS to work more actively,
180 Buireu Guarro, Jorge, Antonio Garcia Alix: un ministro del regeneracionismo (1852-1911) (Madrid, 
1990).
181 The practice was called obstruccionismo. Posada, Adolfo, “Obstruccionismo”, Enciclopedia Juridica 
Espahola, volume XIII, pp.749-752, citing famous cases of parlamientary obtruction: the 1893 debate on 
municipal elections, the Maura law of 1907 on the local administrative system or the 1916-17 financial 
reforms o f the liberal Finance minister Santiago Alba, page 751.
182 Cierva, Juan de la, Notas de mi vida (Madrid, 1955), p.79, written in 1932.
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doubling its budget from 150,000 to 290,000 pesetas in 1908 and further to 314,000 
pesetas in 1909. Through a series of royal orders in early 1907, the factory inspectors’ 
service was also organised. He also allowed the IRS to intervene in the most important 
strikes of the period 1907-9 (a period however of low strike activity) and kept Adolfo 
Posada and Adolfo Buylla, who were required by the Education Ministry to return to
i o n
their chairs at the University of Oviedo. In 1908, the Instituto Nacional de Prevision, 
which was going to organise the Social Security, was created, but it took quite a long 
time to organise the pensions system.
The law on strikes of 1909 originated from a bill passed in the Senate. The 
parliamentary commission was led by two reformers: Gumersindo de Azcarate as
1 84president and Gabriel Maura Gamazo as secretary. Another member, Alvarado,
I O C
representing the Liberal party, had been in the 1902 strike law commission. 
Moreover, this same commission also started drawing up the bill on industrial 
tribunals.186 The strike law was voted on the 7th March 1909, with the canalejista Luis 
Morote willing to eliminate any restriction on the right to strike.187 Remembering his 
participation on the 1902 campaign for the Instituto del Trabajo and the resistances it 
found, a suspicious Morote remarked in the parliamentary debate: “it is remarkable how 
things have changed! Today, on the benches of the parliamentary commission, presiding 
a commission of a reactionary and conservative government, sits Mr. Azcarate, who 
represents the radical extreme of Spanish politics (referring to republicans), (...) 
defending the right to strike. Heading the chamber (referring to the Conservative 
reformist Eduardo Dato), there is a distinguished man who agrees on everything with 
the presidency of the commission, as everyone else does; and Mr. Moret applauded the 
words just pronounced by Mr. Azcarate; he who once belonged to that distinguished
183 Ibid., p. 119.
184 Maura Gamazo, son of Antonio Maura, also sponsored the more conciliatory policy of the prefect o f  
Barcelona, Angel Ossorio, a fact de la Cierva resented, ibid., p.101, p .131-135.
185 DSC 30th March 1907, number 172, p.5562. On the 5th November 1908, two members o f the 
Commission were changed but not Azcarate, Maura Gamazo or Alvarado.
186 DSC 1907, number 180, p.5597.
187 Luis Morote was a journalist linked to Canalejas, he wrote on the most important regenerationist texts 
La moral de la derrota (Madrid, 1900), in 1901 he wrote a series o f influential articles criticising the 
living and working conditions of Catalan company towns (the series “Feudalismo en las fabricas”), in 
1902 he had an active participation in the Instituto de Trabajo project. Perez Garzon, J.S., Luis Morote. 
La problematica de un republicano (1862-1923) (Madrid, 1976).
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school of (theoretical) individualists that some time ago were the glory of the Spanish
|  o o
democracy (referring to his participation in the revolution of 1869).”
The strike laws of Maura’s Tong government’ established mechanisms to settle 
strikes in a less acrimonious way. Industrial tribunals had jurisdiction over labour 
contracts and were designed to settle minor disputes avoiding costly strikes or 
inefficient ordinary tribunals. Furthermore, the law on conciliation boards allowed the 
local boards of social reforms (juntas locales de reformas sociales, established by the 
1900 accidents law) to arrange the settlement of strikes if the contending parties 
accepted to do so. The laws officially recognised unions by allowing their participation 
in mixed institutions with representatives of employers, authorities and workers. The 
strike law of 1909 explicitly recognised the right of workers to strike, while at the same 
time put a limit on employers and workers ability to coerce each other.
The historical literature has considered these laws to be quite conservative, given 
the limitations on workers’ right to strike. But this judgement lacks comparative 
perspective; Belgium, Italy, or even France had more restrictive laws, for instance 
stipulating more severe penalties for picket lines.189 For example, contemporary critics 
of conciliation procedures remarked only some years later that “shortly after being 
passed, the law was implemented in the social reality (sic), even by the Conservative 
government (...), in its most extreme and radical sense. The law is the cause of the 
terrifying general strikes we have witnessed lately (referring to the 1911 and 1916 
general strikes).”190
3.3. The failure of arbitration.
But how was the reform implemented, if implemented at all? An answer to the question 
can be found by looking at the strikes of the period and the way they ended using the 
strike statistics published by the IRS from 1905 to 1922. These data contain a specific 
entry on the type of settlement of the strike.191 Before the reform was implemented,
188 Luis Morote, DSC 17th March 1909, number 107, p.3174.
]89 DSC, 17 March 1909, number 107, pp.3167-3185.
190 Financiero Hispano-Americano, El problema ferroviario. Proceso social y  juridico de nuestro derecho 
a huelgas. Recopilacion de documentos de actualidady comentarios (Madrid, 1916), p. 22.
191 Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Estadlstica de huelgas (Madrid, 1905-1915).
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from 1905 to 1909, 14 per cent of strikes (N=548) were solved by a recognised union 
and their employers, 2.9 per cent solved by the local junta de reformas sociales (the 
local boards created by the 1900 accidents’law), 11 per cent through the mayor, and 17 
per cent by the prefect of the province (the representative of the Minister of Interior in 
the city). The remaining 55.1 per cent ended without any conciliation procedure. 
Between 1910 and 1915 (N=838), the proportion of strikes using either conciliation 
boards, tribunals or local juntas was a scant 3.5 per cent, the percentage of strikes 
solved formally by a union and employers was only 10.5 per cent. Since the IRS strike 
data for the period 1910-1915 gave much poorer information on the intervention by the 
prefect of the city, I also collected the strike data published by the Catalan Museu Social 
(Social Museum), a Catalan initiative modelled on the French Musee Sociale}92 
Looking at Catalan strikes only is important since they represented 31 per cent of 
Spanish strikes, 50 per cent of the total number of strikers, and 62 per cent of total man- 
days lost, between 1910 and 1915. In the Catalan provinces, the prefect intervened in 18 
per cent of the cases, the mayor another 18 per cent, and the local juntas only 5 per cent, 
in the 315 strikes recorded for 1912 to 1915.
The evidence clearly shows how the laws failed in their implementation. Writing
with historical perspective in January 1932, de la Cierva commented about the laws on
conciliation boards and industrial tribunals that “they have not been implemented since I 
1left the Ministry.” However, this approach adds little to our understanding of the 
problem because more information is needed on the different bargaining alternatives 
open to workers in strikes. This I will explore in chapter 4.
The main reason explaining the failure of boards of conciliation is that 
employers considered any type of conciliation as an intrusion in their private affairs. 
Above, I have discussed how in 1902, when a law on strikes was discussed, employers 
feared government might pass compulsory conciliation and argued they had the 
exclusive authority within their establishments. In important strikes where the state was 
forced to intervene, like in the Bilbao mining strike of 1910 or the Catalan textile strike 
of 1913, employers refused the intervention of the Instituto de Reformas Sociales as an
192 The only monograph I know o f about the Museu is Rovira Roses, Maria Asuncion, “El Museo Social, 
1909-1919,” unpublished dissertation University of Barcelona, 1968.
193 Cierva, Not as de mi vida, p. 120.
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illegitimate intrusion into private affairs. Workers, on the other hand, refused to co­
operate with what they considered inefficient institutions and, as shown in chapter 4, 
preferred the intervention of state officials and local authorities to force employers to 
negotiate with unions. If the state was to force employers into formal collective 
bargaining to avoid the dangers of workers’ militancy, state’s authority would have to 
be extended.
3.4. Conclusion. The decisive configuration of the labour code.
In spite of the general impression that reforms were difficult to implement, by 1909 our 
so called ‘coalition for reform’ was firmly established among the Spanish political elite. 
The resilient principle of freedom of contract, a consequence of an incomplete Liberal 
revolution, was now superseded by the notion that state intervention in the labour 
market was needed to tame workers’ militancy and protect weaker contractual parties. 
In this favourable context, the configuration of the labour law code that reformers 
sponsored was only a matter of time, accident, and political will. In subsequent 
governments, laws limiting the number of hours in the textile industry and in mining, 
another law on industrial tribunals and laws regulating apprenticeship were passed. 
State action involved the protection of unions in mining, railways and the cotton textile 
industry. Moreover, the Instituto de Reformas Sociales had an increasing participation 
in the solution of conflicts and providing first-hand reports on working conditions in 
agriculture, cotton textile, mining, or railways, and providing conciliation settlements 
and recommending the passing of legislation. In Catalonia, the Museu Social was
i
created in 1909 by the provincial government of Barcelona, (Diputacion) after the 
Tragic Week.194 With an insufficient budget, the Museu did not have enough room to 
manoeuvre and had but a secondary role compared to state reformers. The museum 
published, however, a bulletin and a yearbook of social statistics, organised a successful 
unemployment agency, published foreign studies on workplace safety and health, and 
created an influential school of training and vocational guidance.
The surge in strike activity and social conflict after 1917 paved the way for a 
definitive move towards the elaboration of a labour law code. Convinced only more 
reform could appease social conflict and willing to extend state authority, the 
government passed a new set of regulations at an almost frantic pace. A decree
194 Rovira Roses, “El Museo Social,” p.7.
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establishing an eight-hour day was passed in early 1919, a 7 hour workday in mining in 
1919, and an 8 hour day in railways in 1921. Providing formal bargaining institutions 
became a goal of public policy. In October 1919 the government ordered the creation of 
a mixed committee in Barcelona with delegates from employers, unions (including the 
anarcho-syndicalists) and state officials. Previously, in May 1919, the government had 
pushed forward joint committees to solve labour disputes which attempted to re­
establish the ineffective conciliation boards designed by the 1909 strike law.195 The 
IRS, on the other hand, elaborated a bill on the labour contract (as it had done in 1904) 
which included arbitration and conciliation boards and even wrote a report considering 
the benefits of compulsory unionisation. In 1920, the Ministry of Labour was created. 
The ministry’s budget for the Institute of Social Reforms doubled in nominal terms in 
1920 and increased by 65 per cent in real terms. In 1921 another nominal doubling 
occurred (a 122 per cent in real terms because 1921 was a deflationary year). In 1922 a 
more generous accidents law was passed and more resources were channelled towards 
factory inspection. In 1922, a motherhood subsidy was granted for working mothers.
The literature has stressed that continuity rather than change characterised the 
labour policy of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923-1930).196 However, most 
independent unions were forced into clandestine activity, notably the National 
Confederation of Labour (CNT), and there was a severe reduction in the number of 
strikes. However, in 1924, a Board of Labour (Consejo de Trabajo) was created which 
Largo Caballero, as representative of the General Workers’ Union (UGT) was allowed 
to sit. In late 1925 and early 1926 a series of labour laws were passed and this process
195 There is a vast literature on this issue: Rey Reguillo, Fernando, “La polemica sobre el control obrero. 
Los origenes en Espana,” Sociologla del Trabajo (new series), number 8 (winter 1989-1990), pp. 135-165; 
Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Contestacion sobre la redaccion del anteproyecto de ley acerca del 
Contrato de Trabajo, la responsabilidad contratante, los organismos llamados a intervenir en la 
reglamentacion y  en los conflictos de trabajo y  sobre la vindicacion profesiona (Madrid, 1921); Instituto 
de Reformas Sociales, Informacion relativa al proyecto sobre sindicacion obligatoria. Real Orden de 16 
enero de 1919 (Madrid, 1921); Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Informacion relativa al proyecto sobre 
sindicacion obligatoria. Real Orden de 16 de enero de 1919 (Madrid, 1921) Marichalar y Monreal, 
Vizconde de Eza, El sindicatorio obligatorio y  la organizacion profesional (Madrid, 1919); Instituto de 
Reformas Sociales, La reglamentacion colectiva del contrato de trabajo (Madrid, 1922); Instituto de 
Reformas Sociales, Legislacion sobre asociaciones. Leyes y  proyectos de ley sobre el derecho de 
asociacion y  sobre asociacion obrera (Madrid, 1922); Instituto de Reformas Sociales, El contrato de 
trabajo. La discusion en ellnstituto de Reformas Sociales. Actuacion de la representacion patronal 
(Madrid, 1924).
196 Mclvor, Anthony David, Spanish labor policy during the Dictablanda of Primo de Rivera Unpublished 
PhD dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 1982. Gomez Navarro, J.L., El regimen de Primo 
de Rivera (Madrid, 1991), chapter X; Calle, Maria D. de la, “Sobre los origenes del Estado social en 
Espana,” pp. 145-149.
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ended in the constitution of the National Corporatist Organisation of Work 
(Organization Corporativa Nacional del Trabajo) organised though a mixed
1 Q7commission of unions (socialist or non-revolutionary) and employers. The labour law
108code was compiled in 1926 and this basic legal body continued to organise labour 
relations until the Republic was overthrown by the Franco dictatorship.199
197 Preston, Paul, The coming o f the Spanish Civil War (London, 1983), pp.6-10.
198 Gomez Navarro, El regimen de Primo de Rivera (Madrid, 1991), p.327.
199 On the Republic, Linz, Juan Jose, “A century of politics and interests in Spain,” pp.382-387 in 
Suzanne Berger (ed.), Organizing interests in Western Europe. Pluralism, corporatism, and the 
transfoiTnation o f  politics (Cambridge, 1981).
Chapter 4. Winning Spanish strikes. Public order and state 
intervention in labour conflict, 1900-1920.
4.0 Introduction.
Comparing Spanish unions with the model German and British counterparts, Spanish 
reformers did not quite understand either the strategies of Spanish unions or their 
processes of growth and decline. Reformers believed unions grew through ordered dues 
collection and the provision of socially useful institutions. In their view, it was the 
supply of benefits, insurance and recreational centres, along with peaceful collective 
bargaining, that attracted membership to the union. Their interpretation of the processes 
of union growth in Britain and Germany concluded that the expansion of working class 
institutions tamed, rather than encouraged, the revolutionary expectations of workers.
But the Spanish case did not quite fit in these narratives of union growth. As 
described in chapter 2, rather than through gradual advance, unions grew through a 
series of bursts in strike activity, like for instance in 1899-1903 or 1910-1913, 
embracing many economic sectors and whole cities or regions. Strike waves suspended 
the logic of collective action by spreading positive feedback effects with optimistic 
expectations percolating from one group of workers to the next.1 In this context, 
Spanish unions remained distinctively socialist or anarchist, in principle committed to 
the violent overthrow of capitalist institutions. In their daily practice, unions developed 
strike and recruitment strategies based on low dues and the opening of unions to the 
unskilled, women and apprentices. Strike tactics were notably participatory, did not 
depend on the collection of strikefunds, and were based on the doctrine of the mass 
general strike. The practice of co-ordinated solidarity was guaranteed by the
1 Biggs, Michael, “Positive feedback effects in collective mobilization: the American strike wave of 
1886.” University o f Oxford discussion papers in Economic and Social History, number 40 (April 2001). 
See chapter 2, section 2.2. “Unions and strikes.”
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organisation of local and trade federations of unions, which tended to appear in periods 
of high strike activity.
In chapter 3, I have exposed how contemparies argued that politically radical 
working class institutions prevented the orderly development of the labour movement
tVibecause they antagonised employers and workers alike. For example, in the early 20 
century, the supporter of Catholic unionism, Miguel Sastre, wrote that after the strike 
wave of 1903 in Barcelona “the strike became a scourge for the proletarians themselves
'y
and they ended by hating it.” This view has also been incorporated in the historical 
literature, in which it is argued that the unrealistic expectations of anarchists and 
anarcho-syndicalists in strike waves and their explicit lack of interest in setting up 
bureaucracies delayed the organization of effective unions.4 In other cases, it is asserted 
union strategies were radical because state and employers’ oppression pushed workers 
to embrace desperate solutions.5
Rather than seein radicalism as an exogenous or endogenous irrational union 
strategy, in this chapter I argue strategies of strike participation that included the 
unskilled, responded dialectically to the way strikes were settled in the period, with 
inclusive, politically radical working class institutions being, with important exceptions, 
a ‘winning strategy’ in the largest cities in the first two decades of the 20th century. The 
survival of radical politics in unions This in turn guaranteed the survival of radical 
working class traditions in big city unions, which appeared more clearly in the period
2 A comparison o f Spanish unions with German and French union stressing the lack o f union funds in 
Spanish unions: Marvaud, Angel, La question sociale en Espagne (Paris, 1910), p. 72. A thorough study 
of the creation of local and regional federations o f unions in Gabriel, Pere, “Classe obrera i sindicats a 
Catalunya, 1903-1920,” pp. 417-568. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Universitat de Barcelona, 1981. He 
shows that the ‘organisational’ moments o f local and trade federations o f unions in Catalonia but also in 
Spain developed especially in 1902-1905, 1910, and 1913-1915.
3 Sastre, Miguel, Las huelgas de Barcelona y  sus resultados en el aho 1903 (Barcelona, 1904), p. 5.
4 An attribution of millenarian instincts to the Anarchist and Anarcho-syndicalist movements is especially 
dear to the historiography written in English: Carr, Raymond, Spain, 1808-1939 (Oxford, [1966] 1981), p. 
446; Brenan, Gerald, The Spanish labyrinth, “The anarcho-syndicalists;” and on the 1918-1919 
Andalusian anarcho-syndicalists Hobsbawm, Eric J., Primitive rebels: studies in archaic forms o f social 
movements in the 19th and 20th centuries (New York, 2nd .edition, 1965), p. 84.
5 A nuanced perspective: Malefakis, Edward. 1993. “A Comparative Analysis o f Workers’ Movements in 
Spain and Italy,” in Richard Gunther, ed., Politics, Society, and Democracy: The Case o f  Spain 
(Westview), p. 60. As well, Gabriel, Pere, “Classe obrera i sindicats a Catalunya, 1903-1920,” p. 825; 
Balcells, Albert, Cataluha contemporanea, II (1900-1939) (Madrid, 1981), p. 6 . Views stressing anarcho- 
syndicalists acted strategically: Martin, Benjamin, The agony o f  modernization. Labor and 
industrialization in Spain (Ithaca, NY, 1990), chapter 7; Meaker, Gerald H., The Revolutionary Left in 
Spain, 1914-1923 (Palo Alto, CA, 1974), p. 4; Molas, Isidre “Introduccio” in Segui, Salvador, Escrits 
(Barcelona, 1974).
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1918-1920 and during the 2nd Republic. Using strike data from 1905 to 1915, I show 
that the implication of state and local authorities in the resolution of conflicts was 
substantial. Moreover, I also argue that state and local authorities intervention tended to 
favour strikers by promoting compromise settlements. Finally, I discuss the 
determinants of state intervention, indicating that it was more probable in large strikes, 
in big urban concentrations, and where the vote to anti-system parties (republicans and 
socialists) was highest. This suggests strikers in big cities enjoyed some level of 
political power over state officials. In turn, the fact that state officials shielded unions in 
big cities might be a contributing factor in explaining the persistance and expansion of 
political radicalism and inclusive union and strike tactics among Spanish unions.
4.1. Strike outcomes, 1905-1920.
Without state mediation, strikes were wars of attrition which ended in either total failure 
or victory of the union.6 But especially in large cities, implication of state officials 
reduced the failure rate of strikes and substantially increased the probability of a 
compromise settlement (a partial victory). Complete union victories probably granted 
larger wage increases or greater reductions in the hours of work, but they were rare and 
generally required extraordinary economic conditions. In contrast, compromise 
settlements sponsored by state officials were not limited by the business cycle, bringing 
about modest but more probable material advances and reducing the risks and costs of 
collective action.7
6 The difference in the distribution of strike outcomes with and without state intervention and regulation 
over strikes in Card, David and Craig Olson, “Bargaining power, strike duration, and wage outcomes: an 
analysis o f strikes in the 1880s.” NBER working paper number 4075 (May 1992), where it is argued that 
without state intervention, strikes became wars o f attrition until one of the sides surrendered. Thus, strike 
outcomes are inevitably complete victories or complete defeats, rather than compromises or partial 
victories.
7 The distinction between won and lost strikes and compromises can have several empirical problems if  
strike outcomes -for instance over wage increases or shorter hours- are distributed continuously, but it 
was the natural taxonomy used to describe strike outcomes during the period, suggesting contemporaries 
identified clearly when a strike was won, lost or partially won. The distinction between successful or 
failed strikes and compromises was adopted by Miguel Sastre in his analysis o f the Barcelona strikes 
between 1903 and 1914, by the Instituto de Reformas Sociales and the Ministry of Labour from 1905 to 
1935 and by the Museu Social from 1912 to 1915. Moreover, this taxonomy was also used in the French, 
Canadian or American strike data in the period. Sastre, Miguel, Las huelgas de Barcelona y  sus 
resultados, years 1903-1904; Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Estadistica de huelgas, years 1905-1920; 
Museu Social, Anuari d'Estadistica Social, years 1912-1915. On American and French strike data for 
1880-1914: Friedman, Gerald, “Strike success and union ideology: the United States and France, 1880- 
1914,” Journal o f Economic History, 48, 1 (March 1988), pp. 1-25. On Canada, Huberman, Michael and 
Denise Young, “Cross-border unions: Internationals in Canada, 1901-1914.” Explorations in Economic 
Histoiy, 36 (1999), pp. 204-231.
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In the period, compromise settlements and complete union victories did not 
differ qualitatively. With unions hardly recognised by employers and strikes being 
considered subversive challenges to employers’ authority, compromises showed unions 
could alter the conditions of employment. In fact, where unions were not recognised, 
employers refused both union grievances and meeting with union officials to negotiate a 
settlement, which in their views conflicted with the principle of owners’ authority in the
O
workplace. In important strikes, like the mining strikes of Bilbao in 1903, 1906 and 
1910 or the metal workers strikes of Barcelona in 1902 and 1910, employers did not 
accept to meet the strike committee on the grounds that it did not have the authority to 
represent workers. In these cases, compromises, as much as complete strike victories, 
established a de facto recognition of the union.
In graph 4 .1 .1 show the evolution of strike outcomes over time with the data on 
strikes published by the Instituto de Reformas Sociales between 1905 and 1920. The 
data show a clear trend toward more compromises in the period,9 increasing from 15 per 
cent in 1905 to 1909 to over 50 per cent in 1916-1920. This contrasts with complete 
victories, which represented about a third of all strikes in the whole period. The years 
1905-1920 witnessed a clear reduction in the failure rate of strikers: strikes in which 
none of the strikers’ demands were satisfied fell from 52 per cent in 1905-9 to only 23 
per cent in 1916-20.
8 Martin, The agony, p. 237.
9 In the strike data, won strikes were entered as “huelga ganada”, lost strikes as “perdida” and 
compromise settlements as “ganada parcialmente.”
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Graph 4.1. Strike outcomes in Spain, 1905-1920.
Source: Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Estadistica de huelgas, 1905-1920.
Notes: strikes with information on strike outcome are used. Number of observations for the 1905-1909 
period is 548, 838 for 1910-1915 and 1426 for 1916-1920. In the sub-period 1918-1920, with 1077 
recorded strikes, a 20 per cent were lost strikes, 53 per cent were compromises and 28 per cent were 
victories. Numbers do not add up to 100 due to rounding.
At least up to 1915, the ability of strikers to reduce their failure rate and obtain 
compromise settlements depended on third actors stepping in the conflict. The laws on 
strikes, industrial tribunals and conciliation boards passed in the years 1908 and 1909 
instituted mechanisms to reduce the cost of strikes by favouring a quick, less costly 
settlement of the strike. However, as table 4.1 shows, the state failed to enforce this 
reform and the role of arbitrating strikes kept in the hands of local authorities and civil 
governors (the representative of the Ministry of Interior in the province). In the 838 
strikes recorded for the period 1910-1915, only 3.5 per cent were terminated by a local 
joint commission of workers and employers or a similar institution, compared to the 5 
per cent in the period 1905-1909. In Cataluna, in the 315 strikes recollected by the 
Museu Social, joint commissions intervened in only 5 per cent of the cases, while civil 
governors and mayors arbitrated 36 per cent of strikes.10
10 What is understood by intervention of the civil governor or the mayor is problematic. In the Catalan 
strikes I used the entry upersones que intervengueren en la solucid ” (persons involved in the settlement 
of the strike), while for the 1905-1909 strikes I have used the entry “observaciones ” which included 
comments like “intervino el sehor Gobernador CiviC (the civil governor intervened) or “a propuesta del 
alcalde se avinieron las dos partes en conflicto” (workers and employers reached an agreement after the
Chapter 4. Winning strikes. 123
Table 4.1. Strikes by type of settlement 1905-1915.
N Civil governor Mavor Local junta or 
similar
Union-emplovers
IRS 1905-1909 548 17 per cent 11 per cent 2.9 per cent 14 per cent
IRS 1910-1915 838 n.a. n.a. 3.5 per cent 10.5 per cent
Museu Social, 315 18 per cent 18 per cent 5 per cent n.a.
1912-1915
Sources: Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Estadistica de huelgas, years 1905-1915; Museu Social, 
Anuari d ’Estadistica Social de Catalunya, years 1912 to 1915.
Notes: the strike data for the years 1910-1915 systematically underreported the activities o f civil 
governors and mayors. Comparing the IRS data for Catalan strikes in 1912-1915 with the data 
provided by the Museu Social, the IRS data give 271 strikes as opposed to 315 strikes reported by the 
Museu Social. In these strikes, the IRS reported the governor intervened in a 4 per cent of strikes and 
the mayor a 8 per cent, which contrasts with the joint 36 per cent in the Museu data. There is no such 
evidence of underreporting in the case o f  arbitration institutions (local junta or similar). Both the 
Museu and the IRS reported that a local junta or similar intervened in 5 per cent o f the Catalan 
strikes o f 1912-1915 (in the IRS data, 13 out 271 strikes, and in the Museu, 16 out of 315, most of  
them in the province o f Tarragona).
Analysis of the determinants of strike success between 1905 and 1915 shows 
that state or local authorities intervention was closely associated with strike victories or 
compromises. Using data for Spanish strikes between 1905 and 1909, state intervention 
in strikes increased the probability of a compromise or a complete victory by 41 per 
cent and complete victories by 96 per cent, controlling for other strike characteristics 
(full results in the appendix of the chapter, table 4.A1 and 4.A2).11 In Catalan strikes in 
1912-1915, civil governors increased the probability of a compromise or a complete 
victory by 40 per cent and the probability of complete victories by 67 per cent (graph 
4.2). In the case of mayors, the probability for 1905-1909 in Spanish strikes was 33 per 
cent and 60 per cent in Catalan strikes in 1912-1915, in both cases for compromises and 
victories. Local juntas de reformas sociales and other types of mixed boards of 
employers and workers had more mixed results. In the Spanish strikes of 1905-1909, the 
3 per cent of strikes with the involvement a local junta had a 60 per cent higher 
probability of ending up with a compromise or a victory, while in the Catalan data, their
initiative of the mayor). This does not include the cases in which police or the military stepped in to crush 
strikes or strikers were arrested.
11 Based on a logit regression in which the dependent variable takes value 1 if  the strike was won or 
settled with a compromise. Marginal effects are compared to non-intervention while keeping all variables 
at their sample means.
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impact on the probability of obtaining some gains in the strike was not statistically 
different from 0.
The implication of authorities in the resolution of strikes gave a strategic 
advantage to strikes attracting public notice. Looking at the determinants of state 
intervention in the Spanish strikes of 1905-1909, state officials were more likely to 
intervene in large strikes, with an increase of one standard deviation in the number of 
strikers increasing the probability of the intervention of civil governors by 35 per cent 
(full results in the appendix, table 4.A3). Civil governors were almost four times more 
likely to step in strikes in cities over 50, 000 inhabitants and where the provincial share 
of anti-system vote (vote for Republicans and Socialists) was largest, with an increase in 
one standard deviation in the share increasing the probability of intervention by 87 per 
cent (graph 4.3). Looking at Catalan strikes in 1912-1915, the civil governor was more 
than twice more likely to intervene in Barcelona and in larger than average strikes, with 
an increase in one standard deviation in the number of strikers bringing about a 150 per 
cent increase in the probability that the strike was won, and three times more likely to 
intervene in strikes of unionised workers (graph 4.4).
-t)
Graph 4.2. Factors affecting the probability of winning strikes. Catalan strikes 1912- 
1915.
Note: percentages reflect the change in the baseline probability caused by a change in the relevant 
independent variable of one standard deviation in the variable is continuous or o f passing from 0 to 1 if
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the variable is a dummy variable, while keeping all other variables constant. Coefficients and marginal 
effects presented in the appendix.
Source: Museu Social, Anuari d ’Estadistica Social.
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Graph 4.3. Determinants of the intervention of Civil Governors, 1905-1909.
Note: percentages reflect change in baseline probability. Coefficients used to calculate probabilities from 
a logit regression in which the probability of intervention depends on a series of strike characteristics, 
type of strike issue, the size o f the city.
Source: IRS, Estadistica de huelgas.
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Graph 4.4. Determinants of civil governor intervention, Catalan strikes 1912-1915.
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Note: percentages reflect change in baseline probability. Coefficients used to calculate probabilities from 
a logit regression in which the probability o f intervention depends on a series o f strike characteristics, 
type o f strike issue, if the strike happened in Barcelona and dummy variables for eleven industries.
Source: Museu Social, Anuari d ’Estadistica Social.
In this context, state mediation favoured workers’ collective action in the big 
cities, where the links of the labour movement with radical ideologies were more 
consistent. Cities like Barcelona, Bilbao, Valencia or Zaragoza became the centres of 
labour militancy in the period, where generally granted civil liberties reinforced the 
political outlook of unions and their links with radical republicanism, socialism and 
anarchism. But with employers’ fearing social revolution, radical ideologies also faced 
greater resistance. In addition, in big cities, fast urbanisation and immigration generated
1 9a large pool of strikebreakers which the unions found difficult to control. In fact, 
strikes in big cities and larger than average strikes were less successful than were those 
in small cities and towns. Nevertheless, because a significant part of strikes in large 
urban centres were mediated by civil governors and mayors, this difference was 
substantially reduced or compensated. In order to offer a direct test of this hypothesis, in 
graph 4.5., the “big city” effect is decomposed into an effect on the probability of a 
victory or compromise when there is no government intervention and the effect when 
there is government intervention. In 1912-1915, strikes in Barcelona with no 
government intervention were a 23 per cent less likely to be won with respect to other 
Catalan cities and towns (with no government intervention), while strikes in Barcelona 
where the Civil Governor intervened were a 1.5 per cent more likely than strikes in 
smaller cities (with no intervention) to be settled in favourable terms for workers. The 
effect was larger for strikes in 1905-1909 compared to strike outcomes in cities with 
less than 50,000 inhabitants, with strikes in cities over 100,000 with no government 
intervention a 24 per cent less likely to be settled with a compromise or a victory and 23 
per cent more likely to be settled favourably when there was intervention. Similarly, 
state mediation also diminished the costs associated with large strikes. In regressions 
using the strikes for the years 1912-1915, the doubling of the average number of strikers 
is associated with a decrease in the probability of settling the strike in favourable terms 
for the workers when there is no intervention, but the effect was almost zero when there 
was government intervention.
12 On the presence o f a pool o f migrant workers in the cities willing to act as strikebreakers, Meaker, 
Gerald, The Revolutionary! Left in Spain, 1914-1923 (Palo Alto, CA, 1974), p. 2.
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Graph 4.5. The effect of size of city and doubling the number of strikers on strike 
successes, 1905-1915.
Source: IRS, Estadistica de huelgas; Museu Social, Anuari d ’Estadistica Social.
Notes: Columns 1-2 and 5-6 represent the effect on the probability of winning all or some of the strike 
demands when the strike occurs in a city over 100,000 inhabitants with and without government 
intervention compared to the rest of cities, controlling for other strike characteristics. Marginal effects are 
based on regressions in which the dummy variable “big city” is interacted with the dummy variable “civil 
governor intervention”. Columns 3-4 show the effect of a doubling of average strike size on strike 
success.
4.2, Protecting the freedom to work.
In big cities, strikes became public displays of working class power that necessarily 
brought the authorities into action. Important strikes were preceded by public meetings 
in which collective demands were drawn up and unions leaders rallied workers towards 
the strike. Typically, a strike started in a particular establishment and gradually strikers 
paraded in front of other establishments inviting workers to join the strike. Picket lines, 
where strikers harrassed strike-breakers, also created potential situations of conflict. In 
this context, strikes required public notice and the tolerance of the authorities when 
workers took the streets. State authorities could force recalcitrant employers to accept 
some of the strikers’ demands because employers needed protection from strikers and 
the enforcement of the freedom to work. In this sense, employers’ interests collided
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with civil governors wanting to protect public order and avoiding larger social 
explosions.
For example, in Catalonia, where civil governors and employers were deeply 
divided on matters of public order, civil governors were criticised for being 
governadors a la madrilenya (civil governors in the style of Madrid) because they did 
not handle conflicts firmly enough. In the parliamentary debate over the Barcelona 
general strike in 1902, Catalan deputies blamed the civil governor of Barcelona, Miguel 
Soclas, for having allowed a metal workers’ strike to derive into a general strike. In this 
case, Sodas was accused of acting in connivance with anarchist agitators and not having 
crushed the revolutionary meetings that preceded the general strike. A conservative 
journalist backing the complaints of employers remarked that “the responsibilities of the 
civil governor do (did) not entail meddling in the affairs between workers and 
employers, but only imposing the respect for the law and the liberty to work, the same 
for workers and employers without siding with one or the other.”13 The Catalan 
employer Rusinol interrupted the speech of the Minister of Interior Gonzalez, who was 
defending his civil governor, and manifested that “we (employers) could not visit him; 
we did not trust him (.. .).”14
When the miners’ strike started in Bilbao in 1903, a deputy expressed in 
parliament (Gandarias): “I require the minister of Interior15 (...) to give firm instructions 
to the first civil authority in the province of Biscay (the civil governor) to warrant 
everyone’s rights are respected, especially the right to work for those who want to 
work.”16 Later on, the main employers’ association, the Circulo Mercantil e Industrial 
(Commercial and Industrial Circle), wrote a telegram to some allied deputies demanding 
more protection from the state where it was said: “we beg you to ask the government 
about its position on the incidents which have taken place in Bilbao caused by the strike 
and forcing us to close our establishments (...).” And it was added: “We deplore the 
passivity of authorities.”17 Once the conflict was terminated, an employer confessed to
13 Peris Mencheta, DSC 15th March 1902, p.3919.
14 DSC 27th February 1902, number 130, p.3780.
15 At that time it was the conservative Garcia Alix.
16 Gandarias, DSC 27th October 1903, number 57, p. 1285.
17 Urquijo, DSC 28th October 1903, number 58, p. 1313.
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the Conservative politician Antonio Maura that the strike had ended with “masters being
1 Rsacrificed by an order from the government.”
Similarly, in the large metal workers strike of 1910 in Barcelona, the civil 
governor was accused by a conservative Catalan deputy of having allowed a narrow 
conflict eventually to end up affecting the whole of the trade: “it was a conflict limited 
to a negligible number of workers (...) and in spite of that the civil governor of 
Barcelona, (...), tolerated every class of intimidation.” The deputy went on: “if the civil 
governor had remembered there existed a law on strikes, I am sure that we would not 
have reached today’s situation. I do not doubt that protecting the freedom to work, 
nothing of this would have happened.” According to this account, when the strike was 
declared “the civil governor said he was not going to tolerate violence against those 
willing to work, but that he was going to allow committees of strikers to go to factories 
where the strike was not being supported and to invite workers in those establishments 
to join the strike.” According to this source, “these committees, formed from lists that, I 
have been told, were drawn up in the premises of the Civil Government, were made up 
of 3 or 4 persons, but these committees followed by groups of 200 or 300 (strikers).” 
And it concluded “the general strike has been fed by the civil governor.”19 The situation 
finally prompted employers to express to president Canalejas that: “revolutionary 
meetings where attacks to persons are encouraged (...) go unpunished with the result 
that those who decide to work are attacked on a daily basis. (...) We complain about 
this incitement to crime being tolerated, in spite of being penalised in our laws. The 
non-compliance of these laws is the main contributor to the current state of agitation and 
social anarchy.” But rather than dancing to the tune of employers, state officials 
showed remarkable autonomy. As Soledad Bengoechea put it:
From simple complaints employers moved on to action. The visits to the civil 
governor, Buenaventura Munoz Rodriguez, started multiplying, demanding (...)  a firm 
handling o f strikers and picket lines that did not allow the return to work for those 
wishing to do so. However, in spite of employers’ pressure, Munoz was not willing to use
18 Quoted in Fusi, Politica obrera, p.241.
19 The Spanish sentence is “a los pechos del Gobemador Civil se ha ido amamantando esta huelga 
general.” Ibid., p. 1630.
20 The letter was signed by Economica de Amigos del Pais, Fomento del Trabajo Nacional, Circulo de la 
Union Mercantil, Liga de la Defensa Industrial y Comercial, Camara de Comercio and all the economic 
societies (sociedades economicas) o f Barcelona. In Ibid., pp. 1630-1631.
Chapter 4. Winning strikes. 130
force but rather wanted to arbitrate the conflict trough a negotiation with each of the 
parties. (...).
The attitude o f Munoz was intolerable in the eyes o f employers, but the strike went on 
without being solved. Finally, employers were forced to accept the demands o f the civil 
governor and sit at the negotiating table.21
The history of civil govemoms in Barcelona, the most contentious city in the 
period, shows that before 1919 the ministry of Interior in many cases chose governors 
who did not have an aggressive anti-union stance. Above I have mentioned Miguel 
Sodas and Buenaventura Munoz, both selected by liberal governments. Conservative 
governors include Angel Ossorio in 1907-1909, who, as a lawyer, had defended a group 
of socialist activists and was close to the reformist Conservative politician Gabriel 
Maura Gamazo. Eduardo Sanz Escartin, civil governor of Barcelona during the Silvela 
government, also had well-established reformist credentials. In a letter to the Interior 
Minister Eduardo Dato, Sanz Escartin wrote: “about the strike in Sabadell, (...) I want 
to put you on guard against the peculiar attitude of Mr. Sallares (a prominent 
industrialist of Sabadell and president of Fomento del Trabajo National), who by all 
means tried to force employers to keep their establishments closed, condemning (...) 
more than 12,000 (workers) to starvation. According to him, this decision will punish 
the audacity of workers when they decide to stop working without the consent of 
employers. (...) Sallares not only has acted according to class interest (...) but he has 
also other motivations: his recent (political) defeats in Sabadell have upset him and he 
vaguely hopes, as others do here, that if there are some incidents, a Polavieja
99dictatorship will come.” In another strike in Ripoll (north of Catalonia), stubborn 
employers were also accused of not allowing workers to go back to work. There, the 
civil governor said: “they want us to run over everything, destroying what is in our way, 
to put workers’ councils behind the bars, to beat them up treacherously, if necessary, to 
recognise the employers’ association but not the workers’ union. (...) What employers
9 - 5
in Ripoll want are two battalions in order to show off their power.”
21 Bengoechea, Soledad, Organitzacio patronal i conjlictivitat social a Catalunya (Barcelona, 1994), 
p.105.
22 Quoted in Seco Serrano, Carlos, “Regeneracionismo y tensiones sociales (en tomo al Gobiemo Silvela 
de 1899-1900),” pp.40-41 in Alfonso XIIIy la crisis de la Restauracion (Madrid, 1992). On Polavieja see 
chapter 3. A full treatment in Romero Maura, La Rosa de Fuego, chapter 1.
23 Ibid., p.42.
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Especially during the Liberal governments of 1910-1914, the divide between 
government officials and employers widened. During the 1910 mining strike of Bilbao, 
the minister of Interior complained about “the pitiful unyielding attitude of employers.” 
Later on, president Canalej as threatened to withdraw the troops because it was only “a 
problem caused by some (referring to employers), the fact that troops (were) staying in 
Bilbao (could) not be accepted.” Later on he asserted “if  employers persist in their 
obstination, the government will take definitive solutions.” When the Interior minister 
visited Bilbao to force a conciliatory solution, he encouraged journalists to “convince 
workers they must go back to work because it is (was) absolutely certain that the 
government will solve the conflict, with the certainty that by all possible means the 
government will obtain the immediate reduction of the 10-hour day in August from 
employers.”24 Finally, the minister denounced in Parliament that employers had refused 
any agreement and the arbitration of the Institute of Social Reforms.25
The fact that conciliatory strategies dominated the way government and local 
authorities settled conflicts did not prevent authorities to resort to repression when they 
believed it was necessary to do so. In big cities, the position of unskilled workers in the 
utilities or transports sectors, like tramway or gas workers, was extremely weak because 
authorities crushed their strikes to ensure public order. In May 1901, the Barcelona tram 
workers went out on strike to demand a pay rise and the closed shop. After some 
attempts to turn the conflict into a general strike, strikers were crushed by the military 
on the 8th and 9th of May and a considerable number of arrests were made.26 The more 
modest tram workers’ strike of 1903 also ended up in the authorities protecting strike­
breakers and crushing picket lines. Similarly, in 1903, in a strike of gas workers, most 
strikers were replaced by strike-breakers and more than 350 workers lost their jobs. The
97union, with more than 700 members, was banned by the government. Similarly,
98dockers and coachmen were also replaced by strike-breakers. In Madrid in the early
tfi20 century, the civil governor temporarily closed the Socialist centre of Madrid, which
90had sponsored the unionisation of the gas utilities’ workers. In a similar fashion, in the
24 Quotes from Ibarra, DSC 15th October 1910, number 44, pp. 1177-1179.
25 Merino (Ministro de la Gobemacion), DSC 19th October 1910, p. 1216.
26 Cuadrat, Xavier, Socialismo y  anarquismo en Cataluha (1899-1911). Los origenes de la CNT (Madrid, 
1976), p.74.
27 Sastre, Miguel, Las huelgas de Barcelona, year 1903, ‘Gas Lebon’.
28 Ibid., ‘descargadores’ and ‘carreteros’.
29Morato, Juan Jose, Pablo Iglesias Posse. Educador de muchedumbres (Barcelona, 1968 [1931]), p. 116.
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railways’ workers strike of 1912, the so-called “armband strike”, the government forced 
reservists to work, under threat of a military tribunal and mobilised military engineers to 
keep the railways working.
But nothing antagonised employers and state officials more than the mass 
general strike. Large strikes in big cities and occasional episodes of local general strikes 
in 1901-1902 and 1910-1911 prompted the reaction of state officials and the military 
against labour. In 1901-1902, an important strike movement was led the Regional 
Federation of Workers’ Resistance Societies (FRSOR), organising local general strikes 
in the province of Barcelona and in Gijon, La Coruna, Sevilla, Valencia, Reus, Oviedo
t
or Badajoz, which the government was forced to crush. Later on, in 1911 a general 
strike in Bilbao was followed by sympathy general strikes in Gijon, Zaragoza and 
Valencia, an insurrection in Cullera (Valencia), and strike waves in Oviedo, La Coruna, 
Malaga, Santander, Langreo and Mieres. When the emerging National Confederation of 
Labour (CNT), created in 1910, called for the national general strike to protest for the 
sending of troops to Morocco, the liberal government of Jose Canalejas, which had first 
adopted a conciliatory stance, decided to crush the strike movement.32 At the same time,
'X ^a court in Barcelona outlawed the CNT and all the affiliated unions.
The general strike of Sabadell in 1910 shows the limits of activists’ appeals to 
the mass general strike. There, the local federation of unions had staged a strike against 
Seydoux, a French company that had laid off union workers. In response, the local 
employers’ association, the Union Patronal, ordered a lock-out. The state initially 
adopted a conciliatory stance, while groups of Civil Guards protected some of the 
largest establishments to guarantee the freedom to work.34 Later on, the Interior minister 
visited Sabadell in an attempt to reach an agreement between workers and employers. 
When the minister called the contending parties to a meeting, the president of the
30 Suarez Gonzalez, Fernando, “La huelga de los ferrocarriles de 1912,” in Anes, Gonzalo, Luis Angel 
Rojo and Pedro Tedde (eds.), Historia economica y  pensamiento social (Madrid, 1983), pp.523-538.
31 Diaz del Moral, Juan, Historia de las agitaciones campesinas andaluzas -  Cordoba (Antecedentes para  
una reforma agraria) (Madrid, 1973, originally published in 1928), p. 170. Cuadrat, Socialismo y  
anarquismo, p. 126.
32 See for instance telegram from Canalejas to the civil governor o f Bilbao and intervention o f Azcarate 
and Pujol, from the Institute o f Social Reforms, on the conflict in Asturias, Cuadrat, Socialismo y  
anarquismo, pp.546-547.
33 Diaz del Moral, Historia de las agitaciones, p. 171.
34 In the case of Barcelona: Emiliano Iglesias, DSC 7th November 1910, number 57, p. 1721.
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employers’ association (Union Patronal) did not attend it. Likewise, the Union did not 
accept the arbitration of the Institute of Social Reforms. At this stage, the local 
Federacion declared a general strike, and in some meetings its leaders rallied for a 
revolutionary general strike. This brought about the prompt arrest of its members, the 
closing of union offices and the crushing of demonstrations. During this episode, El 
Progreso, the radical republican newspaper directed by Emiliano Iglesias, published 
the following words: “the workers of Sabadell have suffered all rigours, they have been 
miserably cornered, they have been forced, pushed by a senseless government, to act 
beyond the law, the only alternative they had after the outrageous alliance between 
authorities and employers.”
4.3. The limits of participatory unionism.
The case of Sabadell exemplifies the dialectical relationship between unions and state 
authorities and the potential dangers brought about by strategic interaction with state 
officials. As results in the previous section show, large, well publicised strikes in big 
cities had the greatest chance of obtaining state support and winning concessions from 
employers. This required tolerance on the part of authorities towards unions meetings, 
strikers’ parades and picket-lines. Participatory strikes, however, occasionally bordered 
on social revolution antagonising state officials and employers alike.
But at least until 1915, participatory unionism was a winning strategy preparing 
the ground for the rise of the National Confederation of Labour (CNT) in Catalonia, the 
Levant and Andalucia. The CNT success in Barcelona in 1918-1919 sent their leaders 
on a mission around Spain to publicise the benefits of revolutionary syndicalism. The 
payment of union dues was symbolical because “the Catalan worker has always rejected 
strike funds, because he believes strike funds numb his eagerness to struggle.” To the 
question of how were strikes sustained without strikefunds, it was added “in Catalonia, 
workers pay weekly dues of 20, 25 or 30 cents; but we have devoted ourselves to
n n
promote the spirit of solidarity among workers.”
35 On Emiliano Iglesias, see chapter 3.
36 Quoted in Bertran y Musitu, DSC 11th November 1910, number 61, p .1889.
37 Pestana, Angel, “El Sindicalismo en Cataluna,” p.366, in Trayectoria sindicalista (Madrid, 1974). 30 
cents was about 1-2 per cent of the average weekly wage in Barcelona.
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But Catalan unions were not the only ones to practice co-perative resistance. 
Large cities like La Coruna, Oviedo, Gijon, Zaragoza, Valencia and the smaller towns 
of the province of Cordoba also had vibrant local federations organised by anarchists in
tH 1 0the early 20 century. The reformist unionism practiced by the General Workers’ 
Union (UGT) did not differ substantially in the important urban and industrial 
concentration of Bilbao, where socialist activists co-ordinated four general strikes 
between 1890 and 1911.
The burst in strikes in 1918-1919 decisively widened the divide between 
employers and state officials. In Barcelona, believing themselves unprotected from 
riotous workers, employers finally organised private police forces and supported the 
military in their firmer handling of strikes. After a second general strike in 1919, the 
civil governor was suspended and the military governor Milans del Bosch took charge 
without the consent of the government. With the support of the military and with 
constitutional guarantees suspended in the city, employers launched a full scale attack 
on the CNT. An eight-tousand strong armed militia of armed citizens, the Somaten, was 
formed to supplement the police. Employers staged a 84 days long lock-out from 
November 1919 to late January 1920. Shortly after, private gangs supported by 
employers were engaged in the elimination of some of the most prominent union leaders 
like Salvador Segui, Valerio Boal or the lawyer Francesc Layret.40 The Barcelona 
employers’ Federation (Federacion Patronal) declared that:
Since the police in Barcelona has repeatedly shown its inability to stop coercions and 
attacks on employers and free workers (obreros litres'), we have agreed upon the 
creation o f a private police force that will overcome these deficiencies and become the 
protector o f lives that are constantly being threatened (.. .).41
38 A brief summary o f developments in Spain: Diaz del Moral, Agitaciones campesinas andaluzas, pp. 
170-172.
39 Martin, The agony, p. 216.
40 The best account o f the Barcelona lock-out in Bengoechea, Soledad, El lock-out de Barcelona.Els 
precedents de la dictadura de Primo de Rivera (Barcelona, 1998). Accounts o f the period by 
contemporaries: a list o f murdered syndicalists is given in Manent Pesas, Joan, Records d ’un sindicalista 
llibertari catala (Paris, 1976), pp.60-64; on the Sugar Boy, Foix, Pere, Apdstols i mercaders. Seixanta 
anys de lluita social a Catalunya (Barcelona, 1976 [Mexico, 1957]), pp.51-120; on Martinez Anido and 
Arlegui, Solano, E.G., ^El ocaso del sindicalismo? Segunda pan e de El sindicalismo en la teorlay en la 
practica (Barcelona, 1933).
41 Quoted in Bengoechea, Organitzacio patronal, p.210.
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Tolerated by the weak late-Restoration governments, it was the employers and 
the military in open revolt the ones who were to repress more decidely the CNT in 
Catalonia, while the government alternated between hesitant conciliatory and repressive 
policies.42 Open class warfare finally led the economic and political elites in Barcelona 
to support a military dictatorship to handle “the bolshevik threat”. As Francesc Cambo, 
leader of the Catalan Lliga Regionalista and representative of the Catalan high 
bourgeoisie, admitted outspokenly:
The Spanish dictatorship was bom in Barcelona and was the product o f the ambiance o f  
Barcelona where syndicalist demagogy possessed an intolerable intensity and chronicity.
All the normal ways of defending the society and all the conventional measures o f  
government have failed to cope with this syndicalist demagogy. (...)  A society in which 
the demagogic avalanche puts in grave danger ideals and interest would submit itself to 
anything in order to feel protected. ( ...)  The instinct of life and defence would be given 
first priority, and the troubled society would clamour for a dictator, it would demand him 
unconditionally; it would not even ask him to serve or respect its ideal. It would only ask 
him to maintain order, to secure the possessive state, (...), or a degree o f civilization that 
the demagogic surge threatens to devour.43
42 On policies of the civil governors: Martin, The agony, pp. 218-224; Balcells, El sindicalismo, pp. 67- 
81.
43 Francesc Cambo, translated by and quoted in Ben-Ami, Shlomo, Fascism from above. The Dictatorship 
ofPrimo de Rivera in Spain, 1923-1930 (Oxford, 1983), p. 34.
Chapter 4. Winning strikes. 136
APPENDIX.
In table 4.A1. 1 present the results based on a logit regression on the Catalan strikes with 
the dependent variable taking value 1 for victories and compromises and 0 when none 
of the strikers’ demands was conceded. Independent variables include strike 
characteristics like strike duration, the number of strikers, the strike participation rate 
(the ratio between strikers and employees in the struck establishments) and average 
establishment size in the sector. Dummy variables are added taking value 1 if the strike 
was organised by a union and if an employer’s association existed in the sector. 
Furthermore, additional dummy variables are included to control for the types of issue 
motivating the strike (strike over wages, hours, re-admission of workers, unionshop, 
multiple, with the control group being other demands), for unobserved industry 
characteristics (12 categories), for each year and to control for differences between 
Barcelona and other towns. Finally, the probability of winning the strike to vary is 
allowed to vary if there was intervention of the civil governor, the mayor or a local joint 
commission (the control group is no intervention). Model 1 and model 2 in table 4.A1., 
compromise and complete victories take value 1, while in model 3 and model 4 only 
complete victories do so.
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Table 4.A1. Factors affecting the probability of winning strikes, 1912-1915 (logit).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variables Mean Coeff Mg Coeff Mg Coeff Mg Coeff Mg
Effect Effect Effect effect
Dependent variable 0.57
0.36
Constant 1 0.39 0.9 0.49 0.08
Log (days on strike) 2.2 -0.263 -15.5 -0.273 -0.283 -0.23b
Log(strikers) 4.15 -0.01 0.12 -0.16° -0.08
Log(strike participation rate) -0.29 0.45c 11.03 0.41c 0.29 0.02
Log (establishment size) -0.29b -0.07
Union (Yes=l) 0.81 0 .88b 53.46 1.093 0.82b 1.0 l b
Employers’ association 0.46 -0.05 -2.39 -0.08 -0.16 -0.3
(yes=l)
In Barcelona (city) (yes=l) 0.49 -0.44 -0.51 0.01 0.11
Civil governor (yes=l) 0.18 0 .88b 43.57 0.78b 37.32 0.74c 66.81 0.75b 67.08
Mayor (yes=l) 0.18 1.25a 58.51 1.3a 61.43 0.43 0.46
Junta Local (yes=l) 0.05 0.16 0.01 0.25 -0.05
Type of strike issue (4) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type of industry (11) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province dummies (3) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log L -181 -158 -172 -150
Chi-Squared 67.64 66.81 67.38 62.28
% correctly classified* 71.97 72.03 69.43 69.45
Number of observations 315 277 315 277
Notes: superscripts a,b, and, c indicate statistical significance at better than 1, 5 and 10 per cent in two sided z- 
tests. Marginal effects measure the percentage change on the estimated baseline probabilities caused by one 
standard deviation change in each particular’s variable mean, holding all other variables at their sample means. 
The estimated marginal effects of the dummy variables are changes from 0 to 1. Marginal effects in italics are 
significant at standard levels o f significance.
*correctly classified at cut-off probability = 0.5. _________________________________________________________
Overall signification of the regressions is satisfactory, with only 30 per cent of 
the observations assigned to the wrong category (the model predicts probabilities higher
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than 0.5 to observations that take value 1 in 70 per cent of the cases). The negative 
coefficient on the number of days shows how the probability of winning the strike 
declined as the strike grew longer; a result that makes intuitive sense. Furthermore, 
another expected result is that the probability of winning the strike increased with the 
strike participation rate. In addition, establishment size is negatively related to the 
probability of settling the strike on favourable terms. Union workers have a much 
larger probability of winning the strike, with an increase in the baseline probability of 
53 per cent with respect to non-union strikes. Employers’ associations, on the other 
hand did not have much of an impact on the settlement of the strike, with negative, but 
small and statistically insignificant coefficients. Moving on to the type of settlement, the 
available conciliation procedures (civil governor, mayor, junta) are superior alternatives 
to the absence of third party intervention, keeping all other things constant. However, 
the civil governor and the mayor have a larger effect on the probability of settling the 
strikes on favourable terms, while the coefficient of the junta, if positive (but small) in 
most specifications, has a large standard error (mainly because there are only 16 
observations taking value 1). Mayors increased the probability of obtaining a 
compromise, controlling for all the other variables, by 60 per cent, while the 
contribution to complete victories could not be distinguished from 0. Civil governors 
increased the probability of obtaining a victory or a compromise by about 40 per cent 
and the probability of a complete victory by 67 per cent. Note that the favourable 
mediation of the civil governor not only generated compromises but also had a large 
effect on the probability that strikers obtained all their demands. This suggests the civil 
governor was not creating compromises from possible victories. Using Spanish strikes 
in the years 1905-1909, the impact of civil governors was also substantive, with an 
increase in the baseline probability of winning the strike. Results from a very similar 
regression are presented in column 1 table 4.A2.
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Table 4.A2. Factors affecting strike outcomes, 1905-1915 (logit).
Strike outcomes. Strike outcomes.
1905-1909 [11 1905-1909 T21
Mean: 0.5 Victories onlv
Mean: 0.34
Variables Means Coeff Mg eff Coeff Mg eff
Constant 1 1.69*** j J2***
Log (days on strike) 2.29 _q 4 *** -25.84 -0.46***
Log(strikers) 3.81 -0.07 -0 .2 ***
Log(strike partipation rate) -0.45 0.48*** 17.69 0.45***
City 10,000-25,000 0.17 0.22 0.37
City 25,000-50,000 0.09 0.03 -0.3
City 50,000-100,000 0.08 -0.14 0.1
City over 100,000 0.4 -0.41* 0.01
Civil governor (yes=T) 0.17 0.69*** 40.71 1.1*** 95.52
Mayor (yes=l) 0.11 0.56* 32.86 0.35
Junta Local (yes=l) 0.03 0.99* 57.38 0.48
Type o f strike issue (5) Yes Yes
Type of industry (15) Yes Yes
Year dummies (4) Yes Yes
Region dummies (3) Yes Yes
Log L -328.43 -294.3
Chi-Squared 102.83 113.54
% correctly classified**** 67.15 74.82
Number of observations 548 548
Notes: ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the better than 1, 5 and 10 per cent 
in two-sided z-tests. Marginal effects measure the percentage change on the estimated 
baseline probabilities caused by one standard deviation change in each particular’s 
variable mean, holding all other variables at their sample means. The estimated 
marginal effects o f the dummy variables are changes from 0 to 1. Marginal effects in 
italics are significant at standard levels o f significance.
Region dummies: Mediterranean, South, North, with control group being the two 
Castiles.
****cut-0ff probability^.5.
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In order to understand the determinants of state intervention, it is necessary to 
analyse what forces drove the civil governor to step in a conflict and arbitrate the strike. 
In table 4.A3,1 look at the determinants of strike mediation by the civil governor using 
both the IRS data for 1905-1909 and the data compiled by the Museu Social. I consider 
as independent variables a series of strike characteristics -days on strike, the number of 
strikers, the participation rate (strikers/employed)-, institutional characteristics like if 
there was a union or an employers’ association, and controls for the size of the city, the 
share of anti-system vote (measured by the results on the 1907 general election) and a 
dummy variable taking value one if the strike happened in Barcelona.44
44 Data on share of Socialist and Republican vote from Martinez Cuadrado, Elecciones y  partidos 
politicos, 1868-193 (Madrid, 1968), volume 2.
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Table 4.A3. Factors affecting government intervention in strikes, 1905-1915 (logit).- ------ w ----- *** ---------------------------------------------------
Intervention in 
Strikes. 1905-9. T21
Intervention in 
strikes, 1912-15 T31
Variables Means Coeff Mg eff Coeff Mg eff
Dependent variable (0.17) (0.18)
Constant 1 _3 4 9 *** -7 64+++
Log (days on strike) 2.29 -0 .21 ++ 0.17
Log(strikers) 3.81 0.23++ 35.29 0.62+++ 151.67
Log(strike partipation rate) -0.45 0.31 -0.01
Share antisystem vote in 1907 0.11 13%*** 86.76
City 25,000-50,000 0.09 0.67
City 50,000-100,000 0.08 ' 1.08++
City over 100,000 0.4 0.76++ 260
Strike in Barcelona (yes=l) 0.49 1.03++ 159.5
Civil governor (yes=l) 0.17
Mayor (yes=l) 0.11
Junta Local (yes=l) 0.03
Union-employers 0.14
Union workers (yes=l) 0.81 1.15**
Employers’ association 0.46 0.45
(yes=l)
Type of strike issue (5) Yes Yes
Type of industry (11) Yes Yes
Year dummies (4) Yes Yes (3)
Region dummies (3) Yes Yes*****
Log L -191.52 -95.77
Chi-Squared 122.39 105.94
% correctly classified++++ 85.77 81.3
Number of observations 548 315 .
Notes: ♦♦♦, ♦♦, * indicate statistical significance at the better than 1, 5 and 10 per cent in 
two-sided z-tests. Marginal effects measure the percentage change on the estimated baseline 
probabilities caused by one standard deviation change in each particular’s variable’s mean, 
holding all other variables at their sample means. The estimated marginal effects o f the 
dummy variables are changes from 0 to 1. Marginal effects in italics are significant at 
standard levels o f significance.
***** 4 provincial dummies, ♦♦♦♦cut-off probability=0.5.
Chapter 4. Winning strikes. 142
Looking at the determinants of state mediation in strikes, the civil governor 
tended to mediate the dispute in larger than average strikes. In the case of the Spanish 
data for the period 1905-1909, an increase in one standard deviation in the number of 
strikers increases the probability that the state stepped in the dispute by 35 per cent. For 
Catalonia, the effect of strike size on the probability of intervention is substantially 
larger, with a marginal effect of 152 per cent for every standard deviation. On the other 
hand, the civil governor only mediated in the main cities of the province and it was in 
Barcelona where he was more active, with 159 per cent higher probability of arbitrating 
the strike with respect to other Catalan cities. Considering the Spanish data, the civil 
governor tended to intervene more in cities with a population greater than 100, 000 
(almost 4 times more likely) and where the share of anti-system vote was larger (vote 
for Republicans and Socialists in the 1907 general election), with a one standard 
deviation increase in anti-system vote increasing the baseline probability by 87 per cent.
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Part II. Workplace public goods.
Chapter 5.
The shortening of the workday from the mid 1880s to 1920.
5.0. Introduction.
The first First of May in Spain was celebrated in 1890. The main aim of the protest was 
to obtain the eight-hour day with its familiar white flags with three eights painted in 
black: “eight hours for work, eight for sleep, and eight for whatever we want.”1 In spite 
of the extraordinary importance of the short hour movement in Spain and the evidence 
pointing to a decline of the workday and working week until 1936, there are no 
systematic studies explaining the historical experience of the decline of the workday in 
this country. One of the aims of the chapter is to describe the decline and put forward 
some hypotheses about the factors explaining the shift in the number of hours supplied 
in early 20th century Spain.
In the international literature, the analysis of the number of hours workers supply 
to the market has attracted a great deal of attention. First, because it has implications for
tViworkers’ welfare and living standards as leisure has been increasing during the 20 
century. With a working year of approximately 290 days, workers in early twentieth 
century Spain supplied some 2,900 hours per year. In long-hours sectors like the textile 
industry, workers supplied well above 3,000 hours. In contrast, in 1997 the average 
Spaniard worked yearly 1,809 hours according to the International Labour Office. 
Therefore, the secular decline in the number of hours of work is in the range of 40 per 
cent. Second, changes in the amont of time devoted to work also have important
1 Depiction of an early 1st May protest in Eugeni d’Ors, Glosari (Barcelona, 1990), p.300, original article 
published in “La Veu” on the 5th October 1919.
2 This figure is based on calculations for the number o f working days in the area o f Barcelona in the 
1910s. To a year of 365 days, 52 Sundays are subtracted. Then there were 7 holy days that did not fall on 
a Sunday (for instance, Maundy Thursday), there were 3 additional days for the town’s festival {fiesta 
mayor) and 15 other festivities. Of these 18 additional non-working days, it is assumed 3 fall on a 
Sunday. This calculation gives a working year o f 291 days.
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implications regarding inequality trends if workers at different income levels supply 
different number of hours to the market. Therefore, estimates on income inequality 
based solely on earnings under- or overestimate the inequality in individual welfare. 
Finally, the study of the workday also offers a fundamental case study of the effects of 
unions and collective bargaining on labour market outcomes. As unions take into 
account the preferences of more long-term, skilled workers with a preference for short 
hours, the effect of unions’ collective bargaining will be a reduction of the working 
week.4
5.1. The historical evolution of the workday in Spain.
The 1880s:
The first systematic, albeit incomplete, source of information on the working day was 
the evidence collected and published by the Comision de Reformas Sociales during the 
1880s. The Comision was created in an effort to produce the first enquiry into the state 
of the working class.5 Responses to group XIII of the questionnaire, “Hours of work,” 
provide some observations on the number of hours worked in different Spanish towns 
and in different occupations. The information is divided into different types of material. 
First, provincial commissions were created in which responses to the questionnaire were 
discussed publicly and this material was published verbatim. Second, unions, local 
authorities, or even academics, doctors, or lawyers, could also send their responses to 
the questionnaire. Because the questions were so specific and the questionnaire was so 
long, not all questions were answered and some of them asked the respondent to gather 
costly information, which, in some cases, was impossible to summarise in one statistic. 
For instance, if one had to know the average number of hours worked in a particular 
trade in which establishments had different time schedules, the entry for the question of 
hours of work was not, say, “9 hours 57 minutes,” but rather “from 8 to 11.” This 
obviously poses a problem for the adequate computation of hours of work. However, on 
the other hand, most responses were followed by comments on the length of the work 
week, the type of work, method of payment, employment of women, use of artificial 
lighting, or the evolution of hours, which make some of them particularly interesting.
3 Costa, Dora L., “The unequal work day: a long-term view.” American Economic Review, 88 , 2 (May 
1998), pp. 330-334. Costa, Dora L., “The wage and the length of the work day: from the 1890s to 1991.” 
Journal o f Labor Economics, 18, 1 (2000), pp. 156-181.
4 Freeman, Richard and James Medoff, What do unions do? (New York, 1984), p. 44.
5 1 have discussed the literature on the Comision in chapter 2.
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Another problem is the geographical coverage of the information, which is quite 
extensive for Madrid, Valencia and Alicante, but is much poorer for other regions, 
especially for Catalonia, which neither answered the full questionnaire nor organised the 
provincial commission.6 However, some patterns can be detected that I expose below.
In most sectors the hours of work were determined by the hours of sunlight. 
Accordingly, hours varied almost five hours between summer and winter. This was 
obviously true for agricultural workers, but also for many urban. Work in summer 
generally started at about 6:00 AM and ended at around 8:00 PM with an hour for 
breakfast and two or two and a half for lunch -from noon to 2:00 PM. In winter, work 
started at 7: 00 AM and generally finished at 5:00 or 5:30 PM, with generally a shorter 
lunch break. Time schedules thus varied from seven to eight hours in winter to eleven or 
twelve in the summer and about ten in autumn and spring.
Building construction workers in Madrid worked on average ten hours, but as
one of their representatives recognised in front of the Comision, they worked only with
sunlight, or in Spanish ‘We sol a soF (from dawn to dusk) and were paid a daily rather
than hourly wage.7 In summer, the period of rest at mid day was a bit longer, which
allowed for a nap after lunch (siesta). In Valencia, according to the local federation of
unions, building construction workers worked ‘We sol a soV\ about thirteen hours in
summer and nine in winter. Since these figures, contrary to common practice, included
the time for breakfast and lunch, generally from two hours to two hours and a half, the
effective number of hours of work was about eleven in summer and seven in winter,
with an average of about nine during the year. The Ateneo (the local workers’ council)
noted that building construction workers in Valencia had recently obtained a reduction
£
of the workday from their employers. Similarly, building construction workers in 
Barcelona also reduced their average workday from 11 to 10 hours without a cut in 
pay.9 In Sueca (province of Valencia), the average workday for the trade was ten
6 There is however information on hours for a wide array of sectors for Mataro (province o f Barcelona), 
where the conditions o f work could not have differed much from the ones prevailing in Barcelona.
7 Santiago Castillo (ed.), Informacion oral y  escrita de la Comision de Reformas Sociales, Tome I, 
Villegas, Sociedad de Canteros, p. 106.
8 Ibid., tome III, “Memoria de la Comision Provincial de Valencia,” p. 106.
9 Ibid., tome II, “Contestation Corporaciones,” “Grupo XIII. Horas de Trabajo,” Jose Rodriguez Mourelo, 
p .141.
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hours.10 In Ontinyent (in the province of Alicante) the average ranged between ten and 
eleven hours.11
Carpenters, who generally worked alongside building construction workers and 
in some cases belonged to the same union, also worked about the same number of hours
1 9with the same differences between summer and winter hours: an average of ten in
Madrid, nine in Valencia, ten in Sueca (Valencia) and from ten and a half to eleven in 
Ontinyent (Alicante). Quarry workers also worked only with sunlight and their hours of 
work, according to one respondent from Madrid, were “from ten to eight, depending on 
the season.” He also added that, in the case of quarry workers, “these hours are rather
1 9common in our country and only vary depending on the season.” Quarry workers in 
Valencia, like the rest of the building trades, had shortened their average workday from 
ten to nine hours.
In contrast to the traditional determination of the hours of work, workshops and 
factories worked longer hours in winter. Artificial light allowed for an extension in the 
hours of work in winter to ten or more and regularised the number of hours between 
winter and summer. In winter, workers extended their work during the night to about 
seven or eight pm In Spanish, working during the night was called velar, which means 
“keeping awake voluntarily during the night.” The pattern seems to be that the hours of 
vela were about two or three in winter and only surpassed this number in exceptional 
circumstances when a job needed to be finished. In Oviedo (Asturias), an observer 
remarked “the most common average number of hours is ten. In winter, some 
workshops reduce the workday to nine hours and a half and workers lose a day of pay 
per month during four months. In other cases, work continues through the night until the 
ten hours are completed.”14 However, in Valencia, the velada apparently was not so 
common. Vives Mora, representing the local federation of unions, claimed that the 
extension of the workday in winter was “not known, except in the case of typographers,
10 Ibid., tome III, “Informe del Ateneo Sueco del Socorro,” p.372.
11 Ibid., tome III, “Memoria de la Comision Provincial de Valencia,” p. 106, “Informe de la Comision 
local de Onteniente,” p.274.
12 Ibid., tome II, Contestacion Corporaciones, Grupo XIII, “Horas de Trabajo,” Jose Rodriguez Mourelo, 
p. 141.
13 Ibid., tome II, Contestacion Corporaciones, Grupo XIII, “Horas de Trabajo,” Jose Rodriguez Mourelo, 
p. 141.
14 Ibid., tome V, information oral Oviedo, p.450.
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and among these, only these who work in newspapers’ prints. In the remaining trades, if 
artificial light is used, it is only to complete the scheduled hours of work.”15
Workers in the printing trades had a regular work schedule of 10 to 11 hours, 
which included about 2 hours of vela in winter. A bookbinder from Madrid noted “in 
my trade, we work ten hours, from 8:00 am to 1:00 pm and from 2:00 pm to 7:00 pm; in 
winter, when it gets dark (...) we light the lamp.”16 In Albacete, typographers worked
1 710 hours, and reported they had won a shorter workday in a recent strike. In Almeria,
1 ftthey used to work twelve hours. In Oviedo, typographers worked generally eleven 
hours, and sometimes twelve.19 In Castellon, the norm was ten hours and a half. In 
Avila, the usual workday for the printing trades was about 10 hours, as in Barcelona,
7HMadrid, Cuenca, Guadalajara, Navarra, Palencia, Segovia, Valencia, and Vizcaya. In 
Huelva, Leon, Malaga, or Sevilla, nine hours were the usual.21 Only Logrono records a 
work day of eight hours for the printing trades. Apparently, typographers employed in 
newspapers’ prints had a more irregular work schedule and worked longer at night,
77while they also earned higher wages.
The vela was also very common in other sectors. Bakers and millers were known 
to work continuously day and night in shifts of approximately ten hours.24 In the case of 
workshop carpenters (carpinteros de taller), shoemakers, tailors, or cabinetmakers, the 
supply of hours of work was regular throughout the year, including two or three hours
j r  r
of vela from November to February. In the province of Avila, tailors, shoemakers, and
76workshop carpenters worked about 10 hours. In the province of Barcelona, 
cabinetmakers worked ten hours, whereas shoemakers and tailors supplied eleven hours
15 Ibid., tome III, Informacion oral Valencia, p. 174.
16 Ibid., tome I, Ordonez, encuademador Madrid, p.225.
17 Comision de Reformas Sociales, Contestacion del interrogators formulado p o r la Comision de 
Reformas Sociales sobre la limitacion de las horas de trabajo y  extracto de los datos y  observaciones 
referentes al grupo XIII del cuestionario 1884 'Horas de Trabajo’ que se encuentran en las 
infoimaciones practicadas en ese aho (Madrid, 1891), p.70.
18 Ibid., p.71.
19 Castillo, Informacion, tome V, informacion oral Oviedo, p.450.
29 Comision, Contestacion, p.73, p.80, p.84, p.86 , p.88 , p.91, p.98.
21 Ibid., pp.84-85, p.89, p.92.
22 Ibid., p.86 .
23 Castillo, Informacion, tome I, p.144; tome III, p.174; tome V, p.35.
24 Ibid., tome V, memoria Comision local de Navarra, p.202; tome III, Memoria Comision provincial de 
Valencia, p. 106.
25 Ibid., tome I, “Contestacion Corporaciones:” Don Jose Rodriguez Mourelo, p. 140.
26 Comision, Extracto, p.72.
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per day.27 In Madrid, shoemakers worked from eight to eleven hours with three hours of
98vela in winter. In Malaga, they worked “during the day and some hours at night.” In 
Navarra, cabinetmakers worked ten hours and half. In Valencia, ten hours were 
common.
Metal workers tended to work continuously in shifts of 10 to 12 hours. A 
blacksmith from Madrid indicated that blacksmiths worked twelve hours a day, with the
90necessary vela in winter. Another observer from Madrid provided a more conservative 
estimate of 10 hours for both trades. As well, he remarked tinsmiths never worked more 
than 10 hours. In Barcelona, tinsmiths supplied 10 hours, foundry workers 10 and a 
half, locksmiths 11 and blacksmiths above l l . 31 In Jaen, the workers in a foundry 
worked 9 hours in winter and 10 hours in summer. Foundry workers in Malaga worked
799 hours. In Valencia, blacksmiths and foundry workers worked 10 hours. In Ontinyent
77(Valencia), they worked from 10 to 11 hours. In Sueca (Valencia), the local Ateneo 
reported 12 hours for foundry workers and 11 for locksmiths.34 In Navarra, an 
establishment reported working from 11 to 12 hours in summer and 13 in winter (from 5 
in the morning to 8 in the evening with a two hour lunch break).35 In Oviedo (Asturias), 
the local Comision informed that the usual shift in metallurgical establishments was
7  r
about 8 to 10 hours. In Gijon (Asturias), metal workers supplied 10 hours during the
77whole year.
Manufacturing workers worked extraordinarily long hours, generally above 
eleven hours in the textile or paper industries. In Navarra, for instance, the local 
Comision affirmed that “only industrial workers work during the night in winter,”
78referring to the traditional hours of vela from November to February. In these sectors,
27 Ibid., p.73.
28 Ibid., p.86 .
29 Ibid., tome I, Contestaciones particulares de Madrid, Sociedad de Socorros Mutuos de Herradores, 
p.486.
30 Ibid., tome I, Jose Rodriguez Moruelo, p. 141.
31 Comision, Extracto, p.73.
32 Ibid., p.84, p.87, p.96.
33 Castillo, Informacion, tome III, Onteniente, informe operararios herreros, p.277.
34 Ibid., tome III, Sueca, informe del Ateneo Sueco del Socorro, p.372.
35 Ibid., tome V, informe del Sr. D. Jenaro Mendia, dueno de la fabrica de hierro “Las dos hermanas,”
p.294.
36 Ibid., tome V, informe de la Comision local de Oviedo, p.374.
37 Ibid., informacion oral de Oviedo hecha en el Ateneo Casino Obrero de Gijon per el socio D. Fernando
Garcia Arenal, p.396.
38 Ibid., tome V, Memoria Comision Local Navarra, p.202.
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factories sometimes operated continuously with day and night shifts in order to 
minimise the increased costs of idle fixed equipment. However, this was still an unusual 
alternative and was only implemented in factories using water power, which tended to 
work less days during the year. Continuous operation was generally organised with two 
different 12 hour shifts that alternated every week or every month. There were two 
shifts of 12 hours each, with half an hour and one hour breaks. It was common that 
workers organised shifts so as to keep the machinery going on while meanwhile some 
could eat and rest (the so-called relevos)?9 Factories that organised day and night shifts 
generally ran longer hours. One of the reasons was the strong resistance to a shortening 
of shifts below 11 to 12 hours, when two shifts were in operation. Further reductions 
required either three identical shifts of eight hours or a combination of three shifts with 
different hours schedules. Any reduction of the workday in factories operating 
continuously therefore forced employers to organise an additional shift of perhaps 
scarce or expensive workers.
Hours in manufacturing rarely varied between winter arid summer. Cotton textile 
workers in Catalonia worked from 66 to 68 hours a week in the spinning, weaving and 
finishing trades, with a workday of about eleven hours.40 In Ontinyent (Valencia), 
manufacturing workers worked from 10 to 11 hours in the cotton and silk textile 
industries, and 10 in the woollen industry (in this case they remarked they worked only 
with sunlight). In Alcoy, an important industrial centre in the province of Alicante, the 
workday for manufacturing workers ranged from 11 to 12 hours and included night 
shifts in some establishments. According to the employers of a factory producing 
woollen cloths, men who tended machinery worked eleven hours and women and 
children nine. In the cases where night shifts were introduced, generally in water driven 
factories, the shift lasted 12 hours. 41 In Valencia, it was noted that “today the average 
workday is about 9 to 11 hours; some industries (translation of ‘industrias’ not of the 
more usual ‘oficios trades), which employ an ever increasing number of women, 
operate for 12 hours or more.”42 In the silk industry, for instance, the average workday 
was 12 hours. In the paper industry, workers supplied ten hours in Ontinyent (Valencia)
39 This practice was denounced in Institute de Reformas Sociales, La Jornada de trabajo en la industria 
textil. Trabajos preparatorios del Reglamento para la aplicacion del Real Decreto de 24 de agosto de 
1913 (Madrid, 1914), p.362.
40 Comision, Contestacion, p.73. Data from Mataro (province o f Barcelona).
41 Castillo, Informacion, tome IV, Informe de la Corporacion de fabricantes de panos, p. 103.
42 Ibid., tome III, Informacion oral Valencia, Sr. Vives Mora, p. 174.
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and “between 7 and 12” in Alcoy depending on the occupation.43 A factory making 
blankets in Palencia worked 11 hours and a half in summer and 11 in winter, with 
artificial light needed from 6pm to 8pm.44
Nevertheless, some examples reveal that the use of artificial lighting and regular 
hours schedules were not always implemented. In the report submitted by the employers 
of a woollen factory in Navarra -Tejeria Mecanica Pamplonesa-, it was stated that their 
factory worked between a maximum of twelve hours in May, June, and July and a 
minimum of eight in November, December, and January, with an average workday 
during the year of about 10 hours. Further, the managers also declared they had 
considered running night shifts or longer hours in winter but that the cost of artificial 
lighting was too high and that it was difficult to organise a second shift of workers.45
Finally, it is important to note that in some cases, these establishments worked 
only periodically, and this was common as well in many trades like for instance the sub­
contracted work for tailors. For example, woollen cloth manufactures in Alcoy did not 
work continuously. As it was said, “in Alcoy, in most factories the work is not perennial 
(literal translation of perenne, which meant that production was regular throughout the 
year).”46
A case in point were the workers paid by the piece, who were known to supply 
irregular but sometimes very long hours of work. This was for instance the case of 
handloom weavers, tailors, women employed in the garment industry, and shoemakers. 
A weaver from Alcoy (Alicante) affirmed he worked from 13 to 14 hours per day when 
he had to finish a piece for an employer.47 When asked about the number of hours in its 
trade the Alcoy local union of weavers responded: “there are no established hours of
Aa
work because this trade works on a piece rate basis.” Shoemakers working in factories 
on piece rates or on a putting out basis from home supplied about 10 to 11 hours per 
day, with two or three hours of vela required in winter. In Madrid, seamstresses and
43 Ibid., tome III, Ontinyent, informe de los operarios de la industria papelera, p.266; tome IV, informe de 
la Union Papelera, p. 105.
44 Ibid., tome V, informacion local Palencia fabricantes de mantas, p.511.
45 Ibid., tome V, informe del senor director de la Tejeria Mecanica Pamplonesa, p.295.
46 Ibid., tome IV, Memoria de la Comision Local de Alcoy, p.63.
47 Ibid., tome IV, informacion oral Alcoy, p.43.
48 Ibid., tome IV, informe de la Sociedad de Tejedores, p.l 19.
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dress makers working by the piece in workshops had a work schedule of ten hours both 
in winter and summer: work started at eight, at twelve there was a lunch break of two 
hours, and then they worked from 2 pm to 8 pm. Furthermore, sometimes the work at 
night could be longer if  a piece had to be delivered and occasionally work on Sunday 
was required -the so-called remate.49 In this trade, some women worked from home, 
about them it was remarked, “they work excessively, some days about twelve hours.”50 
In the silk industry of Valencia, women paid by the piece were reported to work 
fourteen to sixteen hours at times.51
Miners tended to work day and night shifts in all the mining towns except in 
Biscay, where there was not underground mining and hours of work were determined by 
sunlight, i.e. a minimum of 7 to 8 hours in winter and 12 in summer. The chief 
engineer of the Linares mines (Jaen) remarked there were two underground shifts of 
eight hours each: a first shift from 8 in the morning to 4 in the afternoon and another 
from 5 pm to 1 am. When necessary, a third shift was added. A common practice among 
miners was to work two shifts in a row and then rest the whole following day, a practice 
called iendoble\ In the surface, labourers worked from 9 to 10 hours a day depending 
on the season, while machinists worked continuously for 24 hours and then rested a 
whole day.53 In the coal mining region of Asturias, underground shifts of 8 hours were 
also continuous, with six hours of effective work, while surface personnel worked 12 
hours in summer (from the 3rd May to the 14th September) and about 8 in winter.54
Finally, sales and service workers were known to work very long hours under 
very bad conditions and working on Sundays. For instance, waiters in Madrid supplied 
15 hours of work per day, as did the sales workers employed in grocery stores. In 
bookshops the standard workday lasted about 13 hours.55 In Valencia, a respondent 
remarked “the number of hours work supplied by sales workers is unlimited. (...) In the 
stores, personnel commonly work all day until 10, 11 or 12 at night (...). In retail sales, 
counters close at 8 or 9 at night, but there are some additional hours of work (...).” And
49 Ibid., tome I, contestacion Jose Rodriguez Mourelo, p. 140.
50 Ibid., Jose Rodriguez Moruelo, p. 141.
51 Ibid, tome III, Memoria de la Comision provincial, p. 106.
52 Ibid., tome V, informe Comision local de Vizcaya, p.613.
53 Ibid., tome V, informe del ingeniero jefe de las minas de Linares, p. 175.
54 Ibid., tome V, informe de la Comision Local de Oviedo, p.375; informacion oral engineer Gascue, 
p.452.
55 Ibid., tome II, Jose Rodriguez Moruelo, p. 145.
Chapter 5. The reduction o f  the workday. 153
he went on “in Sueca (Valencia) the sales workers start work at five in the morning and 
stop at eleven at night in summer, in winter they start work at six in the morning and 
finish at ten at night; on Sundays they work until noon.” Similarly, “in Alcira (Valencia) 
they work with sunlight and some hours at night, holy days and Sundays they work until 
noon.”56 In La Coruna (Galicia), work typically started at eight in the morning and
rn
ended at ten at night and stores remained open on non-working days until noon. 
Similarly, barbers and hairdressers also had very long work schedules and were known
CO
to work a fair number of hours during the night.
Several patterns can be detected from the evidence on hours of work in the 
1880s. Where hours of work were determined by sunlight, the workday varied by as 
much as three or four hours between winter and summer. In general, hours of work 
fluctuated between 7 or 8 in winter and 11 to 12 in summer, with an average workday 
throughout the year of 9 to 10 hours (table 5.1). Workers in workshops and factories had 
longer hours schedules in winter with two hours of vela from November to February. In 
this case, a more regular work schedule of 10 to 11 hours throughout the year was the 
rule. In manufacturing, winter and summer workdays were similar, with hours of work 
being scheduled above 11 in winter and summer. In mining, underground miners had 
regular work schedules of 8 hours, while surface workers worked 10 hours on average 
following the pattern of hours of work determined by sunlight. Finally, the longest 
hours are observed among retail and service workers in cities.
Table 5.1. Hours of work. 1880s.
Trade Observations. Averages throughout the year.
Building construction workers 10, 9, 10, 10, 10, 10 to 11, 9, 9
Carpenters 10, 9, 10, 10, 10 to 11, 9.
Printing trades 10 to 11, 10, 11, 11, 10 Vi, 9
Workshop carpenters, tailors, cabinet makers, 10, 10 Vi, 11, 10 Vi, 11, 10
shoemakers
Metal workers 10, 10 VS, 11,11 Vi, 9, 10 to 11, 12, 11, 10
Textile and paper industries 11 Vi, 10 Vi, 11 to 12, 12, 11 to 12.
Source: Comision de Reformas Sociales, Informacion oral y  escrita; Comision de Reformas Sociales, 
Contestacion al inteirogatorio.
56 Ibid., tome III, Memoria de la Comision Provincial de Valencia, p. 108.
57 Ibid., tome V, Memoria de la Comision local La Coruna, p.35.
58 Ibid., tome II, p.145, tome III, p. 109.
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The early 20th century.
Evidence on hours of work in the early twentieth century is quite limited. The first 
reports of factory inspectors, which included detailed information on hours of work, 
were not published until 1908 For Catalonia, the evidence on hours and wages 
published in 1899 by Miguel Rente y Cassola, a typographer member of the Ateneo 
Obrero of Barcelona, and the information collected by Miguel Sastre y Sanna on strikes 
in Barcelona from 1903 to 1914 are useful, if incomplete, sources.
Compared to the mid 1880s in the province of Barcelona, the data provided by 
Rente and by Sastre show there were substantial reductions in the hours of work. In 
workshops of male skilled workers, the working day approximately fell by an hour from 
11 to 10 to 9 to 10. In some trades like shoemakers or dyers, workers were already 
demanding the eight hour day. In these sectors, worked started at 6:30 am and ended at 
5:30 or 6:30 pm, with an hour for breakfast and one and half or two hours for lunch, and 
hours of work did not increase in the summer. In sectors in which hours of work 
depended on sunlight, like building construction workers, carpenters, painters, 
bricklayers, quarry workers, and so on, there was a sharp reduction in the hours of work 
to about 7 or 8 in both winter and summer. In the latter season, they no longer had to 
supply long shifts of about eleven to twelve hours. Manufacturing workers, on the other 
hand, were less likely to obtain reductions in the workday. In the textile and garment 
industries, which employed a large share of women, hours of work remained at 11 or 12 
hours. Sales and services workers also kept their long working days above 12 hours 
both in winter and summer. In table 5.2. I compared hour observations for different 
trades in the province of Barcelona using the data of the Comision for 1884 and the data 
gleaned by Miguel Rente in 1899. This table shows many trades obtaining a reduction 
of the working day of one hour between 1884 and 1899.
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Table 5.2. Hours of work in the province of Barcelona, 1884 and 1899.
Trade Comision 1884 Rente 1899 Percentage
change
Bleachers 1 lh  20 min 10 h day -11.5
Dyers 11 h 10 to 11 h -4.5a
Tailors 11 h lOh -9.1
Locksmiths 11 h lOh -9.1
Building construction 10 h 9 h -10
Blacksmiths 11 h 40 min 10 h -14.3
Foundry workers 10 h 30 min lOh -4.8
Tinsmiths 10 h 10 h 0
Sawyers 11 h 20 min 10 h - 11.8
Cabinetmakers 10 h lOh 0
Barrel makers 9 h 9 h 30 min +5.6
Tanners 8 h 30 min 9 h +5.9
Coach-makers 11 h 30 min 10 h -13
Shoemakers 11 h lOh -9.1
Sources and notes: Comision de Reformas Sociales, Contestacion; Rente, Miguel,
La abolicion del salario por la participacion en los beneficios (Barcelona, 1899), 
pp.24-29.
Superscript a: the hours of work chosen were 10 and a half.
By 1901, building construction workers in Barcelona, a trade that included an 
important group of carpenters and painters, already worked an eight hour day after 
having eliminated their extra summer hours. In 1903, Sastre noted: “the hours of work 
supplied by building construction workers are eight since the 18th October of 1901 when 
they won a shorter workday after a strike.” In 1899, Miguel Rente reports a workday of 
9 hours for this trade. The collective contract of 1901 also included a clause for 
overtime. One could argue that the decline in hours was only nominal since overtime 
gave incentive to workers to supply longer hours. However, the building construction 
workers’ union made sure the collective contract forbade overtime above two hours and 
only considered this possibility in these construction works that had started before 
October 1901.59 On the other hand, roofers were reported to work seven hours from 8am 
to noon and from 2pm to 5pm in 1907.60
59 Sastre, Miguel, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1903, “Albaniles.”
60 Sastre, Miguel, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1907, “Yeseros adomistas (constructores de cielos rasos).”
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Similarly, stonecutters commonly worked 7 hours in winter and summer. In 
1903 they led an unsuccessful strike to win a pay rise of four reales, a reduction of the 
workday in establishments that still worked eight hours, the regulation of the number of 
apprentices and the rules governing laying off workers.61 In March 1906, a joint strike 
of stone and marble masons obtained the seven hours day, union recognition, and a 
mixed employers-workers commission. Dockers, on the other hand, worked between 
seven to eight hours. Typically, work started at 6:30 a, there was a rest period from 8 
to 9 am which included breakfast, there was another hour and a half of work from 9 to 
10:30, then a rest of 15 minutes, work continued from 10:45 to noon, lunch took one 
hour and a half, and then they worked from 13:30 to 15:30 and from 15:45 to 17:30.64
Urban trades also obtained further reductions in the hours of work (table 5.3). A 
case in point were carpenters, both in workshops or working alongside building 
construction workers, who obtained the eight hour day in a strike in 1903. The first 
article of the collective contract they signed with their employers established a regular 
eight hour day throughout the year. Work was scheduled to start at 8am, at noon there 
was a two hours lunch break, from April to September, work continued from 2pm to 
6pm, while from October to March, it did so from 1:30pm to 5:30pm or from 1 pm to 
5pm. Article 3 restricted overtime to “exceptional cases, not as a rule,” while article 4 
stipulated overtime work was paid a fifty per cent higher the first two hours and double 
after ten hours on Sundays.65 In sawmills, the common workday was ten hours in 1899 
and nine in 1903. In 1903, of the 370 sawyers employed in Barcelona, only 80 worked 
ten hour shifts. In 1903, they staged a strike to generalise the nine hour day in the trade, 
which they obtained by giving up overtime pay.66 In the same trade, which was 
regulated by a collective contract dating from 1899, lathe operators and workers 
engaged in the construction of beds (“torneros en madera” and “montadores de camas 
torneadas”) also won the nine hour day.67
61 Ibid., “Picapedreros.”
62 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1906, “Marmolistas.”
63 Ibid., “Descargadores de carbon del puerto,” “Descargadores de maderas del puerto,” “Descargadores 
de cereales y demas generos del puerto,” “Lancheros del carbon mineral.”
64 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1904, “Descargadores de los depositos comerciales del puerto.”
65 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1903, “Carpinteros;” very detailed information as well in Las huelgas 
de Barcelona 1905, “Carpinteros.”
66 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1903, “aserradores mecanicos.”
67 Ibid., “tomerors en madera” and “montadores de camas torneadas.” As well in Sastre, Las huelgas de 
Barcelona 1904, “Constructores de sillas y muebles tomeados,” and Las huelgas de Barcelona 1905, 
“torneros y bamizadores.”
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The metal trades were one of the most active in their efforts for a shorter 
working day, leading to the massive strikes of 1902 and 1910 in Barcelona. If in the mid 
1880s their workday was about 10 to 11 hours, by the turn of the century a 10 hour day 
was the norm (table 5.2). Of the foundry workers, Sastre remarked “their main objective 
is obtaining the eight hour day.” However, their strike of 1903 calling for the eight hour 
day was unsuccessful as employers did not even accept nine hours. The collective 
contract for the sector that ended the strike maintained the 10 hour day with overtime
fiO
being paid an additional 50 per cent of the wage. In 1905, Sastre also reported that 
foundry workers supplied ten hours of work, from 6am to 6pm with breaks adding up to 
two hours, and that “in only one or two establishments, the workday is nine hours and a 
half.”69 Among locksmiths the prevalent workday was ten hours, with some but few 
establishments working nine or even eight hours. For these working ten hours, work 
started at 6:30am and ended up at 6:30pm with half an hour for breakfast and one and a 
half hours for lunch.
In the printing trades of Barcelona, the workday was agreed at nine hours, with 
only some marginal establishments running ten hour shifts (in the mid 1880s, the 
printing trades worked on average 10 hours). In 1903, the whole sector in Barcelona 
went on strike to increase overtime pay. Strikers finally obtained an additional 25 per
70cent for normal overtime hours and 50 per cent in the case of Holy days or Sundays. 
According to Miguel Sastre, the main objectives of their union “El Arte de Imprimir” 
was abolishing piece rate work and instituting the eight hour day.71 After 1903, a nine
77hour day was the norm.
Other sectors also experienced substantial reductions in the hours of work. The 
Barcelona shoemakers’ union “La IgualdacT’ staged a strike in 1903 and again in 1906 
to abolish piece rate work and win the eight hour day. In both cases the union failed and 
hours remained at nine hours and a half -from a previous level of 10 hours in 1899- in 
factories and workshops. There, work time was scheduled from 6am to 8am, from 8:30
68 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1903, “fundidores de bronce y otros metales.”
69 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1905, “fundidores de hierro.”
70 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1904, “Cajistas.”
71 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1905, “Cajistas.”
72 For instance, Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1907, “encuademadores y rayadores.”
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to noon, and from 2pm to 6pm in summer; and from 7am to 8am, from 8:30am to noon, 
and from 1:30pm to 6:30 pm in winter.73 In 1904, coach-makers obtained a reduction of 
the workday from ten to nine hours after a 22-week long strike of 500 workers, with the 
first hour of overtime being paid a 25 per cent higher and from then on a 50 per cent.74 
Saddlers tended to work ten or ten and half hours. In 1906, they obtained the nine-hour 
day in a strike. In the collective contract they sent to their employers overtime was
7Sallowed, but forbade it “when there are one or more union members unemployed.” 
Barrel-makers, with a union since 1870, worked nine hours and a half in 1899 (table 
5.2), while in 1905 they were reported to work eight hours. A rule for union members 
stated that their weekly earnings could not go beyond 30 pesetas a week -they were 
paid by the piece-, so when an operative reached this amount, he did not work on 
Saturdays. On that issue, Sastre indicated “they have imposed themselves this restriction
7 f \in order to maximise the number of employed barrel-makers.” In addition, tanners 
supplied nine hours per day in 1899 and 1907.77 Finally, glass workers had a work
78schedule of ten hours in 1907.
In workshops, tailors, hatters and glove makers, worked on average about 10 
hours. Hatters worked from 6 in the morning to 6 in the evening in summer and from 7 
am to 7 pm in winter. Of these workers, Sastre remarked in 1904 “hatters are satisfied 
with their working conditions, their salaries and their hours of work” and that they did
70not have any collective contract signed with their employers. Of glove makers, who 
were paid according to an elaborate piece rate list, it was noted “one cannot tell their 
hours of work because they are paid by the piece.”80 Umbrella makers worked nine 
hours as a rule.81
As in the 1880s, manufacturing workers worked distinctively longer hours. In 
the knitwear industry, women worked 12 hours by 1899. The jute or the woollen cloth
industries, men and women worked for 11 hours. In Barcelona, the cotton textile
73 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1906, “Zapateros;” Las huelgas de Barcelona 1907, “Zapateros.”
74 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1904, “Constructores de carruajes.”
75 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1906, “Guamicioneros y guamecedores de carruajes,” 
“Talabarteros.”
76 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1905, “Toneleros.”
77 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1907, “curtidores.”
78 Ibid., “vidrieros.”
79 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1904, “Sombrereros de plancha.”
80 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1906, “Guanteros.”
81 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1907, “paragueros.”
Chapter 5. The reduction o f  the workday. 159
industry, as in the 1880s, worked eleven hours from Monday to Friday; from 5:30 am to 
6:30 pm with breaks amounting to two hours. On Saturday, factories closed two hours 
in advance to allow for the cleaning of machinery, which took from fifteen to thirty 
minutes, and to collect pay. The whole working week was therefore 64 hours. Some 
factories also organised a night shift of eight hours. As Sastre noted, these conditions of 
work were “uniform across all factories.” According to him, “through an agreement 
between the union “Tres Clases de Vapor” and the patrons, the piece rate workers 
employed in night shifts have experienced an increase of 25 per cent in pay to 
compensate for the their shorter shifts.” In the finishing trades, characteristically 
dominated by skilled male workers, hours of work were shorter, generally ranging from 
9 to 10 hours. Cotton, wool, and silk dyers went on strike in February 1903 to reduce 
their workday from 10 to 8 hours, finally obtaining and successfully implementing the 
nine-hour day. In addition, these workers also got an increase in overtime pay of 0.25 
ptas. In other finishing trades (“cilindradores y  aprestadores”), workers presented a 
collective contract to their employers stipulating a nine hour day, wages in different 
occupations, and overtime pay. On overtime, they stated that “if there are unemployed 
union members, overtime work is forbidden.”84 In this case, strikers could only obtain a 
reduction of fifteen minutes in their hours of work. In 1906, it was reported they worked 
nine and a half hours, from 6:30 to 8:30, 9:15 to 12:30, and 2:00 pm to 6:00 pm.85
Service workers worked the longest hours. Coachmen had work shifts of 13
or
hours with irregular meal times. According to Sastre, bakers, whose main objective 
was abolishing work on Sunday, suffered shifts of 16 hours with short rest periods in 
the middle. In 1904, after a strike, employers conceded a continuous rest period of 24 
hours from seven am on Sunday to seven am on Monday. Dairy workers were reported
87to work from dawn to midnight. Barbers and hairdressers worked 13 hours from 
Monday to Friday and 15 hours on Saturdays. According to Sastre, the objectives of the 
barbers’ union were “obtaining a day of rest on Sunday, limiting the workday from
82 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1905, “Arte fabril.”
83 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1903, “Tintoreros en algodon y seda” and “Tintoreros en lana y  
piezas.”
84 Ibid., “Cilindradores y aprestadores.”
85 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1906, “cilindradores y aprestadores;” as well 9 and a half hours in 
Las huelgas de Barcelona 1907, “aprestadores.”
86 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1903, “carreteros.”
87 Ibid., “dependientes de vaqueria.”
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eight in the morning to eight in the evening with adequate periods for meals, and being
oo
spared the cleaning of the shop.”
To summarise: evidence from the province of Barcelona shows a substantial 
reduction of work took place for some occupations between the mid 1880s and the early 
20th century (table 5.3). That was the case for urban trades, which worked roughly 
between 10 to 8 hours. Manufacturing workers, on the other hand, still worked over 11 
hours except in the male-dominated finishing trades of the textile industry. Service and 
sales workers supplied the longest workday and there are no differences with respect to 
the situation in the 1880s.
iL
Table 5.3. Hours of work in Barcelona, early 20 century
Trade Workday Year o f observation
Building construction 8 1901
Roofers 7 1901
stonecutters 7 1906
Marble masons 7 1906
Dockers 7 to 8 1903
Carpenters 8 1903
Sawyers 9 1903
Lathe operators 9 1899
Metal workers 10 1899
Printing trades 9 1903
Shoe-makers 9 ]/2 1903
Coach-makers 9 1904
Saddlers 9 1906
Barrel-makers 8 1905
Tanners . 9 1907
Glass workers 10 1907
Tailors, hatters, glove makers 10 1904
Knitwear industry 12 1906
Jute and woollen industries 11 1906
Cotton textile (except finishing) 11 1906
Cotton textile (finishing only) 9 '/2 1906
Source: Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona, various years.
88 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona, “Barberos y peluqueros.”
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It is interesting to examine the factors that explain the cross-sectional variation
OQ
in hours among occupations in Barcelona between 1904 and 1909. When analysing 
the variance in hours of work, it is usually considered that the elasticity of the supply 
curve with respect to hourly wage rates is negative because the income effect created by 
rising hourly earnings dominates the substitution effect.90 A formal model of hour 
determination cannot be estimated because observations for many of the required labour 
demand and labour supply variables do not exist. However, the analysis of wage-hours 
pairs is approached here by estimating a relationship in which the hourly wage rate 
depends on the number of hours. The natural step should have been to estimate the 
elasticity of hours with respect to wages as in a labour supply model, but the estimation 
was inverted so as to make results in this section comparable with those of the next. If 
longer hours are related to lower hourly rates, then this is evidence pointing at a trade 
off between hourly wages and leisure. Moreover, the size and sign of the coefficient 
also offers a crude approximation to the market compensation for a longer workday. A 
wage-hours elasticity bigger than -1 (estimated from a group of workers with similar 
characteristics) is consistent the existence of some compensation differential for longer 
hours.91
Using data on working conditions in trades from Barcelona between 1904 and 
1909, information on real wages and union density was gathered for different trades. 
The method is necessarily crude. Occupations were grouped in five different skill and 
demographic categories: overseers and supervisory personnel, male craftsmen and male 
semi-skilled workers, male unskilled, adult women, and apprentices with boys and girls
Q9working in factories. Four dummy variables were constructed covering the trades, 
manufacturing, construction, and a “miscellaneous” category. Then, the natural 
logarithm of the reported hourly wage deflated by the price level is regressed against the
89 In this period (but not in 1903), Sastre included a special appendix on hours o f work and wages in all 
the striking trades o f Barcelona broken down by occupation.
90 Costa, “The wage and the length o f the work day,” p. 163. The study o f 1909-1919 is Whaples, Robert 
“Winning the eight-hour day, 1909-1919 ,” Journal o f  Economic History, L, 2 (June 1990); Atack, 
Jeremy and Fred Bateman, “How long was the workday in 1880?,” Journal o f  Economic History, 52, 1 
(March 1992).
91 Sundstrom, William A. and Joshua L. Rosenbloom, “Occupational differences in the dispersion of 
wages and working hours: labor market integration in the United States, 1890-1903,”
92 Supervisory personnel includes encargados, contrameastres, mayordomos. Semi-skilled and craftsmen 
includes oficiales de primera and oficiales de segunda, male adult occupations in the manufacturing 
sector, barbers. Unskilled includes all peones, mozos, ayudantes. Adult women occupations include semi­
skilled and unskilled positions occupied by adult women, generally recorded as mujeres. “Apprentices” 
groups apprentices o f first, second and third year {aprendices de primer, segundo y  tercer aho).
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logarithm of hours and union density in each of the ‘occupational’ groups. Two 
obvious problems are that union density affects real earnings and hours and that the 
hours affect the hourly real wage if there are compensating differentials. In both cases, a 
problem of endogeneity biases the estimated coefficients. The natural solution would 
have been to attempt to run a two-stage regression, first for hours and then for earnings. 
Unfortunately, an adequate variable to be used as instrument in the first stage regression 
with hours could not be found. A third problem is related to the fact that the effect of 
union density is probably underestimated since only trades that went on strike are being 
considered. The average union density is high -40 per cent-, and this could be a 
problem if the alleged union effect only occurs when passing from very low to higher 
densities. Different thresholds levels for union density (10 per cent, 25 per cent and 50 
per cent) were tried without obtaining significantly different results results.
In table 5.4, alternative specifications of the exercise are shown for the different 
categories of workers. The control group in most regressions is “miscellaneous 
industries” in 1904. However, there were some cases were different control groups were 
used because there were insufficient or no observations in the “miscellaneous” group. 
For example, there were not enough observations for unskilled workers employed in 
“other” industries, so in this case I use the trades as the control group.
93 Consumer price index for the province of Barcelona from Ballesteros Doncel, Esmeralda, “Una 
estimation del coste de la vida en Espana, 1861-1937,” Revista de Historia Economica, XV, 2 (1997).
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Table 5.4. Relationship between hours and waees, 1904-9. Dependent variable: log of 
the hourly real wage.
Overseers and supervisory personnel Semi-skilled and skilled adult male 
occupations
Log (hours) -1.43* -1.36 -0.71** -0.69**
(-1.72) (-1.55) (-3.05) (-2.94)
Union density -0.66 0.23
(0.64) (0.44)
Sector dummies
Trades -0.22 -0.24 0.138** 0.217**
(-1.99) (-1.91) (2.3) (2.91)
Construction -0.33 -0.327 0.207** 0.293
(-1.62)* (-1.62) (2.45) (2.87)
Manufacturing 0.12 0.11 0.001 0.013
(0.91) (0.82) (0.024) (0.17)
Year Dummies Yes (4) Yes (4) Yes (5) Yes (5)
Constant -1.95 -2.18 -4.0 -4.05
(-1.04) (-1.07)) (-7.37) (-7.08)
Adj-R-Sq 0.28 0.28 0.37 0.38
N 36 36 247 247
Unskilled male occupations______________ Aduhwomen_occugations_
Log (hours) -0.93** -1.075* 0.81 0.91*
(-2.04) (-1.77) (1.54) (1.69)
Union density -0.16 -0.163
(-0.76) (-1.29)
Sector dummies
Trades
Construction -0.36** -0.37**
(-3.02) (2.89)
Manufacturing -0.23 -0.24 -0.101 -0.15
(-1.43) (-1.42) (-1.27) (-1.56)
Year Dummies Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (4) Yes (4)
Constant -3.56** -3.11 -8.04** -8.2
(-3.41) (-2.2) (-6.79) (-6.84)
Adj-R-Sq 0.31 0.32 0.03 0.04
N 42 42 87 87
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Apprentices
Log (hours) -2.53** -2.29**
(-4.67) (-3.9)
Union density 0.13
(0.86)
Sector dummies
Trades 0.13 0.11
(0.64) (0.52)
Construction -0.2 0.22
(-0.95) (-1.01)
Manufacturing 0.41* 0.42*
(1.72) (1.68)
Year Dummies Yes (5) Yes (5)
Constant -1.38 -1.97
(-1.22) (-1.56)
Adj-R-Sq
N
0.21
106
0.21
106
Notes: White-heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Control group 
is “miscellaneous” and “1904” except in these cases where there were no 
observations in one or both groups. In the case o f “adult women occupations 
there were no observations in “construction” and “other”,
“trades” was the control group. Absolute t-statistics in parentheses.
** significant at less than 5 % levels.
* significant at less than 10 %.
The hypothesis of a significant negative relationship between the hourly wage 
and hours receives support from the data in male occupations. For all groups, longer 
hours are associated with lower hourly rates and the coefficients are robust to the 
inclusion of the union density variable. Coefficients for overseers, unskilled workers 
and apprentices are negative, significant at standard levels and generally smaller than or 
close to -1, suggesting the market did not compensate workers for longer hours. Only 
for skilled and semi-skilled workers the value of the coefficient is bigger than -1, while 
semi-skilled female workers get positive coefficients. The main reason for the observed 
pattern of wages and hours is that women enjoyed higher wages in the long-hour, low- 
union density manufacturing sectors, especially in the cotton textile industry. A positive 
coefficient also suggests the premium for long hours was substantial. In the textile 
industry, piece rate female workers earned the same as men, in many cases over 4 
pesetas a day, when the average wage for women was 2.4 pesetas (unweighted average 
of all female occupations). The historical literature on gender and unions’ policies has 
not been developed so far, but the sorting of women towards the long-hours
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manufacturing sectors can be explained by entry restrictions to the skilled trades, while 
employment opportunities existed in the manufacturing sector as semi-skilled workers.94
While a formal labour supply model could not be estimated, the negative 
correlation between hours and wages found in the data for Barcelona suggests the 
elasticity of the labour supply was negative and that workers enjoying higher wages 
wanted to restrict their hours of work. This evidence is supported by the qualitative 
information on the limiting the supply of hours in some of the short hour sectors. I have 
mentioned the case of carpenters and building construction workers in which clauses 
were introduced to limit overtime. On the other hand, the link between higher wages 
and shorter hours was commonplace among trade union propaganda. Interestingly 
enough, the causality of the argument linking higher wages to shorter hours -a  
backward bending labour supply- was reversed. Instead, unions claimed that by limiting 
the supply of labour and obtaining monopoly rents, they were able to increase wages. In 
1905, the anarchist newspaper El Trabajo, from Sabadell, near Barcelona, published a 
pamphlet called “La Jornada de Ocho Horas ” (the eight-hour day). The document was 
a translation of an original by the French Confederation Generale du .Travail aimed at 
preparing the events of May Day 1906. The first argument put forward by anarcho- 
syndicalists was the relationship between shorter hours and higher wages, the familiar 
“the shorter the hours, the greater the pay.” The cases of Australia and New Zealand 
were mentioned as successful cases where eight-hour days had been enforced with no 
loss in wages. Moreover, they offered a more than biased comparison of wages in the 
US and in the UK, showing how in the US hours were shorter and consequently wages 
higher than in the UK for the same occupation.95 Another argument in favour of a 
shorter workday had to do with the fact that unions claimed shorter hours did not reduce 
total output:
Some (...)  believe that a reduction in working hours is going to lead to industrial ruin.
(...)  But the opposite effect is observed, a renewed industrial progress generally has been
the consequence o f  a reduction in working hours.
94 In Barcelona, there is evidence that unions tried to restrict the employment o f women in the printing 
trades and shoe-making.
95 Trabajo, El, La Jornada de Ocho Horas. Folleto editado por el periodico “El Trabajo” de Sabadell. 
Translated by Lorenzo Pahissa (Barcelona, 1905), pp. 10-12.
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( ...)  In the middle o f the last century, in 1847, in England, the working day in the textile 
industry, being o f 13 hours or more, was reduced to 10 with neither a significant loss for 
the industry nor a decrease in wages.
(...)  After the transition, with a new time schedule, output was almost the same as before 
and in some cases even higher.
(...)  The hypothesis that output will be the same under eight hours than it has been under 
nine or more hours is not absurd.
If a machine used, it is likely that output will be the same as before, thanks to an 
improvement in the machinery and its use, as well as thanks to the worker, who, less tired 
and more alert, avoids mistakes and misuses,.96
Third, and most important, unemployed workers were to find a job if working 
hours were shared:
Is there anything more fraternal and simpler than giving a job to our companions, in the 
workshop, in the office, in the warehouse, etc. by reducing the length o f our day?97
Nevertheless, it was noted, employment creation was only to happen in 
establishments where output would fall with the introduction of the eight hour day, i.e. 
in establishments in which the intensity of work could not increase. For instance, in a 
strike called on the 22 February 1903 by Barcelona’s carpenters, demanding higher 
wages and a working day of 8 hours, Miguel Sastre commented:
They justify their attitude by the fact that with modem machinery more work is done in 
less time. By reducing hours, four hundred unemployed workers o f the trade could find a 
job.98
In this case, according to Sastre, the reduction of hours from 9 to 8 created jobs 
for the four hundred unemployed. Among typographers, the reduction of the working 
day from 10 to 9 provided a job for ten of the twenty unemployed; in the case of 
lithographers, for nineteen of twenty-five unemployed; bookbinders hoped to provide
96 Ibid., p.16-17 and p. 20.
97 Ibid., p.27.
98 Sastre, Las Huelgas de Barcelona en 1903, “Carpinteros.” See as well for similar cases: “Constructores 
de cajas de embalajes,” “Fundidores en bronce y otros metales,” “Litografos,” “Tipografos,” 
“Encuademadores y rayadores.”
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jobs for twenty unemployed workers, but they failed. The evidence seems to point to 
some work sharing solidarity among workers of the same craft.
The evidence from Barcelona can be complemented with two additional local 
studies on hours and wages for the cities of Madrid and Valencia, included as 
appendixes to Angel Marvaud’s book La question sociale en Espagne published in Paris 
in 1910. The first one is a report containing data for 1903 published in 1907: Memoria 
acerca del estado de la provincia de Madrid en el ano 1903. There, we learn that in the 
city of Madrid quarry workers, stone and marble masons, and sculptors worked 8 hours 
in winter and summer. Building construction workers, manual sawyers, and carpenters 
worked 8 hours in winter and 9 in summer. Plasterers, 8 hours in winter and 9 and a half 
in summer. Mechanic sawyers, cabinetmakers, woodcarvers, or upholsterers nine during 
the whole year. Coach makers laboured nine hours in winter and ten in summer. 
Chocolate-makers, blacksmiths, dyers, electricians, basket-makers, rail workers and 
tramways workers supplied a regular schedule of 11 hours. Gardeners, nine and a half 
hours in winter and eleven in summer. Card-box makers and gas workers, up to 12. 
Finally, according to this source, bakers worked 17 hours." Therefore, the distribution 
of hours across occupations is very similar to that of Barcelona, in spite of the fact that 
some sectors still kept differentiated winter-summer schedules. Hours of work in 
summer, nonetheless, were now substantially shorter.
Evidence from Valencia from the 1900s also supports the view of a reduction of 
the workday below the 10 hours in most sectors, especially through the reduction in the 
hours of work supplied in summer. There, carpenters, saddlers, and cabinetmakers, and 
gold- and silversmiths worked 8 hours. Most trades worked 9 hours and only tanners 
and stokers laboured 10 hours. Furthermore, the negative relationship between the 
hourly wage and hours of work emphasized in the case of Barcelona is also confirmed 
using the data on nominal wages and hours of work. Graph 5.1 shows this negative 
correlation for forty trades of Valencia in the mid 1900s.100
99 Marvaud, Angel, La question sociale en Espagne (Paris, 1910), appendix 3.
100 Ibid., appendix 4.
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Graph 5.1. Hours of work and nominal wages in Valencia, mid 1900s. 
(N=40)
Source: see text.
The 1910s. Maximum hours legislation in mining, the cotton textile industry and 
sales workers.
In the previous section I have shown that workers in the urban trades had obtained a 
reduction in the working day towards 8 to 10 hours. In the case of manufacturing and 
sales workers, the workday had remained roughly constant since the 1880s. 
Nevertheless, the reduction in the working day had only been observed in the case of 
Barcelona and therefore this conclusion needs to be extended with data covering the 
whole of Spain. An obvious source of data is the labour inspectors’ yearbooks published 
daily by the Instituto de Reformas Sociales from 1908 to 1924. The average number of 
hours of work in 1910 for several industrial and agricultural sectors sectors are 
presented in table 5.5.
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Table 5.5. Sector hours of work by 1910.
Sector Workers covered in 
1910
Average hours o f work 
(weighted means and 
standard deviations)
Mines, salt mines, and 30,429 9 h 36 min
quarries (37 min)
Metals 32,271 9 h 37 min
(23 min)
Chemicals 10,877 10 h 06 min
(38 min)
Tobacco 12,193 9 h 16 min
(29 min)
Textiles 72,947 10 h 38 min
(25 min)
Construction 8,897 9 h 22 min
(35 min)
Electrical industry 3,254 11 h 04 min
(57 min)
Printing 5,990 9 h 42 min
(31 min)
Garment industry 25,102 10 h 19 min
(43 min)
Food 11,416 9 h 14 min
(44 min)
Transports 15,308 10 h 08 min
(56 min)
Furniture 4,489 9 h 44 min
(17 min)
Glass 3,387 9 h 15 min
(41 min)
Notes: average hours o f work are the weighted average o f 7 inspectors’ regions. 
Standard deviations in parentheses.________________________________________
Compared to the data collected in Barcelona, the industry averages are 
somewhat higher. Generally, the trades worked below 10 hours per day (construction, 
printing, wood or glass) while manufacturing still maintains on average longer working 
hours -like for instance in the case of the textile and garment industries. Compared to 
the 1880s, in some sectors, the reduction in the workday was on the range of half an 
hour to one hour. Metal workers, confirming the downward trend in their workday 
observed for the Barcelona data, worked on average 9 hours and 37 minutes, while in 
the 1880s they worked from 10 and half to eleven hours. Data for building construction 
workers suggests the reduction in hours of work towards the eight-hour day observed in 
Barcelona, Madrid or Valencia might have been exceptional: the trade reported to work 
abot 10 hours in the 1880s, while in 1910 the average for the whole of Spain is 9 hours 
and 22 minutes. Among carpenters, the reduction of the working day was in the range of
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half and hour and one hour compared to the observations for “workshop carpenters” in 
the 1880s. The printing trades, reporting from 10 to 11 hours in the 1880s, now worked 
on average 9 hours and 42 minutes. Miners, who at that time campaigned for a shorter 
work day, also worked below 10 hours across Spain, but they already did so twenty-five 
years before. Finally, industries arising from the second industrial revolution -like the 
electrical and chemical industries- had longer than average work schedules over 10 
hours.
In order to understand variation in hours across sectors and regions, I use the 
labour inspector’s yearbooks which give data on daily hours of work, average male 
wages and workforce characteristics for 24 sectors of the Spanish economy aggregated 
at the level of the Inspectors’ regions. The inspectors’ regions were quite compact. For 
example, region 3 contained the Basque country but also the Northern provinces of 
Logrono and Santander. Region 2 covered the Catalan provinces. Region 4 included the 
North-Western provinces and Region 6 the Levant. One problem at this level of 
aggregation is to develop adequate cost-of-living indices so as to measure regional real 
wages. Since my main objective here is describing wage-hours pairs and not estimating 
a labour supply model, one way to solve this problem is to estimate a “crude” hedonic 
wage equation for nominal hourly wages (the same procedure than in the previous 
section). This allows me to use nominal instead of real wages letting regional nominal 
wages to adjust to the regional cost of living. In order to do this, I estimated the 
following relationship:
Ln hourly nominal wage (i, j, t) = constant + a In (hours(i, t))
+ b (i) i sector dummies + c (j) j  region dummies + d (t) tyear dummies
+ error term (i,j, t),
where i stands for the 24 sectors, j  for the seven inspectors’ regions and t for the years 
included in the sample. The hourly wage being used here is the average male wage 
reported by inspectors in each of the sectors.
In this case, I have restricted my sample to the years 1909 to 1914. I have 
decided to exclude the years of World War 1 because price shocks caused by the 
disruption of the war shifted wage functions and complicated the estimation of
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parameters. Regional fixed-effects capture unobserved variables affecting nominal 
wages like price level variations among regions and other characteristics like city sizes, 
climate, alternative employment opportunities, or a more organised labour movement. 
Sector fixed-effects capture labour demand variables such as technology or average 
labour productivity and labour supply characteristics like the levels of human capital or 
workers’ collective action. In table 5.6. I present the two estimates of the relationship 
between hours and wages (full tables in the appendix to the chapter). The first one is 
done through ordinary least squares, while in the second especification I also allow 
hours to be affected by nominal wages using lagged hours and lagged nominal wages 
and all the dummies as instrumental variables. Again, a value of the elasticity of 
nominal wages with respect to hours over -1 is consistent with the existence of partial 
market compensation for long hours.
Table 5.6. Elasticity of the nominal wage with respect to hours, 1909-1914.
Value of coefficient t-statistic
OLS -0. 97 -10.72
Instrumental variables -0.752 -2.67
Notes: full results of the nominal wage equation in appendix. 848 and 728 observations. 
Sources: IRS, Memoria general del servicio de inspeccion, 1909-1914.
In both cases, the regressions perform quite well (see table 5A.1 in appendix) 
and I find negative coefficients significant at the one per cent level, showing that shorter 
hours were related to higher hourly earnings. Despite the fact that I am not able to 
approximate a labour supply equation, this results are in line with the existence of an 
income effect in a backward bending labour supply curve in which workers with higher 
hourly earnings get more leisure time. Additionally, in both cases I get estimates of the 
elasticity of wages with respect to hours of work greater than -1, suggesting long hours 
were partially compensated by the market. The compensation according to the OLS 
estimate, though, was almost negligeable. Finally, the size of the coefficients is not off 
the mark with respect to the coefficients calculated in the case of Barcelona for the 
period 1904-1909, which in the case of adult males clustered around -1.
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Government intervention:
One of the puzzles of the evolution of the workday is the persistence of long hours of 
work in sectors like the Catalan cotton textile industry or retail and service workers. On 
the other hand, in these sectors and in sectors like Biscayan mining, conflicts over hours 
of work became salient issues in the early 20th century. This in turn prompted the first 
government interventions in the regulation of hours of work, with mandatory hours 
ceilings being established in mining in 1910, in the cotton textile industry in 1913 and 
in the retail and service sectors in 1903 and again in 1918. My explanation for these 
interventions is that a collective action problem existed in these sectors preventing the 
adjustment of hours.
Mining unions in Biscay had been calling for a regular nine hour day throughout 
the year since 1890. Up to the government intervention in 1910, miners in Biscay 
worked 11 hours in summer, 10 hours in spring and autumn, and 9 hours in winter.101 In 
this case, the particular labour force mix generated a conflict between workers willing to 
supply long hours and those pressing for a reduction in the workday. In the report by 
Instituto de Reformas Sociales on the working conditions of the mines in Biscay it was 
observed: “one of the most remarkable characteristics of the mining population in 
Biscay is the division between permanent (“fijo”) and temporary (“ambulante”)
i  rsy
workers.” According to the 1904 report, about a 70 per cent of miners were employed 
on a temporary basis. Most of them migrated from the provinces of Galicia and the 
North of Castilla to be employed for a limited number of years or during the slack 
season in winter.103 For instance, one of the managers (Mr. Woolf) of the “Orconera 
Iron Ore Company Limited” recognised the costs of employing transient workers “who 
stay in our mines one, two or three years, most of them only for some months.” 104 The 
ambulante was “reluctant to unionise because (...),” it was said, “he believes his ties
101 There was not underground mining.
102 Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Informe de las minas de Vizcaya (1904), re-printed in Revista de 
Trabajo, number 19 (year 1967), p. 187; Instituto de Reformas Sociales, “Information sobre el trabajo en 
las minas. A proposito de las peticiones que las sociedades obreras elevaron al gobiemo el ano 1909,” re­
printed in Revista de Trabajo, number 1 (1968), pp. 138-139.
103 A colourful depiction o f the life in the mines o f Vizcaya which puts emphasis on the rivalries created 
by the different regional origins of miners (quoting songs for example) is given in Ibarruri, Dolores, ‘La 
Pasionaria,’ El unico camino (Moscow, 1963), chapter 3, “Proletariado,” pp. 15-20.
104 Instituto, Infoime, p. 189.
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with mining work are temporary.”105 Generally, union membership in the sector rarely 
surpassed ten per cent of the labour force. Additionally, the ambulante also accepted 
barrack housing, credit in the company store, being paid by the month rather than the 
week, and longer hours to maximise pay. On the other hand, transient, immigrant 
workers were employed as unskilled workers, while “the Biscayan worker,” it was said, 
“rarely works as a labourer,” occupying positions of foremen or skilled workers 
instead.106
The relationships between these two groups were undoubtedly tense.107 During 
strikes, strikers regularly clashed with temporary workers who did not support the
10R . .strike. The traditional demands of the Biscay mining unions had been the abolition of 
barrack housing and the truck system, the setting of a regular pattern of hours of work 
based on winter hours, and the abrogation of tareas (the payment on the basis of 
individual or group output). However, as I have explained in chapter 2, employers 
refused to deal with the union because they argued it did not represent the interests of all 
workers. Therefore, working conditions were by and large determined by the 
preferences of the transient workers: long hours in summer, payment by the piece, and 
barrack housing. When the members of the Instituto de Reformas Sociales asked some 
Biscayan workers which system of payment they preferred, a group of miners answered: 
“This you have to ask to the ambulantes”m  Similarly, the employment of workers with 
a strong preference for long hours and an inefficient collective action mechanism -the 
union was not formally recognised by employers- assured summer hours remained long 
in Biscay mining work until 1910.
Sales and service workers (in the Spanish debate dependencia mercantil) also 
worked very long hours up to 1918 and generally had to work on Sunday in spite of the 
December 1903 law establishing the right to rest on Sundays.110 For instance, of the 358 
respondents of the questionnaire sent by the Instituto in 1912, more than a fifty per cent 
answered sales workers supplied between 12 and 14 hours in winter and 12 to 15 in
105 Ibid., p. 189.
106 Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Informe, p. 187.
107 Ibarruri, El unico camino, p. 17.
108 See for instance account of the 1903 general strike: Fusi, Juan Pablo, Politico obrera en el Pais Vasco, 
1880-1923 (Madrid, 1975), p.268.
109 Ibid., p. 188.
110 On these workers: Nielfa, Gloria, Los sectores mercantiles en Madrid en el primer tercio del siglo XX. 
Tiendas, comerciantesy dependientes de comercio, (Madrid, 1985).
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summer (table 5.7).111 Clearly, these hours did not have the intensity of work in industry
and included rest and meal times. In the survey of working conditions in this sector, the
mean response to the question of how many hours of “intense work” there were in these
112establishments was about 5 hours. But the contemporary depictions of working 
conditions for sales and retail workers, waiters, etc. suggest that they worked all day 
from dawn to almost midnight for almost seven days a week, in many cases even 
sleeping in the store (in caves, warehouses or sleeping on the floor behind the counter) 
in the harshest conditions.
Table 5.7. Hours distribution among sales workers in 1912 (percentages of responses).
10 h 11 h 12 h 13 h 14 h 15 h
Winter 10.1 9.8 21.3 13.4 15.4 12.6
Summer 5.8 6.9 11.8 12.2 21.7 11.5
Notes and sources: see text.
Again, a collective action problem explains the persistence of extraordinary long 
hours among the sales and service workers. First of all, the atomistic distribution of 
establishments employing one or two workers made it difficult and costly to punish 
defectors from reductions of work instituted by the union or by the state. In Barcelona,
I
the proportion of barbers per establishment was below two. In the taverns of Madrid, 
by 1910 there were 1454 workers employed in 1073 establishments.114 Labour 
inspectors repeatedly expressed their inability to supervise the conditions of work in 
stores and retail establishments. The law of Sunday rest of 1903 proved extremely 
difficult to implement, and by 1919 it was still considered to have failed to be enforced. 
As a result, the atomistic distribution of establishments contributed to the fact that 
violations of either state or union regulations on hours and rest periods were difficult to 
detect.
More importantly, the demographic characteristics and preferences of sales 
workers were different from the rest of the traditional craft workers. The data provided
111 Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Preparacion de un proyecto de ley regulando la jom ada de trabajo de 
las personas empleadas en los establecimientos mercantiles (Madrid, 1914).
112 Ibid., p.30.
113 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1906, “Barberos y peluqueros.”
114 Of the 1797 taverns existing in Madrid in 1910, 904 did not hire workers outside the family, Instituto 
de Reformas Sociales, El descanso dominical en las tabernas de Madrid (Madrid, 1910), p.20.
Chapter 5. The reduction o f  the workday. 175
by labour inspectors in the city of Madrid on the ages of waiters in the taverns of 
Madrid shows how the age distribution was skewed toward younger than average 
workers: 28 per cent of workers were older than 23, 32 per cent were between 18 to 23 
years old, while 40 per cent were younger than 18. Evidence also suggests that these 
were “blind alley occupations”: jobs occupied by adolescents in big cities not requiring 
an initial set of skills and providing little on-the-job training. As a result, sales workers 
had flat earnings profiles as their earnings had little chances to increase after reaching 
twenty-five years of age. For example, in the agreements signed by the members of the 
Barcelona joint commission of sales workers and patrons in 1918-1919, minimum 
wages were stipulated to increase with each year of service for 14 to 24 years olds, but 
not after this age.115
In addition, their employment package was substantially different from the one 
prevailing in industry or the trades. Most sales workers, were internos, meaning they 
lodged and ate at their patron’s house, generally in the same establishment. In the 
taverns of Madrid, this arrangement covered 90 per cent of workers and all qualitative 
evidence points to the fact that internado was the rule. For example, the 1912 study of 
the IRS stated that, as a rule, commercial workers were paid by the year or even had to 
wait until the termination of their employment at the establishment to be paid at all.116 
Moreover, because workers needed lodgings and food, the practice of the internado 
suggests that in big cities sales workers were recruited from nearby provinces and not 
from the city. Again in the cases of the taverns of Madrid, the labour inspectors 
remarked “the interno is very unstable and changes frequently when there are no family 
ties with the patron,” and added “he (the interno) is hired from all the provinces of
117Spain, but preferably from these neighbouring Madrid.”
Therefore, the sector characteristically employed workers operating a regional 
labour market for unskilled, adolescent work. In the case of interno workers, 
employment spells were short. This labour market offered little prospects for workers 
after the age of marriage. Again, the collective action problem appears with weak trade
115 Camara Oficial de la Industria de Barcelona, Memoria reglamentaria 1920-1921, “Acuerdos de 
caracter general y obligatorio publicados por la Comision Mixta del Trabajo en el Comercio de 
Barcelona,” pp. 179-183.
116 Instituto, Preparacion de unproyecto, p. 58.
1,7 Instituto, El descanso dominical, p. 19.
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unions and in the conflict between these workers willing to invest in the improvement of 
working conditions in the sector and these planning to shift to other occupations or 
return to their towns of origin.
Finally, long hours also prevailed in the manufacturing sectors. Cases in point 
were the Catalan cotton textile sector, with a 66-hours week until 1913, or the paper or 
garment industries, having a workday well over 10 hours during the early 1910s. A 
distinctive characteristic of these sectors is that they employed mainly women. For 
example, women represented a 62 per cent of the working population in the textile 
industry, a 64 per cent in the garment industry and a 55 per cent in the paper industry in 
the early 1910s according to data provided by the labour inspectors. An exception was 
the case of the tobacco industry, with a 94 per cent of women in the total working
1 1 o
population, which worked relatively short hours.
In order to establish that women tended to work in long hours sectors, in table 
5.8. I present the correlations of the logarithm of hours of work with respect to the 
different age groups selected by the labour inspectors: women over 23, between 14 and 
22, and below 14 years old. In all the three cases the correlations with respect to the log 
of hours appear to be positive. In a second descriptive exercise, the log of hours is 
regressed against the share of women in the different age groups, allowing for regional 
differences in hours of work. In this case the relationship is positive and statistically 
significant for all age groups. Taking into account the mean share of women and young 
girls of each age group in total employment, the coefficients are largest for the 15-22 
and for the age group below 14.
118 Lina Galvez argues that the sector employed mainly married women and their fundamental demand 
was a flexible, short hours regime that allowed working mothers to keep up with housework. Galvez 
Munoz, Lina, La Compahia Airendataria de Tabacos (1887-1945): cambio tecnologico y  empleo 
femenino (Madrid, 2000), chapter 3.
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Table 5.8. Correlations of hours of work with age and share of women in 
the labour force, 1909-1914.
Log(hours)
% women 0.13
% women age group 23 and over 0.11
% women age group 15-22 0.14
%  girls age group younger than 14 0.06
N=848, 24 sectors in 8 inspection regions.
Source: IRS, Memoria general del servicio de inspeccion, 
years 1909-1914.
1 2  3 4
Constant 2.25** 2.26** 2.25** 2.26**
% women 0.04**
mean: 0.31 (4.65)
% women age group 0.06**
23 and over (3.85)
Mean: 0.11
% women age group 0.13**
15-22 (5.47)
Mean: 0.10
% girls age group: 0.4*
younger than 14 (2.51)
mean: 0.007
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Adj-Rq 0.08 0.04 0.02
N -848
Notes: ** significant at less than 1 per cent. * 5 per cent. White- 
heteroroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Sources: IRS, Memoria general del servicio de inspeccion, years
1909-1914.
Explaining why hours of work were long in manufacturing (here I consider 
manufacturing mainly the textile and knitwear, the garment and the paper industries) 
thus requires to explain this in relation to the labour supply of female workers. It has 
generally been argued that the labour supply of women during the life cycle in the past 
differed substantially from that of men.119 This is especially so because women 
participated in the labour market for a shorter period of time than men, generally before 
marriage. A purely market-based explanation of long hours in sectors employing 
women would thus consider that since women worked fewer years than men, they might 
have had a preference for longer hours in order to maximise earnings while being
119 For example discussed in Goldin, Claudia, Understanding the gender gap. An economic history o f  
American Women (New York, 1990), chapter 1.
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indifferent about their future productivity (which has a negative correlation with hours 
of work supplied in the past). On the other hand, an alternative explanation would 
consider that since trade union entry restrictions prevented career advancement in the 
skilled trades, women were crowded out to the long hours manufacturing sectors. 
Furthermore, if, as it is generally stressed in labour history, women were more docile 
workers and lacked trade union experience, trade union action to shorten hours of work 
must have been weaker than in traditionally skilled male-dominated sectors. Union 
density figures in the textile sector were generally below five per cent, while employers 
fiercely opposed the recognition of the union. In the garment or paper industries, unions 
were also weak and almost non-existent until 1918-1919.
Because the willingness to invest in unions and the preference for short hours 
probably depended on the number of years of paid work that an individual expected to 
work in a particular trade, it is difficult to disentangle both hypotheses. There is some 
evidence, however, that shows that older, working mothers could fulfil their preferences 
for shorter hours. In the tobacco industry, employing urban, married women, a strong
i 9npreference for short hours and a flexible work regime was the norm. In the Catalan 
textile industry, detailed studies on female workers’ life cycle participation have been 
provided by Enriqueta Camps for the textile town of Sabadell. Her research shows that 
the participation of married women was substantially greater in the 1920s than in the 
second half of the 19th century, when women left paid work shortly after marriage, in 
spite of the fact that the detailed timing of this transition is not known. By 1919-1920, 
in the Sabadell woollen sector the average age of female weavers and spinners was 
about 30 years and about 25 in the preparatory stages of both weaving and spinning. 
There is some evidence that the continued employment of women after the age of 
marriage was accompanied by a reduction in hours. In the woollen factories of the town, 
the English week (working fewer hours on Saturday) and a working week of 62 hours
1 99were the rule already in the 1910s. In the cotton factories, this transition seems to 
have been slower. Before 1913, there was little union concern for excessive hours of 
work in the urban factories, except for the existing differentials in hours between rural
120 Galvez Munoz, La Compahia.
121 Camps Cura, Enriqueta, “Transitions in women’s and children’s work patterns and implications for the 
study of family income and household structure: a case study from the Catalan textile sector (1850- 
1923),” The History o f  the Family, volume 3, number 2, p. 149.
122 Instituto de Reformas Sociales, La jom ada de trabajo en la industria textil (Madrid, 1914).
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and urban establishments. The main agenda of unions in the period seems to have been
19”^to protect employment and the levels of pay. Grievances however changed in the 
early 1910s. By 1913, “La Constancies’ (constancy), the cotton textile union almost 
exclusively formed by women, staged an extremely long and massive general strike in 
the summer of 1913 to shorten the hours of work and win the English week.124
Summarising, in manufacturing, mining and retail and service workers, in which 
hours remained long, weak unions could not reconcile the different preferences for 
hours of workers with different characteristics and expectations about their future in a 
particular trade. In this regard, a collective action problem assured the workday could 
only be reduced through state intervention and shifts in public opinion. In retailing and 
services, the state supported a reduction of the workday and the right to rest on Sunday. 
In the mining strike of the 1910, a government headed by Jose Canalejas established a 
maximum nine-hour day in mining. In the textile industry, another Liberal government 
passed a decree setting the statutory working week at 60 hours and a 10 hour workday 
to put an end to the textile general strike of summer 1913. In this case, however, it was 
still difficult to implement the decree (its Reglamento was never passed in Parliament) 
and textile workers had to wait until the concession of the eight hour day in October 
1919 to experience a sharp decline in their workday. Finally, retail workers were 
granted a reduction of their workday in 1918 to 10 hours both in winter and summer and 
a further reduction to eight hours under the April 1919 Decree. A law passed in early 
1919 also defined maximum hour ceilings in bakeries.
5.2. Winning the eight hour day.
In April 1919, Count Romanones’ government sanctioned a royal decree establishing 
the eight hour day for all sectors of the Spanish economy from the 1st October 1919,
1 JC
therefore conceding one of the oldest grievances of the Spanish working class. It was
123 Smith, Angel, “Social conflict and trade-union organisation in the Catalan cotton textile industry, 
1890-1914.” International Review o f  Social History, XXXVI (1991).
124 A gripping analysis o f the patterns o f protest among women textile workers in the area o f Barcelona in 
Kaplan, Temma, Red city, blue period. Social movements in Picasso’s Barcelona (Berkeley, CA, 1992). 
Instituto de Reformas Sociales, La jom ada de trabajo en la industria textil. Trabajos preparatorios del 
Reglamento para la aplicacion del Real decreto de 24 de agosto de 1913 (Madrid, 1914), “Noticias 
relativas a la huelga del llamado Arte Fabril, remuneracion del trabajo y estado de la industria textil, 
remitidas en el mes de agost de 1913 a la Inspeccion Central por los Inspectores de Trabajo,” p.407.
125 In his political autobiography Count Romanones says little about his decision to sanction the decree, 
the episode is treated Conde de Romanones (Alvaro de Figueroa y Torres), Notas de una vida (Madrid,
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the Instituto de Reformas Sociales which proposed this project to the government after 
having accepted it unanimously in the plenary session of the institute (the project had in 
fact been drawn up by the General Workers’ Union (UGT)). After the vote, employers’ 
associations claimed that they were not represented in the Instituto and did not
1 9Arecognise their representatives sitting at the session.
Several factors precipitated the passing of the eight-hours decree. First, the long 
general strike in Barcelona in early 1919 which culminated the spectacular rise of the 
National Confederation of Labour (CNT) in Catalonia. Second, a weak government and 
the spectre of the Russian revolution with industrial conflict extending from Barcelona 
to other cities. Third, in late April 1919, it was agreed that the treaty of Versailles 
should include an article fixing the eight hour day and the 48 hour working week. This 
decision was later on ratified in the Washington conference (29 October 1919 to 29 
November 1919). Some countries had already adopted this decision: Germany in late 
1918 and Italy in February 1919. Others, like Austria or Belgium, were to ratify the 8 
hour day on the condition that other countries also did so.127
The decision caused a stir among conservative politicians and employers’ 
associations. The Catalan regionalist politician, Francesc Cambo, in a conference 
delivered on the 10th April 1920 considered the decree to be “one of the craziest things
1 98Humanity has ever made.” According to Fomento del Trabajo National, the eight- 
hour day was “such as sudden change that it resembles an economic coup disrupting the 
whole of the national economy.” And it went on to say that “even in Russia, the 
Bolshevik government has been forced to mandate a substantial increase in the number 
of hours, but in this country the government is more severe on this [the hours’] issue 
than on the handling of social disorders.” The Chamber of Industry of Barcelona
1 OQ
claimed that the eight hour day would bring about “a complete economic disaster.”
1999), p.434. Rey Reguillo quotes Romanones saying he was “proud o f signing that decree.” In Rey 
Reguillo, Fernando del, Propietarios y  patronos. La politico de las organizaciones economicas en la 
Espaha de la Restauracion (1914-1923),p.365, footnote 69.
Ibid., p.367.
127 Camara Oficial de la Industria de Barcelona, Informe de esta Camara sobre los efectos de la 
aplicacion de la jornada de ocho horas (Barcelona, 1926), pp. 1-3. Spain and the Treaty o f Versailles: 
Cesta Bustillo, Josefina, Una esperanza para los trabajadores. Las relaciones entre Espaha y  la 
Organization International del Trabajo, vol. 1 (1919-1939) (Madrid, 1994).
128 Quoted in Bengoechea, Soledad, Organitzacio patronal i conflictivitat social a Catalunya (Barcelona, 
1994), p.203, footnote 42.
129 All quotes from Rey, Propietarios y  patronos, p.370.
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The eight hour day was implemented on the 1st October 1919. In spite of
employers’ opposition to the decree, according to the Interior Minister at the time,
(Burgos y Mazo) “the transition to the new regime was made without any alteration of 
1
public order.” In late 1919 and early 1920, all Spanish sectors in principle had a 
statutory working day of 8 hours, except some notable cases like the rail workers, who 
obtained their eight hours in 1921.131 Furthermore, a decree in 1920 inaugurated a 
period to negotiate overtime clauses for each sector. In the inspectors’ yearbook for 
1920, with some exceptions, most sectors reported hours of work close to eight hours, 
generally from 8 to 8 and half hours. In some cases, a sharp drop in the number of hours 
is detected well before the passing of the law. Coinciding with the rise of the National 
Confederation of Labour (CNT) and the widespread implementation of their workshop 
delegates, in Catalonia a move towards the eight-hour day is evident in 1918, except in
1 ^ 9the textile industry.
Turning to the qualitative evidence presented by the labour inspectors, it is
important to note that they seem to have been aware of the benefits of a shorter workday
according to the contemporary debate. For example, they echoed the debates on the
intensive workday -stating that a reduction in hours was not necessarily related to a
drop in labour productivity or pay- and the beneficial effects of a shorter workday on
the accident rate and the detrimental effect of long workdays on the health of the 
1worker. In some other cases, they also show themselves committed to the reduction 
of the workday by lamenting their inability to detect all violations or enforce fines.134
In addition, available evidence suggests that the 8-hour law was effectively 
implemented in the main cities, where powerful unions could enforce the eight-hour 
day. In 1920, labour inspectors of the third region (Basque country) claimed that “the
130 Burgos y Mazo, Manuel, Para otras paginas historicas. El verano de 1919 en Gobernacion (Madrid, 
1921), p.406.
131 Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Adaptacion del regimen de la jom ada de ocho horas a los servicios 
ferroviarios (Madrid, 1922). The reason was railway workers had a special status sine 1912 being 
considered public servants. Thus, they were excluded from state legislation.
132 Using the inspectors’ data for Region 2, a regression with log (hours o f work) in the years from 1909 
to 1920 for eighteen sectors of the Catalan economy against dummies for the sector and year dummies 
finds the negative coefficients on the 1918, 1919 and 1920 dummies to be significant at the one per cent 
level.
133 Memoria year 1921, p.83.
134 Memoria year 1920, p. 182, Memoria year 1921, pp. 165-166.
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eight hour day has been implemented in the large industrial centres.”135 In the 4th 
Region (Oviedo, Santander), it was noted in 1920: “the general pattern is the 
compliance of the decree, with very rare exceptions,” while remarking that “there are
still some establishments where patrons are reluctant to institute the eight hour day
1 rInspectors in Region 7 (Avila, Caceres, Salamanca, Segovia, Valladolid)
affirmed flour mills and the electric industry were working 12-hour shifts “under the
pretext that they could not dispose of scarce skilled personnel to implement
1 "X!overtime.” In the Andalusian region (region 10), which in contrast had one of the 
highest violation rates, “the eight-hour day has been adopted in almost all industries in 
the region (...).” In addition, compliance was more frequent in large cities than in 
smaller towns. For example the inspectors of the 8th Region claimed in 1921: “the large 
establishments do not violate the law, while medium and small establishments, 
especially in smaller localities, work two additional unremunerated hours after their 
legal 8 hours of work.”139
From the reports, some evidence is obtained on the extent of overtime work. In 
the Catalan region in 1922, it was noted: “initially workers and even patrons were 
pleased by the enactment of the decree introducing the eight-hour day (...) However, 
the clauses for overtime work, in which workers are not adequately compensated, (...), 
give way to unjust situations that this Inspection has detected and has sought to 
correct.”140 In 1920, the inspectors of the 3rd Region (Basque Country) expressed: 
“where overtime agreements exist, the workers are willing to supply more hours. Some 
do not want to do so influenced by the orders given by unions, which in this area forbid 
overtime work.”141 Later on in 1921, the same inspectors stated that “agreements over 
overtime work are rarely reached.”142 Similarly, inspectors in the 10th Region (South- 
West) in 1922 remarked their efforts at informing employers on the need to establish 
clauses for overtime work with their workers, stating that they expected that “more 
agreements will be reached making possible that workers increase their hours of work
135 Memoria year 1920, p. 101.
136 Ibid., p. 102.
137 Ibid., p. 182.
138 Ibid., p.253.
139 Memoria year 1921, p.179.
140 Memoria year 1922, p.79.
141 Memoria 1920, p. 101.
142 Memoria 1921, p. 83.
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according to the law.”143 Inspectors in the 4th Region (North-East) remarked in 1922 
how the adequate enforcement of the eight-hour law was the first step to implement 
overtime clauses, which in many industries, they noted, were not fully enforced.144
5.3. Conclusions.
One of the reasons the eight-hour day was accommodated in many sectors of the 
Spanish economy is that there had been a long-term declining trend in the hours of 
work. The analysis of cross-sectional variation of wage-hours pairs shows hours and 
wages were negatively correlated. I suggest this is evidence that workers with higher 
hourly wages were obtaining shorter workdays, because income effects dominated 
substitution effects in the labour supply. In the “urban trades” -employing unionised, 
permanent male workers-, hours had been brought down first by reducing summer hours 
and shortening the shifts to 10 to 9 hours in the early 1910s. In these sectors, 
homogenous preferences assured the hours of work slowly fell towards the objective of 
eight-hours, in which case the 1919 eight-hour day could be accommodated or codified 
existing practices. However, hours in manufacturing, some mining regions and among 
sales workers, changed little from the mid 1880s to 1919. I have put forward the 
hypothesis that in these sectors hours remained high because weak unions could not 
reconcile the preferences for hours of workers with different characteristics and 
expectations about future employment in the sector. State intervention and shifts in 
public opinion warranted hours fell precipitously by 1919 and 1920 in these sectors. My 
analysis of the evidence surrounding enforcement of the eight-hour day shows how 
generally the eight-hour day was broadly enforced while overtime agreements were 
more problematic given the inexistence of adequate formal bargaining procedures.
143 Memoria 1922, p. 250.
144 Memoria 1922, p. 121. A similar conclusion in: Memoria 1921, p. 179.
Chapter 5. The reduction o f  the workday. 184
Appendix to chapter 5.
A. Nominal wages, 1909-1914.
Table 5.A1. Nominal wage functions, 1909-1914._
Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic
Dependent variable:
Log hourly nominal wage
Constant 0.851*** 4.2 0.342 0.54
Log (hourly real wage) -0.972*** -10.72 -0.752*** -2.67
Sector dummies
Mines,' saltmines, quarries 0.061 1.44 0.079** 2.48
Metallurgy 0 .12*** 3.23 0.107** 2.48
Iron and other metals 0.078*** 2.73 0.086*** 2.77
Chemical industries 0.047* 1.73 0.05 1.55
Tobacco 0.045 1.51 0.081* 1.77
Textiles -0.041 -1.37 -0.035 -0.93
Agricultural services -0.133*** -2.94 _q i*** -2.64
Construction 0.036 1.2 0.051 1.62
Electrical industry 0.154*** 5.32 0.137** 2.72
Food 0.061* 1.92 0.054 1.31
Printing 0.075** 2.56 0.097*** 3.07
Paper -0.009 -0.28 -0.006 -0.19
Garment industry -0.051 -1.49 -0.064* -1.7
Leather -0.071** -2.35 -0.06* -1.9
Lumber 0.009 0.29 0.02 0.65
Transports 0.146*** 4.29 Q 14*** 4.01
Furniture 0.049* 1.79 0.067** 2.07
Crafts 0.018 0.57 0.037 1.19
Pottery -0.031 -1.05 -0.028 -0.84
Glass 0.123*** 3.36 0.15*** 4.02
Regional dummies
Region 1 -0.028 - 1.22 -0.016 -0.68
Region 2 0.269** 15.94 0.276*** 12.4
Region 3 0.127*** 6.65 0.123*** 5.56
Region 4 0.128*** 6.21 0.142*** 6.84
Region 6 -0.053*** -2.82 -0.059*** -2.9
Region 7 0.004 0.17 0.01 0.46
Year dummies Yes (5) Yes (5)
N 848 728
Adj-R-Squared 0.59
Durbin-Watson 1.9 1.91
F-statistic 34.86 12.63
Notes: White-heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. * significant at less than 10 per cent levels
** significant at less than 5 per cent levels.
***1  per cent levels.
Control group is region 5 and “miscellaneous industries”.
Region 1: Madrid, Caceres, Ciudad Real.
Region 2: Barcelona, Gerona, Tarragona, Lerida.
Region 3: Vizcaya, Alava, Guipuzcoa, Logrono, Santander.
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Region 4 : Oviedo, Leon, Orense, Lugo, Coruna, Pontevedra.
Region 5: Granada, Sevilla, Malaga, Huelva, Cordoba, Almeria, Cadiz, Jaen.
Region 6 : Albacete, Alicante, Castellon, Cuenca, Murcia, Valencia. 
Region 7: Salamanca, Valladolid, Burgos, Avila, Palencia, Segovia, Zamora.
Chapter 6. 
The collective negotiation of piece rates. A case study on the 
management of piece rate lists in the Catalan cotton textile 
sector, 1880-1910.
6.0. Introduction.
When analysing the historical demands of the Spanish labour movement, the abrogation 
of piece rates is certainly one of the most persistent grievances. It was for instance a 
classic demand of Anarcho-syndicalist and Socialist unions. Both Solidaridad Obrera 
and the National Confederation of Labour (CNT) had the complete abrogation of piece 
rates as one of the top priorities in their agenda. One of the oldest demands of the 
socialist mining unions of Biscay was the end of payment by tareas, the payment 
according to group output. Piece rates were seen by unions as a particularly rapacious 
system of extracting more work from workers, which enhanced the commodity status of 
their supply of labour. In this chapter, I study the management of piece rates in the cotton 
textile industry, an industry employing about 80,000 workers or a 1/5 of the Catalan 
working population in the late 19th century and a sector in which historians have 
emphasized working conditions became more volatile after 1885.
In the chapter dedicated to piece wages in Das Kapital, Marx claimed that as 
opposed to time rates, piece wages were difficult to manage and sparked conflicts 
between workers and their masters: “the quality of the labour is here controlled by the 
work itself, which must be of average perfection if the piece-price is to be paid in full. 
Piece wages become, from this point of view, the most fruitful source of reductions of 
wages and capitalistic cheating.” Further, piece rates encouraged the intensification of 
workers’ effort, increased the hours of work, and brought about a fall in the price of 
labour: “given piece rates, it is naturally the personal interest of the labourer to strain his
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labour-power as intensely as possible; this enables the capitalist to raise more easily the 
normal degree of intensity of labour. It is moreover now the personal interest of the 
labourer to lengthen the working-day, since with it his daily or weekly wages raise.” 
Consequently, “(the) piece-wage is lowered in the same proportion as the number of the 
pieces produced in the same time rises, and, therefore, as the working time spent on the 
same piece falls. This change in piece-wage, so far purely nominal, leads to constant 
battles between capitalist and labour. Either because the capitalist uses it as a pretext for 
actually lowering the price of labour, or because increased productive power of labour is 
accompanied by an increased intensity of the same.” This effect awoke an artificial 
competition among workers: “(...) the wider scope that piece-wage gives to individuality 
on the one hand tends to develop that individuality, and with it the sense of liberty, 
independence, and self-control of the labourers, and on the other, their competition with 
one another.”1
Unions believed they lived in a world very similar to the one described by Marx, 
characterised by recurrent periods of excess supply with the consequence of 
overproduction crises, falling prices, and unemployment. Under these economic laws, 
piece rates, rather than increasing pay, enticed more work effort. This in turn brought 
wages down, eroded the relationship between effort and pay, and increased the levels of 
unemployment. Moreover, piece wages undermined the solidarity ties of the working 
class as a whole or the members of the trade in particular. The evidence compiled by the 
Comision de Reformas Sociales occasionally provides information on the views of 
workers on piece rates. For instance, in Plasencia (Caceres) the local commission 
observed that the “the most important effect of piece rates (...) is an artificial increase in 
the number of hands, because since the worker is interested in finishing the tasks as soon 
as possible, he works at twice his normal level of activity and only four workers are 
necessary to do what, under normal circumstances, would require eight operatives.” A 
typographer from Madrid remarked to the Comision de Reformas Sociales in 1884 that 
piece rates favoured employers because “under this system, (...) with lower wages, they 
obtain more output. Further, by paying by the piece, they are able to spark the 
competition among workers to produce more. But this harms rather than benefits the
1 All quotes from the 1886 English edition of Capital, volume I, chapter 21, “Piece wages,” p.550-558, this 
part translated by Dr. Aveling. Available at www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-cl/ch2Lhtm 
Santiago Castillo (ed.), Infoimacion oral y  escrita de la Comision de Reformas Sociales, tome IV,
memoria Comision local de Plasencia, p. 534.
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workers, since the more they produce, the sooner they will be unemployed.” In his view, 
this was equivalent to “the exploitation of the worker by the worker.” The representative 
of the Madrid stone cutters union reported to the Comision de Reformas Sociales: “there 
is a(n) (...) evil in piece rate work and it is that one tends to work too much, orders get 
finished and then the crises come, harming everybody.”4
Moreover, it was argued that, by enhancing work effort and longer hours, 
payment by the piece threatened the health of workers and reduced their expected 
working life. A representative of the friendly society of the silk workers of Valencia 
considered it to be a “slow suicide.”5 Another union member from Madrid considered 
that, under piece rates, the worker “earns more than under time rates but also wears 
himself down and dies very soon.”6 A carpenter from Madrid claimed “everybody likes 
to earn an additional peseta per day, but (...) if I work by the piece and I lose twenty 
years of my life, what would I have won?”
Modem contract theory also underlines the problems associated with the 
management of piece rates. Generally, piece rates are treated as a prisoners’ dilemma 
game in which next period’s pay depends on the current period’s output, leading to 
strategic behaviour by managers and workers. Game theoretical approaches have shown 
how there is a time inconsistency problem because employers cannot credibly commit to
Q
keep the rates of pay when labour productivity increases. If repeated interaction is 
limited in time, the inevitable outcome of the piece rate game is slow productivity growth 
and resistance to organisational and technical innovations.9
In this chapter, my strategy to deal with the historical debate on piece rates is 
analysing the behaviour of piece rates in the Catalan textile industry, where collective 
bargaining over piece rates was widespread. The main questions that arise from the 
historical debate are:
3 Castillo, Information, tome I, session 2nd November 1884, sr. Gomez, Sociedad de tipografos, p.65.
4 Castillo, Information, tome I, session 14th December 1884, Villegas, Sociedad de Canteros, p. 106.
5 Ibid., tome III, informe de la Comision Provincial de Valencia, p. 100.
6 Castillo, Infoimacion, tome I, p. 106.
7 Castillo, Infonnacion, tome I, session 6th January 1884, Sr. Serna, p. 162.
8 Gibbons, Robert, “Piece rate incentive schemes,” Journal o f  Labor Economics, 5 ,4  (1987), p. 413.
9 Miller, Gary M., Managerial dilemmas. The political economy o f  hierarchy (Cambridge, Uk, 1992), 
chapter 5 (co-authored with Jack Knott, “Vertical dilemmas. Piece rate incentives and credible 
commitments.”
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1. what is the relationship between intensification of worker effort and piece rates?
2. how stable are agreements on piece rates?
3. What determines the bargaining power of workers when protecting piece rates 
from competitive cuts?
6.1. Piece rate and working conditions in the Catalan cotton textile industry, 1880- 
1910.
Since the publication of a seminal article by Albert Balcells in 1974, Spanish labour 
historians have been emphasising the erosion of the terms of employment in the Catalan 
cotton textile industry following the recession of 1885-1890.10 For example, Balcells 
remarked the declining trend in real wages between 1895 and 1915 in the industry caused 
by nominal wage cuts and increases in the cost of living.11 On the other hand, a recent 
contribution by Carles Enrech has focused on the destruction of a previously existing 
“craft culture” caused by the expansion of the town mill system since the 1870s, de­
skilling technical change and the associated increase in female employment, and
1 ^
periodical overproduction crises. Angel Smith, who has carefully studied conflicts in 
the textile industry in the early twentieth century, also suggests that excess capacity and 
technical change led to irreversible shifts in labour demand. Employers “anxious to cut 
labour costs and unwilling to negotiate with trade unions” altered the traditional terms of 
employment in the cotton textile industry, which finally led to a decrease in cotton 
workers’ living standards.13
Implicit in these views, it is accepted that the labour market became more 
competitive eroding customary practices prevalent in the factories since the 
mechanisation of artisan work. This line of reasoning holds that workers’ bargaining 
power weakened as a consequence of unemployment caused by economic decline and 
periodic industrial downturns and the competition of women in skilled or semi-skilled 
jobs such as weaving or spinning. Competitive forces were especially strong in 
recessions, when employers reduced wages, intensified work, fired male workers and
10 Balcells, Albert, “La mujer obrera en la industria catalana durante el primer cuarto del siglo XIX,” in 
Trabajo industrialy organizacion obrera en la Cataluha contemporanea (Barcelona, 1974).
11 Ibid., p. 35.
12 Enrech, “L’ofensiva patronal”, p. III.
13 Smith, “Social conflict,” p. 331.
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curtailed the power of unions by sacking union workers.14 Similar views also appeared 
among contemporaries. In the early 1890s, a popular song written by the textile workers 
of the so-called Mountain (Muntanya), employed in the water-powered factories of inner 
Catalonia, stated that unremunerated increases in the length of pieces of woven cloth 
were common:
“los teixidors mechanics com ja  se sap per tots,
‘Is allargan los trossos y  ’Is pagan mes poch .
Es molt clara la cosa com ja  poden pensa,
Que del guanyy de la feina ja  no podem menja. ”15 
(we, mechanised weavers, as everybody knows, / get longer pieces and lower pay 
/ it is all too clear / that from our work and our pay we can only starve)
Another example, Juan Marti, a weaver leader of the textile union La Constancia 
in 1913 offered a testimony of how piece rates were managed in the weaving rooms since 
1890:
(...)  Years ago, work was paid according to count and type of warp, but today we are 
paid [strictly] by the piece. As each year there are changes in the type o f yam, pay 
varies accordingly without taking into consideration these changes. Even if  the type of 
yam does not change, the number of picks increases by one or two per piece, and each 
additional pick meaning three additional, unremunerated metres per piece. This means 
the worker is paid less for his effort ( . . . ) .16
However, these contributions rely on scattered (but eloquent) evidence provided 
by the union press, which can be biased or is not straightforward to interpret. Smith 
focuses on the conflict of spinners in the Ter Valley and especially in Manlleu, a small 
textile town in the north of the province of Barcelona, where the presence of men in 
spinning rooms was abnormally high with respect to other areas where female work was 
more common. The contention by Balcells that the cost of living was increasing in
14 Ibid., p. 336.
15 Serra, Rosa and Ramon Vilades, La coldnia Pons de Puig Reig (1875-1987) (Berga, 1987), p. 138.
16 Instituto de Reformas Sociales, La jom ada de trabajo en la industria textil (trabajos preparatorios para  
el Reglamento para la aplicacion del Real Decreto de 24 deAgosto de 1913 (Madrid, 1914), pp. 59-60.
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Barcelona is mainly based on the working class press {La Nacio) and this evidence is not
1 7supported by the available cost-of-living indices.
The emphasis on the erosion of working conditions contrasts sharply with other
studies pointing to nominal wage stability between 1890 and 1910 in a period of very low
1 8inflation and even deflation. Moreover, authors like Enriqueta Camps have drawn 
attention to the existence of internal labour markets in the Catalan cotton textile firms.19 
This implies that, especially in the case of men, well defined career paths existed based 
on promotion from one job title to the other, from unskilled work up to supervisory
9f)tasks. This, in turn, suggests the existence of customary rules of promotion and the 
preservation of lengthy attachments between firms and workers. The survival of these 
rules depended on the fact that firms did not renege on their side of the implicit 
agreement.
Finally, there is also evidence that firms worked short-time during recessions. The 
earliest quantitative evidence on short time among Catalan textile firms is from 1848, but 
there is some qualitative evidence firms also worked short time in recessions in the late
tVi 9119 century. This shows that labour-hoarding might have been an extensive practice 
during the period through which employers and workers tried to preserve lengthy 
attachments with the same firm.
Since available evidence is scattered and sometimes contradictory, what could be 
labelled as the “increasing competition” as opposed to the “stability of norms and 
customs” hypotheses need to be tested against available data on wages and piece rates 
paid in the cotton textile industry. In order to do that, I use insights from models of 
employment and wage setting which derive predictions on the behaviour of wages and
17 Maluquer de Motes, Jordi, “Los salarios,” in Carreras, Albert, (ed.), Estadisticas historicas de Espaha. 
Siglos X IX y X X  (Madrid, 1985); Ballesteros Doncel, Esmeralda, “Una estimation del coste de la vida en 
Espana, 1861-1936,” jRevista de Historia Economica, 15,2(1997).
18 Camps, Enriqueta, La formacion del mercado de trabajo industrial en la Cataluha del siglo XIX  
(Madrid, 1995), pp. 214-215; Maluquer de Motes, “Los salarios;” Soler, Raimon, “La evolution del salario 
en una empresa textil algodonera. La fabrica de la Rambla de Vilanova i la Geltru (1891-1925),” Revista de 
Historia Economica, 15, 2 (1997); Dorel-Ferre, Gracia, Les coldnies industrials a Catalunya. El cas de la 
Coldnia Sedo (Barcelona, 1992), p. 302.
19 Camps, Enriqueta, “La teoria del capital humano: una contrastacion empirica. La Espana Industrial en el 
siglo XIX,” Revista de Historia Economica, 8 , 2 (1990).
20 Ibid., p. 320.
For example, noted in “La crisis industrial,” El Trabajo Nacional, 30th September 1900, number 225.
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employment over the business cycle, which depart from the traditional spot market
99adjustment to recessions in which prices are totally flexible. Moreover, I also use the 
empirical applications of these models, which are based on the comparison of wage,
9^employment and output movements over the business cycle, to characterise the 
behaviour of the labour market in the Catalan cotton textile industry. In table 6.1, I 
present the main labour market characterisations which follow each of the hypotheses, 
along with the implications derived from a standard spot market in which wages are 
flexible:
Table 6.1. Behaviour of firms during economic downturns (hypotheses).
Increasing competition Spot market Norms and customs
hypothesis
Competitive piece rate cuts Piece rates adjust downwards Piece rates are stable (sticky)
Intensification o f labour effort Minimal labour input 
adjustments, labour markets 
clear.
Labour hoarding
Increasing hours o f work Hours of work fall
Lay-offs Lay-offs
Given the paucity of data before 1890, a comparison of labour market 
performance in cotton textile before and after the 1885-1890 crisis cannot be done. I can 
only test for the existence of competitive forces in the period after 1885 causing cuts in 
piece rates and declining wages. In this chapter, I analyse the trends in piece rates and 
output in the main processes of cotton manufacturing, namely spinning and weaving, 
using data collected from corporate records of several textile firms for the period 1885 to 
1910. I focus here on nominal adjustment, because the period on the whole was 
deflationary (available cost of living indices are shown in table A6.1 in the appendix). 
Contrary to the views emphasising growing competitive pressures, I show how piece
22 Solow, Robert M., The labor market as a social institution (Oxford, 1990), chapter 2.
23 Hanes, Cristopher, “The development o f nominal wage rigidityin the late 19th century,” American 
Economic Review, 83, 4 (1990); Carter, Susan and Richard Sutch, “The labor market a hundred years ago: 
new, micro-level evidence on long-term change from the depression o f 1893-1894,” in Dick, Trevor J. O., 
Business cycles since 1820. New international perspectives from historical evidence (Cheltenham, UK, 
1998); Sundstrom, William, “Was there a golden age o f flexible wages? Evidence from Ohio 
manufacturing, 1892-1910,” Journal o f Economic Histoiy, 50, 3 (1990).
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rates remained fixed in spite of the absence of local and regional piece rate lists. Analysis 
of employers’ decisions in economic downturns shows how firms adjusted the amount of 
labour input, through short-time (the working of fewer days in a given week) and layoffs, 
rather than adjusting wages. The pattern of wage adjustment in recessions in the period 
conforms to a labour market model in which custom still plays an important role and 
“insiders” enjoy considerable labour market power. To a great extent, this means 
“insiders” were relatively isolated from the vagaries of the firms’ product market.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 presents the 
main institutions organising pay in the sector and their characteristics and coverage. 
Section 6.3 describes the sources being used in this study. Section 6.4 discusses the 
evolution of piece rates over time and adjustment to economic recessions between 1890 
and 1910. Section 6.5 studies the possible origins of nominal rigidity. Section 6.6 
concludes.
6.2. Institutions governing pay.
Pay in the Catalan cotton textile industry was governed by piece rate or price lists (listas 
de precios), which in few occasions covered whole towns or regions (public lists) and 
were generally bargained at the firm level (private lists). The evidence on both public and 
private lists is scarce and in the following section I present new evidence on piece rates 
collected from firms’ payroll records.
Piece rates in cotton weaving depended on the number of picks (pasadas) per inch 
(pulgada espanola) ) -the pick being a technical term referring to the number of times 
weft yam is passed through warp yam to produce cloth- as well as the size of pieces, and 
yam characteristics. In spinning, the standard unit was the weight of output, with the 
payment per Catalan pound or kilogram increasing with the fineness of yam. Yam 
fineness was measured by the count, defined as the number of Catalan hanks (madejas) of 
yam -the standard unit of length corresponding to 500 canas, or 777.50 metres- 
weighting 1.1 Catalan pounds or 440 grams.24 Therefore, one hank or 777.50 metres of 
count number 1 weights 440 grams, one hank of count number 10 weights 44 grams.
24 Ferrer Vidal, Jose, Conferencias sobre el arte de hilar y  tejer en general y  especialmente sobre el de 
hilar y  tejer algodon, hechas en el Ateneo Barcelones (Barcelona, 1875), p. 70; Rabasa, Francisco, Tratado 
teorico-practico del sistema de numeracion y  peso de algodones, lana y  estambre (Barcelona, 1923), p. 3.
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Since it took longer to spin one kilogram of yam at higher counts, pay increased with the 
count of yam.
The first public local lists in cotton processing appeared in the early 1840s for
*yr
hand-loom weavers, associated with a short period of formal collective bargaining. 
During the “self-actings conflict” {conflicto de las selfactinas) in 1854, there is evidence
9 Aof the first local lists for power-loom weavers (mechanised looms). A similar list was 
agreed upon in Salient -a  traditional textile town in the Llobregat valley- on March 
1855. Formal collective bargaining made possible other public lists appeared in other 
textile towns like Manresa, Vilanova i la Geltru or Manlleu.
In the case of lists for weaving, the payment associated with each piece of cloth 
depended on the size of the piece and the number of picks. In the 1854 list, the number of 
‘picks’ for each type of piece could vary from 14 to 20. For instance, a piece of size 4/4 
with 14 to 16 picks was paid 11 reales, with every additional two picks being paid an 
additional real. Similarly, a piece of size 6/4 was paid 15 reales for a piece of 14 to 16 
picks and 17 reales for a piece of 18 to 20 picks.
Evidence on cotton spinning local lists is relatively scarce. Manlleu spinners’
90drew up a local list in 1855, but it is not known exactly how it worked. In Barcelona, a 
mixed commission of employers and spinners negotiated a spinning list for Barcelona, 
but conflict over the introduction of self-acting mules postponed every possible 
agreement on the list.
In the 1st Republic (1872-1873), with another period of formal collective 
bargaining, a regional textile union belonging to the 1st International -the Union 
Manufacturera- tried to enforce a regional list which included a 7.5 per cent rise in pay. 
In this case, the regional list contemplated discounts in rates proportional to the distance 
from each town to Barcelona -Barcelona being considered to have the highest cost-of-
25 Olle, Josep Maria, El moviment obrer a Catalunya, 1840-1843 (Barcelona, 1973), p. 109; Bamosell, 
Genis, Els origens del sindicalisme catala (Vic, 1999), p. 130.
26 Benet, Josep and Casimir Marti, Barcelona a mitjan segle XIX. El moviment obrer durant el bienni 
progressista (1854-1856) (Barcelona, 1976), vol. I, pp. 570-572.
27 Ibid., p. 627.
28 Units are not defined. The two units of length used in the period were canas and metres (1 cana being 
equal to 1.56 metres).
29 La Publicidad, morning edition, 17th February 1899.
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living and thus having higher wages.30 However, evidence on the particular form of this 
list is not available.
In the 1880s, thanks to the union press, especially the newspaper of the leading
71cotton textile union, the Tres Clases de Vapor (three steam sections), there is some 
scattered evidence on the nature of lists. As in 1873, the textile unions also tried to 
enforce a regional list, but these efforts failed after the defeat in the general strike of 
1890. Contrary to the previous examples, in the general strike the bargaining of lists was 
made over nominal wages, a standard weekly wage, rather than piece rates. In mechanical 
weaving, nominal earnings for weavers increased with the size of looms, the number of 
shuttles per loom and the type of cloth being produced. For example, the standard wages 
drawn up by the 3 Classes for Manresa (province of Barcelona) stipulated that weavers of 
white fabrics on two looms were to earn from 17 to 18 pesetas per week, those tending 
looms with only one shuttle weaving coloured fabrics from 20 to 21 pesetas and weavers 
tending looms with more than one shuttle from 24 to 25 pesetas?2. In Sant Andreu del 
Palomar (next to Barcelona), target earnings varied with the size of looms, with 19, 21 
and 23 pesetas week being paid to weavers tending looms of 5, 8 and 10 hand spans.
Similarly, in cotton spinning target earnings depended on the size of self-acting 
mules. In Manresa in 1890, nominal weekly wages increased with the number of 
spindles. In self-acting mules of 400 to 500 spindles, spinners were entitled to 19-20 
pesetas week, with pay increasing to 22 to 24 pta for spinners tending 600 to 700 spindles 
and to 25 to 28 pta for those tending 800 to 1000 spindles.34 No premium was given to 
faster machine speeds (self-acting mules could be driven at different revolutions per 
minute). Once workers and managers had agreed upon standard wages, each firm 
adjusted piece rates according to its particular labour productivity, with less productive 
firms paying in principle higher piece rates to meet the required standard.
30 Izard, Miquel, Industrialitzacio i obrerisme: les Tres Classes de Vapor (Barcelona, 1970), p. 171.
31 Refers to the 3 processes o f cotton processing: spinning, weaving, finishing.
32 Dalmases Gil, F., El socialismo en Barcelona (Barcelona, 2nd ed, 1890), p. 15.'
33 Enrech, “L’ofensiva patronal,” p. 448.
34 Ibid:, p. 285.
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6.3. Data.
Data for this study were drawn up from available records of Catalan textile firms -La 
Espaha Industrial, Manufacturas Sedo and Almeda, Alemany y  Cia.- located at the 
National Archive of Catalonia (ANC). There are obvious potential biases in the use of 
these sources to describe labour market conditions. The records of these firms might not 
be representative if they were exceptionally successful in dealing with the problems of 
their product and labour market. However, these firms were selected because they 
represented very different labour market conditions. Contemporaries divided the sector 
into two different areas: the Lowlands {Pla) -which included the steam powered factories 
of the area of Barcelona and coastal towns like Mataro and Vilanova i la Geltru- and the 
Mountain (Muntanya), containing traditional textile towns like Manlleu or Manresa and 
the town mills located on the banks of the rivers Llobregat, Cardener, Ter, and Fresser
-ic
(map of the main Catalan textile towns is provided in the Appendix to the chapter).
Some of the steam powered factories {vapors) in the Lowlands were among the 
largest establishments in the sector. Next to Barcelona, in Les Corts, can Batllo 
concentrated some 2,500 workers circa 1880. Nearby, in Sants, La Espaha Industrial 
employed more than 1,500 workers and Vapor Giiell about 1,000. In the Mountain,
'Xfkbecause water power did not allow large establishment sizes, firms employed between 
150 to 300 workers, with the only exception of Sedo, employing 2,500 workers in 1900. 
The largest concern in Manresa in the late 1880s did not employ more than 300 workers. 
In Manlleu, a spinning centre in the Ter Valley, average establishment size in 1892 was 
187 workers.38
In order to analyse the behaviour of piece rates, I have taken data on earnings in 
the weaving and spinning sections of La Espaha Industrial, Manufacturas Sedo and 
Almeda, Alamany y  Cia. In all these firms, weavers and spinners were paid by the piece, 
except ring spinners at La Espaha Industrial after 1887. In both processes, it is necessary 
to take into account technical change and different skill requirements. Cotton spinning in 
the big factories around Barcelona initially employed female spinners on mules to break
35 IRS, La jom ada.
36 Vails Casas, Pere, De coldnies textils a pare fluvial. E l sistema de colonies textils del Baix Bergueda. 
Genesi i revaloracio (Barcelona, 1999), p. 90.
37 Dorel-Ferre, Les coldnies industrials, p. 301.
38 Sallares y Pla, Juan, E l trabajo de las mujeres y  los nihos. Estudio sobre las condiciones actuales 
(Sabadell, 1992), p. 130.
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out resistance of male spinners employed in mule-jennies. However, the employment 
of women limited the ability of employers to extend the number of spindles per mule 
because longer mules required more physical exertion.40 As a result, men were hired to 
tend the longest mules. A similar process happened in the power looms, where men were 
known to be hired to operate the largest power looms. In fact, between 1840 and 1861 
(the two available benchmark years), the proportion of adult men increased from 5.40 per 
cent to 29 per cent in cotton spinning and from 61.80 to 76.90 per cent in cotton 
weaving.41
In cotton spinning, since the 1880s there was another available technology, ring 
spinning, which substantially reduced skill and strength requirements and had a 
significant productivity advantage in coarse and medium yams 42 Except in Manlleu, 
where male spinners resisted the hiring of women to replace them,43 ring spinners were 
mainly women assisted by a piecer and occasionally a helper, in both cases generally 
young girls.
La Espana Industrial, created in 1847, is representative of the experience of a 
large steam-powered factory of the lowlands. In the 1880s, the firm used 27,332 mule 
spindles and 3,250 throstle spindles and some 900 power looms.44 After a strike lasting 
three and a half months, a reform of machinery in 1887 brought about the substitution of 
rings for mules and throstles. In 1891, 21,288 ring spindles were in place, while the 
number of looms was reduced to 700.45 Both self-acting and ring spinners were women, 
assisted by a piecer and one or two helpers, with each team tending frames of 400 
spindles on average.46 In the weaving rooms, women tended 2 small looms while men 
tended 2 large ones. After 1887, ring spinners in La Espana Industrial were paid time 
rather than piece rates.
39 Benet i Marti, Barcelona a mitjan segle XIX, vol. I, p. 366.
40 On the strength requirements o f self-acting mules: Lazonick, William, “Industrial relations and technical 
change: the case o f the self-acting mule,” Cambridge Journal o f  Economics, 3 (1979), p. 235.
41 Izard, Revolucio industrial, p. 43.
42 Saxonhouse, Gary and Gavin Wright, “Technological evolution in cotton spinning, 1878-1933,” working 
paper Stanford University, January 2000, p. 3.
3 Smith, “Social conflict,” p. 339.
44 Enrech, “L’ofensiva patronal,” p. 275.
45 Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya (ANC), fons La Espana Industrial, “Reforma total de la maquinaria en las 
secciones de preparacion de hilados e hilados” (1887); Enrech, “L’ofensiva patronal,” p. 275.
46 Reforma (1887) gives productivity calculations for rings of 672 and 700 spindles for warp and weft yam  
respectively. However, in the visit o f the officials o f the US department o f Commerce and Labor in 1910, 
frames of 400 spindles on average were reported, much in line with the observed ring sizes in Catalonia. 
Odell, Ralph M, Cotton goods in Spain and Portugal (Washington, 1911), p. 30.
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Sedo was unusually large for a town mill of the Llobregat Valley. The firm was 
created in the mid 19 century when the owner, Mi quel Puig, bought the right to use 
water power from the Llobregat river. By 1875, the firm had already installed 25 000 
spinning spindles and 500 power looms and employed 1,300 workers.47 A new town mill 
was built in 1895 with 1328 inhabitants, the main group being families of four to five
A O
members, most of them employed in the factory. These figures suggest that about half
thof the labour force (of 1,700 to 2,000 workers in the early 20 century) lived in the town 
mill and the rest walked to the factory from the neighbouring towns of Olesa and 
Esparraguera.
In our period, the firm experienced five strikes. In 1882, the employers locked-out 
the entire labour force to layoff union workers.49 In 1885, workers staged a 6 months-
tV»long strike (from September 1885 to the 10 March 1886) to prevent employers from 
increasing the number of looms and mules tended by workers.50 In 1890, workers went 
on strike in solidarity with the textile workers of Manresa. In 1899, a strike lasting five 
weeks was staged to demand an increase of pay of 25 per cent for weavers. In November 
1900, a strike took place after employers tried to reduce wages by 5 to 8 per cent. The 
strike ended on February 1901 when the pay cut was withdrawn.51
At Sedo, loom sizes ranged between 1 and 2.70 metres. Men generally tended two 
large looms, while women tended two small ones. Before 1903, most spinners were 
men. Men tended one mule with the help of one assistant, while both men and women 
tended one ring with the help of a piecer and a helper. For example, in 1901, the firm 
employed 201 men and 89 women in its spinning room. However, in 1903, a fire 
destroyed the spinning section (according to workers, it was deliberately started by 
employers) and the firm replaced all male spinners with women.54 Warp spinners tended 
one ring assisted by a helper, while weft spinners with a helper operated two rings. Weft 
spinning additionally used a group of ancillary workers to do away with the heavy spools
47 Dorel-Ferre, Les coldnies industrials, p. 268.
48 Ibid., p. 358.
49 Ibid., p. 382.
50 Ibid., p. 385.
51 Ibid., p. 392.
52 Ibid., p. 404.
53 Enrech, “L’ofensiva patronal,” p. 255.
54 Dorel-Ferre, Les coldnies industrials, p. 393.
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of yam.55 Sedo installed relatively small rings bought to the British manufacturers 
Howard&Bulloughs of 280 and 256 spindles respectively.56
Almeda, Alamany and Cia was a river factory located in Manlleu employing 197
c n
workers in 1903. As most firms in Manlleu, the firm specialised in cotton spinning and 
employed exclusively male spinners throughout the period. The firm started to produce in 
1882 with eight mules of 312 to 404 spindles and 2,626 spindles in total. From 1885 
onwards, Almeda only bought rings of about 350 spindles, using 3,772 ring spindles in 
1900.58
In all three cases, data were taken on pay and output in the spinning and weaving 
rooms from payroll ledgers (llibres de salaris). Since wages were earned on a weekly 
basis, I sampled the ledgers by choosing only weeks corresponding to early March, early 
June, mid September, and late November. In the case of Sedo, because only ledgers from 
week 13, 26, 39, and 52 have survived and the series only covers 1900 to 1912, with two 
additional wage books from 1895, all available ledgers were selected to maximise the 
number of observations.
Little is known about how pay varied in the spinning and weaving rooms. In the 
case of spinning, it is possible to analyse if  systematic differences in the output 
performance of spinners and their teams producing differences in pay. The available 
evidence suggests that, at least in spinning, piece rates were not used to pay a premium to 
abler spinners because there were not large differences in individual or team 
performance. In the case of mule spinning, the conclusion from an exercise with 16 
randomly selected self-acting mules from La Espana Industrial seems to be that 
differences in performance were very small: differences in yam quality -measured by the 
count- explain above 90 per cent of the variation in productivity per day (see table A6.2 
in appendix).59 A similar exercise was done for ring spinners selecting 10 rings in each 
spinning room. Results do not show the same level of homogeneity as the regression with
55 Ibid., p. 255.
56 ANC, fons Manufactures Sedo, “Maquinaria existente.”
57 Enrech, “L’ofensiva patronal,” p. 262.
58 Ibid., p. 452.
59 See table 2A n the appendix to the chapter. Three weeks per year were selected for 16 randomly selected 
mules and output per day was regressed against yam quality, a time trend and 16 fixed effects.
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mules, but still differences among rings once yam quality is controlled for were below 12
> 60 per cent.
6.4. Price and quantity adjustments, 1890-1910.
Evidence o f  viece rates stickiness.
Cotton spinning.
In the Catalan textile sector, with the exception of short periods of collective bargaining, 
lists were bargained between workers and their firms in absence of formal bargaining 
procedures and, in most cases, in absence of a union. However, the evidence collected 
shows piece rates remained fixed in a period of frequent economic downturns, leading to 
the existence of piece rate stickiness. In fact, there is some evidence piece rates were 
adjusted upwards, but only exceptionally downwards. Changes in piece rates did not 
correspond to cyclical downturns or upturns.
This view is corroborated by evidence on piece rates for particular types of count 
over 1890 to 1910. Piece rate changes are found in table 6.2, figures from Sedo and La 
Espana Industrial correspond to female spinners while Almeda only employed male 
spinners (piece rates were substantially higher, about double the piece rates of women). 
In table 6.2A, I show piece rates were fixed for the most common yams in the mule 
spinning section of La Espana Industrial between 1880 and 1886, which includes the bad 
business years of 1885 and 1886. In Sedo (table 6.2B), nominal piece rates increased by 3 
to 20 per cent between , 1901 and 1910 and do not show downward adjustments. At 
Almeda, between 1890 and 1910, piece rates remained stable across most count types. In 
the period 1886-1890, piece rates in ring spinning were cut by 10 to 20 per cent, but this 
could well correspond to a period of experimentation after the rings were first introduced 
in 1886 (in fact, in self-acting spinning, rates were not cut). This cut does not correspond 
with an economic downturn; rather, the firm’s output was increasing very fast. 
Afterwards, piece rates remained fixed during the whole period. Rates corresponding to
60 Again, this a fixed effects regression. In the case o f Sedo and La Espana Industrial, I chose 10 rings 
spinning warp yam and regressed their kilograms of yam produced per day in a given week against count, a 
time trend and fixed effects. In the Almeda regression, all ring spinning machines of the company are 
included.
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the common twist yam count 24 in the self-acting mules kept constant during the whole 
period.
Table 6.2. Piece rate changes, ring and self-acting spinning.
6.2A. La Espana Industrial, self-acting spinning 1880-1886.
1880-1884 1885-1886
Warp yam, count 22 0.593 reales/kg 
Warp yam, count 32 0.985 reales/kg
0.593 reales/kg 
0.985 reales/kg
6.2B. Sedo, 1901-1910. Pts oerkiloeram
14 warp 20 warp 26 warp 55 warp
March 1901 
December 1901 
March 1904
0.029 0.046 
0.0307 0.0487 
0.0350 0.0501
0.0742 0.18 
0.0742 0.1908 
0.0764 0.1908
6.2C. Almeda, 1886-1910. Pts per kilogram
1886 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
Self-acting mules, twist yam, 
number 24.
0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165 0.165
Rings, warp 14 Na na 0.074 0.074 0.075 Na
Rings, warp 16 0.096 0.085 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.086
Ring,s warp 18 0.1103 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.097 0.098
Rings, warp 20 0.1103 0.127 0.101 0.112 0.104 0.104
Source: see text.
Weaving.
In spite of the existence of many different types of woven cloth, detailed examination of 
piece rates at La Espana Industrial of the most common types of cloth suggests piece 
rates were also sticky in the weaving rooms of Catalan factories. For example, between 
1880 and 1886, piece rates did not change in spite of including two bad business years 
such as 1885 and 1886 (table 6.3A). However, in 1887, there was a piece rate cut of 
about 30 per cent when the firm laid off most of its male weavers and hired women 
(piece rates varied between men and women).61 The cut took place under very 
exceptional circumstances when the firm re-organised its spinning section and activity 
was stopped or slowed during almost one year and a half. After 1888, piece rates 
remained fixed or with little adjustments up to 1910. During the period there was a shift
61 Pay did not necessarily fall, the average number of pieces produced in a given week increased by 35 per 
cent while average piece rates fell only by 30 per cent (values o f 1880-1885 are compared to those of 1890- 
1900).
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towards the production of more expensive pieces of the type liso or bordon. As a result, 
average nominal piece rates increased from 1.94 ptas piece to 2.92 in 1905 and further to 
5.38 in 1910, with a percentage increase between 1890 and 1910 of 177 per cent.
Evidence from Sedo suggests that the rising rates per piece of cloth depended on 
the pieces getting heavier. In the case of Sedo, calculating average rates per piece showed 
an increase of 119 per cent between 1895 and 1910 (table 6.3C). Increases in the rate paid 
per metre of cloth are in the same order of magnitude, with an increase of 61 per cent in 
the rate per metre paid between 1900 and 1910 (between 1900 and 1910 the average 
piece rate increased by 69 per cent). The average length of pieces grew from 82 metres 
per piece in 1901 to 86 in 1910, an increase of 4.9 per cent over the period. The 
explanation for the surprising rise in the piece rates is provided by the evolution of the 
weight of pieces. At Sedo, between 1895 and 1910 the average weight of pieces increased 
from 12.88 kilograms per piece to 22.49 kilograms, i.e. an increase of 74.6 per cent.62 At 
the same time, the rate per kilogram of cloth grew by 30.8 per cent. These two changes 
together bring about an increase in the rate per piece of 129 per cent (1.75*1.31), 
explaining the 119 per cent rise in the price of pieces observed between 1895 and 1910.
Average piece rates at Sedo also show that piece rates were sticky. The average 
rate per kilogram proxies the rate per pick, while the average rate per metre proxies the 
premium for longer pieces (table 6.3D). In spite of having an increasing trend, average 
rates per kilogram fell in 1905 with respect to 1900. However, the increase in the average 
rate per metre more than compensated the fall in the rate per kilogram, the combined rate 
per kilogram-metre grew by 11 per cent between 1900 and 1905.
62 The increase was continuous in time. In 1895, the average weight o f pieces was 12.88 kilograms, in 
1900, it was 14.78, in 1905 it was 19.072, and in 1910, 22.49 kilograms per piece.
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Table 6.3. Piece rates changes, cotton weaving.
Table 6.3A. La Espana Industrial, 1880-1886. Reales per piece.
Type 1880-84 1885-1886
4/4 3a 11.82 11.82
4/4 2a 12.63 12.63
4/4 Madras 10 10
6/4 Madras 18 18
Entrefmo primera 8.80 8.80
Entrefmo segunda 8.80 8.80
Molesquin 4/4 39 39
Table 6.3B. La Espana Industrial, 1890-1910. Reales per piece.
Type 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
4/4 3a 8 na na Na na
4/4 18 7 7 7 Na na
4/4 Madras Vi 8.50 8.50 8.50 na na
4/4 Molesquin 3a 18 18 18 19 19
4/4 Molesquin 4a na 24 24 25.50 na
4/4 Franela na 6.20 6.50 7 na
4/4 setina la na 13 na 15 na
4/4 Bordon na na 34 37 37
4/4 Liso D na na na 42 42
5/4 Franela l a na na 6.50 6.90 6.80
5/4 chagrin 8 8 8 na na
6/4 Encuad na na 13 13 13
6/4 Madras 2“ 10 10 10 na na
Table 6.3C. La Espana Industrial, 1890-1910.
Year Average piece rate. Average labour productivity 
Ptas piece. (pieces per week)
1880 2.905 5.65
1885 3.139 3.83
1890 1.937 6.73
1895 1.970 6.57
1900 2.423 5.91
1905 2.916 6.06
1910 5.377 3.67
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Table 6.3D. Sedo. 1895-1910
Year Average rate per 
piece of cloth
Average rate per 
kg
Average rate per 
metre
1895 2.76 0.214 n. a.
1901 3.59 0.252 0.044
1905 4.59 0.241 0.051
1910 6.07 0.280 0.071
Source: see text.
Adjustment to economic downturns.
In this section, I will analyse employers’ responses to economic downturns addressing 
explicitly the pattern of adjustment in the sector to gain insights on how the cotton textile 
labour market operated. By doing this, I follow other historical studies that compare the 
output, nominal wage and labour input changes over the business cycle to characterise 
historical labour markets that did not have institutional impediments to nominal 
adjustment like minimum wages or state-enforced collective bargaining.63 As I will show, 
since piece rates were rigid, price rigidity produced quantity adjustments. Firms 
responded to declines in economic activity by adjusting output, hours of work (short- 
time), and employment.
In our period, there were three identifiable economic downturns producing a 
decline in sales and excess capacity: 1898, 1900 and 1904. The first two crises are related 
to the Cuba war of 1898 because Cuba was the main export market of the Catalan textile 
industry.64 The crisis of 1904 according to the employers’ press was an overproduction 
crisis caused in part by a rise in raw material prices.65 In order to identify declines in 
sales, I regressed the logarithm of weekly output against a constant and a time trend. 
Economic crises were identified when there were more than three observations below 
trend (9 months below trend). Then I compare the values of the relevant variables with 
values corresponding to good years (above trend). In table 6.4, I present results for this
63 Huberman, Michael, “Invisible handshakes in Lancashire: cotton spinning in the first half o f the 19th 
century,” Journal o f  Economic History, 46, 4 (1986); Sundstrom, “Was there a golden age,”; Sundstrom, 
William A., “Rigid wages or small equilibrium adjustments? Evidence from the contraction of 1893,” 
Explorations in Economic History, 29 (1992); Carter and Sutch, “The labor market.”
64 Nadal, Jordi, “La industria cotonera,” p. 64, in Nadal, Jordi, Jordi Maluquer de Motes and Francesc 
Cabana (eds.), Histdria Econdmica de la Catalunya contemporanea, vol. 3 (Barcelona, 1991).
65 El Trabajo Nacional, numbers 312 and 313, first page, July and August 1904.
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exercise carried out with data from the spinning and weaving rooms at Sedo and La 
Espana Industrial.
Table 6.4. Labour input and wage adjustments to output fluctuations.
Sedo, spinning Sep 1903- 
Dec 1904
June 1909- 
March 1910
Output (kgs) -54.54 -14.38
Employment -41.13 -11.85
Labour productivity- 
week
-23.19 -2.01
Average rate per 
kilogram
13.89 10.53
Nominal weekly wage -12.36 8.78
La Espana Industrial, Sep 1900- Nov 1902- March 1910
spinning June 1901 March 1904 -N o v  1911
Output (kgs) -23.67 -29.81 -25.54
Employment -24.32 -25.5 -10.08
Labour productivity -  
week (Y/L)
1.56 -3.17 -17.44
Average rate per kg 2.82 10 7.95
Nominal weekly wage 4.24 12.03 -11.29
Sedo, weaving Dec 1903- March 1910-
June 1904 Sep 1911
Output (kgs) -38.73 -18.01
Employment -37.58 -14.17
Labour productivity -  
week (Y/L)
7.11 -14.72
Average rate per kg -7.06 13.99
Nominal weekly wage -0.77 -1.62
La Espana Industrial, Nov 1898- March 1903- March 1910-
weaving June 1899 March 1904 J\Jarch 1911
Output (pieces) -26.02 -38.52 -44.05
Employment 4.1 -21.48 -15.49
Labour productivity -  
week (Y/L)
-28.74 -15.76 -34.98
Average rate per kg 17.07 33.36 62.14
Nominal weekly wage -15.09 2.19 1.68
Source: see text and appendix.
The magnitude of the fall in output in the cases being analysed was indeed large. 
For example, output in the spinning rooms of Sedo fell by 54 per cent in late 1903 and 
early 1904 with respect to average output in the previous two years. The company reacted 
by cutting employment by 41 per cent and working short-time. The magnitude of the 
negative adjustment in the number of hours worked is proxied by the average weekly 
labour productivity (weekly output divided by the number of workers on payroll) because 
data on hours or days of work in a given week are not available. The difference between
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the two periods was 23 per cent, which would mean that, if the levels of daily 
productivity were kept constant, the firm worked on average 4.62 days instead of 6. On 
the other hand, the average rate per kilogram of spun yam showed considerable counter­
cyclicality, with an increase of 14 per cent caused by upward changes in the average 
quality of spun yam. As a result, nominal weekly wages only fell by 12 per cent.
The recession of the late 1909 and early 1910 was milder, with output falling only 
by 14.38 per cent. Layoffs were limited to a 5.17 per cent of the workforce while short- 
time -measured by the fall in weekly labour productivity- was only 2.01 per cent in this 
case. Because the firm adjusted mainly through layoffs and quality was countercyclical, 
the nominal weekly wage increased by 8.78 per cent.
Compared to Sedo, the elasticity of employment with respect to output was larger 
in the spinning rooms of La Espana Industrial In two of the three recessions that I have 
identified, the fall in employment was of the same magnitude than the fall in output, 
reducing the need to work short-time. Accordingly, weekly labour productivity increased 
or fell only slightly in both recessions. Average weekly wages and the average rate per 
kilogram increased during both downturns. Only in the latest economic downturn, March 
1910-June 1911, did the firm resort to both lay-offs and short-hour working (minus 10 
per cent and minus 17.4 per cent respectively).
Still in table 6.4, the same exercise was repeated in the case of the weaving rooms 
of Sedo and La Espana Industrial Again, the response to large economic downturns was 
adjusting labour input rather than prices. In the case of Sedo, the firm adjusted the fall in 
output (measured by the number of kilograms of woven cloth) through a combination of 
lay-offs and short-time. In the downturn of early 1904, the firm adjusted only by reducing 
employment: with output falling by 39 per cent, employment fell by 38 per cent, while 
weekly labour productivity grew by 7 per cent. During the second economic downturn in 
1910-1911, with output falling by 18 per cent, short-time was 14.7 per cent.
Evidence on the weaving rooms of La Espana Industrial is more difficult to 
interpret given the fact that the output variable is measured in terms of pieces of cloth, 
which varied in characteristics over the cycle. From December 1898 to June 1899, output 
fell by 26 per cent but the firm did not reduce employment. Instead, it reduced weekly
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labour productivity by 28.74 per cent to accommodate the reduction in sales. Average 
weekly wages only fell by 15.09 per cent because at the same time the average piece rate 
was increasing by 17.07 per cent because pieces of cloth of higher quality were being 
produced. In the other two economic downturns in early 1904 and 1910, the company 
resorted to a combination of lay-offs and short-hour working. As a consequence of the 
employment adjustment and the increase in average piece rates, nominal weekly wages 
increased in both recessions.
Labour input adjustments.
The results in the previous section can be improved in three directions. First of all, I will 
like to depict the aggregate picture of movements in output, short-time and employment 
rather than one that is only focused on particular downturns. In this regard, it is useful to 
aggregate all output, short-time and employment changes. Second, due to our sampling 
method which takes three or four weekly observations per year, some fluctuations can 
simply be seasonal. Thus a method to correct for purely seasonal variation is needed. 
Finally, upward movements in average piece rates during economic downturns suggest it 
is worthwhile to control for quality movements over the cycle. Since downturns are 
associated with higher piece rates, there is a concern that declines in total product might 
be confused with simple increases in average quality reducing the physical quantity of 
output being produced. This is simple to control for in the case of spinning where I could 
collect at a reasonable cost the average count for the different types of yam (warp and 
weft).
In order to incorporate these improvements, I have regressed the logarithm of the 
weekly amount of spun yam against a constant, a time trend, and dummies for each of the 
weeks selected in the study.66 In two firms, I also included a yam quality control. In the 
case of Almeda, I used the average count of warp yam and I calculated for La Espana 
Industrial a composite index of average warp and weft yam multiplied by the shares of 
warp and weft yam in the total weight of yam produced in a given week. I did the same 
exercise with the logarithm of weekly labour productivity, also including a quality 
control. In Almeda, because employment figures were not reported, I used output per
66 I tried different trends: linear, quadratic and experimented with trends including lagged values o f the 
dependent variable as independent variables. Including lagged values obviously diminished the size of 
fluctuations about trend, but results did not vary substantially. Results presented here use linear trends only.
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spindle to proxy labour productivity given that capital-labour ratios did not vary in the 
period. The rest of variables were regressed against a constant, a trend and dummies for 
each week (all variables expressed in natural logarithms). Then, negative deviations of 
output with respect to trend were added up and compared to adjustments about trend in
fJlthe rest of variables. All differences with respect to trend are expressed in percentages.
Some caveats however are necessary preventing a straightforward interpretation 
of the pattern of employment and hours adjustment. Given my sampling procedure, I 
capture more precisely short-run adjustments than adjustments that are lagged in time. 
Since employment cuts meant the loss of trained workers and firm-specific human 
capital, employers might have delayed cuts until the trough of the recession was reached. 
If this was the case, then my procedure would underestimate the magnitude of the 
adjustment. In order to avoid the problem of lagged adjustment, I have calculated the sum 
of the absolute values of positive and negative deviations with respect to trend. 
Employment and labour productivity adjustments to negative output deviations capture 
the (short-run) “sensitivity” of these variables to changes in output, whereas adding up all 
deviations about trend captures the size of cyclical adjustment in each of the variables.
67 This follows Huberman, Michael, “How did labor markets work in Lancashire? More evidence on prices 
and quantitities in cotton spinning, 1822-185,” Explorations in Economic History, 28 (1991). As well, 
Huberman, “The economic origins o f paternalism: Lancashire cotton spinning in the first half o f the 19th 
century,” Social History>, XII, 2 (1987).
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Table 6.5. Adjustment to output declines, cotton spinning. 1880-1910. Cumulative 
percentage deviations about trend compared to negative output deviations with respect to
trend.
Table 6.5A. La Espana Industrial. 1880-1886 (mule spinning).
Output kgs Employment Labour
Productivity
Week
Negative deviations -31.7 -11.5 -59.2
with respect to
trend
Quality adjusted -30.0 - 10.0 -54
All deviations with 60.0 36.7 116.2
respect to trend
(quality adjusted)
Table 6.5B. La Espana Industrial, 1891-1910. Ring spinning.
Output kgs Employment Labour
Productivity
Week
Negative deviations -74.7 -39.5 -108.9
with respect to
trend
Quality adjusted -65.5 -39.7 -91.7
All deviations 132.9 127.5 212.5
with respect to 
trend (quality 
adjusted)_____
Table 6.5C. Almeda, Alamany, y Cia.. 1886-1910. Ring spinning.
Output kgs Output per spindle -
______________________________ week________________
Negative deviations -48.6 -343.7
With respect to trend
Quality adjusted__________-45____________________ -330.7______________
Table 6.5D. Sedo, ring spinning 1900-1910.
Output
Kilograms
Employment Labour
productivity -  
week
Negative deviations -41.6 -33.6 -48.2
with respect to trend
All deviations 81.14 106.2 112.9
Source: see text.
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The results in table 6.5 show how correcting for yam quality removes some of the 
variance of both the output and labour productivity variables but still the conclusions 
drawn from table 6.4 are still valid. The main adjustment mechanism for firms in the face 
of negative demand shocks was working short-time, measured by the decline in average 
weekly labour productivity. In all the four cases, changes in average weekly labour 
productivity are bigger than changes in output. This is especially the case in Almeda and 
mule and ring spinners in La Espana Industrial, where short-time was more important 
than lay-offs. In Sedo, the size of the adjustment through employment and labour 
productivity is of similar magnitude (perceptible using both only negative and all 
deviations).
Table 6.6 Adjustment to output declines, cotton weaving, 1889-1910. Cumulative
Table 6.6A. Sedo, weaving, 1900-1910.
Output
(kilograms)
Employment Labour 
productivity 
(kilograms week)
Negative 
deviations 
All deviations
-24.19
48.38
-3.68
54.69
-56.2
139.27
Output (metres) Employment Labour 
productivity 
(metres week)
Negative 
deviations 
All deviations
-25.31
50.61
-5.48
54.69
-65.35
203.51
Table 6.6B. La Espanva Industrial, weaving 1889-1910.
Output (pieces) Employment Labour 
productivity 
(pieces week)
Negative -110.9 -20.7 -382.9
deviations
All deviations 221.8 100.1 881.6
Table 6.6 presents the results of the same exercise in cotton weaving. The results 
for Sedo, calculated for both kilograms and metres, show again the same pattern of 
adjustment through short-time and employment, with short-time being the main form of 
adjustment. Compared to spinning, employment fluctuations are remarkably smaller if
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only at negative deviations are considered. When all deviations are included, differences 
with respect to trend are similar in output and employment, while deviations of weekly 
labour productivity are much higher. In part, this was caused by the fact that weavers 
were more skilled personnel than ring spinners, so that managers might have been 
reluctant to lose trained workers. Furthermore, weavers probably enjoyed some additional 
bargaining power because half of weavers were adult men, a group that traditionally 
formed the backbone of unionism in the sector. In this sense, employment levels 
fluctuated less around their trend line.
The conclusions from section 6.4 are clear enough. On the one hand, piece rates 
were remarkably rigid, not varying or even increasing over time since 1890. In section 
6 .4 ,1 have shown the main pattern of adjustment to economic downturns based on labour 
input adjustments. Among these, short-time was especially important in cotton weaving, 
while employment seems to be more elastic in the short-run in cotton spinning.
The pattern of short-weeks or short-time needs some elaboration since working 
short-time to accommodate reductions in demand is rare in modem times. It could be 
argued that short time benefited employers because it reduced the total wage bill and the 
weekly wage paid to an individual worker. But for employers, the relevant unit was not 
the weekly wage but the labour cost per unit of output -and unitary labour costs were 
fixed. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine that all firms would collude to reduce output, 
so short time firms might be losing market shares in favour of full time working firms. 
Second, employers could lose good workers to full-time working firms. However, there 
are several reasons why employers might be willing to abide to these practices. For 
example, managers might want to hoard labour to avoid losing skilled personnel to
y'O
competitors and reducing the migration of valuable workers. On the part of workers, 
short time could be seen as a way to preserve lengthy attachments with the same firm and 
as a fair way to spread the costs of unemployment and obtain some earnings in the 
absence of unemployment insurance.69 Moreover, short time working protected rates in 
economic downturns. For example, a rule could exist in which firms can cut piece rates in 
downturns and work full time (for example, under a sliding scale system), with the
68 Kiesling, Lynne L., “Institutional choice matters: the Poor Law and implicit labor contracts in Victorian 
Lancashire,” Explorations in Economic History, 33 (1996), p. 70.
69 Huberman, “Economic origins,” p. 14; Huberman, Michael, Escape from the market: negotiating work in 
Lancashire (Cambridge, UK, 1996), chapter 5.
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commitment to raise them again in upturns. However, this was rarely the case because, as 
some experiences in the 1880s show (discussed below), workers feared firms would 
renege on their commitments.
6.5. Causes of piece rate rigidity.
Adjustment to economic downturns by working short-time and cutting employments 
with sticky piece rates raises questions about the origins of nominal rigidity in the 
Catalan cotton textile sector. Below I discuss models of piece rate bargaining in which 
firms need to elicit the co-operation of workers to introduce innovations and increase 
labour productivity. The theoretical base of these models is the existence of informational 
asymmetries between workers and managers leading to the payment of an efficiency 
wage. On the other hand, insider-outsider models of wage and employment setting show 
that insiders with some degree of job security can resist wage cuts even in the event of an
7 nexcess supply of labour. The main reason for this is that ‘insiders’ -the workers with 
some degree of job security- are not perfectly interchangeable with unemployed or other 
available workers, either because insiders are more productive or can resist the hiring of 
outsiders.71
Informational asymmetries.
The design of an incentive system that extracts the maximum effort from workers at the 
lower cost for employers has been a traditional concern among industrial relations 
specialists, managers and economists. Because piece rates pay workers for the output 
they really produce, this method of payment solves problems associated with hidden 
information (for example, the adverse selection of workers with low levels of ability and 
dexterity) and hidden action (related to shirking on the job). Edward Lazear shows that 
piece rates are found where output is individual and easily observable, employers face an 
heterogeneous pool of workers with different skill levels, and supervisory costs are 
high.72
70 Lindbeck, Assar and Dennis Snower, “Cooperation, harrassment, and involuntary unemployment: an 
insider-outsider approach,” American Economic Review, 78, 2 (1988).
71 Solow, The labor market, p. 34.
72 Lazaer, “Salaries and piece rates,” p. 427.
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The cotton textile industry conformed to this pattern. The output of individuals or 
work groups was easily observable (kilograms of spun yam or pieces of cloth). 
Additionally, fast urban growth in the textile towns and internal migratory movements 
generated a labour force that varied in skill levels and in commitment to industrial
7 7work. Evidence about increasing supervisory costs is more mixed and difficult to
tViinterpret. In the mid 19 century Catalan establishment sizes were small compared, for 
example, to Lancashire. In 1850 Catalan cotton factories employed on average 86 
workers while in Lancashire the figure was 171.74
n c
In the historical literature, firms over 150 employees are considered to be large. 
By the early 1860s, the proportion of workers in establishments over 200 employees was 
14 per cent in cotton spinning and 17 per cent in weaving and mixed fabrics, 
corresponding to five and establishments in cotton spinning and 16 in weaving. 
Therefore, the ‘monitoring costs’ hypothesis cannot account for 68 per cent of cotton 
spinning workers and 67 per cent of weaving workers paid by the piece employed in 
establishments with less than 100 workers in 1861. The most plausible explanation is that 
cotton firms paid by the piece because it was the traditional form of payment in the 
putting-out stage of the textile industry and, as Enriqueta Camps has shown, customary 
practices from traditional manufacturing were adopted to organise work in the early
77factories.
The literature on incentive schemes stresses that piece rates are difficult to 
implement when employers and workers gain experience on a new technology because it 
is difficult to set the optimal rate. The main problem is the fact that employers cannot 
abstain from cutting piece rates when workers’ earnings increase with rising labour 
productivity. This in turn leads to strategic behaviour by workers, restricting effort levels,
70
not revealing their lull productivity potential or resisting technical change. Repeated 
interaction in long-run organisations can avoid this sort of problem if both employers and 
workers create reputations signalling the co-operative equilibrium in which workers give
73 On migratory movements, Camps, Enriqueta, La formacion del mercado de trabajo, chapter 2.
74 Roses, Joan Ramon, “The early phase of Catalan industrialisation, 1830-1861,” p. 166, unpublished PhD 
dissertation, European University Institute, 1998.
75 Huberman, “How did labor markets work?,” p. 88 .
76 Roses, “The early phase,” tables 7.5 and 7.8, pp. 20-213.
77 Camps, “La teoria del capital humano,” pp. 332-333.
78 Miller, Managerial dilemmas, chapter 5.
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the full effort and co-operate in the introduction of new techniques and firms never cut
70rates of pay (piece rates can decrease but less than the increase in labour productivity).
Informational asymmetries might have been important when new machinery was 
introduced in Catalonia and adapted to local conditions. Self-acting mules appeared in 
1844 and expanded from 83,268 spindles recorded in 1850 to 763,051 in 1861.80 The 
number of power looms increased from 210 in 1841, to 4,109 in 1850, 9652 in 1861 and
o 1
approximately 29,000 in 1870. However, there are grounds to think that both the self- 
acting mule and power-loom technologies were quite ‘mature’ when introduced in Spain. 
This meant the process of experimentation on the technology was finished and the 
sources of potential information asymmetries were quite limited. In the self-acting mules, 
physical productivity per spindle changed little between 1860 to 1885, with available 
estimates clustering around 20 kgs per year and spindle. Some estimates are given in 
table 6.7 (results are for a 64 hours working week, assuming full capacity and the same 
number of working days in the 1860s than in the 1880s). Estimates for the 1860s are 
calculated for the average count, which fluctuated between 20 and 30 (Catalan count), 
medium range quality of yam. For the 1880s, figures are given for counts 22, 24 and 32. 
Calculations of physical productivity in the sector were generally done with counts 
between 20 and 24.82
79 This is discussed in ibid., chapter 9.
80 On the arrival o f self-actors, Benet i Marti, Barcelona a mitjan segle XIX, vol. I, p. 543.
81 Izard, Revolucio industrial, p. 21.
82 Ramoneda, Alfredo, Introduccion al estudio del precio de coste en la hilatura de algodon (Barcelona,
1915), p. 189.
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Table 6.7. Phvsical nroductivitv of mule spindles, 1860-1885.
Source Year . Average number 
o f spindles in 
mules
Count Kgs per spindle 
(one year)
Instituto 1860 20.9
Industrial
Espana Industrial 1860 20.9
Gimenez Guited 1861 22.6
Espana Industrial 1880 320 22 (warp) 24.29
32 (warp) 16.73
Almeda 1885 333 24 (warp) 20.55
(Manlleu)
Sources: data for the 1860s, Roses (1998), p. 77. Espaha Industrial from Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya 
(ANC), Fons La Espana Industrial, “Salaris”, 1880. Data on spindles from ANC, Fons La Espana 
Industrial, “Reforma total de la maquinaria en las secciones de preparation de hilados e Hilados. Su costo y 
economia anual” (1887). Almeda, ANC, Fons Almeda, Alemany y Cia., “Salaris”.
Qualitative evidence also points to the fact that new technologies were easily 
diffused. In 1872, a cotton manufacturer commenting on the use of self-acting mules 
remarked “in Spain and France, Germany, Belgium, England, Switzerland, Russia and 
other nations use the same more or less improved self-acting mules with different number 
of spindles. This means that a factory to spin cotton uses nowadays the same machinery 
no matter where in the world it is located. Frequently, machinery producers like Platt, 
Parr Curtis, Higghins (sic) and other English producers, and the Koechlins and 
Schlumberger from Alsace, sell machinery to different countries in the world.” 
Generally, most of these firms not only supplied spinning machinery, but also an entire 
package of ancillary services including technological information and expert advice. 
Therefore, productivity differences in mule spinning were caused by different mule sizes 
and mule speeds and staffing levels -the number of workers per machine- which 
depended on local conditions.
In this context, a possibility for co-operative technical change existed in the form 
of increases in mule speeds and mule and power loom sizes (the number of spindles per 
mule or the length of looms) and increases in the number of machines tended by each 
worker. This situation generated potential margins of adjustment bringing about what in
83 Ferrer Vidal, Conferencias, pp. 71-72.
84 Saxonhouse and Wright, “Technological evolution,” p. 4; Bruland, Kristine, “Skills, learning and the 
international diffusion o f technology,” in Berg, M. and K. Bruland (eds.), Technological revolutions in 
Europe (Cheltenham, UK, 1998).
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the literature is called “worker-sponsored technical change” -increases in firm-specific 
skills or in mule or loom-specific skills, i.e. continuous improvements of an existing
or
technology. The literature opposes this concept to “manager-sponsored technical 
change” when firms invest in new equipment not requiring or requiring little of 
previously existing skills. A result in the literature of piece rate management is that cuts 
in piece rates are not justified when technical change is “worker-sponsored” but are 
unavoidable when technical change is “manager-sponsored”.
Evidence on technical change in the Catalan textile industry is mixed. There are 
periods in which technological change is manager-sponsored: the transition from hand- 
loom weaving to power-looms (intense in the 1860s), from mull-jennies to self-acting 
mules (in the 1850s and 1860s) in spinning, and later on from mules to rings (in the 
1880s). Automatic looms and high-drafting spinning were not introduced until the 1920s.
In the case of rings, the potential for productivity improvement was exploited 
from very early on with a spinner and a helper minding rings of 400 to 500 spindles. 
Here, the information gap on new practices seems to have been small and managers 
decided in some cases to switch to time rates -as in La Rambla or La Espana Industrial. 
Productivity advances in ring spinning were necessary small. According to the evidence 
collected from the records of British producers Howard & Bulloughs, output per spindle
527did not increase between 1885 and 1910. Evidence from Spanish ring purchases from 
British producers shows how, between 1884 and 1914, the average size of new rings 
increased by only 1.9 per cent (from 417 spindles in the period 1884-1890 to 425.2 in 
1907-1914), while machine speeds of new purchases fell from an average 8,500 
revolutions per minute in 1884-1890 to 8,400 in 1907-1914.88 Furthermore, capital to 
labour ratios did not increase in the period. Therefore, this suggests managers had a clear 
idea of how much could be produced with the new rings and this did not require the co­
operation of their workforces. This led to a one-off increase in labour productivity for 
coarse and medium yams in the late 1880s and early 1890s but no further or minimal 
improvements up to 1914-1918.
85 Carmichael and MacLeod, “Worker cooperation,” pp. 3-4.
86 Ibid., p. 4.
87 Saxonhouse, Gary M., “Productivity change and labor absorption in Japanese cotton spinning,” Quarterly 
Journal o f Economics, 91 ,2  (1977), p. 216, footnote 38.
88 Saxonhouse and Wright, “Technological evolution.” In Odell’s Cotton goods purchases o f rings o f 400 to 
420 spindles are reported in the late 1900s.
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It is more difficult to examine the trend of potential sources of worker sponsored 
productivity growth on the ‘mature’ self-acting mule and power loom technologies. 
Information on characteristics of power loom purchases over time is very scarce. There is 
some more evidence on self-acting spinning. Evidence on self-acting mules bought in the
OQ
1850s and early 1860s, show the number of spindles fluctuated between 320 to 500. 
Mules ordered by Spanish factories to the machinery producers Platt Brothers collected 
by Gary Saxonhouse and Gavin Wright show increasing mule sizes towards an average 
of 711.6 spindles in the period 1878-1883 and 882.5 for 1884-1890. Mule speeds also 
increased from 6,800 r.p.m. in 1878-1883 to 9,700 rpm in 1891-1898. Mule size of new 
purchases increased by 24 per cent and average speed by 43 per cent, if staffing levels 
(capital to labour ratios) remained the same this means a crude potential productivity 
increase of 77 per cent in 20 years
However, the rate of technical change seems to have been more modest. This is 
due to the fact that increasing mule sizes was only possible in firms spinning finer counts, 
which were already experimenting with mules of well over 500 spindles in the 1880s.90 
Coarse yam producers like La Espana Industrial spun warp yam in 1887 with 49 mules 
of 320 spindles and weft yam with 39 self-acting mules of 343 spindles.91 Another coarse 
spinner, La Rambla, bought 5 self-acting mules of 410 spindles in 1853, 6 mules of 452 
spindles between 1859 and 1869, and 3 mules of 500 spindles in 1867. This means the 
average number of spindles in mules increased from 410 in 1853 to 447 in 1867, a 9 per 
cent increase over 14 years or 0.62 per year. Almeda, Alamany y  Cia used mules of 312 
spindles purchased in the early 1880s, later on buying mules of 360 and 404 spindles.93 
By 1913, the most quoted figure for the average number of mule spindles was 500 to 600 
spindles.94 This figure, however, overestimates the pace of technical change: at the time, 
self-acting mules were only used to spin the finest yams which allowed for longer mules 
already in the 1880s.
89 ANC, fons La Espana Industrial, Reforma; Soler, Raimon, “Estrategies empresarials en la industria 
cotonera catalana. El cas de la fabrica de la Rambla de Vilanova, 1833-1865,” p. 89, unpublished PhD 
dissertation, Universitat de Barcelona, 2000.
90 One example is La Bauma, Enrech, “L’ofensiva,” p. 332.
91 ANC, fons la Espana Industrial, Reforma.
92 Ibid., p. 89.
93 ANC, fons Almeda, “Salaris”, year 1886.
94 IRS, La jornada, pp. 442-443.
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Finally, another source of potential worker-sponsored productivity change was the 
increase in capital to labour ratios, i.e. the reduction of staffing levels per machine. 
During the 1880s, a series of publications written by cotton employers resulting from 
visits to Lancashire noted the differences in productivity between workers in Catalonia 
and Lancashire.95 One of the main conclusions of these studies referred to the low 
productivity of the Catalan workforce, especially when comparing the number of spindles 
tended by Lancashire and Catalan workers. Andres de Sard, for instance, claimed Catalan 
spinners ran self-acting mules of less than 600 spindles, assisted by a helper and a piecer, 
while in three of the four Lancashire he surveyed, the same team tended more than 2,000 
spindles. Further, the speed at which these machines were run was on average a 20 per 
cent lower in Spain than in Lancashire.96 Similarly, the Comision Obrera Catalana, an 
expedition of cotton workers sent to England to gather information on how conflicts 
between capital and labour were solved in Lancashire, remarked as well the low 
capital/labour ratios in the Catalan cotton mills with respect to best practices in 
Lancashire. According to the Comision, this did not offer prima facie evidence that 
Catalan operatives were less efficient than their Lancashire counterparts, remarking the 
air was drier in Spain, which increased the breakage rate, and noting that managerial 
skills were deficient in the Catalan industry.
The noticing of large productivity differences and the poor state of the sector 
brought about a debate between unions and employers on the need to increase 
capital/labour ratios in cotton spinning and weaving. When the 1885-7 crisis abated, there 
was a series of attempts by employers at increasing the efficiency of their establishments 
known as reforma de traball a Vanglesa (working the English way). Succinctly, the 
reform meant a doubling of capital to labour ratios: each spinner, with his two minders 
and two apprentices, to tend 2 self-acting mules instead of one and each weaver to tend a 
maximum of 4 power looms instead of 2 depending on their ability to do so.
Reforms in the organisation of work were especially intense in the large steam 
powered factories of the Lowlands. A case in point was the reforms attempted by Ferran
95 Sard, Andres de, Comparacidn entre el actual estado de desairollo de la industria algodonera en 
Inglateira y  el de la propia industria en Espana (Barcelona, 1884); Comision Obrera Catalana, Memoria 
descriptiva elaborada por la Comision Obrera Catalana nombrada para estudiar el estado de las fabricas 
de hilados y  tejidos de algodon en Inglateira y  su relacion con el obrero ingles ... (Barcelona, 1889).
96 Sard, Comparacidn, pp. 20-21.
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Alsina in the Vapor Veil of Sants.97 Alsina had a good knowledge of best practices in 
Lancashire and wanted the factory to specialise in finer yams, increase mule size from an 
average of 476 spindles to 1,000, and double capital to labour ratios in spinning and 
weaving. The firm committed itself among other things, not to fire workers, increase 
wages by 20 per cent, apart from setting aside funds to provide for workers during the re-
QQ
organisation with a mutual benefit fund.
Workers, however, strongly resisted the re-organisation of working conditions 
along these lines. In 1885, the managers of Sedo faced a six months long strike in 
opposition to the failed employers’ attempts of doubling the number of machines tended 
by workers. In the Vapor Veil, a long strike ensued when the reform was proposed and a 
worker shot Alsina in the street. Unable or unwilling to come to terms with the workers, 
factory managers finally re-located the establishment outside Barcelona. Another large 
lowlands steam-powered factory, Can Batllo, was forced to close down.99 Until the First 
World War years, when there was an export boom in the industry and the rationalisation 
of work did not make workers redundant, spinners and their team tended only one 
machine, while weavers tended two looms as rule.100 According to the unions’ press, the 
main reason for resisting organisational changes of this type was related to the fact that 
the increase in capital to labour ratios generated redundancies and unemployment.101
Insiders' bargaining power..
Informational asymmetries therefore do not take us very far in explaining the factors 
causing wage rigidity in such a ‘mature’ industry as the Catalan cotton textile industry. A 
simpler explanation for the stability of price lists is that workers resisted wage cuts. 
Evidence on strikes in the period show considerable resistance to pay cuts even in the 
event of employment cuts and excess labour supply.
For example, in the crisis of the mid 1880s, there is ample evidence of strikes 
against piece rate cuts even if in the period numerous firms laid off workers or worked
97 Alsina, Fernando, Fonaments de la refoima de treball en la industria cotonera tal com s ’es comensada 
en lo Vapor Veil de Sans (Barcelona, 1889).
98 Ibid., p. 5.
99 Enrech, “L’ofensiva patronal,” pp. 445-450.
100 IRS, La jom ada, p. 421.
101 For several examples, Enrech, “L’ofensiva patronal,” pp. 443-453.
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short-time. During the 1880s, the periodical of the Tres Classes de Vapor reported the 
existence of various conflicts over piece rate cuts. For example, in 1888, workers in the
109Mas factory of Vilanova i la Geltru staged a 600 strong strike against a piece rate cut.
In Sant Marti de Proven9als (Barcelona) there was a conflict lasting 11 weeks after 
employers had attempted to introduce a piece rate cut. In Sant Andreu del Palomar (next 
to Barcelona) and in Manresa (Llobregat valley) in 1890, a strike occurred after a piece 
rate cut had not been reversed.
More comprehensive evidence on strikes is available after 1905 using the data
1
provided by the Instituto de Reformas Sociales. Between 1905 and 1910, a period of 
low strike activity, there were 29 strikes by cotton textile workers in the province of 
Barcelona. Of these, 9 were against lay-offs, 9 retaliated against a wage cut, 10 demanded 
wage increases and one asked for a shortening of the working day. The first group of 
strikes were organised exclusively against the dismissal of union or strike leaders, or 
sometimes of popular foremen. Only in one strike, workers demanded a more continuous 
activity throughout the year “to guarantee a standard weekly wage.” However, it appears 
to be the case of a river factory in which employers promised their workers to buy new 
machinery to avoid the decline of activity caused by summer droughts.104 In one third of 
the recorded strikes of the period, workers protested a wage cut.
Moreover, insiders’ bargaining power was enhanced by the regionalisation of the 
textile industry. For example, during the 1880s, El Obrero publicised all conflicts over 
pieces and organised solidarity strikes. The most famous one was the conflict after a 
piece rate cut in the factory Els Dolors in Manresa in 1890. In response, the textile union 
organised solidarity strikes in Barcelona, Vilanova i la Geltru and the Llobregat valley.105
Finally, conflicts with blacklegs were legendary, putting limits to the substitution 
of outsiders for insiders. In strikes in Barcelona or Manresa, it was common that women 
on strike harassed strike-breakers by throwing stones at them or cutting the plaits of 
female strike-breakers.106 In strikes, shootings and fights were not uncommon among
102 Enrech, “L’ofensiva patronal,” p. 448.
103 The source is IRS, Estadisitica de huelgas, years 1905-1910.
104 Ibid., year 1909.
105 Ferrer, Joaquim, El primer "Primer de M aig” a Catalunya (Barcelona, 1972), p. 65.
106 Enrech, “L’ofensiva patronal,” p. 252.
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strikers and blacklegs. This reduced the ability of workers who were available in the 
labour market to affect working conditions. For example, Angel Smith described conflict 
lasting 6 months over a new piece rate list in Manlleu in 1909 in which strike-breakers 
could not be recruited:
Conditions in the Rusihol company town were, it has been noted, among the best on the 
Ter. Profit margins in the factory had, therefore, no doubt been particularly badly 
squeezed. This explains why on 15 May 1909 the owner, Albert Rusiiiol, closed his 
factory and dismissed the 365 workers employed therein. The workers would, Rusinol 
stated, have to reapply for admission, and accept a new wage list which had been drawn 
up. Not surprisingly, wages were in the future to be considerably lower. In particular 
male spinners who worked on the ring-frames would have to accept a cut in wages o f 20 
per cent. The workforce replied that it would only accept wage cuts in those cases in 
which wages had actually been higher than in the other factories in the town. Rusinol 
refused to compromise, so no solution to the dispute could be found. Thus, when the 
factory reopened on June 30, the only people to go in were the managers and foremen.
Another long strike ensued. The strikers were strongly supported by the Ter’s textile 
unions. Rusinol tried to break the strike by sending agents out into the country to look for 
blacklegs, but he had little success: by November only 40 had been recruited. The result 
was deadlock, which was only broken in February 1910 when Rusinol announced that he 
was to close the factory.107
6.6. Conclusions.
This chapter addresses some of the questions of the historical and theoretical debate on 
piece rates using evidence from the Catalan cotton textile sector between 1880 and 1910:
1. in our case study, the relationship between rising labour productivity and piece 
rates could not be studied, because labour productivity in cotton spinning and 
weaving remained stagnant or with minimal increases between 1885 and 1910. 
One of the reasons for this is that the sources of “worker-sponsored” technical 
change appear to have been quite limited in the sector. In this setting, average 
piece rates tended to increase, not decrease.
2. During the whole period, piece rate lists remained fixed, creating nominal rigidity. 
As a result, firms adjusted negative demand shocks via output, hours of work, and 
employment. A further line of research is the study of the behaviour of output 
prices over the cycle, since firms seems to be adjusting to economic downturns
107 Smith, “Social conflict,” p. 361.
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via output rather than prices. Quantity adjustments seem to follow an implicit 
contract between workers and employers in which rates are stable and firms work 
short-time in recessions to protect lengthy attachments with their workers.
3. This happened in absence of formal collective bargaining mechanisms and in 
absence of a formally recognised union. The strike threat and decentralised and 
informal collective bargaining was enough to guarantee the stability of piece 
rates. Given large employment fluctuations in the firms of the study, insiders’ 
bargaining power to protect piece rate lists and working conditions was 
remarkable.
4. The recurrence of periods of idleness and unemployment has implications for the 
understanding of living standards and the patterns of collective action of Catalan
xL
industrial workers in the late 19 century.
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Appendix to chapter 6.
Table 6.A1. Cost of living indices.
Spain, 1880-1910 (base year 1913=100)
Year Cost o f Living Year Cost of Living
1880 121.92 1896 102.84
1881 121.10 1897 106.87
1882 118.36 1898 110.14
1883 129.12 1899 112.30
1884 126.50 1900 106.62
1885 118.23 1901 105.51
1886 117.14 1902 105.34
1887 118.13 1903 109.00
1888 117.48 1904 109.60
1889 115.19 1905 113.64
1890 113.24 1906 110.87
1891 106.82 1907 105.71
1892 104.90 1908 104.01
1893 106.84 1909 115.50
1894 107.31 1910 102.64
1895 106.08
Source: Ballesteros Doncel (1997), pp. 394-395. Index of food, clothing, fuel. Rent 
included after 1900.
Cost of living indices, province of Barcelona. Benchmark years. Base Barcelona
1910=100.
1861 1874 1910 1914 1920
COL
Barcelona
104.7 111.6 100 100.1 181.14
Source: Roses and Sanchez Alonso (2000), p. 20. Index includes food, clothing, fuel and 
rent. Cost of living index calculated for 48 Spanish provinces.
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Table 6.A2. Fixed effects regressions (unbalanced panel), output (kilograms) per day.
1880-1910.
Mule spinning La 
Espana Industrial, 
1880-1886.
Sedo, ring 
spinning 1900- 
1910.
Almeda, ring 
spinning, 1900- 
1910.
La Espana 
Industrial, ring 
spinning, 1890- 
1910.
Warp Count -9.216*** -7.67*** -10.53*** -10.578***
(34.94) (9.84) (7.34) (6 .66)
Warp count 0.153*** 0.082*** 0.16*** 0.144
squared (28.62) (7.0) (4.77) (3.64)
Weft count 0.706** 0.793**
(shifting (2.61) (2.531)
coefficient)
Weft count -0.025** -0.03**
squared (shifting (-3.27) (2.29)
coefficient)
Time trend No 1.118*** -0.097 -0.334***
(4.48) (1.41) (5.79)
Year dummies Yes No No No
Fixed effects
Mach 1 153.8569 183.3305 205.3011 263.4360
Mach 2 153.9561 190.9146 206.3822 261.0453
Mach 3 153.7879 186.8196 209.5882 269.0365
Mach 4 153.9158 184.8893 204.2563 247.4476
Mach 5 153.0438 196.2305 204.9600 232.1956
Mach 6 152.9095 175.3971 205.2438 240.5974
Mach 7 154.4060 176.0423 207.9020 241.1222
Mach 8 154.9216 184.9180 205.2457 245.0269
Mach 9 153.1974 183.7910 226.4784 246.0063
Mach 10 150.7116 190.0158 226.1152 240.3436
Mach 11 155.1202 176.3538 216.2319 -
Mach 12 152.8122 224.5283
Mach 13 152.5856
Mach 14 153.0824
Mach 15 152.8404
Mach 16 155.2435
Adj-R-squared 0.902 0.628 0.711 0.654
Durbin-Watson 1.846 2.089 2.14 1.733
F 279.98 201.74 187.06 519.3
N 332 232 374 543
*** = significant at less than 1 per cent level; ** =significant at 5 per cent level
Chapter 6. Piece rates. 225
Table 6. A3 .A. Price and quantity adjustments, Sedo, ring spinning 1900-1910.
Good vear December 1901- 
March 1903
Good vear September 1907- 
March 1909
Output (kgs) 31012.17 Output (kgs) 33251.92
Total earnings 3340.22 Total earnings 3156.63
Employment 322.33 Employment 341.83
Labour productivity (Y/L) -week 96.063 Labour productivity (Y/L) -week 97.39
Average rate per Kg. 0.108 Average rate per Kg. 0.095
Nominal wage 10.348 Nominal wage 9.233
Bad vear September 1903- Bad vear June 1909-
June 1904 March 1910
Output (kgs) 14095.75 Output (kgs) 28470.03
Total earnings 1736.39 Total earnings 2993.32
Employment 189.75 Employment 301.33
Labour productivity (Y/L) -week 73.79 Labour productivity (Y/L) -week 95.43
Average rate per Kg. 0.123 Average rate per Kg. 0.105
Nominal wage 9.069 Nominal wage 10.04
Percentage change Percentage change
Output (kgs) -54.54 % Output (kgs) -14.38 %
Total earnings -48.02 % Total earnings -5.17%
Employment -41.13% Employment -11.85%
Labour productivity (Y/L) -week -23.19% Labour productivity (Y/L) -week -2.01 %
Average rate per Kg. 13.89 % Average rate per Kg. 10.53 %
Nominal wage -12.36% Nominal wage 8.78 %
Table 6.A3.B. Quantity and price adjustments to output fluctuations. La Espana 
Industrial, ring spinning 1889-1910 (weekly averages).
Good vear June 1899-June 
1900
Good vear September 1901- 
September 1902
Good vear March 1909- 
December 1909
Output 16911.92 Output 15940.32 Output 15591.5
(kilograms) (kilograms) (kilograms)
Employment 124.2 Employment 119.15 Employment 119
Average wage 9.603 Average wage 10.018 Average wage 10.872
(week) (week) (week)
Average piece 0.071 Average piece 0.08 Average piece 0.083
Labour 136.17 Labour 134.11 Labour 131.35
productivity productivity productivity
(kgs/week) (kgs/week) (kgs/week)
Bad vear September 1900- Bad vear December 1902- Bad vear March 1910 -
June 1901 March 1904 June 1911
Output 12909.13 Output 11187.83 Output 11609.92
(kilograms) (kilograms) (kilograms)
Employment 94.0 Employment 88.83 Employment 107
Average wage 10.01 Average wage 11.224 Average wage 9.645
(week) (week) (week)
Average piece 0.073 Average piece 0.088 Average piece 0.0896
Labour 138.29 Labour 129.86 Labour 108.44
productivity productivity productivity
(kgs/week) (kgs/week) (kgs/week)
Percentage change Percentage change Percentage change
Output (pieces) -23.67 % Output (pieces) -29.81 % Output (pieces) -25.54%
Employment -24.32 % Employment -25.45 % Employment -10.08%
Average wage 4.24 % Average wage 12.03% Average wage -11.29%
(week) (week) (week)
Average piece 2.82 % Average piece 10% Average piece 7.95 %
Labour 1.56% Labour -3 .1 7 % Labour -17.44%
productivity productivity productivity
(pieces/week) (pieces/week) (pieces/week)
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Table 6.A3.C. Quantity and price adjustments to output fluctuations, Sedo 1900-1910 
_______________________ (weekly averages), weaving._______________________
Good vear: June 1901- 
March 1903
Good vear: March 1908- 
September 1909
Kgs, metres, pieces 25318.69 Kgs, metres, pieces 27469.55
136910.9 116187
1665.25 1487.167
Employment 650.9 Employment 536.17
Productivity kgs, metres, pieces per 22.79 Productivity kgs, metres, pieces per 22.43
loom-week 123.41 loom-week 94.83
1.504 1.214
Rates (kgs, metres, piece) 0.255 Rates 0.243
0.047 0.057
3.87 4.51
Weekly wage 11.65 Weekly wage 10.88
Bad vear December 1903- Bad vear March 1910-
June 1904* September 1911.
Kgs, metres, pieces 15512.2 Kgs, metres, pieces 22521.47
70895.6 88707.67
906.6 1021.17
Employment 406.3 Employment 460.17
Productivity kgs, metres, pieces per 24.41 Productivity kgs, metres, pieces per 19.13
week 107.26 week 76.06
1.395 0.88
Rates (kgs, metres, piece) 0.237 Rates (kgs, metres, piece) 0.277
0.054 0.07
4.16 6.12
Weekly wage 11.56 Weekly wage 10.7
Percentage change Percentage change
Kgs, metres, pieces -38.73 % Kgs, metres, pieces -18.01 %
-48.22 % -23.65 %
-45.56 % -31.33%
Employment -37.58 % Employment -14.17 %
Productivity kgs, metres, pieces per 7.11 % Productivity kgs, metres, pieces per -14.72%
loom-week -13.09% loom-week -19.79%
-7.25 % -27.76 %
Rates (kgs, metres, piece) -7.06 % Rates (kgs, metres, piece) 13.99 %
14.89 % 22.81 %
7.49 % 35.7 %
Weekly wage -0.77 % Weekly wage -1.62%
Note: * I have exluced June and September 1903 because data on employment is not
available for these observations.
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Table A3.D. Quantity and price adjustments to output fluctuations. La Espana Industrial, 
1889-1910 (weekly averages), weaving.
Good vear Sept
1898
1897-Sept Good vear March 1901-Dec 
1902
Good vear June 1907- 
September 1909
Output (pieces) 2370.8 Output (pieces) 1949.5 Output (pieces) 1420.8
Employment 336.5 Employment 330.38 Employment 304.8
Average wage 14.38 Average wage 14.59 Average wage 17.81
(week) (week) (week)
Average piece 2.05 Average piece 2.5 Average piece 3.83
Labour 7.045 Labour 5.9 Labour 4.66
productivity productivity productivity
(pieces/week) (pieces/week) (pieces/week)
Bad vear Dec 1898-June Bad vear March 1903- Bad vear March 1910-Dec
1899 March 1904 1910
Output (pieces) 1754 Output (pieces) 1198.6 Output (pieces) 795
Employment 350.3 Employment 259.4 Employment 257.6
Average wage 12.21 Average wage 14.91 Average wage 18.11
(week) (week) (week)
Average piece 2.4 Average piece 3.34 Average piece 6.21
Labour 5.02 Labour 4.97 Labour 3.03
productivity productivity productivity
(pieces/week) (pieces/week) (pieces/week)
Percentaee change Percentaee change Percentage change
Output (pieces) -26.02 Output (pieces) -38.52 Output (pieces) -44.05
Employment 4.1 Employment -21.48 Employment -15.49
Average wage -15.09 Average wage 2.19 Average wage 1.68
(week) (week) (week)
Average piece 17.07 Average piece 33.36 Average piece 62.14
Labour -28.74 Labour - 15.76 Labour -34.98
productivity productivity productivity
(pieces/week) (pieces/week) (pieces/week)
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Map 6.A1. Geographical distribution of the Catalan cotton textile sector. Textile 
towns and their population in 1900.
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Chapter 7. 
Workplace health and safety in Spain, 1890-1920.
7.0. Introduction.
This chapter examines the debate about workplace safety in early twentieth century 
Spain and collective bargaining over workplace health and safety issues between 
workers, employers and labour inspectors. In the latter case, participation was brought 
about by state regulation of workplace safety since 1900 and the creation of a body of 
labour inspectors in 1906. As in the cases of hours of work and piece rate lists, 
workplace safety and health can be treated as a public good negotiated by the different 
actors of the labour market.
In this chapter, most of the discussion is necessarily going to be qualitative since 
available accident data covering 1902 to 1935 are hard to interpret. To some extent, the 
aggregate series of workplace accidents was ‘socially constructed,’ because the 
responsibility to report depended on private agents and the propensity to report accidents 
increased with the levels of accident compensation and the probability of obtaining post­
accident rents.1 Moreover, some sectors might have been relatively more prone to report 
accidents depending on a series of factors such as their unionisation rate, average 
establishment size or their geographical concentration. Hence it is difficult to draw 
conclusions by simply looking at the aggregate data broken down by sectors. Graph 7.1 
shows the aggregate evolution of the reported workplace fatalities over time. The most 
salient change in the series is the sharp increase in the number of reported fatalities in 
1922 caused by the re-organisation of the accident reporting process, which in turn 
depended on the passing of more generous workers’ accident compensation in 1922.
1 Another potential source for accident data are insurance companies. However, a rapidly expanding 
insurance industry prevents the use o f insurance companies’ corporate records and publications to picture 
aggregate trends and makes the distribution of accidents across sectors hard to interpret. Total premiums 
paid by employers to insurance companies increased by 700 per cent between 1909 and 1930 in real 
terms. In this period, the ratio o f premiums paid to cover accident compensation with respect to life 
insurance premiums grew from 0.26 to about 1.
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Graph 7.1. Reported workplace fatalities, 1902-1931.
Source: Institute de Reformas Sociales, Estadistica de accidentes, 1904-1930.
7.1. The debate over workplace risks.
As I have shown in the introductory chapter, the demand for a healthier and safer work 
environment had been one of the most persistent grievances of the labour movement 
since the mid 19th century. This went hand in hand with the recognition that there was a 
significant correlation between an individual’s occupation and his life expectancy. In 
the debate that surrounded the issue it was stressed that workers toiled an excessive 
number of hours in poorly-lit and poorly-ventilated workshops and factories under 
intolerable working conditions that damaged their health and reduced their life 
expectancy. Furthermore, it was also put forward that workplace accidents condemned 
whole families to destitution. Finally, it was argued that diseases transmitted in the 
workplace and the contact with harmful chemicals also put the health of the children of 
working mothers at risk.
Some of the risks inherent to industrial work had been identified by mid 
nineteenth century hygienists.3 In the first debates on industrial working conditions put
2 Lewchuck, Wayne, “Industrialization and occupational mortality in France prior to 1914.” Explorations 
in Economic History, 28 (1991), pp. 344-366.
3 On 19th century Spanish hygienists: Rodriguez Ocana, Esteban, La constitucion de la medicina social 
como disciplina social en Espana (1882-1923) (Madrid, 1987), pp. 17-26.
Chapter 7. Health and safety. 231
forward by social reformers, it was stressed that the environment in which people 
worked was harmful to their health and furthermore posed a danger to public health. In 
line with the contemporary belief that “bad air” was responsible for the spread of 
infectious diseases, Joaquim Salarich, who in 1857 won the gold medal of the Barcelona 
Academy of Medicine and Surgery with a work entitled The hygiene o f the weaver, 
argued that “science, after the works Edwards, Lavoisier, Muller and other distinguished 
physiologists, shows the need for a healthy man of twelve to fourteen cubic meters of 
pure air.”4 According to this view, overcrowded workshops facilitated the transmission 
of infectious diseases. Pere Felip Monlau, writing in 1855, put forward that “it (did) not 
come as a surprise that the statistics (...) show how the number of tubercular cases 
among workers in confined spaces is double the number among those working in the 
open.”5 Hence, Salarich recommended that because “all men (...) have the right to 
breathe pure air,” patrons “should ensure renewed air flows into their factory buildings, 
taking away miasma and other causes (sic) that can infect the atmosphere.”6 This view
tV» f l iwas still prevalent in the early 20 century. In a book published in the early 20 century, 
Ignasi Valenti i Vivo, professor at the Faculty of Medicine of the University of 
Barcelona and President of the Catalan Academy of Hygiene, also warned about the 
consequences of “mephitism” in the workplace, referring to it as a“pathogenic rarefied
n
atmosphere.” This was especially the case of hot and humid environments -like in 
breweries or textile spinning rooms- which became ideal grounds for the transmission of
Q
infectious diseases.
But “bad air” was not only brought about by overcrowding. Some processes like 
metal grinding or polishing or cotton or wool carding generated dusts that were 
suspected of increasing fatigue -because they made breathing more difficult-9 and easing
4 Salarich, Joaquim, Higiene del tejedor. O sean medios fisicos y  morales para evitar las enfermedades y  
procurar el bienestar de los obreros ocupados en hilar y  tejer algodon (Barcelona, 1984, originally 
published in 1858), p.231.
5 Monlau, Pere Felip, Higiene industrial. £Que medidas higienicas puede dictar el gobiemo en favor de 
las clases obreras? (Barcelona, 1984 originally published in 1856), p. 73.
6 Salarich, Higiene, p. 159.
7 Valenti Vivo, Ignasi, La sanidad social y  los obreros (Barcelona, 1905), volume 2, p. 46. This autor, o f  
the Academy o f Hygiene o f Catalonia, also published, Valenti Vivo, Ignasi, La intoxicacion en la 
industrial moderna (Barcelona, 1900).
8 Salarich, Higiene, p. 160. The spread of infectious diseases considered as a more general public health 
problem: Font y Mosella, Joaquin, Consideraciones que irrogan a la salud de los jornaleros y  a la publica 
de Barcelona las fabricas en especial las de vapor y  sobre las ventajas de trasladarlas a la llanura de 
Casa Tunez (Barcelona, 1852).
9 Salarich, Higiene, p. 239; Monlau, Higiene industrial, p. 73.
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the transmission of infectious diseases. Metal and mineral dusts were among the most 
harmful because they led to poisoning if absorbed in large enough quantities. 
Furthermore, because they scarred lung tissue, they were associated with the spread of 
tuberculosis.10 Animal dusts from wool, silk, leather, horsehair, feathers, bone or mother 
of pearl and vegetal dusts from cotton, wood, coal or linen, were less dangerous but 
prolonged exposure increased the risks of respiratory diseases and tuberculosis.11
In many trades workers came in contact with toxic dusts and fumes. Workers 
employed in match factories and every industry that used phosphorus were exposed to 
phosy jaw (i.e., maxilar necrosis), which brought about the loss of all teeth and in some 
cases the death of the worker, and also to bums, asthma and other respiratory diseases,
1 7colics, as well as a higher propensity of natural abortions among women. The effects of 
mercury intoxication (hidragirismo profesional) were also well known: abundant
1 'Isalivation, loss of teeth, digestive problems and the so-called “mercurial trembling.” 
Among hatters and other workers affected by mercury poisoning “an anaemic and sad 
appearance” was common and it was noted that “early on one observes a premature 
decline of their strength, which often leads to paralysis and convulsions.”14 In the 
mercury mines of Almaden (Ciudad Real), “miners (lost) their teeth completely after 
two or three years, and shortly thereafter (became) unable to work.”15 The effects of lead 
poisoning (,satumismo), which were common among typographers for example, included 
violent colics, trembling episodes, paralysis and chronic diseases such as anaemia and 
arteriosclerosis.16 It was remarked: “gas workers, painters, dyers, typographers, (...) 
suffer the* consequences of this (lead) poisoning, some of them dying of it, while the rest 
undergo serious and disastrous (sic) illnesses; many are unable to regain their strength 
and some give birth to sick, epileptic or stupid children. Those employed in some 
factories producing ceruse, white lead or lead carbonate pay three or four visits to the
1 7hospital every year.”
10 Bravo Moreno, Fernando, Tuberculosisy accidentes de trabajo (Barcelona, n.d.), p. 13.
11 Batailler, A. and E. Tresfont, Cours d ’hygiene generale et industrielle (Paris, 1913), p. 255 ; Coreil, 
Francois and Leon Nicolas, Les industries insalubres, etablissements classes (Paris, 1910), chapter 1.
12 Rius y Matas, Higiene industrial (Barcelona, 1887), p. 9.
13 Batailler and Tresfont, Cours d ’hygiene, p. 263. Guerra y Estape, Jaime, Accidentes del trabajo y  
enfermedadesprofesionales (Barcelona, 1907), p. 53.
14 Ibid., p. 10.
15 Rius y Matas, Higiene industrial, p. 10.
16 Batailler and Tresfont,. Tours d ’hygiene, p.262.
17 Rius y Matas, Higiene industrial, p. 15.
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Arguably, technological and organisational developments which took place during 
industrialisation led to improvements in shop floor conditions. It was accepted that the 
new factories were generally better ventilated and better lighted. For instance, Joaquim
tliSalarich in the mid 19 century remarked that:
If the capacity o f plants and workshops completely warranted adequate levels o f hygiene 
and health for the workers employed in them, I would have little or even nothing to say o f  
the mechanised spinning and weaving factories. Because they have to make room for 
machinery, which because of its width and ample movements requires a considerable space, 
they guarantee the much needed pure air for all the workers (.. .) .18
In the mid 1880s, the Provincial Commission of Valencia report stated:
If we consider large industry, we must distinguish between new and old establishments. In 
the ones having been constructed recently, we often appreciate real improvement; lighting, 
ventilation and temperature being the most favourable to the health o f the worker. 
However, old establishments, generally old buildings ill-suited to industry, do not have the 
required conditions for a healthy work environment ( . . . ) .19
However, the substitution of new for old processes and the use and production of 
new products brought new hazards and strains into the workplace. Powerful machinery 
was singled out among the main causes of greater workplace risks. The metaphor of the 
modem industrial machine as representing the ills of capitalism fascinated the minds of 
union leaders and social reformers. The argument went that injury and mortality rates in 
the workplace increased because of the introduction of powerful machinery unforgiving 
of minor lapses in attention. Unfenced gears and unguarded belts threatened the life and 
limb of the worker. In the study by Joaquim Salarich, on mid-19th century Catalan 
weavers wrote a critical note on that debate commenting on some early British 
experiences:
Some have characterised modem engines as the cannons o f  peace, and machines have 
attracted the antagonism of those who they feed. ( ...)  Because an imprudent child lost his 
hand after having put it by sheer distraction in the tooth o f a gear, should we yell against 
mechanic advances?
18 Salarich, Higiene del tejedor, p. 231.
19 Castillo, Santiago (ed.), Reformas sociales. Informacion oral y  escrita de la Comision de Reformas 
Sociales (Madrid, 1985), tome 3, Memoria de la Comision Provincial de Valencia, p. 55.
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( . . . )
Thanks to modifications and advances, the dangers are receding; the victims o f the fulling 
machine (batan) are less frequent (...); gear buckles have disappeared, they do not drag 
women by their hair (...); young workers make sure their shirt sleeves are not taken by 
some gear’s tooth (...); carding machines have become simpler, their cylinders are less 
exposed and screens protect workers from spinning machines (...). ”20
The same study also noted how “distractions, imprudence and lack of training
91among workers are the most common causes of accidents.” He also pointed to the 
practice of experienced workers consisting on repairing dangerous machinery without 
actually stopping it, which led to numerous accidents.
Soon however the pessimistic view on “machinism” came to dominate the debate 
on workplace hazards. An example was provided in the surveys undertaken by the 
Comision de Reformas Sociales (Social Reforms Commission) in the 1880s. The 
Provincial Commission of Valencia stated that the risks brought about by powerful 
machinery were caused by:
The lack o f space and the overcrowding of machinery which does not allow workers to 
circulate safely; the fact that machines are used at their maximum power to keep up with 
the pace of work; in other cases, the lack o f scaffolds and devices to run the machinery 
without unnecessary risks ( .. .) .22
In the case of typographers in Madrid, information is given with great detail 
regarding their concerns with safety which had to do with the poor conditions of 
workshops, the need to fence powerful machinery, insufficient lighting and space, and 
the employment of inexperienced workers in dangerous occupations. For instance, the 
testimony of Mr. Alarcon, delegate of Madrid typographers’ mutual benefit society, who 
insisted on the issue of alertness and dangerous machinery:
I move on now to rotary machines, those making the print run o f a newspaper. Rotary or 
cylindrical machines consist o f four cylinders, one on top o f the other, working at an
20 Salarich, Higiene del tejedor, pp.243-244.
21 Ibid., p.244.
22 Reformas Sociales, tome 3, Memoria de la Comision Provincial de Valencia, p. 55.
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extreme speed. If a worker knocks one o f them with his arm, with his shirt or any other 
thing he is wearing, we can be sure he will lose his limb at once.”23
A more general argument emerges in the following paragraph from lawyer Pedro 
Estasen writing in the early 20th century in favour of workplace accident compensation:
The needs o f modem industry and its fast development in the last few years expose 
industrial workers to more risks than before, when all the work was done in the absence of 
machinery or using very rudimentary tools.
The extraordinary advances taking place in modem machinery being used in all sectors of 
industry have become a constant danger for workers, as they become used to handling them 
without the necessary precautions. Thus, workers are often victims o f the contingencies 
associated with their constant being in contact with complicated machines, which are 
difficult to use and require, not only technical knowledge, but continuous alertness in order 
to avoid all possible accidents. Therefore, today, after having made wonderful discoveries 
which are the pride o f industry, like steam engines, electricity, compressed air, and so on, 
we are in a position to say that machines are no longer subordinated to workers, but the 
latter bent to the former.24
A second source of risk associated with the industrial revolution was workers’ 
fatigue. The concept of fatigue is difficult to define but for contemporaries the concept 
included both physical fatigue -associated with the accumulation of toxins in the 
muscles- and what was called “subjective fatigue”, which referred to the feeling of 
weariness identified to mental fatigue. It was recognised that modem machinery 
lightened physical exertion at work, but at the same time it also required the constant 
attention of workers and the performance of monotonous and repetitive tasks during long 
periods of time. As a result of that process, workers’ subjective fatigue was the 
prominent cause of workplace accidents. Newer, faster machinery demanded constant 
and greater attention from workers, thereby exhausting them both mentally and 
physically. For instance, Valenti Vivo argued that:
With the use of heavy machinery, there has been an intensification o f the causes o f mental 
fatigue and a greater weariness o f the senses, in spite o f the fact that muscular effort is no
23 Comision de Reformas Sociales, Informacion o ra ly  escrita publicada de 1889 a 1893 (Madrid, 1985), 
volume I, p.32. The latter corresponds to “Informacion oral de Madrid,” 26th October 1884.
24 Estasen, Pedro, Los accidentes de trabajo y  el seguro de accidentes (Madrid, 1903), p.436.
25 For definitions see for example, Vernon, H. M., Industrial fatigue and efficiency (London, 1921) or Max 
Weber, Zur Psychophysik der Industriellen Arbeit (Tubingen, 1924) [I have used the Spanish translation 
of this text: Weber, Max, Sociologla del trabajo industrial (1994), pp.81-87].
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longer necessary. However one needs to bear in mind what the automatism o f the body 
represents, in its necessary complement o f the machine ( ...)  such that the organic rhythm is 
unavoidably adapted to the mechanical rhythm (.. .)26
Later on, similar arguments are found in the reports sent by unions in Biscay to 
the Comision de Reformas Sociales which listed a series of factors increasing workplace 
risk:
the local conditions, such as humidity and lack o f natural light, the narrowness of  
workshops (...), as well as excessive hours o f work, all add up in undermining workers’ 
health.27
Likewise during the general strike in the textile sector in Catalonia in the summer 
of 1913, the textile union “La Constancia” presented a set of common rules (bases de 
trabajo) to employers in which it was said:
1. Because o f the prodigious advance o f modem machinery in the last thirty years, output 
has increased by eighty per cent, and the consequence has been that today there is a big 
number o f unemployed textile workers.
Such advances in machinery require more attention from the worker, consequently 
physically debilitating him (...). The absence o f rest periods makes it impossible for him to 
get his strength back.28
Later on, textile unions supporting the 8-hour day in 1919 still maintained this 
line of reasoning by stating about the reduction of the working day:
This reduction (in hours) will improve the physical and mental condition o f workers. Long 
hours exhaust their energy making it impossible to maintain concentration and thought for 
such long periods o f time.29
26 Valenti Vivo, Sanidadsocial, volume 2, p. 55.
27 Reformas sociales, volume 5, Memoria de la Comision Provincial de Vizcaya, p.590.
28 Quoted in Sastre Sanna, Miguel, Las huelgas en Barcelona y  sus resultados durante los ahos 1910 al 
1914 ambos inclusive. Acompahado de numerosos e importantes datos estadisticos sobre otros asuntos 
relacionados sobre la cuestion social obrera (Barcelona, 1915), p.210.
29 Federation Nacional del Arte Textil y Fabril, Infoime para la justificacion de la jornada de ocho horns 
en el Arte Textil y  Fabril de Espana (Barcelona, 1919), p. 14.
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In their opinion, the natural effect of a reduction in hours would be an increase in 
productivity and final output quality and a reduction in injury rates, both a result of 
greater employee attentiveness and care.
The existing evidence on the hours at which accidents occurred partially 
confirms the “fatigue” argument: the greatest fraction of accidents in Spanish factories 
happened in the last part of the workday. Table 7.1 presents evidence collected by the 
published yearbooks on accidents:
Table 7.1. Accidents during the workday, averages 1905-1909.
Hours Percentage o f  accidents Accidents per hour o f  
work, assuming a 10 
hour dav
6 AM-9 AM 21.3 8.52
9 AM-12 AM 26.8 8.93
12AM-6PM 36.6 9.2
6 PM- 10.49 20.98
UNKNOWN 4.81
Source: Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Estadistica de accidentes 
correspondiente al ano 1909 (Madrid, 1911).
Considering a normal workday of 10 hours, work started at 6 am, a half-hour 
breakfast was scheduled around 8 am and lunch from noon to 2 pm, a ten hour workday 
ended by half past 6 pm. Table 7.1 suggests that most accidents happened in the last 
hours of the working day, when workers were most tired. This evidence is completed by 
the fact that, looking at accidents by the day of the week in which they occurred, 
Monday and Saturday are the days on which they were more frequent. Table 7.2 shows 
the percentages for the period 1906 to 1909, which suggests the existence of a strong and 
positive “back-to-work” effect on accident rates in Monday. But the percentage for 
Saturday, if calculated per hour, is also higher than average since most trades worked 
shorter hours on Saturdays to clean machinery and collect pay. This took generally 
between one and two hours. The English week -stopping work at noon on Saturday- was 
very rare.
30 A 10- instead of a 9-hour Saturday will have concentrated 17.2 per cent o f accidents.
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Table 7.2. Accidents by day of the week, percentages 1905-1909:
Day Percentages
MONDAY 16.53
TUESDAY 15.85
WEDNESDAY 15.52
THURSDAY 15.21
FRIDAY 15.17
SATURDAY 15.46
SUNDAY 6.033
Source: same as table 7.1. Statistical analysis with data from the period 
1905 to 1909 with 35 observations confirms the existence o f a strong 
“Monday effect”.31
Finally, reformers identified a third cause of greater workplace risk in changes of 
social relations and the shifting balance of power between labour and capital. According 
to this view, the rights of labour and capital were re-defined during the Industrial 
Revolution. As a consequence, workers lost their right to choose technologies, their 
fellow workers and the pace of work. In the hands of managers, these decisions might 
have given a reduced priority to issues of healthfulness and safety. This view is 
predominant among legal historians and lawyers. For instance in 1903 Pedro Estasen 
wrote:
Moreover, working conditions have changed a lot recently. In the past, workers worked 
isolated or in small groups, in workshops with safe tools. Today they are put into groups 
with hundreds of other workers, using special machinery, and sometimes surrounded by 
dangerous materials.32
Similar views are held by Alejandro Gallart Folch who in 1936 wrote a classic 
text on labour law in which it was held that the modem legislation on labour issues was 
a by-product of the gradual concentration of the industry. This was mainly brought about
31 The results from the regression o f the percentage of accidents occurred in a given day o f the week 
against dummy variables ACCRATE(day, year)=15.211 + 1.314*MONDAY + 0.643*TUESDAY+ 
0.31 * WEDNESDAY -  0.04*FRIDAY -  0.248*SATURDAY -  9.178 * SUNDAY. Coefficients on 
MONDAY, TUESDAY, SUNDAY significant at 1 % levels. The rest failed to be significant at 10 % 
levels. This regression shows that differences in the percentage o f accidents concentrated in one particular 
day were statistically significant.
32 Estasen, Los accidentes de trabajo, p.436. A contrary view can be found in the views of a Catalan 
employer: Alsina, F., “Observacions sobre la reglamentacio del treball dels noys en tallers y fabricas” 
(Barcelona, 1892), especially pp. 12-13.
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by mechanisation and scale economies. As a result of that process, workers became the 
weak contractual party in the employee-employer relationship, an imbalance state action 
sought to correct.
Legal historians have also pointed to the progressive weakening of the position of 
industrial workers during industrialising processes. For instance in his classic work, 
Manuel Carlos Palomeque also found solid footing for intervention by the state in labour 
matters on the rising conflict between labour and capital,
a conflict that is widespread in “big industry” in the 19th century, characterised both by the 
concentration o f capital and workers.34
But not only lawyers and legal historians put forward this argument. Similarly, 
Ignasi Valenti Vivo, remarked (also criticising piece rate work):
Capitalism only surrenders under exceptional circumstances, more often than not disregards 
the “sanitary” postulates, while abiding completely by economic rules and paying work by 
the metre, the dozen, the hundred, the thousand . . . 35
In some cases, a reference to a harmonious past when labour-management 
relations were allegedly less tense was made. Thus, in a book on workplace accidents 
published in 1913, doctor Antonio Morales Perez noted:
In the past, the life o f the worker within his guild had unquestionable advantages. The 
individual belonged to the industrial family. There was more fluid communication between 
the patron and the worker and periods of illness strengthened the bond that existed between 
them. But industry and large firms need more room for manoeuvre and require wider social 
organisations. In these, management accepts all that brings further advancement to the firm.
Large public limited companies are set up, where the dividend is the only gauge o f  their 
prosperity or decline. Profits have neither heart nor.feelings (sic) (.. .)36
33 Gallart Folch, Alejandro, Derecho espahol del trabajo (Barcelona, 1936), pp. 18-20.
34 Palomeque, Manuel Carlos, Derecho del trabajo e ideologia. Medio siglo de formacion ideologica del 
derecho espahol del trabajo (1873-1923), p. 16 (Madrid, third edition, 1987).
35 Valenti Vivo, Sanidad social, volume 1, p. 88 .
36 Morales Perez, Antonio, Tratado mecanicoterapico de los accidentes de trabajo (Barcelona, 1913), pp. 
6-7.
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Similarly, the union of iron and other metal workers of Madrid, El Porvenir, 
claimed:
When considering the current social antagonism, it intensified as modem production grew,
(...)  The apparently harmonious social relationship between employers and workers 
existing in the past, has disappeared completely and there is nothing we can do about it.”37
This led to the disregard of safety and health issues:
The hygiene and health of workshops depends entirely on patrons and their economic 
circumstances determine if conditions at their establishments are acceptable or bad. There 
are no rules guaranteeing workers a not too wet or not too cold atmosphere.
Additionally, there are no rules regulating the installation and upkeep of  
mechanised equipment, no care is given to protect workers from shuttles, belts and other 
moving devices ( .. .) .38
Information gathered in Avila vents similar concerns:
Establishments that use water-driven or steam engines do not implement the 
advances o f modem prevision and as a result workers are exposed to serious risks caused 
by the explosion of steam boilers or the action o f wheels, gears, shafts and belts. Generally, 
the equipment has the necessary guarantees of safety but both the installation and upkeep is 
careless. For example, the initial test made for steam boilers should be repeated every now 
and then, but here, once the boiler has been installed, no one cares to test it anymore (...).
Gears and wheels should be covered up where they can harm workers passing by, 
as it is done in Germany and England. ( ...)  Workers wear baggy clothes which are easily 
caught by revolving wheels. In short, no one warns the worker about the risk he is facing.
Thus, he ends up being familiar with risk to the point o f being imprudent and bold. In the 
province, we lack a series of rules governing work, the potential risks, the appropriate work 
outfits and every measure conducive to accident prevention.39
It is impossible to weigh the importance of these three factors -mechanisation, 
fatigue and changing social relations- on occupational risks. Most Spanish hygienists 
and reformers were mainly policy- and reform-minded. They did not search for
37 Refoimas Sociales, volume 2, Particulares: El Porvenir. Sociedad de trabajadores en hierro y demas 
metales,” p.554.
38 Reformas Sociales, volume 5, Informacion oral de Oviedo, p. 410.
39 Ibid., volume 4, informacion oral de Avila, p. 203.
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domestic evidence on the patterns of occupational mortality and simply used the 
evidence gathered in other countries -mainly German and French local studies- to 
support their arguments about the need to sanitize factories and improve working 
conditions.40 The available accident data suffer from several flaws related to the 
reporting process, which depended on the payment of accident compensation. Moreover, 
it is also argued that injury and fatality rates do not adequately capture workplace 
hazards. Some authors have suggested the use of mortality rates broken down by 
occupation because they catch a broader range of occupational risks than accident data. 
Other historical studies have relied on the subjective evaluation of individual health or 
the number of days lost due to illness 41 But these indicators are subject to much debate, 
especially because it is impossible to isolate the effects on individual health of non­
professional dimensions such as life-style. Finally, some modem studies have included a 
job risk variable taken from accident insurance premiums for different occupations and 
sectors.42 However, there are grounds to think an underdeveloped insurance industry in 
early 20th century Spain and the lack of contemporary studies on occupational risk 
prevented the adequate estimation of risk.
As I have said, injuries and accidents being reported since 1905 have substantial 
flaws caused by the reporting process . These data have the additional problem that the 
tabulations broken down by sector do not distinguish how serious an accident was. In 
spite of these shortcomings, I have tried to isolate some of the effects that might have 
driven up industrial risk, namely the effects of fatigue and changing social relations. 
Using the population census of 1910 for the four Catalan provinces, which gives the 
active population broken down by sector of economic activity, I calculated yearly injury 
rates per 1000 workers for 15 sectors.43 Using the Labour Inspectors’ yearbook for
40 Rodriguez Ocana, Constitucion de la medicina social, pp. 17-20. For instance, Francisco Murillo 
Palacios used American and German studies: Murillo Palacios, Francisco, “La defensa social de la salud 
publica,” speech delivered at the Royal Academy of Medicine in 1918, in Rodriguez Ocana, Constitucion 
de la medicina social, pp. 113-160.
41 Lewchuck, “Occupational mortality,” p. 351. For a historical study based on the subjective evaluation of 
individual health: Atack, Jeremy and Fred Bateman, “Louis Brandeis, work and fatigue at the start o f the 
twentieth century: prelude to Oregon’s hours limitation law.” NBER working paper number 25 (May 
1991), especially page 23.
42 Viscusi, Kip W., “The value of risks to life and health,” Journal o f  Economic Literature, XXXI, 3, 
(1993), pp. 1917-1918.
43 Some adjustments were necessary as the divisions by economic activity differed in the two sources. The 
main was dropping the sector “agricultural services” from the accident data which did not have a 
corresponding value in the population census. The absolute values o f injuries broken down by sector:
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1910,1 have been able to construct sectoral averages of hours of work and establishment 
size.44 The first variable catches the effects of fatigue on the probability of an injury 
while the average number of workers employed in each establishment proxies the level 
of managerial control over decision making, assuming that it was in large establishments 
where workers had lost more control over shop floor decisions. Because accident 
reporting propensities differed among the eight inspecting regions, I have decided to 
choose a region with higher than average propensity to report. Region 2 (covering 
Barcelona, Gerona, Lerida, Tarragona) was finally chosen because it had more sectoral 
observations than the other regions with a high propensity to report.
The information is presented in table 7.3. The results on the level of sectoral risk 
are not surprising, with “metals”, “transport” and “mines and quarries” having the 
largest fraction of injured workers per 1,000 workers. The alleged relationship between 
hours of work and injuries does not appear in the data, with a negative, insignificant 
spearman rank-order-correlation value 45 Furthermore, there was a positive correlation 
coefficient between average establishment size and the injury rate, but the null 
hypothesis of no correlation could not be rejected.
Institute) de Reformas Sociales, Estadlstica de los accidentes de trabajo ocurridos en el aho 1910 (Madrid, 
1911). Working population by sectors: Censo de poblacion de 1910, tome 4.
44 Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Memoria general de la inspeccion del trabajo en el aho 1910 (Madrid, 
1911).
n
45 The formula being used is: p =  1 — (6 . ^  d f  /  n2 —n) with n=15 and d being the difference between
7=1
the ranks of the two variables.
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Table 7.3. Sources of occupational risk, Catalonia 1910.
Sectors Injuries Rank 
per 1000 
workers
Average Rank 
hours o f  
work
Average 
number o f  
workers 
per establ.
Rank
Mines and quarries 59.49 13 9.83 10 49.00 13
Metals 82.25 15 9.4 5.5 27.50 8
Chemicals 32.52 12 9.63 9 29.70 10
Textile 8.20 4 10.85 15 91.30 14
Building 28.95 11 8.89 1 32.75 11
construction
Electricity 27.86 10 9.88 11 22.35 4
Food 7.71 , 3 10 12 8.01 1
Printing trades 13.39 8 9 2.5 23.81 6
Paper 15.05 9 10.46 14 26.65 7
Garment industry 0.30 1 10.43 13 36.16 12
Leather 12.22 6 9.4 5.5 23.59 5
Wood 9.75 5 9.53 8 12.16 3
Transport 74.88 14 9.5 7 144.91 15
Furniture 13.19 7 9.33 4 27.67 9
Crafts 7.06 2 9 2.5 8.18 2
Spearman -0.21 Spearman 0.41
Critical 0.447 Critical 0.447
value p<. 1 value p<. 1
Sources: IRS, Estadlstica de accidentes, 1910; IRS, Memoria del servicio de inspeccion, 1910. As it is 
traditionally done, average rank value is given when two observations are equal.
7.2, Accident prevention and sanitary conditions.
The previous analysis does not allow me to analyse the effect of powerful machinery. As 
I have shown, in the historical debate, mechanisation was seen as one of the main 
driving forces behind the perceived rising trend in workplace risk. Because of its 
importance in the contemporary debate, the protection of workers from dangerous 
machinery was one of the main concerns of the 1900 law on accidents and workers’ 
compensation and the catalogue of protective devices passed immediately afterwards 
(Catalogo de mecanismos preventivos) and articles 54 to 59 of the Reglamento devised 
to enforce the law. This was enforced by labour inspections by the Institute of Social 
Reforms, which started these activities in 1906.
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Dangerous machinery was considered to be the main problem and much of 
inspectors’ work were devoted to installing protective devices like fences, covers and so 
on, to avoid the contact with dangerous parts of machinery. For instance, inspectors from 
region 3 (covering the Basque country and the provinces of Santander and la Rioja) give 
us more detail about the type of violations found by inspectors and what they did to 
improve safety conditions:
The main offences to the accidents law consist o f the lack o f protection from gears and 
transmissions, which have constituted most of the violations (sic); the lack o f handrails in 
dangerous flyovers and over tanks; lack o f protection over the level pipes (tubos de nivel) in 
steam boilers; the same for flywheels in engines and emery wheels, in printing presses and 
in circular saws.46
The first published inspectors’ yearbook in 1907 reported activities in Catalonia:
Sometimes we have ordered the covering of gears, the installation o f handrails or the 
fencing of machinery 47
Also noting the low levels of employers’ awareness of protective devices:
The issue is neglected in the industry and there is little care shown by employers about 
workplace safety issues (in spite o f most of times it being only a matter o f ignorance). 
Evidence o f that is the fact that the regional inspector found 747 workplace safety 
violations, or in average terms, about 3 violations per workshop he visited, revealing the 
greatest negligence on the part o f employers.48
The report of the 4th region (covering the north-west of Spain) gives some more
detail:
In general terms, we have suggested ( ...)  the cleaning and the periodical examination of 
gears, their isolation and that o f their wiring (especially the main ones); the need to totally 
stop engines to install or change the main belts; ( ...)  the unavoidable installation of 
automatic stoppages for machines lacking such devices, in order to turn them on safely; the
46 IRS, Memoria inspeccion aho 1910 (Madrid, 1911), p. 105.
47 IRS, Memoria inspeccion aho 1907 (Madrid, 1908), p. 74.
48 Ibid., p. 74.
Chapter 7. Health and safety. 245
installation of protective devices on machine-tools, especially the cutting and sharpening 
ones ( .. .) .49
Qualitative evidence on the degree of compliance suggests inspectors witnessed 
an improvement in the levels of safety and accident prevention, which they constantly 
contrasted with their inability to improve the sanitary conditions of factories and 
workshops. This did not necessarily translate into lower violations being reported by 
since the propensity of inspectors to report violations, warn and fine employers 
increased during the period (see table 7.4. below). The inspectors of region 4th remarked 
in 1910 that “the law of accidents is the law in which the results of inspection have been 
more immediately felt.”50 In this sense, they mentioned the regular inspections of steam 
boilers, which by 1910 had reached three quarters of the existing ones, the fencing of 
gears, belts and wires in the metal industry, the installation of devices to prevent 
accidents caused by crushing cylinders in flour factories or by unfenced pulleys in 
mechanised sawmills.51 According to the labour inspectors in the 4th region, by 1910 it 
could be said that “most of the actions stipulated by the 1900 accidents law referring to 
accident prevention have been enforced.”52
Similarly, by 1910, inspectors in the 6th region (South-East) maintained that “a 
lot of progress is being made with regard to the enforcement of the 1900 accidents law.” 
Going on to note that “in most of the factories visited, machinery is already fenced.”53
i i .  t
This process, according to the inspectors in the 7 region (old Castile) in 1910, even 
allowed “many employers to cancel accident insurance policies” -which had been 
contracted after the passing of the 1900 law-,54 because “most machines and engines are 
fenced,” causing a decline in the number of accidents.55 In the cases of new plants using 
modem equipment, the activities of labour inspectors were made redundant because 
most equipment was already fenced.56 Contrary to the children’s law of the same year or 
the Sunday rest law of 1904 -famous for determined employers’ opposition-, the 
inspectors in the second region (Catalonia) noted that the law on accidents generated
49 Ibid., p. 116.
50 IRS, Memoria inspeccion aho 1910, p. 135.
51 Ibid., pp. 135-136.
52 Ibid., p. 137.
53 Ibid., p. 165.
54 The law introduced strict employers’liability in work related accidents for the first time.
55 Ibid., p. 218.
56 IRS, Memoria inspeccion aho 1911 (Madrid, 1912), p. 47.
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less opposition among employers, especially thanks to the support for the law from 
insurance companies, which had expanded substantially after the passing of the
cn
accidents law. Similarly, the inspectors in the third region, remarked in 1912 and then 
in 1913 that the accidents law was “easy to enforce,” and that most managers were 
“interested in the recommendations of the inspectors, especially in the case of the 
fencing of machinery.”58
Based on the reports of labour inspectors, accident prevention apparently was 
easily enforced and employers did not oppose the installation of protective devices such 
as fences or handrails. The main reason for that was related to the fact that employers’ 
liability in accidents was well established in courts, which meant that employers or the 
insurance companies contracted by employers paid compensation in the cases of 
accidents. Employers’ liability was more diffuse in professional diseases, where the 
effects were generally felt after years of exposure to bad working conditions, making it 
more difficult to imputate liability to a particular employer. Factory inspection and 
expected fines on the other hand were too small to affect employers’ decisions. 
According to calculations presented in table 7.4., the expected penalties and fines to 
offences to articles on accident prevention were close to zero. Assuming the maximum 
value of the fine, 250 pesetas, the yearly expected penalty for non-compliance in the 
‘toughest’ region conditional on an inspection having taken place was 0.13 ptas year, 
about 3 per cent of the average daily male wage in the 1910s. Moreover, this quantity 
has still to be multiplied by a much smaller number; the probability of being inspected. 
By the early 1920s, the average probability for an employer to be fined conditional on 
an inspection increased to 1 for every 1,000 inspections, with the expected fine still a 
negligible sum. Other inspection costs, which however could not have been very high, 
were also at play, mainly the so-called “nuisance value of inspectors”, the small costs 
associated with having inspectors around the factory, paperwork and so on.59
57 IRS, Memoria inspeccio aho 1913, p. 78.
58 Ibid., p. 113.
59 On the importance of inspectors’ nuisance, Viscusi, Kip W., Fatal trade-offs. Public and private 
responsabilities fo r  risk (New York, 1992), p. 191.
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Table 7.4. Warning and fining probabilities, labour inspection 1909-1922.
Inspectors’
regions.
Warnings per 1,000 
inspectors visits.. 
Average 1909-14.*
Fines per 1,000 
inspectors’ visits. 
Average 1909-14.*
Warnings per 1,000 
inspectors’ visits. 
Average 1920-22.*
Fines per 1,000 
inspectors’ visits. 
Average 1920-22.*
Region 1 0.662 0.529 2.778 2.678
Region 2 1.02 0.51 2.031 1.911
Region 3 0.735 0.49 0.606 0.606
Region 4 0.242 0 0.147 0
Region 5 0.11 0 0.227 0.227
Region 6 0 0 2.508 2.622
Region 7 0.681 0.681 1.177 0.916
Region 8 0.532 0 0 0
Region 9 — — 2.972 0.646
Region 10 — — 1.154 1.058
Spain 0.498 0.276 1.36 1.0664
Source: Memoria general del servicio de inspeccion, various years.
*only warnings and fmes related to non-compliance with workplace safety provisions (art 54 to 59). 
Region 1: Madrid, Badajoz, Caceres, Ciudad Real, Guadalajara, Toledo.
Region 2: Barcelona, Gerona, Lerida, Tarragona.
Region 3: Vizcaya, Alava, Guipuzcoa, Santander, Logrono,.
Region 4: Asturias, Coruna, Lugo, Pontevedra, Orense.
Region 5: Almeria, Cadiz, Cordoba, Granada, Huelva, Jaen, Malaga, Sevilla.
Region 6 : Albacete, Alicante, Castellon, Cuenca, Murcia, Valencia.
Region 7: Salamanca, Valladolid, Burgos, Palencia, Zamora, Avila, Segovia.
Region 8 : Zaragoza, Teruel, Soria, Navarra, Huesca.
Region 9 and 10 appeared as some previous regions became smaller. Region 9 covered eastern 
Andalusia and region 10 western Andalusia and Badajoz.
In comparison to advances in accident prevention, improvements in sanitary 
conditions of workshops and factories seem to have been introduced more slowly. In this 
sense, the satisfaction inspectors felt with the installation of protective devices 
contrasted with their recognised inability to improve sanitary conditions.60 In 1910, 
inspectors in the 4th Region ackowledged some of the main problems:
With regard to sanitary conditions we have acted according to each case, for instance 
recommending better ventilation or lighting in many workplaces when this could be done 
without excessive costs for the employers; similarly, and more generally, we have also 
recommended building toilets (...).
In spite o f the efforts o f inspectors to reach the complete sanitation o f factories and 
workshops, we have not reached our goal because most buildings are defective. Most o f the 
small industries ( ...)  use spaces that do not have the required conditions. In this situation, 
the inspector can only recommend the most radical changes, which many employers could 
not afford. For this reason, we have to drop most o f our recommendations.61
60 This also adds credibility to the labour inspectors’ reports since they did not only underlined their 
relative successes but also went about their failure to improve health standards in industry.
61 IRS, Memoria inspeccion aho 1910, p. 135.
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For labour inspectors in Catalonia, the inability to enforce sanitary conditions 
was related to the age of buildings:
In new buildings, (...) there are not serious shortcomings, dangerous machinery is fenced 
and covered to avoid accidents and sanitary conditions meet the required standards. 
However, most factories and workshops are located in rented spaces or in old buildings, 
most o f which do not have the adequate sanitary conditions and machinery is rarely fenced.
The active campaign o f inspectors to correct these faults has brought about the fencing and 
covering o f unsafe machinery, however results in sanitation are meagre, because in most 
cases the necessary means cannot be installed given the bad conditions o f the buildings.62
It is not difficult to understand why many workplaces became a serious limitation 
to the ability of inspectors to improve sanitary conditions. For example, where workers 
were in contact with toxic dusts, inspectors recommended building new rooms to install 
showers and build canteens, as for instance was the case in a lead foundry in Linares,
fi'XJaen. In many cases, workshops occupied basements which made it difficult to 
ventilate and light satisfactorily.64
By the early 1920s, inspectors still considered sanitary conditions to be 
unsatisfactory. For instance, the inspectors in the Levant region noted in 1920:
Sanitary regulations are often violated. How difficult it is to persuade workers and patrons 
to respect the most elementary sanitary regulations!65
Similarly, inspectors in region 8 (Zaragoza, Teruel, Huesca, Soria, Navarra) 
remarked in 1920:
Little attention is given to the principles of sanitation, even the most elementary.66
62 Ibid., p. 68 .
63 Ibid., p. 165.
64 Ibid., p. 68 , p. 191, p. 242.
65 IRS, Memoria inspeccion aho 1920, p. 161.
66 Ibid., p. 199.
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Still, the unsuitability of some buildings for industrial work limited the ability to 
enforce sanitary regulations and generated the opposition of employers to some 
recommendations:
Especially in Barcelona, there are many small factories and workshops on 
ground floors or basements o f residential buildings that are not suitable for industrial 
purposes. In those, if  we were to be rigorous, we would create serious conflicts.67
Using the same line of reasoning applied to the case of the fencing the 
machinery, sanitary standards were apparently not met because of the costs involved in 
this process. Where buildings were new, inspectors were generally satisfied with the 
conditions of ventilation, lighting, the location of toilets, showers, and canteens. In old 
establishments, however, the qualitative evidence shows sanitation was poor and the 
costs involved in improving hygienic conditions were high with respect to the expected 
benefits of avoiding compensation payments stemming from diffuse liability.
7.3. Unions and professional risks.
Naturally, unions had a central participation in the debate about workplace safety and 
health. The aim of this section to analyse the way unions coped with the apparently 
increasing levels of occupational risk in the most hazardous occupations, which also 
gives some more detail about the evolution of workplace hazards in particularly 
dangerous occupations. Unions could enhance their members’ welfare with respect to 
occupational hazards in two ways. A first one was to raise the wage rate, holding the 
accident rate constant. Second, my main concern here, unions could directly lower the 
accident fate in the plant, workshop or mine by offering an effective voice to negotiate
zo
safety public goods with employers.
Mining.
Work in mines was well known to have above average occupational risks. In 
underground work, roof falls and the use of explosives triggered frequent accidents. 
Sometimes, it was the breaking of lifts transporting the miners or accidents caused by 
mining cars or the fall of objects. Commonly the most publicicised, mine fires and gas
67 IRS, Memoria inspeccion aho 1921, p. 74.
68 Freeman, Richard B. and James L. Medoff, What do unions do?, pp. 8-9.
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and dust explosions could kill workers by the hundreds. Furthermore, metal and mineral 
dusts caused serious respiratory diseases. The constant inhalation of coal dust caused 
pneumoconiosis (black lung), a disease in which excessive fibrous disease developed in 
the lungs.69 In addition, reformers and doctors identified coal dusts as causing asthma
70and tuberculosis. The constant inhalation and absorption of lead and copper triggered 
the serious health problems that I described in the first section, which included phosy 
jaw, colics, and trembling episodes. Better mine ventilation and the watering of mines 
diminished the effects of dust inhalation but increased the negative effects of humidity
71and sudden changes in temperature upon miners’ health. Among the consequences of a 
wet work environment were rheumatism, the spread of infectious diseases, and 
ankylostomiasis, the so-called miners’ anaemia, a disease caused by a parasite
77developing in the digestive system.
But the issues of workplace safety and health were not an important goal of the 
two most successful mining unions in the period. The demand for a reduction in hours, 
the abrogation of piece rates, barrack-housing and canteens were the most pressing 
demands of miners in Biscay.73 However, this is not surprising since the iron mines of 
the area of Bilbao were exploited in the open and thus safety issues were a marginal 
concern. On the other hand, the issues most bitterly fought by the Asturian Coal Miners’ 
Union (SMA) were the 7-hour day for underground miners and the minimum wage, 
summarised under the motto “ni un centimo menos, ni un minuto mas ” (not a cent less, 
not a minute more).74 Moreover, the period between 1910 and 1914 was characterised by 
bitter strike activity trying to force the union shop in non-union settings -the classical 
example being the failed union drive to settle in Hullera Espahola in 1912. In 1913, 
employers created their own union and accepted the SMA as their counterpart in the
69 Batailler and Tresfont, Hygiene industrielle, p. 259.
70 Institute) de Reformas Sociales, “Informe del trabajo en las minas a proposito de las peticiones que las 
sociedades obreras elevaron al gobiemo en 1909,” Revista de Trabajo, 21 (1968), p. 195.
71 Ibid., p. 195.
72 Batailler and Tresfont, Hygiene industrielle, p. 259.
73 A survey o f all miners’ demands since 1890 is provided in: Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Informe de 
las minas de Vizcaya (Madrid, 1904).
74 The book o f articles and speeches written and performed by the leader o f the SMA, Manuel Llaneza, 
does not contain a single article devoted to the issues o f mine safety: Llaneza, Manuel, Escritos y  
discursos (Fundacion Barreiros).
75 Shubert, Adrian, Hacia la revolucion. On'genes sociales del movimiento obrero en Asturias, 1860-1934 
(Barcelona, 1984), pp. 144-145. The company constituted a “yellow” catholic company union. Workers 
from Hullera Espahola affiliated to the Asturian Coal Miners’ Union in 1917. See as well, Moradiellos, 
Enrique, El Sindicato de obreros mineros de Asturias, 1910-1930 (Oviedo, 1986), pp.46-47.
Chapter 7. Health and safety. 251
bargaining process. A formal bargaining process was instituted and a joint commission of 
workers and employers was created.
The fact that safety was a secondary concern for the SMA can be explained by 
two factors. First, the coal mines of Oviedo were not among the most dangerous in the 
country. For instance, the oral information collected by the Social Reforms Commission 
in Oviedo it was argued that: “the way in which the mines of Oviedo are exploited make 
the precautions taken in mines with pits unnecessary” in spite of the fact that nothing 
was being done with respect to “the timbering of roofs, the ventilation mechanisms, or
77the width of tunnels” to improve the working conditions of underground miners. 
Second, a great fraction of workplace risks were in fact to be found among those in 
which the individual miner was the main accident preventer, thereby not being properly 
a public good to be negotiated by the union. In underground mining, the responsibilities 
for health and safety were divided between management and miners. Many safety 
decisions fell in the hands of individual miners, who were given autonomy in their own
78room in exchange of a piece rate. Thus, they decided how often to timber the roof or 
how much explosive was necessary to use.79 To them, the trade-off between safety and 
higher earnings was especially clear and most of these decisions did not affect the safety 
of other workers. On the other hand, management was responsible for those tasks having 
larger externalities such as ventilation and the watering of the mine to prevent mine fires 
and explosions. Finally, some responsibilities were divided between managers and 
workers, as in the case of scaffolds, the care of machinery, and the use of different 
mechanisms to access the bottom of the mine.80 A case in point was the use of lifts 
designed to transport soil removed by miners which caused frequent accidents. As the 
chief engineer of the Linares mines remarked to the Comision de Reformas Sociales in 
the mid 1880s, there was however an experienced worker “with a good salary” -the so-
O 1
called pocero or capitan de pozo- in charge of this lif t.
76 Moradiellos, El sindicato, p.50.
77 Reformas Sociales, volume 5, “Information oral de Oviedo,” pp. 410-411.
78 Instituto de Reformas Sociales, “Informe,” p. 149, p. 155.
79 Reformas Sociales, vol. 5, “Informe del Sr. Ingeniero Jefe de las minas de Linares”, p. 154, and 
“Informe del Sr. Ingeniero de Minas del Distrito de Navarra,” pp. 227-228.
80 A detailed description (trancadas, arrastres, ademas, escalas, malacates, poleas, jaulas): Reformas 
Sociales, vol. 5, “Informe del ingeniero jefe de las minas de Linares,” pp. 148-149.
81 Ibid., p. 149.
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Table 7.5 shows the fraction of fatalities in coal mining caused by different 
factors of risk. Except in the years 1903, 1904, 1909, 1915 and 1920, the fraction of 
accidents due to risks monitored by the worker (roof falls and explosives) or by both 
management and workers (breaks and workers’ falls) was higher than that of gas or dust 
explosions, large-scale accidents in which the responsibility fell largely in the hands of 
management.
Between 1900 and 1930, fatalities in coal mining showed a decreasing trend, but 
however there was no visible impact of the institution of formal collective bargaining in 
1913 on this decline. Gas and dust explosions did not undergo any statistically
Q'y
significant decline over time, nor were affected by collective bargaining. Formal 
collective bargaining only had a statistically significant negative impact on deaths 
caused by explosives and by roof falls, which depended mainly on individual decisions
O 'J
of underground miners.
Table 7.5. Fatality rates per 1.000 workers. Coal mining. 1900-1920.
Year Fatalities Gas or dust 
explosions
Explosives Worker’s
fall
Breaks Roof falls
1900 2.94 0.052 0.000 0.314 0.524 1.57
1901 2.84 0.361 0.052 0.309 0.516 1.03
1902 1.86 0.186 0.046 0.325 0.325 0.79
1903 2.22 0.724 0.048 0.097 0.193 0.68
1904 5.70 4.060 0.048 0.145 0.097 0.34
1905 1.70 0.094 0.094 0.236 0.141 0.57
1906 2.40 0,136 0.045 0.272 0.590 0.82
1907 4.60 0.000 0.263 0.175 0.701 1.18
1908. 2.67 0.083 0.208 0.042 0.250 1.17
1909 2.64 0.911 0.091 0.091 0.182 0.64
1910 2.32 0.045 0.268 0.045 0.223 0.76
1911 1.74 0.127 0.085 0.085 0.552 0.55
1912 2.21 0.443 0.121 0.443 0.080 0.64
1913 2.21 0.037 0.000 0.258 0.589 0.55
1914 1.51 0.431 0.036 0.036 0.359 0.11
1915 3.08 0.904 0.067 0.268 0.670 0.33
1916 1.92 0.158 0.158 0.079 0.105 0.58
1917 1.69 0.086 0.086 0.151 0.108 0.15
1918 2.26 0.255 0.218 0.218 0.437 0.27
1919 2.09 0.055 0.073 0.128 0.623 0.18
1920 1.69 0.287 0.051 0.169 0.270 0.17
Source: Estadistica Minera, 1900-1920.
82 See table 7 A1 in the appendix.
83 Roof falls were affected by collective bargaining in a regression in which the time trend was not 
interacted with the dummy collective bargaining.
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However, the demands of Biscayan and Asturian miners contrast sharply with the 
cases in which the negative externality problem was more serious, especially in those 
cases in which workers entered in contact with toxic fumes and dusts. Two historical 
cases stand out in the history of labour relations in Spanish mining: the copper mines of 
Rio Tinto (Huelva) and the mercury mines of Almaden (Ciudad Real).
In Rio Tinto, the Rio Tinto Company Limited used a practice that produced pure 
copper through a process that first required burning the raw mineral in the open air in 
order to get rid of the sulphur contained in it. Tons of the material were put together 
forming pyramids (teleras) and then burnt continuously from six to twelve months. 
During this period, about 2,000,000 tons of raw copper were converted yearly into pure 
copper through this procedure, freeing about 600 tones of sulphuric toxic gas every day. 
The latter not only did damage workers’ health but also affected agriculture in the 
neighbouring towns. In her meticulous study on the social conflicts in Rio Tinto before 
1900, Maria Dolores Ferrero shows how, compared to other towns, mortality rates, 
appropriately controlled by sex and age, were distinctively higher in Rio Tinto. This 
difference also existed between Rio Tinto and other mining towns (she draws a 
comparison with the mining town of Alquife in Granada).84
Workers organised a strike in 1888 demanding the interruption of all teleras in 
the mine and moving them somewhere else, along with more classic demands such as a 
shortening in the hours of work to eight hours and higher wages. An interesting demand 
was related to the so-called dias de manta (blanket days), days in which the clouds of 
sulphuric gas were so pervasive that they did not allow miners to work, with the 
consequent loss of the day’s wages. Interestingly enough, the numbers of those 
opposing the practices of the mine were enlarged by the Anti-Fumes League (Liga Anti- 
humista), an interest group of agricultural proprietors of the neighbouring towns. On the
iL
day of the joint demonstration in Rio Tinto’s main square, 4 February 1888, leaders 
from both groups tried to force an agreement with the mayor and obtain the prohibition 
of teleras in the town. The mayor waited for the Civil Governor, Agustin Bravo y Joven, 
to arrive and settle the dispute. When the latter arrived, he did not even accept to see the
84 Ferrero Blanco, Maria Dolores, Capitalismo minero y  resistencia rural en el suroeste andaluz. Rio 
Tinto, 1873-1900 (Huelva, 1994), chapter 5, “Mortalidad y morbilidad en las minas de Rio-Tinto, 1873- 
1900.”
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worker leaders and the Liga Antihumista. He then went to the balcony of the main 
building and exhorted demonstrators to go back to work. The story becomes confusing 
at this point. However, it is clear that riots ensued and that the military intervened killing 
48 demonstrators on the spot and wounding 150. From all the demands presented by 
workers during the strike, which also included the creation of a workers’ compensation 
fund, the company only agreed to eliminate the compulsory workers’ contribution to the
or
medical fund and finance it completely.
The liberal government reacted to the events of Rio Tinto by sanctioning a royal 
decree which gave a period of three years to end sulphuric calcinations, known as the 
Albareda decree of 1888. According to the secondary literature, it was plausible that in 
fact the government was abiding by the pressures of the International Copper 
Consortium, created in 1887 in France, which was actually lobbying to reduce the world 
extraction of copper to sustain prices, a decision the Rio Tinto company, the world 
leading producer of copper, opposed. Additionally, general Pavia, who ordered the 
shooting of demonstrators, was removed from the area and the Prefect, Agustin Bravo y 
Joven, was replaced by the more conciliatory Manuel de Lapaliza.87
In 1890, the first teleras started to disappear but at the same time the company 
laid off about a fifth of the workforce on the grounds that the change in the system of 
precipitating pure copper had squeezed profits. Moreover, the company lobbied the 
government to repeal the decree and also obtained from the Spanish Academy of 
Medicine a statement confirming that copper calcinations were not harmful to health. As 
a consequence of this process, the decree was invalidated by the Conservative
QO
government of Canovas del Castillo in December 1890.
However, a series of technological changes reduced the harmful effects of 
obtaining copper. Since the late 1880s, the main competitor of Rio Tinto, the Tharsis 
Sulphur and Copper Company Ltd., had successfully introduced a process known as
85 Ibid., chapter 2, “El Aho de los tiros: 1888. Distintas versiones de los hechos del 4 de febrero.” Ferrero 
Blanco, Maria Dolores, “Los sucesos de Rio Tinto segun los directores de la Rio Tinto Company limited,” 
Re-vista de Historia Industrial, 4 (1998), pp. 43-81.
86 Nadal, Jordi, “Andalucia, paraiso de los metales no ferrosos,” pp. 43-50, in Moler, tejer, fundir. 
Estudios de historia industrial (Barcelona, 1992). Ferrero Blanco, Capitalismo minero, p. 134.
87 Ibid., p. 118.
88 Ibid., p. 128.
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cementation, a method in which piles of mineral up to 90,000 tons were watered, 
bringing about the oxidation of the mineral. This system avoided the freeing of toxic 
fumes on a large scale and at the same time retrieved the sulphuric residual for industrial 
use. The Rio Tinto company had been unsuccessfully experimenting during the late 
1880s and early 1890s with the Doetsch method, which retarded the adoption of the 
cementation method by the company until 1895. From this year onwards, mineral
OQ
calcinations declined steadily and the last telera finally disappeared in 1907. In the 
twentieth century, the demands of Rio Tinto miners were directed at the more traditional 
demands of union recognition, a shorter work day and higher wages.90
The most important workplace risk in the mines of Almaden (Ciudad Real) was 
mercury poisoning. An old mine, run by the Spanish crown, there were other related 
risks like the absence of ventilation or the existence of profound pits, which also 
increased the levels of workplace risk.91 Furthermore, the process of distilling pure 
mercury forced workers to enter heated furnaces to take out the mercury and clean. 
Prolonged exposure to mercury led to hidragirismo, a fit characterised by trembling, 
abundant sweating and weariness.
tfiUntil the early 20 century, the only cure known for mercury poisoning was the
tiltemporary suspension of underground mining work. It was only in the early 20 century 
that electromagnetic techniques started to be used to speed up the cure from mercurial 
trembling. In this regard, from the ,1820s, the rules governing the mines established the 
right of underground miners to work temporarily in open air in the processing tasks 
when the effects of mercury poisoning were evident. Furthermore, also from the late
tVi18 century, hours of underground work were reduced to 6 to minimize the exposure to 
mercury dusts, leading to two underground shifts of about 4 and a half effective hours of
89 Ibid., pp. 134-135.
90 Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Memoria redactada por la Comision nombrada p o r  el Instituto para  
estudiar las condiciones de trabajo en las minas de Rio Tinto (Madrid, 1913).
91 Menendez Navarro, Alfredo, Un mundo sin sol: la salud de los trabajadores en las minas de Almaden, 
1750-1900 (Granada, 1994), chapter 1.
92 Ibid., pp. 80-81.
93 Ibid., pp. 162-163.
Chapter 7. Health and safety. 256
work.94 Finally, because high temperatures increased the level of mercury absorption, 
underground activity was slowed in summer and mercury was only distilled in winter.95
Among underground risks, explosions were one of the most common hazards.
thDuring the 19 century, this risk was reduced progressively following the introduction 
of Bickford fuses (invented in 1831), which replaced the traditional system iron or 
copper needles (agujas).96 Additionally, the report issued by the Instituto de Reformas 
Sociales in 1910 remarked that miners in Almaden did not use dynamite but the less 
intense “black” powder, and generally used smaller than average explosives to avoid an
07excessive generation of mercury dust. On the other hand, the risk of roof falls, which 
was great in the Almaden mines due to larger than average mining rooms and tunnels, 
was substantially reduced with the definitive use of masonry instead of wood in roofing 
from the mid 19th century.98 Another common source of risk was related to the fact that 
miners accessed the bottom of the mine through pits used to haul down the equipment. A 
first decision in the line of reducing this risk was the installation of security devices 
blocking winches. A second separated the access of miners and equipment towards the 
bottom of the mine and finally allowed for the construction of warehouses for equipment 
inside the mine.99 Finally, the introduction of mechanical lifts for miners in the 1870s 
reduced the risk of miners’ falls by almost two thirds.100 As a consequence of this, the 
number of yearly accidents per saca of mercury (the traditional unit of output in the 
mines) declined during the 1870s and thereafter.101
The distillation of pure mercury was considered to be one of the most hazardous 
occupations leading to acute episodes of mercurial trembling. In this task, high 
temperatures and mercurial gases facilitated the absorption of mercury through the skin 
and the consequent episode of trembling. In this sense, there were attempts to increase 
the period passing between the mercury foundry up to the unloading of the metal and the 
cleaning of the furnace (“coc/zwra”). In the early 19th century, a period of slack demand
94 Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Informe de las minas de Almaden. Conclusiones presentadas a la 
aprobacion del Instituto (Madrid, 1910), p. 67.
95 Menendez Navarro, Un mundo sin sol, p. 125
96 Ibid., p. 109.
97 IRS, Infoime minas Almaden, p. 69.
98 Ibid., p. 116. Menendez Navarro quotes a report published in 1861.
99 Ibid., pp. 119-120.
100 Ibid., p. 121, pp. 190-191.
101 Ibid., pp. 186-187.
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triggered an increase in the period of “cochura” to 4 days allowing for an extra day to 
cool off the furnace, but it was subsequently reduced thereafter when demand
109recovered. However, technical improvements in the furnaces brought about a 
reduction of the hazards associated with this operation. For instance, the labour 
inspectors that visited the establishment in 1910 remarked:
The Bustamante furnaces (...)  are very harmful to workers when loading and unloading the 
furnaces, which happens every four days.
The Limermoor-Oyarzabal furnaces are also highly pernicious to workers (...).
The latest furnaces -Cermak-Spireck ( ...)  are more hygienic ( ...)  because they ease the 
unloading and generate a lower quantity o f mercurial dusts.103
When the situation of the miners of Almaden reached public opinion in 1910, the 
demands for a healthier work environment did not come up in the debate. Most of the 
problem focused on the excessive number of workers, which prevented miners to work 
enough days of underground work (which was paid substantially more, 9.25 ptas day as 
opposed to 3 ptas in furnaces and 1.50 for other tasks). There was a established 
maximum of 84 days of underground work for each miner throughout the year and 98 
days of foundry work in the furnaces.104 During the rest of the working year, the miner 
was forced to do less profitable tasks. In this regard, the first demand of the Almaden 
miners was to abolish the auction system adjudicating underground work, a system that 
increased the competition between the miners of Almaden and those from other 
towns.105 Furthermore, they also called for the regulation of the access to outside jobs 
for underground miners in periods of mercurial intoxication or once their underground 
days had been used. In this regard, they wanted access to jobs to be based on seniority 
and on the town of origin, with Almaden miners given preference over miners from 
other towns.106
102 Ibid., pp. 131-132.
103 IRS, Infoime minas de Almaden, p. 70.
104 Ibid., p. 15.
105 Ibid., p. 77.
106 Ibid., pp.83-84, pp. 86-87.
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Building construction workers.
The safety of scaffolds and the risk of falling heavy objects were the two main sources of
risk in building construction. In the information collected by the Comision de Reformas
Sociales in the mid 1880s, the local commission of Alcira for instance reported that
“generally, the safety of scaffolds is overlooked.”107 The written information of Avila
1 08remarked that “as in the rest of Spain, scaffolds have not the required levels of safety.” 
The report of the Provincial Commission of Caceres lamented “the blind routine 
predominating in the construction of scaffolds.”109
Between 1907 and 1922 labour inspectors routinely criticised the existence of 
unsafe scaffolds. For instance, inspectors in the Basque country noted in 1920:
The offences detected by the inspection refer mostly to unsafe scaffolds in building 
construction sites.110
In 1921, according to inspectors in Lugo (Galicia), the problem was caused by 
the way work was contracted out:
In the province we are making progress on the safety o f scaffolds, which have been neglected 
for a long time at the expense of the safety of workers. That being said, we are not close to 
reaching the adequate levels o f safety, mainly because contractors in the province are groups 
of building construction workers (iquadrillas) trying to cut as much as they can from the 
overall costs, especially expenditures guaranteeing their safety (.. .).m
A final example, inspectors in Western Andalusia remarked in 1921:
The building construction trade is the one requiring most attention from inspectors 
because of its special nature. By pernicious custom, its workers are used to work threatened 
by considerable risks.
Contractors and owners o f building construction works try to spend as little 
as possible on the prevention of accidents.112
107 Reformas Sociales, tome 3, “Memoria de la Comision local de Alcira,” p. 284.
108 Ibid., volume 4, “Informacion escrita de Avila,” p. 204.
109 Ibid., volume 4, “Informe de la Comision Provincial de Caceres,” p. 466.
110 IRS, Memoria inspeccion aiio 1920, p. 101. As well in ibid., p. 74 for the case of Catalan provinces.
111 IRS, Memoria inspeccion aho 1921, p. 141.
112 Ibid., p. 247.
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As in mining, it is useful to consider who was the main accident preventer. In this 
case, this would be related to finding who was responsible for the construction and 
supervision of scaffolds. Evidence in this regard is mixed. For instance, the oral 
information collected from the local commission of Plasencia (Caceres) stressed that 
“with respect to the safety of scaffolds, we were informed that in spite of the fact that 
there are rules governing their construction, they are not enforced because the earnings 
of owners and foremen are more important than safety and the fact that authorities do 
not get involved in these matters.”113 In fact, many cities and towns had their own rules 
over scaffolding and even some monitoring power, but most contemporary observers 
considered these regulations were seldom enforced.114
The picture drawn from these scattered bits of information is that the 
responsibilities were shared between the main contractor, the sub-contractor -  a building 
worker who contracted a team of workers to do a particular work- and the head of 
working teams. The oral information from Oviedo remarked that “(...) the rules 
governing scaffolding are in a state of anarchy, with each contractor (contratista), sub­
contractor (destajista) or foreman {maestro) installing the equipment at their own 
convenience.”115 In Valencia, painters, who were considered to belong to the same trade 
as building construction workers, had established a rule which guaranteed that workers 
did not work on scaffolds that they did not consider safe: “among painters, the rules of 
the mixed commission establish the principle that built scaffolds must satisfy the safety 
requirements of the workers who have to work on them, a rule that is generally accepted 
by all the trade.”116 Similarly, as well in Valencia, the commission reported that “among 
building construction workers (who were paid by the hour, n.a.), there exists the practice 
of not discounting the time spent in building scaffolding,” in spite of the fact that
117“neither safety nets nor better equipment are being used.” This contrasts with the 
blame that was routinely levelled at contractors and builders by socialist activists and the 
building construction workers’ unions. The latter criticised the “criminal behaviour of 
contractors, whose greed is the cause of many accidents.” Socialist activists sought to 
drive workers toward the union by stating “you who work in badly constructed scaffolds
113 Ibid., volume 4, “Memoria de la Comision Provincial de Plasencia,” p. 525.
114 For a contrary view: Ibid., volume 5, “Informacion escrita de Navarra,” p. 227.
115 Ibid., volume 5, “Informacion oral de Oviedo,” p. 410.
116 Ibid., volume 3, “Memoria de la Comision Provincial de Valencia,” p. 56.
117 Ibid., p. 56.
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and are exposed to deadly falls, you will not believe a change is possible until the union,
118first among the workers in your trade and then among all workers, is achieved.” In the 
early 20th century, the building construction union of Madrid El Trabajo denounced the 
use of unskilled workers in scaffolding work (as carpenters), a practice that was 
forbidden by the mayor of Madrid in 1915.119
This sharing or confusion of responsibilities on scaffolding probably explains 
why the issue of safety was not on top of the agenda of building construction unions. 
One exception is the demand put forward by the Madrid union of building construction 
workers to the mayor of the city in 1892 to enforce safety regulations regarding scaffolds 
in building construction works.120 But in the two massive strikes of building construction 
workers in Barcelona 1901 and 1903, workers went on strike to reduce their summer 
workday to eight hours and obtain an increase in wages, while the collective contract
•  191drawn up m 1901 did not mention safety issues. The Spanish conference of painters 
(pintores decoradores), held in Barcelona in 1903, considered the eight-hour day to be 
their main demand, in line with the grievances of their fellow building construction 
workers.122 Similarly, the Catalan Regional Confederation of Building Construction 
Workers prioritised unionisation drives and more generous workers’ accident
19 ”^  •compensation rather than safety issues. Similarly, building construction unions m 
Madrid also concentrated on shorter hours, higher wages, and the regulation of the 
apprenticeship system.124 Between 1900 and 1916, the building construction workers of 
Madrid carried out more than 80 strikes, but only one minor strike in one construction 
site was motivated by bad safety conditions.125 The apparent lack of concern for safety 
among.building workers led socialists in Madrid to criticise these workers for “showing
118 Quoted in ibid., p. 34.
119 Byme, Justin, “ ‘Nuestro pan de cada dia’: accidentes del trabajo y respuesta de los albaiiiles de Madrid 
en el cambio de siglo,” p. 30, in Huertas, Rafael and Ricardo Campos (eds.), Medicina social y  close 
obrera enEspaha (siglosXIXy XX). Volume 1. Madrid: Fundacion de Investigaciones Marxistas, 1992.
120 Union Obrera del Gremio de Albaniles de Madrid, Meeting celebrado p o r  la Union Obrera de Abahiles 
de Madrid el miercoles 20 de abril de 1892 presidido por el compahero Jose Adrados Migallon (Madrid, 
1892), p. 9.
121 Sastre Sanna, Miguel, Las huelgas de Barcelona en el aho 1903, ‘Albaniles’.
122 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona 1903, “Congreso de los pintores decoradores.”
123 Confederacion Regional de oficiales y peones de albanil de Cataluna, Memoria y  actas del primer 
congreso celebrado en Villanueva y  la Geltru, en el local Ateneo Villanoves, los dlas 28 y  29 de Julio de 
1914 (Barcelona, 1914), p. 4, pp. 19-21. No session was devoted to the discussing safety issues. As well, 
Confederacion de oficiales y peones de albanil de Cataluna, Reglamento (Barcelona, 1913), pp. 3 - 6  
stating the objectives of the union.
124 Byme, Justin, “Trabajo y conflictividad en el sector de la construction en Madrid, 1900-1914.” 
Sociologla del Trabajo, 15 (Spring 1992), pp. 115-142.
125 This strike is discussed in Boletin del Instituto de Reformas Sociales, number 35 (1907), pp. 910-911.
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1 96off their bravery and sneering at those who take precautions.” This has led some 
labour historians of the period to take into account the existence of some sort of
1 97interiorisation of workplace risk that led to a disregard for safety issues.
Metal workers.
Foundry workers were known to be exposed to very high temperatures from partially 
open furnace doors. In the mid 1880s, the report of the chief engineer in the mines of 
Navarra to the Comision de Reformas Sociales noted that “in the metallurgical 
establishments, there are occupations with intolerable working conditions, namely those 
which are done close to furnaces with extremely high temperatures.” The report went on 
to say “it is useless to deny that workers who work half naked, carrying heavy puddles, 
with eyes fixed upon a shining mass inside a furnace at more than 1000 degrees Celsius, 
are bound to catch chest and eye diseases.”128 At two meters from the furnace, the 
distance at which workers stood, temperatures reached 60 degrees Celsius, which caused 
the famous “foundry workers’ fever”, an episode characterised by trembling, headache, 
difficult breathing, and abundant sweating at night caused by high temperatures, 
physical fatigue, and the breathing of toxic fumes. The fever was especially common 
among copper foundry workers, but it was also observed among those in contact with 
iron, lead, tin or zinc.129 Furthermore, the constant exposure to incandescent materials 
damaged vision and increased the risk of cataract.130
In this case, toxic materials and intolerable working conditions were clearly a 
public good that needed to be negotiated by the union. However, the evidence at hand 
does not show attempts by the metal workers’ unions at altering working conditions and 
introducing changes that may have reduced the hazards associated with the trade. 
Instead, trade union action concentrated on shortening the workday, which at least 
minimised the daily amount of work in insufferable conditions and the contact with toxic 
materials, while allowing for sufficient rest periods for the worker. In this regard -and 
along with typographers who also shared similar problems like the contact with lead
126 Quoted in Byme, “ ‘Nuestro pan de cada dia,’”, p. 32. Original source is El Socialista, 12th May,. 1914.
127 Ibid., p. 33; Jover, Jose Maria, “Conciencia burguesa y conciencia obrera en la Espana 
contemporanea,” p. 72, Polltica, diplomacia y  humanismo popular: estudios sobre la vida espahola del 
siglo XIX (Madrid, 1976); Castillo, Juan Jose and C. Prieto, Condiciones de trabajo: hacia un enfoque 
renovador de la sociologia del trabajo (Madrid, 1983), pp. 149-150.
128 Refoimas Sociales, volume 5, “Informe del Sr. Ingeniero de minas del distrito de Navarra,” p. 229.
129 Batailler and Tresfont, Hygiene industrielle, p. 244.
130 Ibid., pp. 244-45.
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dust-,131 the Spanish metal workers’ unions became the vanguard of the short hours 
movement. The metal unions of Barcelona staged a massive and ultimately failed strike 
to obtain the eight-hour day in 1902. In June 1903, the conference of the Spanish 
Federation of Metallurgical Unions held in Barcelona also agreed as the first priority of
1 T9the Federation the eight hour day and the prohibition of piece rate work. In the failed 
general strike of the trade of September 1910, the metal workers union of Barcelona 
draw up a collective contract which included union recognition, a nine-hour day, the 
abolition of holy days, overtime to be paid a 50 per cent more over normal rates and a 
100 per cent for those working on Sunday, but nothing explicit about sanitary
1 TTconditions. Another congress celebrated in Barcelona in 1914 insisted on the same 
objectives.134
Railway workers.
Transport workers were also among the most hazardous occupations (table 7.5). The 
concern for safety was especially heightened among railway workers. For example, in 
1894, Luis Zurdo, leader of the Spanish Confederation of Railway drivers and Stokers 
“La Esperanza ” (Hope) argued in the pages of the periodical of the union “La Traccion 
Ferroviaria “we would not need to unionise -an impossible thing since without union 
there is no life-, if our lives were protected from the excess of work, which wears our 
robust nature, from the bad state of the equipment and rails, which is a constant threat to 
our lives, the long itineraries, the violent commands, the depressive orders (,..).”135 He 
then went on insisting that “isolated, we are defenceless, our lives constantly threatened. 
Because the same amount of work is ordered to workmen than to machinery (sic), our 
lives are in danger. Neither mobile nor fixed equipment meets the required conditions 
and it is not revised properly. The newest advances in accident prevention are not being 
implemented.”136
Evidence provided by the doctors of the railways companies minimised the 
extent of injuries and accidents. In the mid 1880s, the Company of Railways from
131 Reformas Sociales, volume 3, “Memoria de la Comision Provincial de Valencia,” p. 59; volume 4, 
“Informe de la Comision Provincial de Caceres,” p. 33.
132 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona en 1903, ‘Congreso de los obreros metalurgicos,’ p. 93.
133 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona en 1910-1914, “Huelga general de los obreros metalurgicos.”
134 Congreso Obrero Metalurgico, Memoria del Congreso Obrero Metalurgico celebrado en elpalacio de 
Bellas Artes los dlas 12 y  13 de Abril de 1914 (Barcelona, 1914), pp. 7-10.
135 La Traccion Feiroviaria, year 2, number 17 (April 1894), p. 155.
136 Ibid., p. 155.
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Almansa to Valencia and Tarragona reported to the provincial commission of Valencia 
that “experience shows that the most common illnesses affecting train drivers and 
stokers are those related to the digestive system and those caused by sudden changes in 
temperature and the action of cold, as rheumatism and nervous pains (sic), throat and 
chest irritation, which are endemic to railway life. External injuries causing death, limb 
loss and disability are fortunately scarce.” According to this source, in five years, only 
one death was registered, along with two injured workers losing at least one limb and 
another with permanent disability, of a workforce of 317. Contusions and small injuries 
reached 84. Similarly, the company controlling the route from Cuenca to Valencia
1 1 7downplayed the importance of deaths or serious injuries caused by railway equipment.
In two reports published in 1878 and 1892, the doctor of the Tarragona-Barcelona- 
France company noted that among stokers and train drivers there were “falls so terrible 
that (...) in most cases the worker gets to the hospital more dead than alive.” He then 
argued that “in most cases, the instructed investigations show that the blame for 
accidents falls exclusively on the part of victims.”138
It is difficult with the available data to determine if railways workers had above 
average accident and fatality rates. Because railway companies were larger than average 
and had agreed to pay accident compensation even before the passing of the accidents’ 
law of 1900, there was a higher than average propensity to report accidents. In fact, 
when the causes of death are considered in the reported accident data from 1910 to 1920, 
“railway accidents” caused about 12 per cent of the overall registered casualties, just
1 7Qafter “fall of worker” which represented 19 per cent of the cases.
Railway workers’ unions considered accident prevention as one of the main 
issues in their agenda. In 1893, the rules of the Spanish Confederation of Train drivers 
and Stokers stated as the principal means of obtaining the improvement of working 
conditions in the sector: “First, the collection of scientific and statistical data to study
137 Reformas Sociales, volume 3, “Memoria de la Comision Provincial de Valencia,” p. 56; volume 3, 
“Informe de la Sociedad de los Ferrocarriles de Almansa a Valencia y Tarragona,” p. 301; volume 3, 
“Informe de la Sociedad de los ferrocarriles de Cuenca a Valencia y Teruel,” p. 303.
138 Arro y Triay, Francisco de P., Ensayo de estadistica medica de las llneas de Gerona, de la Compahia 
de Ferrocarriles de Tarragona a Barcelona y  Francia, correspondiente al aho 1878 (Barcelona, 1879), p. 
17. A similar argument in Arro y Triay, Francisco de P., Estadistica medica de la Compahia de 
Ferrocarriles de Tarragona a Barcelona y  Francia, correspondiente al septenio de 1879 a 1885, respecto 
a las llneas de Gerona y  al aho 1896 respecto de estas y  de las de Tarragona y  la fi'ontera (Barcelona, 
1892), p. 73.
139 Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Estadistica de accidentes de trabajo, years 1910 to 1920.
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working conditions, the economic state of the trade, the causes of its expansion or 
decadence (...). Second, obtaining an idea of the moral and economic state of railway 
employees. Third, promoting the implementation of all scientific and administrative 
reforms which may reduce the accidents among train drivers and stokers (...).140 In 
December 1903, an international conference of railways workers’ unions was held in 
Barcelona.141 The main conclusions of the conference, voted by the majority of 
representatives, included the creation of retirement funds, the prohibition of fines and 
penalties, the drawing up of common rules governing the trade (reglamentos), the 
unification of the signalling system for all normal and narrow railways and the adoption, 
in line with the latest scientific advances, of any mechanism of accident prevention. In 
addition, agreements also took into account the creation of joint commission of 
management and workers, a parliamentary representation and a seat in the direction of 
companies through the ownership of shares. Finally, union leaders agreed on the 
prohibition of piece rate work.142 After a series of setbacks, in 1909 the rail workers’ 
union affiliated to the General Workers’ Union (UGT) and relied more on parliamentary 
action, while at the same time putting a stronger emphasis on salaries and a shorter 
workday.143
7.5. Conclusions.
tiiIn this chapter, I have analysed the debate on workplace safety and health in late 19 and 
early 20 century Spain. Several hypotheses about the perceived rise in industrial risks 
are examined, without reaching any conclusion about the weight of each of the factors in 
explaining the rise in workplace hazards. The main conclusion to be drawn from the 
analysis is that the reduction of workplace hazards depended critically on technological 
changes and market forces reducing the costs of improving health and safety standards. 
Where changes were cheap on the margin, as in the fencing and covering of machinery, 
or the inspection and upkeep of boilers, qualitative evidence suggests there was a 
substantial reduction in these risks. Sanitation, on the other hand, faced insurmountable 
obstacles given the costs involved in reforming old and unsuitable buildings, while
140 Juez Gonzalo, Emerenciana, El mundo social de los ferrocarriles espanoles de 1857 a 1917. 
Unpublished PhD disseration, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1997, Appendix 124, “Estatutos de la 
Confederacion de Maquinistas y  Fogoneros de los ferrocarriles de Espana,” p. 834.
141 With 128 Spanish unions, 62 from France, and one from England, Germany, Bohemia, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Chile, Argentina and the United States
142 Sastre, Las huelgas de Barcelona en 1903, ‘Congreso intemacional de los empleados de ferrocarriles,’ 
pp. 99-102.
143 Juez Gonzalo, El mundo social, appendix 129, "Reglamento de la Union Ferroviaria,” p. 843.
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employers’ liability in the case of long-term exposure to bad working conditions was 
diffuse. In this case, it took longer to sanitise factories.
When looking at the evolution of risks by sectors of activity, it is also important 
to distinguish between types of apcident and analyse who is the main accident preventer. 
The historical literature has generally put the blame on employers. However, in many 
types of accident in mining work or in building construction, some responsibilities fell 
on the side of workers or were shared between workers and managers. In these sectors, 
unions prioritised hours, wages, or accident compensation while there is little evidence 
of a public discussion on workplace health and safety standards. In cases in which 
workers were exposed to toxic materials, rules were informally developed to reduce the 
hours of exposure to dangerous materials as in the metal industries or some cases in 
mining -notably in Almaden.
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APPENDIX.
Table 7.A1. The impact of collective bargaining in coal mining accident rates, 1900- 
1930. (N=31)
Dependent variable: number of accidents in coal mining in a given year/ working
population in that year.
Fatalities Gas or dust 
explosions
Explosives Falls Breaks Roof falls
Constant 2.93** 0.69 0.02 0.26** 0.41** 0.84*
(7.75) (2.05) (0.63) (6.21) (4.11) (6.43)
Time trend -0.04 -0.027 0.014** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.64) (-0.54) (3.14) (-1.69) (-0.81) (-0.59)
Time -0.01 0.006 -0.011** 0.004 0.009 -0.01
trend*dummy
1913
(-0.28) (0.16) (-3.01) (0.71) (0.82) (-0.65)
Adj-R Squared 0.26 0.06 0.21 0.31 0.02 0.33
D-W 2.42 2.06 1.78 1.92 2.16 1.7
Source: Estadistica Minera, years 1900 to 1930.
Notes: * significant at 5 per cent levels. T-statistics in parentheses.
Conclusions.
This thesis studies the mechanics of collective action and provides case studies of 
collective bargaining in labour markets during the period of Spanish contemporary ( 
history known as the Restoration (1875-1923). This historical episode allows to study 
the operation and evolution of largely unregulated labour markets. In this sense, one can 
evaluate forces other than binding contracts, state-sponsored collective bargaining, 
unemployment insurance or social security in determining the historical evolution of 
labour market institutions and outcomes. The Spanish case also offers a case study 
which takes into account institutional peculiarities related to the existence of a weak, but 
politically radical labour movement in' the context of a not fully developed 
parliamentary democracy.
The first part of the thesis I analyse workers’ collective action in the economic 
and political context of the Restoration. In the literature on workers’ collective action, 
reforms in labour law and changes in the legal constraints on workers’ organisations and 
collective bargaining have been generally used to explain the expansion of unions and 
strike activity in the twentieth century. In our period, however, unions did not operate in 
a context in which the state enforced union recognition and formal collective bargaining 
institutions with representatives of employers and independent unions. These 
institutions did not appear in Spain before 1926 with the passing of Labour Code during 
the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera and were not fully developed until the 2nd Republic 
(1931-1936).
In chapter 2, I argue that, before 1918, union densities remained low because 
unions were unable to enforce union recognition and the closed shop on to employers in 
some of the largest industrial sectors. As predicted by collective action theory, absence 
of compulsory membership brought about a low unionisation equilibrium in the
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industrial sectors but not in the small, local trade unions of craftsmen. In large sectors, 
only the continuous activity of a small group of activists or the recourse to 
“professional” activists like those of the General Workers’ Union (UGT) or the anarcho- 
syndicalists guaranteed the survival of the union after strikes, had been lost and 
employers retaliated.
Absence of formal bargaining channels amplified the role of the state in shaping 
bargaining institutions, notably through the arbitration of strikes and by forcing 
employers to negotiate with and recognise the union. Government intervention was 
especially intense in strategic sectors like railways and to some extent in mining. 
Conflicts in big cities or in large sectors like the Catalan textile industry also prompted 
intervention because of the sheer number of workers involved.
With severely contested union rights, I stress that processes of union growth 
depended on periods of high strike activity. Unions in the period did not focus on the 
supply of insurance to members or other non-collective goals. Contrary to what was 
argued by progressive reformists and conservative union leaders, unions did not grow 
through ordered dues-collection and the supply of mutual benefits, popular savings 
banks and recreational centres. Rather, unions gave priority to strikes as the main form 
of collective mobilisation. Large strikes operated as mass-propaganda mechanisms in 
which unions demonstrated their ability to mobilise workers and obtain concessions 
from employers. Successful large strikes brought about further strikes in which workers 
presented collective contracts to their employers. In most of these efforts, the strikers’ 
fundamental aim was union recognition.
Cycles of strikes as in 1899-1903, 1910-1913 and 1918-1920 were neither 
“messianic and heroic” nor “naive to the point of self-destruction;”1 they depended on 
exogenously determined circumstances that helped to spread optimistic expectations. 
Strike waves were related to political crises, more progressive governments and social 
and political upheaval. Only under these circumstances in which workers had some 
bargaining leverage over the state or the state opened itself to class-collaboration could
1 Balcells, Albert, Cataluna contemporanea, vol. II (1909-1939) (Madrid, 1981), p. 6; Carr, Raymond, 
“All or nothing,” New York Review o f Books, October 13, 1977; Carr, Raymond, Spain, 1808-1939 
(Oxford, 1966), pp. 446.
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the workers expect to defeat the more powerful employers and obtain the recognition of 
the union. In this sense, my account departs from explanations of rising union activity 
based on deteriorating working conditions or, in constrast, on tight labour markets 
(described in chapter 2).
Additionally, chapter 2 argues that an inclusive tactic of union membership 
based on strike participation also brought about the alienation of union’s occasional 
allies. In this regard, nothing antagonised more employers and the state than the 
experience of mass strikes. Periods of intense strike activity eventually ended with the 
government crushing the strike wave, leading to a period of union demoralisation and 
low strike activity.
In chapter 3, I examine state policy by focusing the contentious issue of strike 
arbitration and union recognition. Conciliation boards and industrial tribunals can be 
thought as en efficiency-enhancing institutional change if arbitration reduces the social 
costs of frequent strike action. In the chapter, I trace the employers’ discourse against 
arbitration and their generally failed attempts at solving the problem of workers’ 
militancy. Additionally, the chapter also describes the arguments of reformers, who 
claimed employers had to recognise unions to stop the revolutionary threat. Finally, I 
show how a coalition for reform involving members of the Conservative and Liberal 
parties and Republicans was created in the late 1900s allowing for the passing of 
reforms on labour matters. The latter postulated unions had to be recognised to stop the 
strike threat, while they also contemplated the extension of state authority to regulate 
the relationship between masters and workers.
Chapter 4 takes a careful look at the implementation of state policy on strikes. 
First, the chapter traces the failure of conciliation boards and other arbitration 
mechanisms. Second, by looking at strike data between 1905 and 1915,1 show how an 
important fraction of strikes ended up with intervention of authorities, leading to 
compromise settlements. In this sense, I suggest arbitration did not fail because of the 
weak bargaining power of unions. Rather, different bargaining alternatives existed 
because civil governors and mayors developed a “prudent” strategy of conflict solving 
and used to step in strikes to quickly settle disputes and avoid larger social explosions. 
Furthermore, contrary to the legislation on local joint committes of workers and
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employers, civil governors could force recalcitrant employers to negotiate with unions 
because employers needed police protection from striking workers and the enforcement 
of the freedom to work. Analysis of the intervention of civil governors suggests that the 
state was more likely to intervene in large cities, with powerful anti-system movements 
and in larger than average strikes. This partially compensated the relative disadvantage 
of workers in large urban centres when organising movements of protest (the failure 
rates of strikes increased with the size of cities), while it protected the links of urban 
unions with radical politics.
To conclude, patterns of union and strike growth in Restoration Spain studied in 
part I of the thesis offer a case-study of working class collective mobilisation in absence 
of fully developed and enforced state regulation of industrial conflict. Explanations of 
workers’ collective mobilisation based on changing legal constraints on collective 
action also have to take into account other forms of state intervention having an 
important effect on the patterns of workers’ mobilisation. In this regard, I emphasise 
the existence of processes of union formation and growth associated with strike waves 
related to political opportunities. The implication of state officials in conflict resolution 
underlines fundamental continuities with post-war labour market regulation in which 
state-enforced formal boards of employers’ and workers’ delegates are devised to avoid 
too frequent strike action. This does not rule out there were fewer constraints on the 
actions of strikers and employers than in post-war labour markets. Solidarity strikes and 
picket lines, as well as lock outs and the use of strike-breakers were more common in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries than they are today in advanced economies. 
Furthermore, strike settlements were more bimodal than they are in post-war labour 
markets: union victories or complete defeats were more usual than compromises up to 
1915. However, the share of compromise settlements increased substantially in the first 
decades of the 20th century.
The absence of formal bargaining institutions leads directly to the question 
whether bargaining was efficient. When I started this dissertation, my main working 
hypothesis considered that underdeveloped bargaining institutions led to the inadequate 
supply of workplace public goods in response to the rapidly changing preferences of 
workers as industrialisation evolved. Inefficient bargaining, in turn, raised the demand 
for public intervention to solve the failure of the private solution in delivering
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workplace public goods. But the picture that has arisen from my case studies is 
substantially different and more complex. My depiction of working conditions stresses 
continuities rather than structural breaks between historical, unregulated industrial 
labour markets with post-war regulated labour markets. In some crucial aspects of 
labour market performance, my account emphasises the role of community-enforced 
norms and customs, repeated interaction and the strike threat as imperfect but close 
substitutes for modem labour market regulation.
In Chapter 5 I discuss the shortening of the workday in Spain from the mid 
1880s to 1920. Given the high proportion of strikes motivated by demands to shorten 
the workday, it could be argued that workers were not able to adjust leisure time to 
desired levels (i.e. their preferences were not fulfilled). However, the study of cross- 
sectional and over time variation in hours of work carried out in chapter 5 shows that 
the workday declined progressively in the period before the introduction of the 8-hour 
day and that workers traded off earnings and leisure through an income effect. The 
chapter discusses exceptions in which hours declined slowly or not at all between the 
mid 1880s and 1910. I argue long hours did not depend exclusively on inefficient 
institutions, but, rather, on the difficulties experienced in making compatible the 
preferences of transient and permanent workers, like in the Biscay iron mining sector or 
in the urban retail and service workers. In manufacturing, the employment of women, 
working continuously before marriage and discontinously thereafter and the existence of 
weak unions guaranteed the shortening of the workday did not become a constested 
issue until the 1910s. In all these cases, conflicts over hours of work translated in large 
strikes in the 1910s prompting mandatory hours ceilings enforced by the government. 
These case-studies contrast sharply with sectors in which preference for short hours was 
dominant leading to a progressive decline of the workday.
Furthermore, the chapter also argues that the 8-hours decree passed in April 
1919 was not a fundamental break with hours determination previous to the passing of 
law. Qualitative evidence shows that there were no important conflicts over the 
introduction of the eight-hour day and most of the evidence points to the fact that the 8- 
hour day was effectively enforced. My conclusion is that the law was accommodated 
because hours of work had been declining towards 8 hours since the mid 1880s.
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The hours case-study emphasises the importance of market forces with 
backward bending labour supply curves. A remarkable feature of the period is that the 
shortening of the workday occurred in absence of binding contracts and of formal union 
recognition. This did not mean written, collective contracts establishing hours of work 
and wages did not exist. They were the norm in many trades. However, employers could 
repudiate contracts which were not enforced by state legislation. The strike threat and 
other forms of ‘informal’ collective action were enough to guarantee the shortening of 
hours.
The study of piece rate lists in the Catalan textile sector shows how stable were 
agreements over wages in a sector characterised by erratic unionisation and firm- level 
rather than local or regional collective bargaining. My analysis in this chapter 
contradicts the historical literature, which points to a deterioration of working 
conditions between 1885 and 1910 caused by technological change and by periodic 
overproduction crises. My evidence on the evolution of piece rate lists using examples 
of urban and rural firms shows private, “firm-specific” lists were completely fixed over 
the economic cycle and very rarely adjusted downwards. Wage rigidity brought about 
quantity adjustments in output and labour input. In the latter case, firms hoarded labour 
by working short time, until selective lay-offs were inevitable. Agreements to adjust 
piece rates downwards (as in sliding scale wage schemes) until the cycle picked up did 
not exist. This way of handling recessions did not originate in the period, it was a part 
of a system of norms and customs which took the form of an implicit contract in which 
rates were fixed and firms worked short-time during economic downturns to protect 
lengthy attachments. The experience of the firms selected in the study also suggests that 
cyclical unemployment was a typical characteristic of the sector’s labour market.
The conclusions drawn from the study of piece rates in the Catalan textile sector 
should naturally be complemented with the study of wage and employment adjustment 
in other sectors and other regions of Spain. However, the existence of piece rate rigidity 
in the textile industry suggests many analogies with macro- and micro-economic studies 
pointing to the existence of nominal wage rigidity in post-war labour markets. The case
2 Among others: Mitchell, Daniel J.B., “Wage flexibility: then and now,” Industrial Relations, 24 (Spring 
1985), pp. 266-279; Kaufman, Roger T., “On wage stickiness in Britain’s competitive sector,” British 
Journal o f Industrial Relations, XII (1984), pp. 101-112; Bemanke Ben S. and James S. Powell, “The
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study of the textile sector shows that wage rigidity did not depend on binding union 
contracts or minimum wage legislation. Rather, other forces must have been at work. In 
a mature sector like the Catalan textile industry in the late 19th century, it is difficult to 
support an efficiency wage argument based on informational asymmetries between 
workers and employers on the productivity potential of the technologies being used. 
Evidence on collective action from the period shows that resistance to piece rate cuts 
guaranteed stable piece rate lists. Implications, of this result for modem labour markets, 
in which services are the main economic activity, are limited. However, it also points to 
fundamental continuities embedded in the system of norms and customs of workers, in 
this case related to resistance to wage cuts and workers’ insider power. There are 
nonetheless several particular characteristics of the period which differ with 
contemporary wage and labour input adjustments. Short-time provided some source of 
earnings when unemployment benefits did not exist (unions also did not provide 
unemployment insurance), but in contemporary labour markets resorting to short weeks 
is much less common.
Moving to workplace safety and sanitation, it is more difficult to establish 
continuities with present labour markets, mainly because it is impossible to have a clear 
idea on the aggregate and sector-specific long run trend in workplace risks. In the 
historical and modem studies of safety regulation, it is generally shown that safety 
regulations often have had a limited impact.3 In the period of study, evidence collected 
suggests that regulations related to the fencing and covering of machinery and the 
upkeep of boilers were generally well enforced, in spite of the fact that we do not know 
the final impact of well enforced regulations on the levels of injuries. Sanitation 
standards, on the other hand, were notably more difficult to enforce. In the chapter, I 
argue the relative success of safety regulations had to do with the fact that accidents, as 
opposed to job-related illnesses, had well-defined compensation to be paid by the 
employer since 1900. Probably as well, the costs involved in fencing machinery or
cyclical behavior o f industrial labor markets: a comparison o f prewar and postwar eras,” in Robert J. 
Gordon, The American business cycle: continuity and change (Chicago, 1986); Freeman, Richard and 
James Medoff, What do unions do?, “Adjustment to business cycles.”
3 Modem studies in Viscusi, Kip V., Fatal tradeoffs: private and public responsibilities toward risk (New  
York, 1992); Bartrip, P.W.J. and P.T. Fenn, “Factory fatalities and regulation in Britain, 1878-1913.” 
Explorations in Economic History, 25 (1988), pp.60-74; Fishback, Price V., “Liability rules and accident 
prevention in the workplace: empirical evidence from the early 20th century,” Journal o f  Legal Studies,
16 (June 1987), pp. 305-328.
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installing handrails were lower than the costs of sanitising factories and workshops 
located in unsuitable buildings.
Evidence from existing historical studies on the effects of unions on safety is so 
far mixed.4 The reasons being given by skeptics of the role of unions in the reduction of 
workplace risks refer to the priority of other demands like union recognition, shorter 
hours and higher wages and the fact that many workplace risks were not public goods.5 
In my analysis of fatality trends in coal mining, I show how collective bargaining did 
not have an impact on the trends of many types of accidents except in the case of “roof 
falls” and “explosions,” which depended on the individual decisions of miners. Other 
cases in mining reveal that rules and norms might arise to reduce the exposure of 
workers to several risks. These ranged from the reduction of hours of work in unhealthy 
jobs to the use of masonry instead of wood in the roofing of mining tunnels. On the 
other hand, evidence of collective bargaining of safety standards in dangerous trades 
like the metallurgical industry or building construction is weak. Unions enhance 
workplace safety by being aware of the risks inherent in a sector and making these risks 
public and part of a public discussion. But the available evidence on this type of activity 
on the part of unions in the period is extremely limited.
Finally, I have stressed that it was useful to distinguish who was the main 
accident preventer. In most cases, workers and employers shared the responsibilities for 
accident prevention and social reformers and inspectors blamed workers for becoming 
too familiar with and overconfident with respect to professional risks. In the 1930s, the 
Labour ministry of the 2nd Republic staged a far-reaching educational campaign to 
increase the awareness of workers with respect to their professional risks. Similar 
campaigns are used today to complement the regulation of safety standards in many 
industries. This suggests that perceptions of risk among workers in dangerous jobs are 
biased. Experimental psychologists have shown that we make systematic mistakes in
4 For example, in the case o f Britain Sidney and Beatrice Webb made a strong case in favour o f the 
positive impact of unions on workplace safety and health: Webb, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial 
democracy (New York, [1897] 1965), pp. 348-360; a more contemporary study supporting the positive 
role of unions in reducing workplace risks: Nichols, T., “Industrial safety in Britain and the 1974 Health 
and Safety Act: the case of Manufacturing,” International Journal o f  Sociology o f  Law, 18 (1990), pp. 
317-342; a skeptical view on the role of unions: Fishback, Price V., “Workplace safety during the 
Progressive Era: fatal accidents in bituminous coal mining, 1912-1923,” Explorations in Economic 
History, 23 (July 1986), pp. 269-298.
5 Ibid., p. 296.
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our estimation of risks in given situations. Instead of ordering the levels of risk 
according to the probability of a given damage, we order risky actions according to 
other variables according to how dreadful or unknown or large-scale are certain risks.6 
For example, the individual perceptions of the risk associated withsmoking among 
smokers or to travelling by car compared to travelling by plane reveal this “failure” to 
assess risks correctly. This is not entirely irrational because people rely on simple 
heuristic principles to skip the complex tasks involved in assessing probabilities and 
predicting the utility (or disutility) of the various possible outcomes.7
Summing up, the evidence presented so far suggests that in spite of the fact that 
it is plausible to assume collective bargaining was inefficient there were several factors 
correcting the inefficiencies associated with weak unions. In part 1 of the thesis I 
suggest that, taking the period as a whole and avoiding to dwell excessively in particular 
historical events, generally granted union and strike rights since the early 20th century 
contributed to the advance of workers’ interests. In this context, strategic interaction 
between workers, employers and state officials shaped a system of strike resolution that 
in some important aspects resembled today’s regulation of industrial conflict, in which 
compulsory or quasi-compulsory arbitration of strikes is the norm. I also show how the 
internal dynamics of this system of labour relations were not conducive to peaceful 
collective bargaining and the generalization of trust among among employers and 
workers, but rather increased the divide between both groups.
Conflict-based rather than trust-based industrial relations and the low 
institutionalisation of collective bargaining did not, however, have a strong impact on 
the efficiency of the collective negotiation of working conditions. The persistance of 
long hours in some sectors was caused by the particular labour market of these sectors, 
not by inefficient collective bargaining. The strong negative correlation between wages 
and the standard workday shows workers with higher wages also enjoyed a shorter 
workday, implying the existence of a dominating income effect. To be sure, evidence of 
the negotiation of workplace safety and health levels is notably more elusive. The
6 Slovic, Paul and Baruch Fischoff, “Behavioral decision theory perspectives on risk and safety,” in 
Borcherding, Katrin, Bemdt Brehmer, Charles Vlek, Willen A. Wagenaar (eds.), Research perspectives 
on decision making under uncertainty (Amsterdam, 1989), p. 185.
7 Khaneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky, “Judging under uncertainty: heuristics and biases,” p. 3, in 
Kahneman, Tversky and Paul Slovic (eds.), Judgement under uncertainty: heuristics and biases 
(Cambridge, 1989).
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evidence at hand, however, suggests informal norms developed to reduce the exposure 
of individual workers to risks with large externalities, while some level of co-operation 
between workers, employers and labour inspectors guaranteed the risks related to 
dangerous machinery were diminished in the period.
Therefore, the case-studies of of working conditions suggest it is difficult to 
make a case for the inefficiency of collective bargaining over the period. I have stressed 
that other forces were at work other than well enforced government regulation, binding 
contracts and formal collective bargaining. In this sense, with an Industrial Revolution
tlitaking off in the mid 19 century, accumulated experience, repeated interaction between 
workers and employers and generally stabilised labour markets by the late 19th and early 
20th centuries become the main candidates explaining this result.
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